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ABSTRACT	
    This thesis examines the social and political history of equalization, which is 
the federal program that allows all provinces to provide reasonably comparable 
levels of services for reasonably comparable levels of taxation. It examines why 
Ottawa adopted this mechanism in 1957, the models that it used for those grants, 
and how it established the formula based upon per capita tax revenues. The 
thesis moves from the establishment of subsidies at Confederation across the 
later decades of the nineteenth century into the twentieth century as politicians 
and bureaucrats gradually realized that few modern federations survive without 
relative equality among the member governments. It explores the fierce domestic 
debates and the Royal Commission studies during this struggle to address fiscal 
inequalities among provincial governments. It also investigates the international 
models that Ottawa consulted in its quest to devise equalization, concentrating 
upon the pivotal influence of Australia on Canada as well as Canada’s influence 
Australia.  
      The approach is state-centred because most policy-oriented groups did not 
consider the issue of fiscal inequality among provincial governments when they 
pushed for the expansion of social services. As well, the thesis considers the 
crucial influence of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent during the federal 
discussions to devise an equalization formula. Caught in a devastating face-off 
with Quebec over the collection of tax revenues, St. Laurent defused the 
confrontation with these unobtrusive, non-conditional grants that equalized key 
tax revenues. With the adoption of equalization in 1957, Ottawa ensured that all 
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provinces could (almost) afford social programs. That cleared the way for vital 
federal grants to the provinces for social assistance, post-secondary education, 
hospital care and eventually Medicare.  
     In effect, equalization is the largely overlooked mechanism that has kept the 
federation together. And the history of its introduction has been too little explored. 																									
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	INTRODUCTION						Scarcely	anyone	noticed	when	an	obscure	transfer	program	dubbed	equalization	commenced	in	Canada	on	April	1,	1957.	Canadians	were	following	dramatic	events	elsewhere	–	the	difficult	Suez	settlement,	the	right-wing	riots	in	Paris	over	North-African	policy,	the	turmoil	in	the	Russian	economy.	In	Toronto,	Progressive	Conservative	leader	John	Diefenbaker	was	already	campaigning	energetically		–	even	though	an	over-confident	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent	had	not	yet	called	an	election	for	June	10.	So,	on	that	mild	Ottawa	Monday	when	equalization	took	effect,	no	one	marked	the	occasion	with	fireworks	or	flowery	speeches.	No	one	hailed	the	program	as	the	solution	to	decades	of	searching	at	home	and	abroad	for	a	better	way	to	remedy	inequality	in	revenues	among	governments.	Few	remembered	the	generations	of	determined,	often	idealistic	and	occasionally	eccentric	Canadians	who	had	fought	for	a	fairer	world.								But	the	unconditional	transfer	of	federal	funds	to	the	poorer	provinces	was	a	dazzling	breakthrough	in	the	almost	century-old	struggle	to	make	federalism	work.	Equalization	grants	are	based	on	the	notion	that	all	provinces	should	be	able	to	provide	relatively	similar	services	to	their	citizenry	with	relatively	similar	levels	of	taxation.	The	transfers	narrow	the	gap	between	the	average	per-capita	revenues	that	poorer	provinces	can	raise	and	the	per-capita	amount	that	richer	provinces	pocket.	In	1957,	those	no-strings-attached	transfers	represented	both	a	pragmatic	federal	compromise	with	the	struggling	provinces	and	a	lifesaver	for	national	unity.		
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					In	effect,	equalization	accomplished	two	huge	tasks:	it	provided	sufficient	revenues	to	the	poorer	provinces	for	social	security	–	and	it	mollified	Quebec,	which	had	paid	a	steep	fiscal	price	for	its	refusal	to	cooperate	with	Ottawa’s	post	war	efforts	to	centralize	revenues.	Now	richer	provinces	could	expand	their	social	programs	for	health	care,	post-secondary	education	and	welfare	with	the	knowledge	that	the	poorer	provinces	could	(barely)	afford	them.	Now	Canadians	could	take	a	(very)	temporary	break	from	the	struggle	to	preserve	national	unity	–	because	Quebec	was	pocketing	unconditional	federal	funds	that	it	could	earmark	for	its	own	priorities.	Now	the	provinces	that	resented	Ottawa’s	intrusions	into	their	bailiwicks	could	count	on	one	source	of	funding,	which	was	calculated	through	a	neutral	formula	and	which	came	without	application	forms	or	heavy-handed	conditions.						The	effects	were	immediate.	Equalization	became	the	cornerstone	of	the	expanding	welfare	state.	With	equalization	funding,	even	the	poorest	provincial	governments	could	agree	with	Ottawa	on	cost-sharing	deals	to	pay	for	hospital	care	and	eventually	Medicare,	post-secondary	education	and	social	assistance.	Equalization	was	crucial	to	the	existence	of	social	security	–	and	to	the	creation	of	transfer	programs	for	specific	social	needs.	As	political	economist	Thomas	Courchene	notes:	“Overarching,	and	critical	to	the	well-being	of	most	of	these	individual	social	programs,	is	the	federal-provincial	transfer	system….	Unlike	the	typical	European	welfare	state,	which	had	its	origins	in	national	class	politics,	the	Canadian	welfare	state	arose	not	so	much	as	part	of	an	inclusive	national	social	contract	among	citizens	but	as	a	way	of	addressing	interregional	and	interprovincial	
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equity.”1	Equalization	tackled	inequalities	among	the	provinces	–	so	that	the	provinces	had	sufficient	funds	to	address	social	inequalities	among	their	citizens.				But	the	publicity	for	this	breakthrough	in	fiscal	relations	was	negligible.	Ottawa	politicians	worried	that	the	richer	provincial	governments	would	resent	the	transfer	of	(more	of)	their	taxpayers’	money	to	poorer	provincial	governments.	Richer	provinces	hesitated	to	complain	amid	the	ongoing	miracle	of	post-war	prosperity.	(Ontario	Premier	Leslie	Frost	had	been	denounced	as	a	“specially	pampered	partner”	when	he	demanded	more	money	for	Ontario	if	the	poorer	provinces	received	more.)2	Poorer	provinces	were	reluctant	to	draw	attention	to	their	new	windfall.								I	contend,	however,	that	the	story	of	equalization	is	the	real	story	of	Canada’s	maturation	as	a	nation	in	the	twentieth	century.	Then,	as	now,	the	operation	of	the	federal	form	of	government	was	a	constant	challenge.	There	were	so	many	pressures	–	and	there	had	to	be	so	many	compromises.	Although	the	Constitution	did	not	formally	mark	the	division,	Canada	was	composed	of	(at	least)	two	nations	–	Francophones	largely	in	Quebec	and	Anglophones	largely	in	the	Rest	of	Canada	–	and	that	complicated	the	fierce	economic	and	cultural	rivalries	among	the	provinces.	The	Constitution	did,	however,	recognize	Quebec’s	special	status	within	Confederation:	the	province	was	guaranteed	control	of	its	civil	law	system;	the	use																																																									1	Thomas	J.	Courchene,	Social	Canada	in	the	Millennium:	Reform	Imperatives	and	
Restructuring	Principles	(Toronto:	C.	D.	Howe	Institute,	1994)	pps.	3,14.	Courchene	attributes	a	portion	of	this	insight	into	the	relatively	diminished	influence	of	class	in	Canada	to	social	policy	analyst	Keith	G.	Banting	in	“Neoconservatism	in	an	Open	
Economy:	The	Social	Role	of	the	Canadian	State”	in	International	Political	
Science	Review	(1992)	Volume	13,	Number	2,	which	I	will	also	reference	later.	2	“Frost	Criticized	For	Tax	Stand	On	Ottawa	Cash”	in	The	Globe	and	Mail,	Tuesday,	December	18,	1956,	p.	4.		
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of	French	and	English	in	the	courts	and	the	legislature	was	guaranteed;	and	the	rights	of	Catholic	and	Protestant	minorities	to	education	were	protected.	As	historian	Claude	Bélanger	at	Marianopolis	College	noted	tersely,	equality	among	the	provinces	“did	not	mean	that	fundamental	differences	were	not	recognised.”3							First	Nations	were	largely	ignored	then:	their	consent	was	not	sought	–	even	though	their	peoples	represented	another	major	component	of	the	nation.	The	Constitution	granted	control	over	“Indians,	and	lands	reserved	for	the	Indians”	to	Ottawa:	it	was	only	in	1982	that	existing	aboriginal	and	treaty	rights	were	affirmed	–	along	with	rights	that	could	be	acquired	in	future	land	claims	agreements.4	The	federation	had	creaked	along	in	the	nineteenth	century	because	provincial	responsibilities	were	relatively	limited	–	and	their	duties	came	closer	to	matching	their	revenues.	But,	in	the	twentieth	century,	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	could	not	escape	the	growing	social	and	economic	demands	from	their	citizenry	for	an	expanded	role	for	the	state.							But	which	state?	Which	level	of	government	should	pocket	the	revenues	–	and	which	level	of	government	should	control	the	programs?	The	very	question	would	provoke	fierce	divisions	along	linguistic,	provincial,	religious,	ethnic,	regional,	gender	and	class	lines	throughout	the	early	decades	of	the	twentieth	century.	Governments	would	fight	over	revenues	and	responsibilities.	Citizens	would	debate	
																																																								3	Claude	Bélanger,	Department	of	History,	Marianopolis	College,	Readings	in	Quebec	History,	last	updated	August	2000:	http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/c.belanger/quebechistory/readings/special.htm		4	Constitution	Act	1867,	clause	91,	section	24;	Constitution	Act	1982,	clause	35.		
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the	rights	that	they	could	and	should	expect	from	those	governments.	The	answer	would	take	decades	to	devise.						There	were	few	models	that	could	provide	guidance	–	because	there	were	so	few	federations.	The	first	modern	federal	constitution	was	adopted	in	the	United	States	in	1787.5	Switzerland	transformed	itself	into	a	federation	in	1848	after	a	short	civil	war,	and	revised	that	pact	in	1874.	Canada	was	also	an	experiment:	Although	it	appears	startling	now	when	federations	are	more	common,	Canada	became	the	third	modern	federation	in	1867.	In	1871,	the	North	German	Federation	of	1867	swallowed	the	southern	German	states.	During	the	late	19th	century,	several	Latin	American	nations	including	Argentina	and	Mexico	adopted	unstable	federal	structures	that	imitated	the	American	model.6	In	1901,	six	self-governing	colonies	in	Australia	united	in	a	federation	that	would	become	the	most	important	model	for	Canada.							The	word	“federation”	is	commonplace	today	because	federalism	has	become	an	increasingly	popular	method	for	governing	states	with	a	high	degree	of	diversity.	Political	scientist	Ronald	L.	Watts	notes	that	the	system	became	increasingly	popular	in	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century	when	there	was	a	“proliferation	of	federations,”	including	Burma	in	1948,	Nigeria	in	1954,	Austria	in	1945	and	the	
																																																								5	Political	scientist	Ronald	L.	Watts	has	briefly	documented	the	history	of	pre-modern	federal	systems	from	ancient	Israeli	tribes	in	1200	B.C.E.	through	the	Roman	Empire,	mediaeval	Italy,	Germany	and	Switzerland.	Both	Watts	and	Feeley	and	Rubin	attribute	the	first	explicitly	modern	discussion	of	federalism	to	the	seventeenth-century	political	philosopher	Johannes	Althusius.	6	Ronald	L.	Watts,	Comparing	Federal	Systems,	Third	Edition	(Montreal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2008)	3.	Watts	summarizes	the	history	of	19th	and	20th	century	federations.		
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restored	federation	of	Germany	in	1949.7	The	varying	divisions	of	responsibilities	and	revenues	among	member	governments	are	delicate	balancing	acts	–	and	each	nation	finds	workable	adjustments	or	it	fails.	American	law	professors	Malcolm	M.	Feeley	and	Edward	Rubin	observe	that	in	the	mid-19th	century,	“two-thirds	of	the	world’s	landmass	was	governed	by	imperial	edict”	while,	in	the	early	21st	century,	“this	same	proportion	of	the	world	is	governed	by	federal	arrangement.”8							The	two	law	professors	define	a	federation	as	“a	means	of	governing	a	polity	that	grants	partial	autonomy	to	geographically	defined	subdivisions	of	the	polity.”9	That	is,	smaller	geographic	units	can	govern	key	aspects	of	their	residents’	lives	while	remaining	part	of	a	larger	whole.	Crucially,	the	two	scholars	add	that	the	principal	reason	that	nations	adopt	federal	regimes	“is	to	resolve	conflicts	among	citizens	that	arise	from	the	disjunction	between	their	geographically	based	sense	of	political	identity	and	the	actual	or	potential	geographic	organization	of	their	polity.”10							I	accept	that	definition.	I	also	accept	the	implication	that	federal	states,	particularly	the	Canadian	state,	could	not	exist	without	the	diffusion	of	responsibilities	and	revenues	among	governments	that	federalism	implies.	By	its	very	nature,	federalism	is	a	compromise.								Federalism	was	probably	the	only	viable	model	of	government	for	a	nation	that	is	not	simply	a	pact	among	provinces	but	a	union	of	two	peoples.	Political	scientists																																																									7	Watts,	3.	8	Malcolm	M.	Feeley	and	Edward	Rubin,	Federalism:	Political	Identity	and	Tragic	
Compromise	(Ann	Arbor:	The	University	of	Michigan	Press,	2008)	1.	9	Feeley	and	Rubin,	12.	10	Feeley	and	Rubin,	38.	
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Richard	Simeon	and	Ian	Robinson	capture	those	complications	perfectly:	Canada’s	federal	society	is	“characterized	by	deeply	rooted	territorial	and	linguistic	interests	and	identities.”11	In	this	thesis,	I	will	occasionally	adopt	Simeon	and	Robinson’s	use	of	the	words	“territorial	identities,”	which	are	associated	with	“language,	region,	province…the	divisions	that	made	federalism	necessary	in	the	first	place	and	which	remain	fundamental	to	understanding	Canadian	federalism.”12							In	effect,	the	term	is	linked	to	a	specific	geographic	area	within	the	federation:	It	is	often	interchangeable	with	provincial	identities	but,	crucially,	not	always.	Social	and	economic	reformers	must	somehow	adjust	their	demands	to	take	account	of	those	provincial	identities	–	and	figure	out	what	level	of	government	can	best	respond	to	their	needs.	Simeon	and	Robinson	depict	the	federation	as	a	complex	reality,	juggling	those	state-centered	and	society-centered	models	in	a	dialectical	relationship.	The	problem	of	“Who	can	or	will	do	what”	is	never	static.										Governance	was	always	complicated	–	because	a	unitary	government	was	impossible.	The	disparate	drafters	of	Confederation	and	their	successors	could	not	square	the	idea	of	a	unitary	government	for	Canada	“with	the	sectional	diversities	in	British	North	America	of	the	1860s	–	or	at	any	time	since.”13	As	historian	Ramsay	Cook	outlines,	provincial	rights	were	particularly	important	to	Quebec	because	the	province	“exercised	authority	over	those	matters	that	were	deemed	essential	to	the	
																																																								11	Richard	Simeon	and	Ian	Robinson,	State,	Society,	and	the	Development	of	Canadian	
Federalism	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1990)	4.	12	Richard	Simeon	and	Ian	Robinson,	p.	4.	13	Ramsay	Cook,	The	Maple	Leaf	Forever:	Essays	on	Nationalism	and	Politics	in	
Canada	(Toronto:	Macmillan	of	Canada,	1977)	71	
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preservation	of	the	French	Canadian	culture	–	education,	religion,	civil	law.”14	The	constitutional	division	of	powers	allowed	different	cultural	and	religious	groups	to	more	easily	influence	smaller	provincial	governments.							Such	trade-offs,	however,	set	up	the	tug-of-war	over	revenues	and	responsibilities	that	remains	the	central	dilemma	of	all	federal	states.									This	thesis	will	examine	the	social	and	political	history	of	equalization,	the	still-far-from-perfect	program	that	tackles	the	fiscal	inequalities	among	provincial	governments.	I	will	refer	to	inequalities	among	citizens,	which	I	will	examine	through	the	statements	of	non-territorial	groups	representing	gender	and	class.	But	the	focus	of	this	thesis	will	be	on	equalization	as	the	remedy	for	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	federation	partners.	I	will	also	analyze	the	interactions	between	Canada	and	several	pivotal	federations,	particularly	Australia,	that	Ottawa	consulted	for	guidance	on	how	to	tackle	fiscal	inequalities	among	member	governments.	That	search	for	international	models	became	even	more	pressing	after	World	War	Two	as	groups	such	as	trade	unions	and	women’s	organization	pushed	Ottawa	to	tackle	social	needs.								And,	far	from	tracing	the	evolution	of	equalization	after	its	formal	establishment,	I	will	look	at	the	decades	prior	to	that	largely	unrecognized	milestone	in	April	1957	–	the	enabling	legislation	actually	passed	on	July	31,	1956	–	when	the	Canadian	federation	was	grappling	with	deep	social	and	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	provinces,	and	unsure	how	to	handle	them.	There	was	no	federal	fiscal	mechanism																																																									14	Cook,	p.71.	
	 	 	 	 	9	
during	those	decades	that	would	allow	the	poorer	provinces	to	provide	adequate	services	to	their	citizenry	to	strengthen	social	cohesion	–	and	bring	political	stability.	The	few	mechanisms	that	Ottawa	deployed	across	those	decades	to	alleviate	fiscal	inequality	among	the	provinces	often	threatened	provincial	identities	and	national	unity.							Indeed,	the	very	notion	of	formal	equalization	was	inconceivable	in	Ottawa.	As	I	will	show,	this	mindset	was	the	primary	obstruction	to	the	adoption	of	equalization	transfers.	The	central	government	regarded	its	fiscal	control	as	pivotal	to	the	continuance	of	the	federation	–	and	its	role	in	the	lives	of	its	citizens.	That	was	a	dangerous	assumption	that	hindered	the	development	of	the	federation	and	the	creation	of	mid-20th	century	social	supports.	Ottawa’s	line-in-the-sand	ensured	that	Canada	lagged	internationally	in	the	development	of	provincial	social	services.								Federal	ministers	and	bureaucrats	simply	could	not	let	go	–	and	the	relatively	weak	policy-oriented	groups	could	not	overcome	that	resistance.	As	social	policy	analyst	Keith	Banting	has	observed:	“The	most	common	interpretation	of	the	politics	of	the	welfare	state	sees	social	policy	as	a	reflection	of	class	politics.	Viewed	from	this	perspective,	the	political	foundations	of	the	Canadian	welfare	state	are	weak.	In	comparison	with	other	Western	nations,	especially	European	ones,	unionization	is	low,	the	labour	movement	is	divided	into	several	federations,	and	the	system	of	collective	bargaining	is	decentralized.”15	Any	class	coalitions	could	not	
																																																								15	Keith	G.	Banting,	“Neoconservatism	in	an	Open	Economy:	The	Social	Role	of	the	Canadian	State”	in	International	Political	Science	Review	(1992)	Volume	13,	Number	2,	p.	153.	
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adequately	address	–	let	alone	suggest	remedies	for	–	the	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	provinces.	But	they	could	put	growing	pressure	on	Ottawa	in	the	post-war	era.							To	tell	the	history	of	this	underappreciated	program	from	the	1920s	to	1957,	I	will	concentrate	on	Ottawa	as	the	central	player	in	a	skein	of	relationships	with	other	federations,	provincial	governments,	and	social	reformers.	In	effect,	I	will	adopt	the	state-centred	approach	that	many	political	scientists	have	embraced,	viewing	government	as	an	active	political	player	that	does	not	simply	respond	to	the	strongest	pressure	groups.	As	political	scientist	Alan	C.	Cairns	posited	in	1977:	“Federal	and	provincial	governments	are	not	neutral	containers,	or	reflecting	mirrors,	but	aggressive	actors	steadily	extending	their	tentacles	of	control,	regulation,	and	manipulation	into	society.”16	Or,	as	political	scientist	Donald	Smiley	underlined,	“In	Canada…governments	influence	private	institutions	–	including	those	we	designate	as	pressure	groups	–	as	they	are	influenced	by	them.”17							This	has	become	a	useful	theoretical	approach	to	the	role	of	modern	governments,	especially	when	applied	to	federations.	American	historian	Theda	Skocpol	depicts	politicians	and	administrators	“as	the	primary	locus	of	action”	in	the	origin	and	transformation	of	the	welfare	state:	“they	are	actors	in	their	own	right,	enabled	and	constrained	by	the	political	organizations	within	which	they	operate.”18	States	are	“sites	of	autonomous	action”	that	“intersect	in	varied	ways	with	economic																																																									16	Alan	C.	Cairns,	“The	Governments	and	Societies	of	Canadian	Federalism”	in	
Canadian	Journal	of	Political	Science,	Vol	10.	No.	4	(December	1977)	p.	706.	17	Donald	Smiley,	“Federal	States	And	Federal	Societies,	With	Special	Reference	To	Canada”	in	International	Political	Science	Review,	Vol	5,	No.	4,	1984.	p.	448.	18	Theda	Skocpol,	Protecting	Soldiers	and	Mothers:	The	Political	Origins	of	Social	
Policy	in	the	United	States.	(Cambridge,	Massachusetts:	The	Belknap	Press	of	Harvard	University	Press,	1992)	41.	
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and	social	transformations.”19	Another	American	political	scientist,	Eric	A.	Nordlinger,	wrote	another	superb	analysis	of	the	democratic	state	and	the	state-centred	approach.	“The	preferences	of	the	state	are	at	least	as	important	as	those	of	civil	society	in	accounting	for	what	the	democratic	states	does	and	does	not	do;	the	democratic	state	is	not	only	frequently	autonomous	insofar	as	it	regularly	acts	upon	its	preferences,	but	also	markedly	autonomous	in	doing	so	even	when	its	preferences	diverge	from	the	demands	of	the	most	powerful	groups	in	civil	society.”20							But	–	and	this	is	a	large	“But”	–	any	examination	of	the	state	must	expand	beyond	the	formal	institutions	of	government	themselves	to	include	political	parties	such	as	the	social	democratic	Co-operative	Commonwealth	Federation,	which	attracted	significant	support	during	the	mid-20th	century.21	It	should	also	include	the	input	of	voluntary	organizations	such	as	labour	and	women’s	groups.	As	political	scientist	Richard	Simeon	observes:	“Of	course	federalism	is	about	governments…	but	to	argue	that	the	explanation	of	the	relations	between	these	governments	can	be	understood	simply	in	governmental	terms	is	wrong.”22	I	agree:	as	the	powers	of	social	groups	increased	in	the	changing	post-war	world,	they	put	immense	
																																																								19	Skocpol,	42,	39.	20	Eric	A.	Nordlinger,	On	The	Autonomy	Of	The	Democratic	State	(Cambridge,	Mass.:	Harvard	University	Press,	1981)	p.	1.	21	Richard	Simeon,	“We	Are	All	Smiley’s	People:	Some	Observations	on	Donald	Smiley	And	The	Study	Of	Federalism”	in	federalism	and	political	community:	Essays	
in	Honour	of	Donald	Smiley,	eds.	David	P.	Shugarman	and	Red	Whitaker	(Peterborough,	On.:	Broadview	Press	Ltd.,	1989)	p.	420.	22	Richard	Simeon,	“We	Are	All	Smiley’s	People:	Some	Observations	on	Donald	Smiley	And	The	Study	Of	Federalism”	in	federalism	and	political	community:	Essays	
in	Honour	of	Donald	Smiley,	eds.	David	P.	Shugarman	and	Red	Whitaker.	p.	420.	
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pressures	on	governments.	I	will	consider	such	pressures	in	the	context	of	their	society	and	their	increasingly	strong	effects	on	the	provinces	and	Ottawa.								It	is	true	that	equalization	itself	is	the	product	of	state-centred	forces.	Ottawa	designed	and	distributed	the	grants,	richer	provinces	remained	dubious	about	the	amounts,	poorer	provinces	welcomed	them	–	and	every	recipient	province	cashed	the	cheques.								But,	as	I	will	show,	Ottawa	only	launched	a	serious	search	to	remedy	inequality	among	governments	when	societal	groups	such	as	trade	unions	and	women’s	groups,	largely	in	the	Rest	of	Canada,	demanded	the	expansion	of	social	security.	Those	groups	did	not	care	what	level	of	government	funded	the	programs.	Virtually	none	of	them	understood	that	the	primary	barrier	to	the	adoption	of	such	programs	was	fiscal	inequality	among	provincial	governments.	But	their	growing	clout	–	coupled	with	Quebec’s	refusal	in	peacetime	to	play	along	with	Ottawa’s	drive	for	fiscal	centralization	–	forced	the	federal	government	to	find	a	better	way	to	share	with	the	hard-pressed	provinces.							I	will	also	occasionally	outline	the	role	that	specific	personalities	played	within	these	dramas.	In	the	1860s,	Nova	Scotia	politician	Joseph	Howe	was	determined	to	emphasize	the	adverse	effects	of	Confederation	on	Nova	Scotia’s	prosperity	–	and	his	strong	warnings	affected	Maritime	successors	across	the	decades.	Key	federal	bureaucrats	in	Ottawa	in	the	1930s	and	1940s	were	determined	to	centralize	revenues.	Their	influence,	along	with	the	testimony	of	Australian	equalization	superstar	L.	F.	Giblin,	shaped	the	approach	to	inequality	in	the	pivotal	report	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations	in	1940.	The	vehement	
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objections	of	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis	in	the	1950s	forced	Ottawa	to	retreat	from	its	desire	to	centralize	revenues.	Such	individuals	affected	the	debates	–	although	I	will	not	argue	that	personalities	were	pivotal	to	outcomes.						I	do	maintain	that	equalization	was	vital	to	the	preservation	of	the	modern	Canadian	federation.	At	Confederation,	such	arrangements	were	impossible	–	because	the	demands	on	governments	were	smaller	and	the	richer	provinces	would	never	have	tolerated	overtly	unequal	treatment.	But	the	political	and	economic	conditions	within	the	federation	changed	across	time.	Provincial	governments	could	generally	fulfill	their	relatively	limited	roles	in	the	decades	after	Confederation.	They	could	even	scrape	along	during	the	1920s	as	their	economies	and	societies	changed:	Even	the	poorest	provinces	could	generally	make	ends	meet	with	federal	subsidies	that	implicitly	and,	in	rare	instances,	explicitly	favoured	them	to	a	small	extent.							But	those	governments	would	be	shaken	out	of	their	complacency	during	the	Depression.	In	the	1930s,	there	was	no	cradle-to-grave	social	safety	net	to	save	Canadians	from	hunger	or	ill	health.	The	needy	usually	relied	on	their	communities	and	their	churches.	Cities	and	towns	doled	out	relief	payments	or	vouchers	to	impoverished	families	and	single	women	–	but	they	often	excluded	single	men.	The	qualifications	for	relief	–	which	could	be	coupled	with	inspections	–	were	humiliating.	(Ontario’s	York	Township,	for	one,	demanded	that	deserted	wives	take	
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out	an	arrest	warrant	against	their	husbands	when	they	applied	for	funds.)23	Governments	could	only	respond	on	an	ad	hoc	basis.							There	had	been	advocates	for	a	social	safety	net	since	the	early	years	of	the	twentieth	century	as	Canada	urbanized	and	industrialized,	stranding	workers	in	manufacturing	and	industry	without	the	back-up	retreat	of	the	family	farm.	As	the	Depression	deepened,	their	voices	grew	stronger.							Meanwhile,	key	politicians	and	bureaucrats	in	Ottawa	and	several	provincial	capitals	belatedly	realized	that	the	federation	itself	had	to	evolve	to	meet	unanticipated	needs.	The	federal	government	had	to	tackle	the	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	provinces	or	poorer	provinces	such	as	Manitoba	and	Saskatchewan	might	topple	into	bankruptcy	or	even	secede.	Their	economies	were	export-based.	When	the	markets	for	their	agricultural	products	dwindled	and	drought	savaged	their	lands,	provincial	incomes	diminished.	Provincial	efforts	“to	develop	resources	or	to	bolster	decaying	industries….	left	a	legacy	of	deadweight	debt.”24						There	was	a	cascade	of	misery	in	the	1930s.	Many	poorer	provinces	could	barely	ensure	that	their	poorer	citizens	were	fed	and	clothed.	Wealthier	provinces	such	as	Ontario	could	barely	afford	their	share	of	the	relief	payments	that	municipalities	doled	out	to	needy	families.	Historians	Raymond	B.	Blake	and	Jeff	Keshen	depict	the	Depression	years	as	uniformly	bleak:	“[A]ttempts	to	deal	with	the	destitution	caused	by	a	severe	economic	collapse	were	patterned	after	the	nineteenth-century	model	of																																																									23	Lara	A.	Campbell,	Respectable	Citizens:	Gender,	Family,	and	Unemployment	in	
Ontario’s	Great	Depression.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2009)	p.	80.	24	J.	A.	Maxwell,	“Notes	And	Memoranda	On	Some	Appendices	To	The	Rowell-Sirois	Report”	in	The	Canadian	Journal	of	Economics	and	Political	Science,	Volume	7,	Number	2,	May,	1941,	p.	246.		
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poor	relief,	supplemented	with	a	growing	dependency	on	voluntary	charity.”25		Poor	Canadians	in	poorer	provinces	could	not	even	hope	for	adequate	provincial	spending	on	their	wretched	hospitals	and	schools.									Theoretically,	Ottawa	had	the	money	to	expand	social	remedies…somewhat.	But	Ottawa	did	not	want	to	act:	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King,	who	regained	power	in	1935,	was	pinching	pennies	to	preserve	Ottawa’s	credit	rating.	He	was	hesitant	to	boost	Ottawa’s	contributions	to	the	provincial	relief	tab.	(He	did	that	briefly	in	late	1935	–	and	then	lowered	them	again	in	April	1936.)	Perhaps	more	importantly,	he	saw	unemployment	as	a	provincial	responsibility	–	which	it	theoretically	was.	The	Judicial	Committee	of	the	British	Privy	Council	would	later	affirm	that	view	when	it	ruled	that	key	elements	of	former	Prime	Minister	R.	B.	Bennett’s	New	Deal	including	Unemployment	Insurance	were	ultra	vires.	Historian	Doug	Owram	notes	that,	when	the	British	court	hobbled	the	Canadian	federation	in	1937,	senior	Ottawa	bureaucrats	drew	their	own	conclusion:	“The	vestiges	of	an	imperial	era	now	affected	domestic	reform.”26								Even	so,	it	is	unlikely	that	King	would	have	acted	generously	or	rashly.	The	Prime	Minister	had	lived	through	the	agonizing	national	debates	over	conscription	during	World	War	One	–	and	he	was	deeply	respectful	of	provincial	turf.	The	elegant	explanation	of	Simeon	and	Robinson	for	his	hesitancy	probably	comes	closest	to	the	truth:	During	the	Depression,	the	Prime	Minister	adopted	a	strategy	of	“minimal																																																									25	Raymond	B.	Blake	and	Jeff	Keshen,	“Introduction”	in	Social	Welfare	Policy	in	
Canada.	Historical	Readings,	eds.	Raymond	B.	Blake	and	Jeff	Keshen	(Toronto:	Copp	Clark	Ltd.,	1995)	p.	3.		26	Douglas	Owram,	The	Government	Generation:	Canadian	Intellectuals	and	the	State	1900-1945.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press.	1986)	p.	238.	
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federal	activity,	informed	by	his	conviction	that	the	principal	threat	to	national	unity	lay	in	French-English	conflict.”27	King	did	not	want	the	dubious	distinction	of	repeating	history.							There	were	so	many	barriers	during	the	1930s	to	a	formal	remedy	for	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	governments.	The	provinces	themselves	were	divided	during	those	desperate	Depression	years.	The	gaps	between	the	richer	and	the	poorer	provinces	were	too	great;	but	the	richer	ones	themselves	were	scrambling	to	survive.	They	would	never	speak	with	a	unified	voice	about	the	need	for	equalization	
until	the	era	of	post-war	prosperity	in	the	mid-1950s.	(Even	then,	Ontario	would	extract	a	price	to	come	around.)	Indeed,	inter-provincial	disagreement	over	help	for	the	poorer	provinces	threatened	social	cohesion,	stranding	many	provincial	governments	in	a	quagmire	of	debts,	leaving	them	to	fend	off	their	angry	and	distraught	voters.								Such	strains	among	the	provinces	were	a	large	factor	in	the	comparatively	late	arrival	of	equalizing	grants	in	the	mid-1950s	–	and	the	social	services	that	they	would	help	to	fund.	Quebec	viewed	any	federal	spending	on	social	programs	as	a	threat	to	its	distinct	identity:	The	Roman	Catholic	Church	provided	many	educational	and	social	services.	(Later,	as	the	provincial	government	assumed	oversight	of	those	services,	it	would	prudently	guard	its	turf.)	As	well,	Ottawa	would	not	accept	that	the	huge	cultural	and	social	differences	among	the	provinces	precluded	the	imposition	of	strong	central	control	over	the	collection	of	revenues	coupled	with	federal	spending	on	new	social	remedies.	The	federation	skittered																																																									27	Simeon	and	Robinson,	82.	
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along	with	ad	hoc	loans	and	grants	to	the	poorer	provinces	throughout	the	Depression	–	while	Ottawa	shuffled	the	issue	of	revenues	and	responsibilities	to	a	Royal	Commission.							In	wartime,	Ottawa	dodged	the	central	issue	of	inequality	of	fiscal	resources	and	revenues	among	the	provinces.	Instead,	in	1941,	it	exerted	control	over	three	key	sources	of	provincial	revenues	through	the	threat	of	invoking	the	War	Measures	Act.	In	return,	it	resorted	to	the	old	ploy	of	compensatory	grants	that	were	carefully	designed	to	look	equal	–	but	which	tacitly	favoured	the	poorer	provinces	to	a	small	extent	because	richer	provinces	pocketed	more	money	for	each	percentage	point	of	tax.	Ottawa	then	attempted	to	maintain	such	control	in	peacetime,	endangering	national	unity	and	social	cohesion.									It	took	another	dozen	years	before	Ottawa	accepted	that	its	schemes	to	centralize	revenues	were	dangerously	isolating	Quebec,	which	had	refused	to	let	Ottawa	collect	its	taxes	after	the	war	in	return	for	those	compensatory	grants.	(This	federal	approach	is	referred	to	as	“renting”	a	province’s	tax	revenues.)	The	economic	and	political	conditions	were	right	for	fiscal	alternatives.							Such	alternatives	were	necessary.	The	poorer	provinces	needed	formal	and	more	substantial	unconditional	assistance,	while	the	richer	provinces	were	finally	prosperous	enough	to	assent	to	this	federal	transfer	of	their	taxpayers’	dollars.	Most	politicians	now	understood	that	greater	provincial	fiscal	equity	could	foster	economic	
efficiency	so	equalization	became	acceptable	to	richer	and	poorer	governments.	As	political	scientist	Douglas	M.	Brown	notes,	equalization	ensures	that	labour	migration	occurs	“for	reasons	which	contribute	to	economic	growth	and	
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development…not	for	access	to	better	services.”28	As	well,	Ottawa	finally	had	sufficient	funds	for	the	grants	as	it	“began	to	tap	into	Ontario’s	rich	fiscal	capacity.”29								Modern	federations	flounder	when	the	partners	cannot	find	an	agreeable	way	to	share.	In	the	end,	Canada	did	not	amend	its	constitution	to	survive	increasing	fiscal	inequality	among	the	provincial	governments:	It	did	not	formally	shuffle	the	division	of	revenues	and	responsibilities	–	although	it	would	eventually	tuck	the	principle	of	equalization	into	the	Constitution	in	1982.	Instead,	key	Ottawa	bureaucrats	and	politicians	arranged	and	then	rearranged	the	flow	of	federal	funds	to	the	provinces,	groping	for	an	ostensibly	neutral	way	to	ease	fiscal	inequality	and	political	tensions.							By	the	mid-1950s,	they	had	to	succeed.	Equalization	was	vital	for	two	reasons.	It	restored	peace	with	Quebec	at	a	time	when	the	province	was	losing	millions	of	dollars	in	compensatory	grants	because	of	its	resistance	to	Ottawa’s	efforts	to	centralize	revenues.	As	well,	it	provided	all	poorer	provinces	with	funds	to	run	their	own	social	programs	–	because	many	provinces	fiercely	objected	to	the	very	idea	that	Ottawa	would	design	and	administer	such	programs.	Equalization	was	a	pragmatic	compromise.							I	will	examine	this	interplay	across	the	decades	among	governments,	the	so-called	fiscal	federalism	that	sounds	obscure	but	is	really	the	lifeblood	of	the	nation.	I	will	concentrate	on	the	politicians	and	bureaucrats	as	they	responded	to	each	other,																																																									28	Douglas	M.	Brown,	Equalization	On	The	Basis	Of	Need	In	Canada	(Kingston:	Institute	of	Intergovernmental	Relations:	Queen’s	University,	1996)	p.5.	29	P.	E.	Bryden,	“The	Obligations	of	Federalism:	Ontario	and	the	Origins	of	Equalization”	in	Framing	Canadian	Federalism:	Historical	Essays	in	Honour	of	John	T.	
Saywell,	Dimitry	Anastakis	and	P.	E.	Bryden,	eds.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2009)	p.	76.	
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while	paying	attention	to	the	broader	political	and	economic	forces	that	beset	them.	Social	activists	obviously	played	a	pivotal	role	in	these	debates	as	they	called	for	national	social	programs,	especially	after	World	War	Two.	But	those	activists	rarely	concentrated	on	the	fundamental	problem	of	unequal	fiscal	resources:	Few	advocated	unconditional	help	for	the	poorer	provinces.	Equalization	was	an	arcane	art	that	was	largely	practised	among	political	initiates.							Indeed,	prior	to	the	mid-1950s,	few	Canadians	with	power	or	influence	accepted	that	equalization	payments	could	be	a	valuable	fiscal	tool	–	if	they	were	calculated	to	
balance	the	needs	of	the	“Have”	and	the	“Have	Not”	provinces.	Ottawa	would	only	surrender	control	over	its	compensatory	transfers	when	key	provinces	became	increasingly	reluctant	to	allow	Ottawa	to	collect	their	three	principal	taxes;	Quebec	simply	refused	to	cooperate	after	the	war.	Many	provinces	also	refused	to	allow	Ottawa	to	dictate	unilaterally	how	they	should	spend	any	new	federal	transfers.	Given	the	stalemate	from	wartime	into	the	early	1950s,	Ottawa	could	only	introduce	programs	that	it	could	run:	Unemployment	Insurance	in	1940,	Family	Allowances	in	1945	and	expanded	Old-Age	Security	in	1951.								Meanwhile,	citizens	were	now	demanding	improved	social	security,	emboldened	by	new	programs	in	other	developed	nations	such	as	Britain	and	Australia.	It	was	apparent,	however,	that	the	poorer	provinces	could	not	afford	social	programs	–	which	were	their	constitutional	responsibility	–	without	additional	federal	funds.	Ottawa	was	caught	in	a	trap	between	activist	citizens	who	were	growing	impatient	amid	the	postwar	prosperity	and	resolute	provincial	governments	who	jealously	guarded	their	constitutional	rights.		
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							In	response,	Ottawa	backed	away	from	the	concept	of	a	federation	with	an	exceedingly	strong	central	government:	Instead,	its	equalization	transfers	to	the	poorer	provinces	would	be	unconditional.	After	years	of	bitter	debates,	equalization	would	become	the	key	to	social	cohesion	and	political	stability	within	the	federation	from	its	inception	in	1957	to	the	present	day.							This	thesis	will	peer	across	those	decades	of	political	tug-of-war,	examining	how	the	federation	evolved.	I	will	briefly	cover	the	early	history	of	subsidies	from	Confederation,	when	politicians	from	the	poorer	provinces	were	already	fighting	for	higher	subsidies	from	Ottawa	–	and	often	winning.	The	drive	toward	equalization	would	gather	steam	in	the	decades	after	World	War	One	as	the	voters	pressed	for	more	social	services,	provinces	flexed	their	political	muscles	–	and	the	hunt	for	models	commenced.	Throughout	the	1920s	into	the	mid-1930s,	although	Canada	examined	the	Argentinian	and	American	federations,	it	looked	primarily	to	Australia	for	wisdom	as	that	Dominion	investigated	inequalities	among	its	states	and	devised	ingenious	remedies.	In	fact,	Australia’s	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission,	which	the	central	government	created	in	1933	in	response	to	Western	Australia’s	vote	to	secede,	would	become	a	model	for	Canada’s	equalization	program.	In	turn,	during	those	decades,	Canberra	sought	wisdom	from	Ottawa’s	efforts	to	tackle	inequalities	among	provincial	governments.								In	1937,	as	provincial	defaults	loomed,	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King	appointed	the	pivotal	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	which	came	to	view	fiscal	inequality	as	a	central	federal	problem.	That	Royal	Commission	–	which	I	
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will	analyze	from	the	viewpoint	of	its	novel	approach	to	inequality	–	was	an	advanced	manual	on	federalism	in	the	modern	world.	Although	most	politicians	at	the	time	dismissed	its	remedies	for	inequalities	in	the	provision	of	services	as	impractical,	its	proposed	National	Adjustment	Grants	would	eventually	provide	another	model	for	equalization.								Most	Canadians	were	slow	to	recognize	the	problem.	As	former	senior	federal	public	servant	Ronald	M.	Burns,	who	was	involved	in	the	design	of	equalization,	observed:	“The	need	for	positive	interaction	in	overcoming	abnormal	regional	differences	in	standards	of	public	services	and	economic	wealth	has	long	been	recognized	by	those	intimately	concerned	in	such	matters.	But	the	acceptance	of	this	need	was	not	general,	and	it	was	in	the	bringing	of	this	need	into	the	open	that	the	[Royal]	Commissioners	made	an	important	contribution.”30	It	is	important	to	note	that	Burns	wrote	from	the	viewpoint	of	an	Ottawa	mandarin:	he	could	not	speak	for	the	many	politicians	and	bureaucrats	in	the	wealthier	provinces	who	remained	dubious	about	the	Royal	Commission	report.								Indeed,	the	initial	reaction	to	the	report	was	muted.	It	was	tabled	in	wartime	–	as	European	governments	toppled	under	the	Nazi	juggernaut.	The	exigencies	of	that	war	–	along	with	the	report’s	radical	proposals	to	centralize	revenues	in	return	for	adjustment	grants	–	derailed	any	immediate	possibility	of	its	adoption.	The	federation	would	shuffle	along	through	war	and	the	ensuing	post-war	boom,	through	the	Cold	War,	and	through	two	post-war	renewals	of	the	federal-provincial																																																									30	Ronald	M.	Burns,	“The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations:	The	Report	In	Retrospect”	in	Canadian	Issues:	Essays	in	Honour	of	Henry	F.	Angus,	ed.	Robert	M.	Clark	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1961)	p.	152.	
	 	 	 	 	22	
tax	rental	agreements.	Those	deals	would	penalize	provinces	such	as	Quebec	that	would	not	allow	Ottawa	to	collect	their	key	taxes	in	exchange	for	grants.	But	the	Royal	Commission’s	idea	of	National	Adjustment	Grants	that	would	allow	poorer	provinces	“to	provide	normal	Canadian	services	with	no	more	than	normal	Canadian	taxation”	would	remain	an	aspiration	for	many	poorer	governments.31												Meanwhile,	social	groups,	poorer	provinces	and	individual	voters	escalated	their	demands	for	modern	federal	social	programs	like	those	that	existed	in	Great	Britain	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	in	the	United	States.	The	contrast	between	Britain,	which	was	a	unitary	state,	and	existing	federations	such	as	the	United	States,	Canada	and	Australia	was	marked.	In	Britain,	there	was	no	need	for	too	many	nuances	or	messy	negotiations	with	any	provinces	to	institute	social	programs.	Before	World	War	I,	British	leaders	instituted	workers’	compensation,	old-age	pensions,	health	insurance,	and,	most	extraordinary	of	all,	the	world’s	first	compulsory	unemployment	insurance	program.32						In	contrast,	most	federations	had	uneven	records	in	their	approach	to	nation-building	through	social	programs.	Progress	was	usually	made	where	the	central	government	was	free	to	take	action	or	where	strong	lobbies	could	combine	their	
																																																								31	Report	Of	The	Royal	Commission	On	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Book	II.	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Queen’s	Printer	and	Controller	of	Stationery,	1954)		p.	272.	32	Margaret	Weir	and	Theda	Skocpol,	“State	Structures	and	the	Possibilities	for	‘Keynesian’	Responses	to	the	Great	Depression	in	Sweden,	Britain,	and	the	United	States”	in	Peter	R.	Evans,	Dietrich	Rueschemeyer	and	Theda	Skocpol,	eds.	Bringing	
the	State	Back	In	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	l985)	108.	
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lobbying	efforts	across	classes.33	In	Australia,	from	the	beginning,	the	Commonwealth	had	the	constitutional	right	to	legislate	on	behalf	of	the	elderly	and	invalids.	In	June	1908,	legislation	was	finally	passed	to	implement	that	right:	it	provided	for	means-tested	age	and	invalid	pensions	at	flat	rates	financed	from	general	revenue.34							In	the	United	States,	as	Theda	Skocpol	has	shown,	the	efforts	of	unified	women’s	groups	that	crossed	geographical	and	class	boundaries	ensured	that	America’s	first	publicly	funded	social	benefits	–	with	the	exception	of	military	pensions	and	poor	relief	–	were	mothers’	pensions.	Forty	states	adopted	such	laws	between	1911	and	1940	to	enable	communities	to	support	newly	widowed	mothers	so	that	they	could	care	for	their	children	at	home.35	But	groups	that	could	not	marshal	the	necessary	power-resources	across	social	and	cultural	lines	were	largely	out	of	luck	amid	the	competing	pressures	within	the	American	federation.	Unbelievably,	although	more	than	half	of	the	American	elderly	lacked	enough	income	to	be	self-supporting	in	1934,	state	pensions	for	the	impoverished	elderly	were	rare	before	1930.36								In	Canada,	despite	the	Royal	Commission’s	recommendations,	the	federal	government	was	exceedingly	slow	to	expand	social	programs	because	it	was	caught:																																																									33	Gøsta	Esping-Andersen,	“The	Three	Political	Economies	of	the	Welfare	State”	in	
Power	Resources	Theory	and	the	Welfare	State:	A	Critical	Approach	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1998)	145.	34	History	of	Pensions	and	Other	Benefits	in	Australia,	Australian	Department	of	Social	Security:	http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/94713ad445ff1425ca25682000192af2/8e72c4526a94aaedca2569de00296978!OpenDocument		35	Skocpol,	16.	36	U.S.	Social	Security	Administration	Historical	Background	and	Development	of	Social	Security:	Official	Social	Security	Website	https://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html		
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universal	social	benefits	were	impossible	to	implement	amid	the	glaring	inequalities	in	provincial	revenues	–	and	the	provinces	were	responsible	for	social	programs.	Should	Ottawa	continue	to	treat	each	province	relatively	equally?	Or	should	Ottawa	bring	provincial	governments	into	a	position	of	relative	fiscal	equality	with	each	other?	By	the	mid-1950s,	there	was	a	more	pressing	quandary:	Could	any	remedy	for	provincial	inequality	resolve	the	increasingly	heated	disputes	with	Quebec	over	federal	efforts	to	control	tax	revenues?							In	1940,	the	Royal	Commission	had	pointed	toward	a	partial	solution	for	inequality	through	the	equalization	of	key	areas	of	provincial	spending	–	and	official	Ottawa	still	remembered	that	proposal.	This	thesis	will	recognize	the	influence	of	specific	politicians	such	as	Louis	St.	Laurent	on	the	creation	of	equalization	–	although	it	will	avoid	any	assertion	that	such	individuals	determined	the	outcome.						It	was	significant,	however,	that	Prime	Minister	St.	Laurent	had	been	the	Francophone	Counsel	for	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations.	And	the	civil	servant	that	St.	Laurent	worked	with	on	equalization	was	John	J.	Deutsch,	who	had	been	the	assistant	research	director	and	then	research	director	for	the	Royal	Commission.	Throughout	1955	into	1956,	St.	Laurent	and	his	cabinet	evaluated	proposed	formulas	for	non-conditional	transfers	to	the	poorer	provinces.	Indeed,	the	Prime	Minister	–	who	formally	introduced	the	concept	of	equalization	grants	in	early	1956	–	was	much	more	involved	in	equalization	than	his	senior	bureaucrats	have	maintained.	St.	Laurent,	however,	would	opt	to	tackle	inequalities	in	the	collection	of	revenues	–	as	opposed	to	the	Royal	Commission’s	emphasis	on	inequalities	in	the	spending	on	services.		
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						The	equalization	formula	–	or	the	program	itself	–	was	never	viewed	as	an	enduring	fix	for	the	federation’s	woes.	The	tensions	between	provincially-based	linguistic	and	cultural	rights	and	the	push	for	expanded	social	rights	did	not	disappear.	Then,	as	now,	the	calculation	of	equalization	payments	required	balance	between	provincial	demands	for	sufficient	funds	to	design	and	administer	their	own	social	programs	and	the	pressure	on	Ottawa	from	social	activists	who	called	for	expanded	social	programs,	no	matter	which	level	of	government	delivered	them.	As	well,	any	calculation	had	to	balance	the	conflicting	needs	among	the	poorer	and	the	wealthier	provinces.	The	dramatic	events	from	Confederation	to	Louis	St.	Laurent’s	principled	decision	constitute	the	chronicle	of	Canada’s	decision	to	save	itself.								Historians	and	memoirists	have	pored	over	Canada’s	pivotal	mid-century	decades,	examining	how	the	nation	coped	with	the	economic	and	social	pressures	of	the	1930s	while	largely	resisting	the	gospel	of	John	Maynard	Keynes,	and	how	it	survived	the	war	to	flourish	in	the	peace	with	a	slowly	expanding	social	safety	net.37	But	they	have	largely	overlooked	the	problems	of	inequality	among	the	“Have”	provinces,	which	were	wary	of	others’	dependency	on	their	prosperity,	and	the	“Have	Not”	provinces,	which	viewed	Confederation	as	an	economic	blight	that	Ottawa	had	a	moral	obligation	to	remedy.						The	federation	structure	is	be	useful	but	it	has	always	been	fragile.	In	recent	decades,	amid	a	more	competitive	world	economy,	the	economic	links	across	Canada	have	grown	weaker	as	individual	regions	have	increasingly	integrated	with																																																									37	This	thesis	will	survey	them	briefly	later	in	the	text.	
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adjacent	American	regions.	As	economist	Paul	Boothe	notes:	“Canada’s	east-west	orientation	is	being	weakened.	One	of	the	implications	is	that	the	western	and	eastern	parts	of	the	country	really	have	little	connection	–	except	through	redistribution.”38	Still,	Canada’s	strong	cultural	and	linguistic	forces	have	resisted	those	continental	trends.	And	fiscal	transfers	have	buttressed	those	unifying	forces.					Prior	to	World	War	Two,	however,	Canada	could	look	to	few	other	federations	to	see	how	they	handled	economic	inequalities	among	their	member	states.	Australian	political	scientist	R.	J.	May,	who	has	compared	federal	systems	in	more	than	a	dozen	nations,	has	briefly	traced	the	evolution	of	demands	for	more	money	from	the	poorer	provinces	since	1867	to	the	later	decades	of	the	twentieth	century.	“Throughout	most	of	the	history	of	Canadian	financial	relations	the	basic	conflict	of	interests	has	been	between	the	smaller	poor	provinces	and	the	larger	richer	provinces,	and	to	a	certain	extent	this	conflict	has	been	resolved,	or	at	least	stabilized,	through	financial	adjustments,”	May	observes.39	Crucially,	he	adds	that	Canada’s	basic	structure	of	one	or	two	large,	rich	provinces	and	several	small	poorer	provinces	resembles	the	situation	in	Australia.								But	equalization	has	never	been	a	household	word.	Although	Economists	Thomas	Courchene	and	Robin	Boadway	have	scrupulously	examined	the	evolution	of	equalization	since	its	formal	introduction	in	1956,	they	have	largely	overlooked	the	political,	social	and	economic	factors	that	led	to	its	development	–	including																																																									38	Paul	Boothe	commentary	in	Toolkits	and	Building	Blocks:	Constructing	a	New	
Canada,	eds.	Richard	Simeon	and	Mary	Janigan	(Toronto:	C.	D.	Howe	Institute,	1991)	p.	21.		39	R.	J.	May,	Federalism	and	Fiscal	Adjustment	(Oxford,	Great	Britain:	Oxford	at	the	Clarendon	Press,	1969)	84.	
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Canada’s	intensive	study	of	Australia’s	experience	in	the	1920s	and	1930s.	Political	scientists	Richard	Simeon	and	Ian	Robinson	have	traced	the	evolution	of	fiscal	arrangements	among	the	Confederation	partners.	But	they	did	not	highlight	the	role	of	equalization	as	a	pivotal	factor	in	the	development	of	key	shared-cost	social	programs,	the	preservation	of	national	unity	and	social	cohesion,	the	maintenance	of	political	stability,	and	the	easing	of	provincial	fears	over	federal	power	grabs	and	the	centralization	of	revenues.40						Other	political	scientists	such	as	Douglas	M.	Brown	and	David	Milne	have	explored	the	roots	of	equalization	in	key	aspects	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations	–	but	they	have	not	looked	at	the	prelude	and	aftermath	of	the	commission	in	detail.	The	authoritative	Peter	M.	Leslie	has	also	examined	the	Commission’s	proposed	National	Adjustment	Grants,	which	he	views	as	unworkable	notions.	But	the	history	of	equalization	in	Canada	has	been	mainly	neglected.								In	effect,	equalization	has	been	a	largely	unrecognized	nation-building	scheme.	Historians	today	may	scoff	at	Canada’s	past	preoccupation	with	the	mechanics	of	federalism.	Historian	Christopher	Dummit	is	almost	bemused:	“Sad,	it	is	true,	that	in	the	midst	of	a	national	crisis	of	poverty	and	unemployment	[in	the	1930s],	Mackenzie	King’s	government	opted	to	study	federalism.	But	this	is	the	essential	Canadian	question.	Before	we	had	the	welfare	state,	before	unemployment	insurance	and	universal	health	care	and	universal	old	age	pensions,	we	studied	
																																																								40	I	am	not	claiming	that	equalization	worked	a	miracle	of	harmony	–	but	it	did	diffuse	provincial	complaints	about	the	centralization	of	revenues,	removed	a	huge	Quebec	objection	to	Ottawa’s	strategies,	and	freed	the	poorer	provinces	from	relative	penury	to	participate	in	shared-cost	programs.	
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federalism.”41		But	Canadian	governments	had	to	grapple	with	the	rigid	fixities	of	federalism’s	division	of	rights	and	responsibilities	before	they	could	cope	with	the	pressures	for	government	action	on	social	needs.													This	thesis	will	expand	on	the	limited	historiography,	concentrating	on	the	evolution	of	the	federation	from	tacit	and	grudging	aid	to	the	poorer	provinces	to	the	overt	acceptance	that	Canada	had	to	remedy	fiscal	inequality	among	its	member	states	to	survive.	It	fills	a	significant	gap	in	Canadian	history,	pulling	out	the	overlooked	debates	among	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	over	inequality.	It	will	also	deal	peripherally	with	the	social	activists,	who	generally	did	not	link	the	slow	pace	in	the	development	of	social	programs	with	the	glaring	fiscal	inequalities	among	governments.						That	was	a	failure	of	imagination	and	analysis.	Instead,	I	will	concentrate	on	the	politicians	and	bureaucrats	who	grasped	the	consequences	of	such	inequalities	and	the	need	to	remedy	them.	In	effect,	I	am	parsing	the	federal-provincial	discussions	that	dealt	with	those	fiscal	imbalances	–	which	is	a	state-centred	approach.	I	will	show,	however,	how	those	politicians	and	bureaucrats	reacted	to	pressures	from	
policy-oriented	groups	to	expand	social	security	–	which	forced	them	to	address	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	federation	members.				
																																																								41	Christopher	Dummit,	“Empire	Man:	A	new	look	at	the	complicated	life	and	work	of		Donald	Creighton”	in	the	Literary	Review	of	Canada,	Vol.	23,	No.	7,	September	2015,	7.		
	 	 	 	 	29	
							This	thesis	will	also	add	to	the	historiography	through	its	examination	of	Ottawa’s	search	for	models	to	remedy	fiscal	inequality	within	federal	states	across	the	decades.	In	particular,	I	will	highlight	many	largely	overlooked	Canadian	academic	studies	and	bureaucratic	reports	on	how	other	federations	tackled	these	issues	–	and	how	Ottawa	might	proceed.	It	is	a	sparse	field.	Even	David	Fransen’s	superb	unpublished	thesis	from	1984	–	“Unscrewing	the	Unscrutable:	The	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,	the	Ottawa	bureaucracy,	and	Public	Finance	Reform,	1935-1941”	–	did	not	focus	on	inequality	as	an	issue.	Instead,	Fransen	concentrated	on	the	push	by	key	federal	bureaucrats	to	secure	greater	control	over	Canadian	tax	revenues.	As	Fransen	depicted	those	debates,	any	possible	remedy	for	inequality	would	be	a	by-product	of	greater	federal	control	over	key	revenue	sources.42					In	particular,	this	thesis	will	break	new	ground	as	it	unveils	the	extraordinary	influence	of	Australia	on	the	Canadian	debates	over	fiscal	probity	and	inequality,	especially	throughout	the	late	1920s	and	the	1930s.	Canadian	and	Australian	Royal	Commissions	cited	each	other,	seeking	wisdom.	Australian	innovations	such	as	loan	councils	fascinated	their	Canadian	counterparts.	And	the	Australian	remedy	for	inequality	among	the	states	would	become	a	model	for	Canada’s	approach	–	although	there	would	be	a	crucially	important	difference	in	the	formula.	My	state-centred	approach	will	trace	those	international	interactions	during	each	nation’s	search	for	remedies	for	fiscal	inequality	among	their	members.	Ottawa	also	inter-acted	with	experts	from	such	nations	as	the	United	States	and	Argentina.																																																										42	David	Fransen,	“Unscrewing	the	Unscrutable:”	The	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,	The	
Ottawa	Bureaucracy,	and	Public	Finance	Reform	1935-1941,	unpublished	thesis,	Department	of	History,	University	of	Toronto,	1984.		
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						The	Canadian	Constitution	was	drafted	in	the	mid-19th	century	when	the	state’s	social	obligations	to	its	citizens	were	limited	–	and	there	was	little	thought	of	expansion	of	those	responsibilities.	Under	the	British	North	America	Act	of	1867,	the	provinces	assumed	responsibility	for	property	and	civil	rights,	public	lands,	education	and	hospitals.	They	could	raise	funds	through	direct	taxation	“within	the	Province…for	Provincial	Purposes.”43	(Sales	taxes	have	subsequently	been	deemed	to	be	direct	taxes.)	In	turn,	Ottawa	handled	the	regulation	of	trade	and	commerce,	the	military,	foreign	policy,	the	currency	and	“Indians,	and	Lands	reserved	for	the	Indians.”44	The	federal	government	could	raise	money	“by	any	Mode	or	System	of	Taxation.”45	Almost	from	the	start,	of	course,	the	categories	have	overlapped	and	occasionally	conflicted.						Indeed,	clashes	have	been	inevitable.		As	political	scientist	R.	J.	May	awkwardly	but	astutely	observes	about	the	political	process	in	federal	systems:	“The	greater	is	the	concentration	of	particular	interests	–	racial,	linguistic,	religious	and	so	on	–	within	particular	unit	boundaries	the	greater	is	likely	to	be	the	conflict	of	interests	on	all	matters	of	federal	policy	and	the	greater	the	tendency	for	provinces	representative	of	minority	interests	to	resist	national	policies	dominated	by	the	interests	of	provinces	not	representative	of	these	interests.”	He	adds	that	Quebec	
																																																								43	The	Constitution	Act	1867,	clause	92,	subsection	2.	44	The	Constitution	Act	1867,	clause	91,	subsection	24.	45	The	Constitution	Act	1867,	clause	91,	subsection	3.	
	 	 	 	 	31	
“has	been	responsible	for	substantial	changes	in	the	pattern	of	intergovernmental	financial	relations.”46					Equalization	is	one	of	the	few	methods	that	federations	can	deploy	to	ameliorate	huge	inequalities	in	the	provision	of	provincial	services.	With	greater	fiscal	equality,	the	federal	partners	can	develop	a	cross-country	social	safety	net	without	threatening	provincial	identities	–	or	national	unity.	Canadians	are	effectively	guaranteed	relatively	equal	services	in	health,	education	and	welfare		–	no	matter	where	they	live.	They	do	not	have	to	move	to	another	province	to	receive	those	benefits:	their	provincial	government	can	afford	to	provide	them.	Everyone	benefits:	taxpayers	in	the	wealthier	provinces	do	not	have	to	provide	services	to	the	new	arrivals	from	the	poorer	provinces;	governments	in	the	poorer	provinces	do	not	lose	tax	revenues	when	their	citizens	move	in	search	of	better	benefits.						Most	modern	federations,	with	the	unusual	exception	of	the	United	States,	now	operate	some	form	of	this	mechanism:	the	transfer	of	largely	unconditional	grants	among	governments	to	create	approximate	per-capita	fiscal	equality.	During	the	post-war	years,	however,	powerful	civil	servants	in	Ottawa	could	see	few	objections	to	the	continued	centralization	of	key	provincial	revenues	through	renewed	tax-rental	deals.	They	tended	to	underestimate	the	strength	of	the	provincial-rights	views	within	their	federation.								Historian	J.	L.	Granatstein	has	referred	to	this	group	as	“The	Ottawa	Men,”	noting	that	their	coterie	was	“exclusively	male…	Nor	was	there	a	single	French-Canadian	
																																																								46	May,	84.	
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member	of	the	mandarin	group.”47	Actually	there	were	several	high-ranking	women	and	Francophones	among	that	group.48	But	his	characterization	is	pivotal	in	terms	of	the	creation	of	equalization.	Such	civil	servants	were	insensitive	to	the	unwritten	bargain	of	the	federation	between	francophone	and	anglophone	Canadians.	And	there	were	few	powerful	politicians	–	with	the	notable	exception	of	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King	–	to	remind	them	that	their	efforts	to	centralize	revenues	and	responsibilities	could	endanger	national	unity.	Even	then,	King	initially	went	along	with	their	plans	to	centralize	revenues	on	a	temporary	basis	in	1941	because	Ottawa	needed	the	money	to	fight	the	war.	He	also	allowed	the	second	round	of	
																																																								47	J.	L.	Granatstein,	The	Ottawa	Men:	The	Civil	Service	Mandarins	1935-1957.	(Toronto:	Oxford	University	Press,	1983)	p.	4.	48	The	report	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	Bilingualism	and	Biculturalism	lamented	the	reduced	number	of	senior	francophone	bureaucrats	after	the	introduction	of	the	Civil	Service	Act	of	1918:	overall,	francophone	participation	declined	to	13	per	cent	in	1946	from	22	per	cent	in	1918.	But	the	report	also	singled	out	the	efforts	of	such	champions	as	Under-Secretary	of	State	O.	D.	Skelton	and	Justice	Minister	Ernest	Lapointe	to	promote	francophone	bureaucrats	from	the	mid-1930s	into	the	1940s.	The	report	offers	a	good	summary	of	those	decades.	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission	
on	Bilingualism	and	Biculturalism,	1967,	Book	III,	pps.	100-110.		
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2014/bcp-pco/Z1-1963-1-5-
3A-1-eng.pdf	
				As	for	women,	Jennifer	Stephen’s	Pick	One	Intelligent	Girl:	Employability,	
Domesticity	and	the	Gendering	of	Canada’s	Welfare	State,	1939-1947	chronicles	the	efforts	of	senior	female	bureaucrats	to	bring	other	women	into	the	work	force	during	World	War	Two.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2007.)	But	the	numbers	were	not	huge.	As	the	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	the	Status	of	Women	in	Canada	noted	in	1970,	the	paucity	of	women	in	the	public	service	ensured	that	“some	half	of	the	population	contributes	almost	nothing	to	economic	and	social	policy	making	in	Canada.”	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	the	Status	of	
Women	in	Canada,	1970,	chapter	7,	p.	342.	
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2014/priv/CP32-96-1970-3-
eng.pdf	
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rental	deals	to	proceed,	content	to	keep	a	firm	hand	on	fiscal	control	during	the	uncertainties	of	reconstruction.						In	the	post-war	era,	when	key	provinces	resisted	continued	tax-rental	deals,	those	bureaucrats	were	in	a	continuing	quandary.	During	the	first	renewal	in	1947,	Quebec	and	Ontario	were	isolated.	Then	only	Quebec	resisted	the	1952	tax	rental	pacts.	With	each	round	of	negotiations	to	forge	five-year	deals,	the	other	provinces	became	more	demanding	in	their	requests	for	compensatory	grants.	The	system	could	not	hold.							But	it	was	not	until	1956	that	Ottawa	finally	surrendered	control	for	the	sake	of	both	social	cohesion	and	national	unity	–	and	opted	for	formal	equalization.	The	post-war	prosperity	had	finally	provided	sufficient	revenues	for	sharing	unconditional	federal	funds	with	the	poorer	provinces.	The	First	Ministers	accepted	that	something	had	to	give:	Quebec	was	isolated	while	an	expanded	social	safety	net	was	long	overdue.	Federal	bureaucrats	and	politicians	belatedly	espoused	the	Federal-Provincial	Tax	Sharing	Arrangements	Act,	which	effectively	ended	Ottawa’s	efforts	to	control	the	main	provincial	tax	revenues.	(The	tax-rental	deals,	however,	would	continue	with	many	provinces	for	another	five	years.)							That	tax-sharing	act	provided	for	equalization	payments	–	which	began	in	the	1957-1958	fiscal	year.	Those	transfers	ensured	that	all	provinces	could	provide	roughly	similar	services	for	roughly	similar	levels	of	taxation.	The	way	was	then	open	for	shared-cost	programs	such	as	hospital	care	and	Medicare	that	even	the	poorer	provinces	could	now	afford	–	almost.	The	equalization	principle	–	which	
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distributed	almost	$18.3-billion	from	Ottawa	to	the	poorer	provinces	in	2017-2018	–	was	even	entrenched	in	the	Canadian	Constitution	in	1982.									Debates	about	equalization	often	focused	on	a	pivotal	dilemma	that	lingers	over	the	equalization	program	to	this	day:	How	could	governments	–	along	with	millions	of	Canadians	–	draw	the	line	between	the	fear	of	encouraging	dependency	and	the	moral	obligation	to	share	with	strangers?	I	will	argue	that	those	two	extremes	only	dominate	the	discussions	about	equalizing	payments	when	the	transfers	are	not	balanced:	If	the	grants	are	too	large	–	or	if	the	grants	are	out	of	sync	with	sudden	economic	downturns	–	then	fear	of	dependency	overshadows	pragmatic	generosity.	If	they	are	too	small,	the	poorer	provinces	threaten	social	cohesion	with	a	plaintive	moral	appeal	for	greater	generosity.	Deployed	properly,	equalization	payments	are	simply	an	essential	fiscal	tool	that	balances	potentially	dangerous	competing	fiscal	requirements	within	the	federation	–	in	the	long-term	economic	and	social	interest	of	every	Canadian.								Dependency	is	a	loaded	word.	Philosopher	Nancy	Fraser	and	historian	Linda	Gordon	have	parsed	the	evolution	of	its	meaning	across	the	centuries	in	A	Genealogy	
of	Dependency:	Tracing	A	Keyword	of	the	U.S.	Welfare	State?49	The	word	has	been	used	–	and	abused	–	across	the	decades	during	“the	struggle	to	define	social	reality	and	to	interpret	people’s	inchoate	aspirations	and	needs.”50	In	Fraser	and	Gordon’s	analysis,	it	was	applied	to	“poor	women	with	children…who	rely	for	economic																																																									49	Nancy	Fraser	and	Linda	Gordon,	“A	Genealogy	of	Dependency:	Tracing	a	Keyword	in	the	U.S.	Welfare	State”	in	Signs,	Vol.	19,	No.	2	(Winter,	1994).	50	Nancy	Fraser	and	Linda	Gordon,	p.	310.	
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support”	on	the	American	government	program,	Aid	to	Families	with	Dependent	Children.51								But	the	word	“dependency”	has	resonance	for	governments	as	well	as	people.	As	I	will	show,	Canada’s	richer	provinces	have	depicted	their	poorer	kin	as	unnecessarily	dependent	on	federal	loans	and	grants	including	equalization	payments.	Poorer	provinces	have	resisted	that	label,	arguing	that	inferior	social	and	educational	programs	would	produce	citizens	who	were	unprepared	to	participate	in	the	economy:	their	residents	should	not	have	to	move	to	another	province	to	secure	a	better	education,	better	health	care	or	a	minimal	base	of	support	in	times	of	need.	Surely	the	wealthier	provinces	want	to	see	the	poorer	provinces	pulling	their	economic	and	social	weight?							Such	responses	capture	an	inherently	pragmatic	approach	to	accusations	of	dependency	–	and	I	will	cite	them	as	they	occurred	throughout	the	decades	of	the	mid-twentieth	century.	The	danger,	of	course,	was	that	the	recipient	provinces	would	come	to	view	equalization	transfers	as	an	entitlement	–	even	when	they	no	longer	qualified	for	them	under	the	formula.								But	a	more	idealistic	principle	of	sharing	underlay	the	hardheaded	fiscal	bargain	of	equalization	–	even	though	few	governments	would	openly	espouse	it.	In	effect,	richer	provincial	governments	on	behalf	of	their	taxpayers	tacitly	agreed	to	allow	Ottawa	to	share	their	taxpayers’	dollars	across	provincial	boundaries.	The	Depression	had	fostered	those	two	attitudes	of	the	moral	need	to	share	and	the	fear	
																																																								51		Nancy	Fraser	and	Linda	Gordon,	311.	
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of	dependency	toward	poorer	citizens	and	poorer	governments,	and	it	was	not	uncommon	for	voters	to	sway	between	the	two	extremes.						It	was	a	response	that	their	politicians	both	reflected	and	nurtured.	As	the	definition	of	basic	social	needs	expanded	over	the	decades	of	the	mid-twentieth	century,	I	will	show	how	the	notion	of	“sharing”	as	a	moral	duty	moderated	that	concern	about	“dependency.”	The	challenge	across	the	decades	was	to	find	balance	in	the	size	of	equalization	transfers	for	revenue	needs	–	if	only	because	there	are	always	practical	limits	to	generosity	within	a	political	system.							Politicians	gradually	accepted	the	need	for	equalization	to	address	inequalities	among	provinces	as	their	citizenry	recognized	–	and,	indeed,	encouraged	–	the	State’s	growing	responsibility	for	social	programs.	Political	philosopher	Michael	Ignatieff	has	pondered	the	precarious	balance	between	political	and	social	rights	versus	needs	in	Canadian	society.	And	he	has	traced	the	struggle	to	treat	needs	for	food,	shelter,	clothing,	education	and	employment	as	social	rights	of	citizenship.	“The	conservative	counter-attack	on	the	welfare	state,”	he	observes,	“is	above	all	an	attack	on	the	idea	that	these	needs	make	rights;	an	attack	on	this	idea	puts	into	question	the	very	notion	of	a	society	as	a	moral	community.”52								In	turn,	among	the	federal	partners,	the	needs	of	poorer	provinces	have	become	constitutional	rights.	But	that	right	to	an	unspecified	level	of	equalization	varies	across	time	and	space	as	provincial	populations	and	prosperity	change	as	well	as	the	formula	itself.	No	one	should	remain	oblivious	to	the	flaws	in	Canada’s	approach:	even	the	definition	of	revenue	needs,	let	alone	fiscal	rights,	remains	controversial.																																																										52	Michael	Ignatieff,	The	Needs	of	Strangers	(New	York:	Picador	edition,	2001,	first	published	in	1984)	13.	
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					The	formula	has	always	been	a	deeply	politicized	construct,	crafted	and	re-crafted	over	the	decades	to	allay	political	conflict.	Provinces	tailor	their	policies	to	maximize	their	benefits.	Obfuscation	is	an	art:	There	are	now	hundreds	of	different	calculations	to	determine	the	provinces’	annual	level	of	support.	What	began	in	1957	as	a	modest	transfer	program	based	upon	the	average	per-capita	collection	of	three	taxes	in	two	provinces	is	now	a	behemoth.	But,	however	politicized	it	was,	and	is,	the	program	is	a	vital	nation-building	instrument	in	a	difficult	federation.								The	historical	debates	over	equalization	were	focused	on	clashes	of	identities.	On	the	one	hand,	as	Simeon	and	Robinson	observe,	there	were	the	provinces,	which	represented	the	traditional	provincial	identities	of	language	and	culture	despite	their	diverse	views	on	the	State’s	duties	to	its	citizens.	Such	identities	worked	“to	entrench	and	reinforce	the	strength	of	provincial	identities,	and	to	undermine	and	weaken	other	bases	of	identity.”53	Tugging	against	those	identities	were	class	and	gender-based	groups,	such	as	trade	unions	and	women’s	organizations,	which	were	increasingly	demanding	that	Ottawa	expand	its	social	safety	net,	including	health	care,	educational	funding,	social	assistance	and	pensions.	Such	programs	represent	the	foundation	of	what	British	sociologist	T.	H.	Marshall	has	labeled	“social	citizenship.”54																																																									53	Simeon	and	Robinson,	16.	54	T.	H.	Marshall,	“Citizenship	and	Social	Class”	in	Inequality	and	Society,	eds.	Jeff	Manza	and	Michael	Sauder	(New	York:	W.W.	Norton	and	Co.,	2009)	148-154.	Marshall	first	published	his	essay	in	1950.	See	also	Thomas	H.	Marshall,	“Citizenship	and	Social	Class”	in	Class,	Citizenship,	and	Social	Development	(Westport,	Conn:	Greenwood	Press,	1973)	as	quoted	in	Leslie,	National	Citizenship	and	Provincial	Communities.	p.	10.	
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						After	World	War	Two,	those	society-centred	identities	would	grow	stronger	as	groups	increasingly	echoed	each	other’s	call	for	social	programs	–	even	if	they	did	not	explicitly	cooperate.	But	–	and	this	is	pivotal	–	there	were	no	concerted	calls	from	those	groups	during	the	1930s,	1940s	or	1950s	for	a	specific	program	of	non-conditional	financial	assistance	such	as	equalization	when	provincial	revenues	did	not	match	provincial	responsibilities.	There	was	no	organized	lobby	for	anything	more	than	ad	hoc	assistance	and	special	subsidies	for	specific	social	causes	from	Ottawa.	Equalization	emerged	over	the	decades	from	an	inner	circle	of	political	and	bureaucratic	elites	in	Ottawa	and	key	provinces.	They,	in	turn,	consulted	Canadian	academics	and,	crucially,	experts	on	federalism	in	other	federations.								That	inner	circle	of	politicians,	bureaucrats,	academics	and	international	experts	that	pushed	for	equalization	comprised	a	select	group.	While	disparate	advocates	pushed	for	expanded	social	programs,	only	a	handful	of	provincial	premiers	such	as	Nova	Scotia’s	Angus	L.	Macdonald	and,	later,	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas	and	social	scientists	such	as	University	of	Toronto	sociologist	Harry	Cassidy	understood	the	link	between	equalization	and	improved	public	services.	(Astonishingly,	however,	as	I	will	show,	Douglas	wanted	to	penalize	Quebec	financially	in	the	mid-1950s	if	it	did	not	sign	a	tax-rental	deal	with	Ottawa.)								The	members	of	historian	Doug	Owram’s	Government	Generation	also	consulted	respected	international	experts	such	as	Swedish	political	economist	Gunnar	Myrdall,	U.	S.	Treasury	Under-Secretary	Roswell	Magill,	and	the	key	Australian	player	behind	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	formula,	L.	F.	Giblin.	(Sweden	was	a	unitary	state	–	but	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	relations	wanted	to	
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explore	how	its	different	levels	of	government	inter-related.)	That	Canadian	inner	circle	had	to	figure	out	how	to	remake	the	federation	to	save	it.								But	equalization	did	not	develop	within	a	vacuum:	throughout	the	middle	decades	of	the	century,	there	were	multiple	pressures	to	expand	the	social	safety	net.	From	the	1930s	into	the	1960s,	Ottawa	and	the	provinces,	particularly	Quebec,	competed	for	public	support	through	conflicting	appeals	to	social	identities	and	provincial	identities.	Over	time,	those	stances	were	adjusted	as	voter	attitudes	evolved:	that	is,	all	governments	moderated	their	positions	on	transfers	and	social	security	to	win	the	approval	of	their	citizenry.	To	do	otherwise	would	have	endangered	political	stability	–	and	the	elites’	political	careers.								Where	necessary	when	I	concentrate	on	specific	governments,	I	will	also	deploy	the	approach	to	“The	State”	that	Philip	Abrams	has	proposed:	The	state	“is	itself	the	mask	which	prevents	our	seeing	political	practice	as	it	is…[It	is]	a	palpable	nexus	of	practice	and	institutional	structure…The	state	comes	into	being	as	a	structuration	within	political	practice.”55	In	other	words,	I	will	look	behind	the	formal	description	of	the	state	to	how	each	government	confronted	day-to-day	life.	Behind	the	mask	of	the	state	from	the	late-1920s	to	the	adoption	of	equalization,	there	were	federal	governments	that	were	centrist	and	avowedly	capitalist	grappling	with	provincial	governments	that	ranged	from	the	deep	social	conservatism	of	Quebec	to	the	social	democratic	approach	of	Saskatchewan	and	the	radical	fundamentalism	of	Social	Credit	in	Alberta.	Admittedly,	the	range	of	differences	was	relatively	small:	the	leaders	and	their	governments	espoused	their	practices	within	a	democratic	federal																																																									55	Philip	Abrams,	“Notes	on	the	Difficulty	of	Studying	the	State”	in	Journal	of	
Historical	Sociology,	Vol.	1,	No.	1,	March	1988.	82.		
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polity	and	a	capitalist	economy.	But	such	different	philosophies	were	disruptive.	As	I	will	show	in	later	chapters,	equalization	could	not	commence	until	Ottawa	could	edge	those	disparate	views	toward	a	compromise.							Equalization	grants	were	an	essential	component	in	the	expansion	of	the	social	safety	net.	Today,	all	provinces	can	provide	good	health	care	and	education	for	their	citizens	–	if	they	choose	to	do	so.	They	can	look	after	the	jobless	who	have	exhausted	their	Unemployment	Insurance	with	social	assistance	payments	that	are	at	least	minimally	adequate	(and	also	partially	federally	funded.)	Equalization	payments	have	set	a	national	standard	for	the	amount	of	per-capita	revenue	that	each	province	needs	to	survive	with	grace	and	relative	equality.	Those	transfer	payments	have	bound	Canadians	together	in	a	pragmatic	web	of	financial	ties	that	is	far	removed	from	the	resounding	patriotic	ideal	that	many	wistfully	espoused.	But	those	practical	ties	have	funded	a	common	social	citizenship	that	has	become	the	foundation	of	the	modern	nation.						In	1965,	in	his	seminal	Lament	for	a	Nation:	The	Defeat	of	Canadian	Nationalism,	philosopher	George	Grant	understandably	missed	what	few	recognized	or	understood	then.	He	saw	English-speaking	conservatism	as	loyalty	to	the	nation	based	on	the	flow	of	trade	–	and	that	was	“destined	to	change	when	that	flow	changed”	from	Great	Britain	and	its	Dominions	to	the	United	States.56	He	saw	
																																																								56	George	Grant,	Lament	for	a	Nation:	The	Defeat	of	Canadian	Nationalism.	(Toronto:	McClelland	and	Stewart	Limited,	1965)	69.	
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French-Canadian	nationalism	as	“a	last-ditch	stand”	against	the	powerful	assimilating	forces	of	American	corporations.57							He	caught	the	zeitgeist,	the	fear	that	Anglophone	and	Francophone	Canada	were	disappearing	into	the	American	orbit.	But	he	missed	the	fiscal	ties	that	provided	revenues	so	that	all	governments	could	create	a	strong	network	of	social	programs.	Equalization	allowed	all	governments	to	provide	relatively	equal	services	for	relatively	equal	levels	of	taxation.	In	turn,	equalization	is	“part	of	the	broader	set	of	federal-provincial	fiscal	arrangements	and	is	not	set	in	a	vacuum.”58	That	network	–	along	with	the	persistently	strong	cultural	identities	of	the	provinces	–	would	eventually	trump	those	economic	forces	that	Grant	lamented.								That	does	not	mean	that	redistributing	revenues	among	governments	has	been	easy.	The	senior	civil	servants	of	the	1930s	and	1940s	would	likely	be	confounded	to	see	the	federation’s	alternative	to	their	drive	for	a	strong,	almost	overpowering	central	government	that	collected	huge	pools	of	cash.	In	the	1930s,	few	senior	federal	bureaucrats	or	politicians	were	converts	to	the	theories	of	British	economist	John	Maynard	Keynes,	who	advocated	government	spending	during	downturns	–	even	if	that	spending	created	deeper	deficits.	Although	some	junior	bureaucrats	espoused	the	Keynesian	approach	during	the	1930s,	they	had	little	power.	As	well,	no	one	knew	if	such	approaches	would	work	in	a	federal	state	–	and	they	were	hesitant	to	embrace	them.	In	the	end,	provincial	resistance	to	Ottawa’s	continuing																																																									57	George	Grant,	Lament	for	a	Nation:	The	Defeat	of	Canadian	Nationalism.	p.76.	58	Robin	Boadway,	“Fiscal	equalization:	the	Canadian	experience”	in	Fiscal	
Federalism	and	Political	Decentralization:	Lessons	from	Spain,	Germany	and	Canada.	Bosch,	Núria	and	José	M.	Durán,	eds.	Cheltenham,	U.	K.	:	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	Limited,	2008.	p.	134.			
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bid	to	centralize	revenues	would	thwart	such	half-hearted	and	temporary	initiatives.	But	the	fiscal	ties	of	transfers	between	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	have	remained	strong.												I	will	trace	the	history	of	Ottawa’s	adoption	and	refinement	of	equalization	from	the	1920s	to	1957	in	five	chapters	that	will	rely	primarily	on	documents	from	the	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	the	National	Archives	of	Australia,	the	Tasmanian	Parliamentary	Library,	the	Nova	Scotia	Archives,	and	Library	and	Archives	Canada	as	well	as	archives	at	the	Canadian	Tax	Foundation,	Queen’s	University,	the	Australian	War	Memorial	in	Canberra,	the	Bank	of	Nova	Scotia	and	the	University	of	Manitoba.	(Obviously,	I	also	consulted	secondary	sources.)						Chapter	one	will	set	the	stage	for	equalization	by	tracing	the	early	fights	between	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	over	subsidy	levels	across	the	decades	from	Confederation	into	the	mid-1930s.								Chapter	two	will	open	in	1935	as	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King	recaptured	power	–	and	promptly	called	a	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	which	encapsulated	the	huge	differences	among	governments	over	how	to	handle	fiscal	inequality	among	the	provinces.	When	the	First	Ministers	could	not	agree	on	solutions,	bureaucrats	and	politicians	pushed	for	a	Royal	Commission	to	examine	the	federation’s	imbalances	in	revenues	and	responsibilities.	King	reluctantly	agreed.	Politicians	could	no	longer	view	fiscal	inequality	as	business	as	usual.					Chapter	three	will	examine	the	ensuing	hearings	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	which	captured	Canada	on	the	cusp	of	the	changing	
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role	of	the	state	in	its	citizens’	lives.	The	hearings	became	a	superb	illustration	of	the	different	provincial	views	on	the	federation,	dramatizing	the	federation’s	inability	to	handle	the	social	and	economic	inequalities	among	its	governments	–	and	its	citizens.		
				Chapter	four	will	examine	the	fate	of	that	seminal	Royal	Commission	report,	concentrating	on	how	it	addressed	inequality.	It	was	simply	too	centralizing	for	wealthier	provinces,	including	Ontario,	to	accept	and	it	would	have	required	formal	constitutional	change.	It	also	challenged	Quebec’s	linguistic	and	cultural	rights:	the	province	relied	on	key	tax	revenues	such	as	succession	duties	to	preserve	its	language	and	culture.						Uneasily	aware	of	those	tensions,	the	deeply	cautious	King	would	never	formally	attempt	to	take	over	the	provinces’	income	taxes	and	inheritance	taxes.	The	report	failed.	And	any	push	toward	permanent	fiscal	centralization	would	fail	every	step	of	
the	way	for	the	next	decade,	including	discussions	at	two	First	Ministers’	Conferences.	Instead,	all	provinces	reluctantly	agreed	to	surrender	key	tax	revenues	
temporarily	in	return	for	per-capita	payments.			
Chapter	five	will	examine	federal-provincial	relations	in	the	wake	of	the	failed	1945-1946	conference	–	as	King’s	proposal	for	a	social	security	network	was	shelved.	Meanwhile,	policy-oriented	groups	in	many	provinces	grew	stronger	–	and	confronted	the	traditional	political	guardians	of	provincial	rights.	By	the	early	1950s,	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent	and	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis	were	engaged	in	a	dramatic	quarrel	over	provincial	tax	revenues	–	which	Quebec	would	not	allow	Ottawa	to	collect.	In	the	Rest	of	Canada,	key	Premiers	from	the	
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poorer	provinces	were	pushing	for	some	form	of	equalizing	funding	–	despite	the	objections	of	Premiers	from	the	richer	provinces.	Political	stability	was	strained.	Equalization	became	the	only	sensible	solution	to	the	impasse	over	fiscal	inequality	among	the	provinces.	Once	equalization	was	achieved,	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	then	introduced	a	range	of	social	programs.							The	conclusion	will	review	the	process	of	nation-building	over	the	decades.	Two	forces	contrived	to	create	equalization:	The	push	for	expanded	social	security	from	the	advocates	of	social	citizenship	and	the	increasing	resentment	in	Quebec	over	Ottawa’s	efforts	to	centralize	revenues.	When	the	dispute	between	Quebec	and	Ottawa	escalated	dangerously,	Ottawa	had	to	back	away	from	its	plans	to	centralize	revenues	–	because	that	approach	penalized	Quebec	financially.								But	it	also	had	to	deal	with	the	voices	of	society-centred	groups,	which	now	matched	–	indeed,	outweighed	in	most	provinces	–	the	voices	of	fierce	provincial	identities.	Ottawa	had	to	act.	Equalization	established	relative	fiscal	equality	among	the	provinces	to	preserve	social	cohesion	and	political	stability.	It	was	a	state-centred	solution	that	balanced	provincially-based	rights	and	the	demands	of	social	policy	groups.							Equalization	was	–	and	remains	–	a	necessary	fiscal	tool	that	must	be	used	with	calculated	care	might	not	buy	love,	but	it	has	enabled	the	creation	of	good	health	care,	reputable	post-secondary	institutions	and	an	expanded	welfare	system.	Equalization	saved	the	Canadian	nation.	And	that	was	a	remarkable	legacy	from	the	generation	that	came	home	from	World	War	Two	to	make	a	better	world.
	
CHAPTER	ONE:	The	Poorer	Provinces	Stake	Their	Claims	1867-1935	 	
	 	 	 	 									Inequality	has	always	been	a	troublesome	issue	within	the	Canadian	federation.	The	risk	of	fiscal	disparities	even	disrupted	the	debates	among	the	colonies	on	the	brink	of	Confederation	in	1867.	The	smaller	ones	–	New	Brunswick	and	especially	Nova	Scotia	–	were	convinced	that	union	with	the	larger	and	more	populous	Province	of	Canada	would	upset	their	trade	and	shrink	their	revenues.	Although	the	British	paid	little	attention	to	such	Maritime	lobbying,	the	Canadian	negotiators	could	not	be	so	dismissive.	They	handled	inequality	with	subtlety,	cunningly	allotting	unusually	large	grants	for	government	operations	to	the	poorer	provinces.	It	was	the	start	of	covert	solutions	for	inequality:	Federal	subsidies	still	appeared	relatively	equal	for	all	provinces.	Such	ingenious	remedies	could	not	last.						Over	the	next	seven	decades,	all	provinces	would	demand	larger	subsidies	from	Ottawa	to	meet	their	growing	social	and	economic	responsibilities.	But	the	Maritimes	would	become	especially	vehement	in	the	years	after	World	War	One	as	transportation	costs	escalated,	corroding	the	underpinnings	of	its	economy,	while	its	political	clout	waned.	By	the	mid-1920s,	the	Maritime	Rights	movement		–	“a	spontaneous	expression	of	the	economic	and	social	frustrations	of	the	Maritime	people”	–	forced	Ottawa	to	create	a	Royal	Commission	into	the	region’s	plight.1	That	commission	report,	in	turn,	would	become	one	of	the	pivotal	beginners’	manuals	on	fiscal	federalism	for	both	Canada	and	Australia.	During	the	mid-1920s	into	the																																																									1	Ernest	R.	Forbes,	Maritime	Rights:	The	Maritime	Rights	Movement,	1919-1927:	A	
study	in	Canadian	Regionalism.	(Montreal:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	1979)	p.	viii.		
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1930s,	both	Dominions	researched	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	member	states	in	their	federations	–	and	both	consulted	each	other	on	their	progress.	The	synergy	was	startling	–	and	it	has	been	largely	unexplored.								By	the	mid-1930s,	amid	the	Depression,	the	federation	was	under	siege.	The	Prairie	Provinces	were	desperate	for	funds	–	and	Ottawa	resorted	to	ad	hoc	loans	and	grants	to	keep	them	afloat.	Meanwhile,	two	additional	Royal	Commissions	looked	at	the	Maritime	plight:	one	examined	Nova	Scotia;	the	other	scrutinized	all	three	Atlantic	Provinces.	By	1935,	as	even	the	wealthier	provinces	of	Ontario	and	Quebec	scrambled	to	take	care	of	their	citizenry,	Prime	Minister	R.	B.	Bennett	promised	to	reform	capitalism	while	extending	more	ad	hoc	loans	and	grants	to	the	West.	But	there	were	no	permanent	remedies	for	this	ongoing,	seemingly	insoluble	dilemma	of	inequality	among	the	member	provinces.	After	nearly	seven	decades	of	turmoil	and	protest,	the	federation	was	no	closer	to	a	solution	for	sharing	in	1935	than	it	had	been	in	1867.			
The	Maritime	Plight						Nova	Scotia	was	always	wary	of	the	idea	of	Confederation.	There	had	to	be	winners	and	losers	in	this	new-fangled	form	of	government,	where	provinces	and	the	central	government	divvied	up	their	revenues	and	their	responsibilities.	And	that	fiery	journalist	and	politician,	Joseph	Howe,	was	convinced	that	Nova	Scotia	would	be	a	loser.	His	province	needed	better	communication	links	with	its	fellow	British	provinces	in	Central	Canada,	including	an	inter-colonial	railway,	before	it	could	even	contemplate	union	with	such	an	alien	entity.	In	1866,	he	could	see	few	
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ties	that	bound	the	disparate	provinces	together.	He	even	wrote	an	intemperate	pamphlet	to	warn	the	British	about	the	perils	of	the	union:	the	Maritimes	were	deeply	devoted	to	the	Mother	Country	–	and	looked	outward	to	the	sea	for	their	commerce	and	trade;	the	Province	of	Canada	was	divided	by	“the	antagonism	of	races	arbitrarily	bound	together,	shaken	by	incompatibility	of	temper.”2							It	would	take	more	than	a	mere	act	of	the	British	Parliament,	the	Halifax-born	Howe	argued,	to	unite	the	four	provinces	into	a	nation.	Such	hasty	legislation	was	a	disastrous	approach	to	nation	building,	and	it	was	doomed	to	fail.	The	former	colonial	Premier	was	so	opposed	to	the	compromises	and	inequalities	of	federation	that	he	campaigned	against	the	bill	for	ten	months	in	Great	Britain.	His	predictions	in	his	37-page	pamphlet	denouncing	Confederation	were	dire.	If	Nova	Scotia	and	New	Brunswick	were	forced	into	a	federal	union	with	the	central	government	of	Ontario	and	Quebec	through	“an	arbitrary	act	of	Parliament,”		Maritimers	would	be	stranded	in	a	nation	where	they	were	outnumbered.	Their	political	clout	would	be	insignificant.	The	more	populous	provinces	would	always	put	aside	their	difference	to	combine	so	that	“the	centre	of	power	and	of	influence	will	always	be	in	[the	Province	of]	Canada.”3						Worse,	federation	would	mean	the	ruin	of	the	Maritime	economy.	Maritimers	applied	only	light	duties	to	British	manufactured	products		–	and	they	were	anxious	to	foster	trade	relations	within	the	Empire	and	with	other	foreign	nations.	In	contrast,	Canada	imposed	high	duties	on	goods	–	and	it	would	certainly	expand																																																									2	The	Hon.	Joseph	Howe,	Confederation	In	Relation	To	The	Interests	Of	The	Empire,	(London:	Edward	Stanford,	1866)	6.		3	Howe,	35.	
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those	tariffs	with	Confederation.	That	would	leave	Maritimers	in	dire	straits:	their	resource	products	such	as	lumber	and	fish	could	not	reach	the	interior	of	Canada	over	frozen	waterways	for	six	months	of	the	year.4	And	they	would	be	forced	to	buy	Central	Canadian	manufactured	products.	To	every	British	politician	that	Howe	could	buttonhole	between	July	1866	and	May	1867,	he	offered	a	terrible	warning.	“The	wisdom	of	Solomon	and	the	energy	and	strategy	of	Frederick	the	Great	would	seem	to	be	required	to	preserve	and	strengthen	such	a	people,	if	formed…into	‘a	new	Nationality.’”5							Howe	could	not	win.	He	would	turn	out	to	be	right,	of	course,	but	it	would	be	almost	a	century	before	the	semi-satisfactory	solution	of	equalization	would	materialize.	In	the	1860s,	his	grim	anti-Confederation	denunciations	threatened	social	cohesion	and	political	stability	in	the	incipient	nation.	His	Confederation	partners	anxiously	ensured	that	Nova	Scotia	and	New	Brunswick	secured	federal	precedents	for	special	treatment	for	the	poorer	provinces	that	would	preoccupy	Dominion	Governments	into	the	1950s.	And	beyond.								Perhaps	more	important,	as	other	territories	and	provinces	joined	Canada,	they	would	echo	the	Maritime	lament,	elbowing	each	other	aside	with	pleas	of	poverty	and	demands	for	financial	remedies.	As	their	populations	grew,	they	could	barely	fulfill	their	existing	social	and	economic	responsibilities.	They	did	not	contemplate	permanent	formal	solutions	for	inequality,	nor	did	they	dream	of	expanding	their	current	social	duties	such	as	the	construction	of	new	schools.		
																																																								4	Howe,	21.		5	Howe,	10.	
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						Their	complaints	escalated.	Two	decades	after	federation,	provincial	inequality	was	already	a	reliable	theme	in	the	discourse	of	the	poorer	provinces.	But	it	was	only	in	the	decades	after	World	War	One	that	the	poorer	provinces	would	double	down	their	demands	for	more	federal	cash	–	because	they	could	not	afford	the	programs	such	as	the	Old-Age	Pension	that	the	richer	provinces	and	Ottawa	espoused.	More	responsibilities	would	always	breed	more	discontent.							It	was	Howe’s	political	heirs	who	would	provide	much	of	the	impetus	for	the	renewed	post-World	War	One	provincial	campaigns	for	higher	subsidies.	The	Maritimers	would	argue	that	Confederation	had	damaged	their	economic	prospects.	They	would	demand,	and	often	secure,	more	money	for	their	governments,	brandishing	amorphous	claims	of	fiscal	need	and	the	disabilities	that	federation	had	foisted	upon	them.	They	would	come	to	view	those	subsidies	as	a	moral	right	–	and	as	virtually	intrinsic	to	their	identities.	Ottawa	would	eventually	discover	that	more	funds	could	make	the	claimants	go	away,	but	only	temporarily.	The	poorer	provinces	would	seemingly	always	be	with	the	federation.							Along	the	way,	the	Maritimes	would	also	become	key	players	in	the	post-World	War	One	bond	between	Canada	and	Australia.	The	two	nations	would	learn	from	each	other’s	approach	to	everything	from	loan	councils	to	grants	to	the	poorer	states	to	remedy	fiscal	inequality	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	And	both	nations	would	rely	heavily	on	investigations	into	the	Maritime’s	economic	plight	and	into	the	poorer	Australian	states’	plights.	They	would	then	figure	out	how	to	compensate	for	those	inequalities.	How	much	had	higher	tariffs	affected	Nova	Scotia	–	and	should	that	matter?	How	could	central	governments	measure	the	results	of	a	poor	
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provincial	hand	in	the	game	of	nationhood?	Should	central	governments	even	aim	for	relative	fiscal	equality	among	the	member	states	to	preserve	and	build	the	nation	when	the	provinces	(and	the	Australian	states)	were	so	disparate?	Could	the	glaring	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	provinces	endanger	the	social	cohesion	and	political	stability	of	the	federation	itself?					In	the	end,	those	difficult	questions	would	lead	to	an	overhaul	of	the	entire	subsidy	system.	For	ninety	years,	Ottawa	and	the	richer	provinces	would	cling	to	the	mantra	of	provincial	equality.	For	ninety	years,	the	successors	of	Joseph	Howe	would	contest	that	assertion	with	the	argument	that	their	unequal	fiscal	situation	made	a	mockery	of	formal	provincial	equality.	They	demanded	–	and	often	got	–	more	federal	money	than	their	richer	kin	received.	In	1957,	Ottawa	would	formally	recognize	that	inequality.	Equalization	payments	based	on	the	provincial	ability	to	raise	revenues	would	replace	those	subsidies	with	a	formula	for	transfers	to	the	poorer	provinces.	Specific	federal	transfers	for	programs	such	as	health	care	would	follow.									Joseph	Howe	was	not	one	of	the	Fathers	of	Confederation.	But	he	was	one	of	the	founders	of	equalization.	That	is	an	accolade	that	he	would	likely	view	with	very	mixed	sentiments	–	since	he	regarded	Nova	Scotia	as	a	proud	trading	colony	as	opposed	to	its	identity	as	a	Canadian	province	facing	continuing	fiscal	adversity.			
The	Maritimers	At	Home	and	In	London	in	the	1860s						Wisdom	was	seemingly	always	in	short	supply	in	British	North	America.	In	the	1860s,	as	the	creators	of	the	world’s	third	modern	federation,	the	Confederation	
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partners	had	to	grope	their	way	through	the	foreseen	–	and	unforeseen	–	complaints	about	union.	The	future	Maritime	Provinces	fell	back	on	the	ploy	of	demanding	more	funds.							Then,	as	now,	money	mattered.	Indeed,	financial	concerns	were	one	of	the	key	factors	behind	Confederation.	The	notion	of	federation	suited	Central	Canada.	The	Canadian	Union	was	deadlocked,	burdened	with	debts,	and	dangerously	divided	by	cultural	and	linguistic	differences.	Confederation	was	a	“thoroughly	practical”	solution	to	those	woes.6	The	British	agreed.						In	contrast,	many	politicians	from	Atlantic	Canada	were	concerned	about	their	provincial	government’s	fiscal	health	in	a	federation	that	the	Province	of	Canada	would	dominate.	How	could	they	fulfill	their	responsibilities	within	a	federation	that	would	take	over	the	collection	of	their	vital	customs	duties?	In	particular,	how	would	they	cope	if	Ontario	and	Quebec	burdened	them	with	taxation	to	pay	Canada’s	large	debts	for	railroads?	From	the	start,	fiscal	inequality	among	the	provinces	would	be	a	motif	of	the	federation.	While	the	British	pushed	for	Confederation,	the	Maritime	Provinces	resisted	it.						The	representatives	from	the	Atlantic	colonies	at	the	Quebec	Conference	in	October	1864	clearly	grasped	their	plight.	Weeks	after	those	discussions,	Nova	Scotia	Premier	Charles	Tupper	warned	Canadian	Finance	Minister	Alexander	Galt	that	he	had	ably	presented	the	goal	of	Confederation	“altho’	a	little	too	much	from	
																																																								6	P.	B.	Waite,	The	Life	and	Times	of	Confederation,	1864-1867:	Politics,	Newspapers,	
and	the	Union	of	British	North	America.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1962)	p.	49.	
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the	Canadian	point	of	view.”7	Newfoundland	Liberal	Party	leader	Ambrose	Shea,	who	was	a	delegate	to	that	conference,	later	told	Galt:	“Some	of	our	mercantile	men	fear	a	large	amount	of	increased	taxation….	this	is	a	point	on	which	it	is	easy	to	alarm	the	masses	everywhere.”8	Shea	would	prove	prescient:	Newfoundland	would	not	join	the	federation	until	1949.						Prince	Edward	Island	Liberal	assemblyman	and	conference	delegate	Edward	Whelan,	who	favoured	union,	was	equally	cautious	with	Galt:	“You	treat	the	question	too	much	from	a	Canadian	point	of	view…and	the	asses	of	country	people	[in	Prince	Edward	Island]…are	afraid	they	are	going	to	be	tremendously	taxed.”9	He	was	right:	When	PEI	could	not	secure	sufficient	compensation	for	its	lack	of	Crown	resources,	it	resisted	Confederation.	In	1873,	saddled	with	massive	debts	from	railroad	construction,	the	government	would	go	back	to	Ottawa	to	make	a	better	deal	that	included	cash	to	buy	out	absentee	landlords.						In	New	Brunswick,	the	newspapers	accepted	the	need	for	a	commercial	connection	with	Canada,	but	some	were	dubious	about	a	political	and	fiscal	bond.	As	the	New	Brunswick	Courier	explained:	“The	financial	part	of	the	project	has	received	the	most	attention.”10	In	speeches	after	the	Quebec	conference,	New	Brunswick																																																									7	Nova	Scotia	Premier	Charles	Tupper	to	Finance	Minister	Alexander	Galt,	December	13,	1864,	as	quoted	in	“Letters	To	Galt	Concerning	The	Maritime	Provinces	And	Confederation”	in	Canadian	Historical	Review,	Volume	XXXIV,	no.	2,	June	1953,	p.	166.	8	Newfoundland	Liberal	Party	Leader	Ambrose	Shea	to	federal	Finance	Minister	Galt,	December	15,	1864,	“Letters	To	Galt.”	p.	167.		9	Liberal	Assemblyman	Edward	Whelan	to	Finance	Minister	Alexander	Galt,	December	17,	1864,	“Letters	To	Galt.”	p.	168.	10	As	quoted	in	P.	B.	Waite,	The	Life	and	Times	of	Confederation,	1864-1867:	Politics,	
Newspapers,	and	the	Union	of	British	North	America	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1962)	p.	240.	
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Premier	Samuel	Leonard	Tilley’s	“main	purpose	was	to	satisfy	his	audiences	that	Confederation	would	not	increase	their	taxation.”11	It	was	a	tough	chore.							Fiscal	inequality	among	member	states	remains	the	plague	of	any	federation.	Howe	surely	knew	that	Confederation	was	unstoppable	when	influential	British	railroad	financiers	swung	behind	its	promise	of	“the	political	stability	and	the	economic	security	without	which	existing	enterprises	must	remain	in	jeopardy	and	future	developments	[must]	be	limited	and	uncertain.”12	Pinned	under	Central	Canada’s	weight,	tugged	into	projects	that	would	often	benefit	other	regions,	Atlantic	Canadians	would	continue	to	complain	about	fiscal	inequality	across	the	decades.	As	historian	Christopher	Moore	notes,	the	Confederation	bargain	did	give	“blunt	evidence”	of	federal	primacy:			Although	the	Maritime	provinces	had	substantial	net	assets	and	the	Canadas	substantial	liabilities,	Galt’s	[fiscal]	resolution	transferred	to	the	federal	government	most	of	the	assets	and	liabilities	of	the	old	provinces.	The	federal	government	would	also	acquire	control	of	customs	duties	and	tariffs,	though	the	sea-trading	Maritimes	needed	low	tariffs	much	more	than	the	revenue-hungry	Canadas	did.13							The	Central	Canadian	Provinces	were	(temporarily)	satisfied	with	their	fiscal	deal.	Ontario	Reformer	Oliver	Mowat,	who	would	become	Premier	in	1872	and	Sir	John	A.’s	nemesis,	secured	resource	revenues	–	and	the	ability	to	levy	direct	taxes,	which	might	then	be	applied	to	property.	Mowat	was	initially	viewed	as	“no	great	threat”	to	Ottawa’s	centralizing	drive	–	but	his	fiscal	cunning	showed	remarkable																																																									11	P.	B.	Waite,	p.	240.	12	R.	G.	Trotter,	“British	Finance	and	Confederation”	in	the	Report	of	the	Annual	
Meeting	of	the	Canadian	Historical	Association,	Vol.	6,	number	1	(1927),	p.	96.	13	Christopher	Moore,	1867:	How	the	Fathers	Made	a	Deal	(Toronto:	McClelland	&	Stewart	Inc.,	1997)	p.	128.	
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foresight.14	Quebec,	in	turn,	welcomed	those	resource	revenues	from	lands,	mines	and	minerals.	But	its	primary	goals	were	linguistic	and	cultural	preservation,	which	it	secured	through	its	control	over	education,	civil	and	religious	institutions.	As	historian	A.	I.	Silver	notes:	“Quebec	was	to	be	the	French-Canadian	country,	working	together	with	the	others	on	common	projects,	but	always	autonomous	in	the	promotion	and	embodiment	of	the	French-Canadian	nationality.”15														Such	bargains	left	Atlantic	Canadians	struggling	for	the	assurance	that	their	provincial	legislatures	would	have	the	resources	to	fulfill	their	responsibilities	such	as	hospital	construction	and	transportation	infrastructure.	They	had	one	advantage:	Federation	negotiators	were	uneasily	aware	of	the	potency	of	Joseph	Howe’s	financial	warnings.	In	the	end,	they	provided	extra	compensation	for	the	recalcitrant	Maritimes	as	an	inducement	to	bring	the	nation	into	being:	Nova	Scotia	Premier	Charles	Tupper	and	New	Brunswick	Premier	Leonard	Tilley	obtained	the	promise	of	unusually	large	grants	to	meet	government	expenses,	which	were	calculated	“on	no	determinable	basis,	and	[which]	favored	the	Maritime	provinces	very	considerably.”16	Premier	Tilley,	who	had	led	his	pro-Confederation	party	to	a	tough	victory	in	New	Brunswick	in	June,	was	pleased.	Howe	remained	in	London,	unappeased.							But	the	British	Government	paid	little	attention	to	this	prophet	of	doom.	It	could	no	longer	defend	Canada	against	possible	American	incursions,	if	only	because	the																																																									14	Moore,	p.	115.	15	A.	I.	Silver,	The	French-Canadian	Idea	of	Confederation,	1864-1900	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1982)	p.	50.	16	“Review	of	Dominion	Provincial	Financial	Arrangements,”	John	James	Deutsch	Fonds,	n.	name,	revised	in	1955,	Queen’s	University	Archives,	Box	81,	File	770.	2.	
	 	 	 	 	55	
expense	and	the	distance	were	prohibitive.	It	was	dismantling	its	protectionist	tariffs,	easing	away	from	its	mercantilist	ties	with	Canada.	As	well,	in	an	industrializing	era	that	required	massive	investments	in	infrastructure,	the	deadlock	between	anglophone	Upper	Canada	and	francophone	Lower	Canada	“demonstrated	the	inadequacy	of	existing	institutions	and	structures	of	government.”17	In	unity,	the	colonies	might	find	strength	–	and	vaguely	common	cause.	Howe	could	not	fight	the	tide.					In	May	1867,	deeply	disillusioned,	he	returned	to	Canada.	His	faith	in	the	wisdom	of	the	Mother	Country	was	shaken.	But	he	had	learned	little.	When	the	Dominion	of	Canada	came	into	existence	on	July	1,	New	Brunswick	received	a	so-called	“special	grant”	for	which	there	was	“no	determinable	basis…except	as	the	price	to	bring	it	into	union.”18	There	was	no	special	grant	for	Nova	Scotia.	In	September	1867,	Howe	won	election	as	an	anti-confederate	MP	to	the	House	of	Commons.	After	the	first	session	of	that	first	Dominion	Parliament,	he	rashly	led	a	Nova	Scotia	delegation	for	repeal	back	to	Britain	between	February	and	July	1868.	“He	got	only	one	concession,”	notes	his	biographer	J.	Murray	Beck.	“[T]he	colonial	secretary	agreed	to	ask	the	dominion	government	to	review	the	impact	of	its	taxation,	trade,	and	fishing	policies	on	Nova	Scotia	with	a	view	to	their	modification.”19	Back	in	Canada,	in	December	1868,	he	finally	gave	up	hope.	
																																																								17	Kenneth	Norrie,	Douglas	Owram	and	J.C.	Herbert	Emery,	The	History	of	the	
Canadian	Economy,	fourth	edition.	(Toronto:	Nelson,	Thomson,	2008)	p.	143.	18	Review	of	Dominion	Provincial	Financial	Arrangements,”	3.		19	J.	Murray	Beck	on	Joseph	Howe	in	the	Dictionary	of	Canadian	Biography:			http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/howe_joseph_10E.html		
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						A	month	later,	after	years	of	protest,	he	and	his	fellow	Nova	Scotia	MP	Archibald	W.	McLelan	secured	a	financial	agreement	with	Finance	Minister	John	Rose	that	promised	“better	terms.”	The	province	received	special	grants	of	$83,000	per	year	–	and	Ottawa	increased	the	per-capita	basis	for	the	beleaguered	province’s	“debt	allowance,”	an	arcane	subsidy	that	initially	rewarded	more	frugal	provinces	for	lower	debts.	In	both	Nova	Scotia	and	New	Brunswick,	federal	subsidies	amounted	to	80	per	cent	to	90	per	cent	of	provincial	budgets.	In	Ontario	and	Quebec,	where	natural	resource	revenues	were	significant,	they	accounted	for	one-half	to	two-thirds	of	revenues.								Howe	had	done	his	best	–	or,	depending	on	the	point	of	view,	his	worst.	He	had	certainly	demonstrated	that	the	arcane	business	of	federal	subsidies	to	member	states	could	evoke	fierce	emotions	and	endanger	the	political	peace.	In	1873,	in	a	somewhat	ironic	denouement,	he	accepted	a	federal	appointment	as	Lieutenant	Governor	of	Nova	Scotia.	Less	than	three	weeks	later,	on	June	1,	he	died	at	age	sixty-eight	at	Government	House	in	Halifax.			
Howe’s	Legacy							Howe	did	bequeath	his	keen	grasp	of	the	pivotal	role	of	fiscal	matters	in	federations	to	his	successors.	But	he	would	likely	have	been	shocked	to	learn	how	much	wisdom	and	guile	would	be	required	over	the	ensuing	decades	to	adjust	the	skein	of	subsidies	and	grants	that	tied	the	nation	together.	Until	the	introduction	of	equalization	in	1957,	that	system	would	consist	mainly	of	per-capita	subsidies	coupled	with	ad	hoc	subsidies	to	individual	provinces	or,	later,	grants	hammered	
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out	during	one-on-one	five-year	tax	rental	deals.	As	Howe	had	predicted,	it	would	be	an	untidy,	slapdash	system	that	created	winners	and	losers	among	the	provinces	–	and	endangered	social	cohesion	within	the	nation-state.	As	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations	characterized	the	arrangements	in	1940:	The	system	of	subsidies	was	“chaotic	and	illogical.”20						Provincial	politicians	would	lean	on	federal	politicians.	Depending	on	the	strength	of	their	lobbying	–	and	the	dizzying	proximity	of	an	election	–	they	could	secure	more	funds.	The	federal	government	was	perched	amid	this	web,	holding	the	disparate	strings,	as	the	key	player	in	arrangements	with	the	Haves	and	the	Have-Nots.	As	American	political	scientist	Theda	Skocpol	has	observed,	elected	politicians	and	appointed	officials	are	independent	actors:	They	"look	for	ways	to	aggregate	or	compromise	the	interests	of	diverse	groups	who	have	various	non-overlapping	resources.”21							Or,	as	political	scientist	Donald	Smiley	noted:	“Only	the	state-centred	view	of	Canadian	federalism	can	explain	the	assertiveness	and	aggressiveness	of	the	provinces	other	than	Quebec.”22	That	is:	all	provincial	governments	competed	for	federal	cash	while	playing	self-aggrandizing	roles	and	emphasizing	their	political	
																																																								20	As	quoted	in	David	Milne,	“Equalization	And	The	Politics	Of	Restraint”	in	Equalization:	Its	Contribution	to	Canada’s	Economic	and	Fiscal	Progress,	eds.	Robin	W.	Boadway	and	Paul	A.	R.	Hobson	(Kingston:	John	Deutsch	Institute	For	The	Study	Of	Economic	Policy,	Queen’s	University1997)	p.	182.	21	Theda	Skocpol,	Protecting	Soldiers	and	Mothers:	The	Political	Origins	of	Social	
Policy	in	the	United	States,	(Cambridge,	Massachusetts:	The	Belknap	Press	of	Harvard	University	Press,	1992)	29	22	Donald	Smiley,	“Federal	States	And	Federal	Societies,	With	Special	Reference	To	Canada”	in	International	Political	Science	Review,	Vol	5,	No.	4,	1984.	p.	447	
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clout.	If	politicians	are	lucky,	they	learn	the	art	of	the	mollifying	deal	–	if	only	to	guarantee	their	own	political	stability	and	survival.								There	was	no	neutral	commission	to	arbitrate	between	Ottawa	and	its	petitioners.	There	was	no	set	formula	for	aid.	Few	cited	the	perils	of	provincial	dependency	or	the	moral	value	of	inter-governmental	sharing.	The	provision	of	extra	funds	was	a	tough,	pragmatic	political	compromise.	Ottawa	would	make	its	decision	after	a	province	pleaded	its	case	for	more	cash,	which	included	citing	everything	from	the	unfairness	of	Confederation	itself	to	immediate	fiscal	need.								Confederation	finances	were	always	contentious.	In	1864,	during	rounds	of	hard	bargaining	over	the	federation’s	proposed	revenues	and	responsibilities,	Upper	Canadian	politicians	urged	Maritime	finance	ministers	to	reduce	their	bottom-line	revenue	needs	to	a	bare	minimum.23	Those	estimates	took	little	account	of	any	province’s	social	responsibilities,	especially	toward	its	poorer	citizens.24	But	those	estimates	became	a	rough	basis	for	calculating	the	three	principal	subsidies	at	Confederation	in	1867:	the	then-substantial	per-capita	grants,	the	subsidies	to	meet	the	cost	of	governance	and	the	debt	allowances.	The	Fathers	of	Confederation	made	a	trade-off:	Ottawa	would	pay	a	fixed	amount	in	per-capita	subsidies	and	collect	all	customs	and	excise	duties,	which	would	be	the	main	source	of	federal	funds.		
																																																								23	E.	A.	Heamon,	Tax,	Order,	and	Good	Government:	A	New	Political	History	of	Canada,	
1867-1917	(Montreal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2017)	p.	44.	24	Heamon	describes	Sir	John	A.	Macdonald’s	notion	of	accountability	to	the	citizenry	as	“quasi-patrician…studiously	ignorant	of	and	callous	towards	the	scantily-propertied.”	p.	460.	
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						At	the	time,	it	seemed	like	a	fair	deal,	at	least	to	the	pro-Unionists,	whose	newspapers	chronicled	“glittering	predictions	of	state-driven	wealth.”25	In	contrast,	the	anti-Unionists	viewed	estimates	of	the	money	that	would	flow	from	the	Maritime	governments	to	Ottawa	as	“murkier…[and]	saw	much	evidence	for	quasi-imperial	and	predatory	taxation.”26	They	were	correct:	six	decades	after	Confederation,	economist	J.	A.	Maxwell	calculated	that	Nova	Scotia	lost	90	per	cent	of	its	revenue	with	Confederation,	“but	only	about	55	per	cent	of	its	spending	responsibilities.”27							Problems	were	almost	predictable.	The	exact	amounts	of	subsidy	per	person	were	spelled	out	in	the	Constitution,	and	Ottawa	clung	to	the	1861	census	for	many	provinces	to	determine	the	number	of	residents.	As	new	provinces	such	as	Manitoba	joined	Canada,	they	had	their	per-capita	subsidies	limited	by	population	caps.	But	the	economy	and	the	population	were	growing.	Premiers	in	the	later	decades	of	the	19th	century	–	along	with	their	citizens	–	literally	paid	for	their	predecessors’	controversial	bargain.									The	trouble	was	that	the	Constitution	could	not	freeze	time.	In	1867,	provincial	subsidies	consumed	twenty	per	cent	of	federal	revenues.	By	1887,	as	Ottawa’s	customs	revenues	grew,	per-capita	provincial	subsidies	were	only	thirteen	per	cent	
																																																								25	E.	A.	Heamon,	Tax,	Order,	and	Good	Government:	A	New	Political	History	of	Canada,	
1867-1917,	p.	58.	26	E.	A.	Heamon,	Tax,	Order,	and	Good	Government:	A	New	Political	History	of	Canada,	
1867-1917,	p.	58.	27	As	cited	in	E.	A.	Heamon,	Tax,	Order,	and	Good	Government:	A	New	Political	History	
of	Canada,	1867-1917,	p.	58.	
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of	federal	revenues.28	And	the	subsidies	were	theoretically	set	in	stone.		A	federal	discussion	paper	would	later	explain	the	19th	century	subsidy	hodge-podge	to	baffled	mid-20th	century	politicians:	“Serious	depression	conditions	which	lasted	for	almost	a	quarter	century	following	1873	also	brought	the	provinces	continually	to	Ottawa	for	better	terms.	Many	revisions	were	made,	despite	the	fact	that	the	financial	provisions	of	the	British	North	America	Act	were	specifically	stated	to	be	in	‘full	and	final	settlement’	of	any	claims	of	the	provinces	on	the	Dominion.”29	To	deal	with	this	constitutional	stalemate,	Ottawa	simply	shuffled	the	inputs	into	its	subsidy	calculations:	it	would	increase	the	estimated	number	of	people	in	a	province	to	push	up	its	per	capita	payments;	it	would	increase	the	amount	of	allowable	debt.	With	new	provinces,	there	were	new	arrangements	to	foster	social	cohesion.								But	Ottawa	would	not,	and	probably	could	not,	change	the	system.	The	Premiers	realized	that	they	had	to	take	action.	In	October	1887,	Quebec’s	Liberal	Premier	Honoré	Mercier	invited	the	First	Ministers	to	a	conference	on	provincial	rights	in	Quebec	City.	No	fool,	Prime	Minister	Sir	John	A.	Macdonald	refused	to	attend.	The	Premiers	unanimously	adopted	twenty-two	detailed	resolutions,	including	demands	for	higher	subsidies	because	the	current	payments	“have	proved	totally	inadequate,”	and	sent	them	to	Ottawa.30	Significantly,	the	Premiers	demanded	equal	increases	for	each	province,	based	solely	on	census	estimates.	There	was	no	provision	for	special	treatment	for	the	poorer	provinces	in	their	request.	Sir	John	A.	simply	ignored	them.																																																												28	Resolution	17,	Interprovincial	Conference	in	1887	in	Quebec	City	in	Dominion	
Provincial	and	Interprovincial	Conferences	from	1887	to	1926.	(Ottawa:	Reprinted	by	Edmond	Cloutier	King’s	Printer,	1951).	p.	24.	29	Review	of	Dominion	Provincial	Financial	Arrangements,”	3-4.		30	Dominion	Provincial	and	Interprovincial	Conferences	From	1887	to	1926.	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	King’s	Printer	and	Controller	of	Stationery,	1951)	p.	24.	
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						But	that	did	not	quell	the	increasing	unrest.	In	1902,	another	Interprovincial	Conference	requested	a	subsidy	increase.	Prime	Minister	Sir	Wilfrid	Laurier	deftly	shelved	that	demand.	In	October	1906,	when	the	Premiers	once	again	demanded	more	money,	Laurier	yielded	–	partly	because	the	provinces	genuinely	needed	more	funds.	But	any	changes	to	the	basic	subsidy	required	a	Constitutional	amendment,	because	the	existing	amounts	were	itemized	in	the	Constitution.	And	Britain	had	to	approve	any	amendments.							The	Constitution	Act	of	1907	spelled	out	a	new	formula	with	higher	specific	numbers:	the	subsidy	would	increase	as	provincial	populations	grew;	the	maximum	amount	would	take	effect	when	the	population	in	any	province	reached	1.5-million.	Laurier	also	granted	an	extra	$100,000	per	year	for	ten	years	to	British	Columbia	–	partly	because	Premier	Richard	McBride	had	demanded	exceptional	treatment.	McBride	argued	that	the	per-capita	cost	of	running	his	government	was	five	times	higher	than	the	average	costs	in	other	provinces,	and	it	had	been	that	way	for	thirty	years.	The	Premier	had	disputed	the	very	notion	of	provincial	fiscal	equality	–	and	won	a	temporary	concession.							But,	and	this	is	pivotal,	there	was	no	thought	of	a	permanent	formal	remedy	for	fiscal	inequality.	And	no	province	spoke	of	new	social	programs:	As	their	populations	grew,	they	could	barely	handle	their	current	responsibilities.						Laurier	craved	harmony.	Higher	subsidies	would	purportedly	allow	the	Premiers	to	tackle	the	wrenching	problems	of	their	industrializing	age.	He	also	wanted	an	end	to	the	persistent	lobbying.	The	schedule	of	his	Constitution	Act	declared	that	the	
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subsidy	levels	constituted	“a	final	and	unalterable	settlement.”31	It	was	folly	to	think	that	this	could	last	–	when	provincial	populations	were	growing	and	inflation	was	nibbling	away	at	the	value	of	the	currency.	Although	such	provinces	as	Manitoba	would	subsequently	win	extra	cash	through	one-on-one	negotiations,	the	provisions	of	the	Constitution	Act	1907	would	endure	throughout	the	early	20th	century	boom	and	the	horrors	of	World	War	One.	Somehow,	despite	the	wartime	conflict	between	francophone	and	anglophone	Canada	over	conscription,	the	federation	endured.	But	the	federation	partners	were	jealous	and	suspicious	of	each	other	–	and	that	concoction	was	dangerous	to	social	cohesion	and	political	stability.				Australia	Pays	Attention													Half	a	world	away,	Australia	was	watching.	“Of	all	other	federations	the	one	that	most	resembles	Canada	is	Australia,”	Canadian	taxation	expert	Harvey	Perry	wrote	in	1960.	”The	two	countries	have	in	common	the	basic	British	institutions	of	government,	and	a	catalogue	of	the	geographic,	economic,	cultural	and	social	characteristics	of	one	applies	with	only	slight	modification	to	the	other.”32	In	the	early	1900s,	Australia	was	also	discovering	that	it	was	difficult	to	preserve	its	federation	bargain.	Like	the	provinces	in	its	sister	Dominion	of	Canada,	the	six	states	
																																																								31	British	North	America	Act,	1907.	Schedule.		32	Harvey	Perry,	“Foreword”	in	Eric	J.	Hanson,	Australian	Commonwealth	Grants	
Commission:	A	Quarter	Century	of	Fiscal	Judgement.	(Toronto:	Canadian	Tax	Foundation,	1960.	i.	
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that	had	joined	together	on	January	1,	1901	to	form	the	Commonwealth	of	Australia	differed	widely	in	“area,	climate,	topography,	development	and	natural	resources.”33							Unlike	Canada,	Australia	had	a	nascent	but	explicit	form	of	equalization	from	the	start.	To	compensate	for	variations	in	fiscal	strength	among	the	state	governments,	the	Australian	Constitution	allowed	the	central	Commonwealth	Government	to	provide	assistance	to	any	needy	applicant	“on	such	terms	and	conditions	as	the	Parliament	thinks	fit.”34	Nation	building	required	an	ethic	of	sharing	along	with	a	semblance	of	fiscal	equality	–	if	only	because	many	states	blamed	the	very	act	of	federation	for	their	fiscal	plight.	But	there	was	no	official	mechanism	or	formula.						The	states	were	not	slow	in	lining	up	at	the	Commonwealth’s	doors	for	assistance.	Western	Australia,	with	its	sprawling	Outback	and	largely	unexplored	resource	wealth,	was	the	first	to	receive	“relatively	small”	grants	in	1910-1911.35	Two	years	later,	the	isolated	island	state	of	Tasmania,	which	dangled	off	the	southeastern	coast	of	the	mainland,	was	the	second	to	qualify,	pocketing	between	85,000	and	95,000	British	pounds	per	year.	In	the	mid-1920s,	the	procedure	to	determine	the	size	of	the	grants	changed.	After	years	of	complaints	about	political	interference,	Parliament	shuffled	that	task	to	the	Commonwealth	Treasury	department	and	to	special	commissions	established	by	successive	federal	governments.	In	1929-1930,	South	Australia	with	its	barren	outback	desert	and																																																									33	“The	Work	of	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission”	in	Commonwealth	Grants	
Commission	memo,	December	8,1944,	National	Archives	of	Australia.	Series	A2770,	file	24.	2.	34	Commonwealth	of	Australia	Constitution	Act,	1900,	Section	96.		35	“The	Work	of	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission”	in	Commonwealth	Grants	
Commission	memo,	December	8,1944,	National	Archives	of	Australia.	Series	A2770,	file	24.	p.	1.	
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rugged	coastline	joined	the	queue	for	cash.	The	parallels	with	Canada	were	striking.	And	yet	harmony	remained	stubbornly	elusive.							As	a	later	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	memo	would	report,	Australia’s	recourse	to	ad	hoc	solutions	throughout	the	1920s	and	early	1930s	simply	did	not	work:	This	[ad	hoc]	procedure,	however,	had	many	weaknesses.	The	appointment	of	different	personnel	to	the	various	bodies	set	up,	and	the	absence	of	any	consistent	or	uniform	approach	to	the	problems	of	the	weaker	States,	caused	concern	to	successive	Governments.	Moreover,	since	those	special	bodies	investigated	the	conditions	of	the	applicant	State	only,	it	was	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	to	establish	principles	and	methods	of	assessment	which	could	be	applied	uniformly	to	any	State	at	any	time.	Those	conditions	gave	rise	to	increasing	dissatisfaction	in	the	three	States,	viz.,	South	Australia,	Western	Australia	and	Tasmania,	and	the	impact	of	the	world	depression,	which	reached	its	peak	in	or	about	1931-32,	increased	their	difficulties.36							Even	at	the	time,	the	Commonwealth	Government	understood	that	fiscal	inequality	among	the	states	was	a	serious	problem	that	could	threaten	political	stability	and	social	cohesion	–	and	there	was	no	immediate	prospect	of	long-term	solutions.	On	November	5,	1924,	Prime	Minister	Stanley	Melbourne	Bruce	appointed	a	Royal	Commission	on	the	Finances	of	Western	Australia	as	Affected	by	Federation.							The	three	commissioners	promptly	requested	copies	of	the	British	Financial	Mission	report	on	Brazil,	which	had	theoretically	been	a	federation	since	1891.	The	39-page	report	to	the	Brazilian	president,	presented	in	February	1924,	noted	that																																																									36	“The	Work	of	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission”	in	Commonwealth	Grants	
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the	federal	government	was	enmeshed	in	battles	over	loan	guarantees	that	it	had	offered	to	the	states	for	infrastructure	work.	“The	Brazilian	Government	should	either	make	itself	directly	responsible	for	the	undertaking	and	arrange	the	finance	directly,”	the	report	observed,	“or	should	refuse	to	give	its	guarantee	where	its	control	is	difficult	and	limited.”37									State	borrowing	would	become	an	important	issue:	Canada’s	federal	government	would	confront	a	similar	quandary	in	the	mid-1930s.	The	Royal	Commission	on	Western	Australia	also	obtained	a	copy	of	the	Baxter	Commission	report	from	May	1923	on	financial	relations	between	several	provinces	and	the	Union	Government	of	South	Africa,	which	had	been	a	federation	since	1909.	As	Canada	would	later	do,	the	Australians	were	researching	their	situation,	canvassing	other	federations	for	their	financial	experience	and	expertise.							The	ensuing	report	on	Western	Australia	in	September	1925	substantiated	the	Commonwealth	Government’s	concerns.	State	residents	were	talking	angrily	about	secession,	which	a	newspaper	“of	wide	circulation…sedulously	fostered.”38	Commission	Chair	Stephen	Mills	rued	the	talk	of	secession	“which	has	obtained	a	degree	of	acceptance	that	cannot	be	dismissed	as	insignificant.”39	Commissioner	John	Entwistle	was	even	blunter:	“In	my	opinion	Western	Australia	should	never	have	entered	the	Federation,	but,	having	done	so,	there	is,	I	feel	convinced,	only	one																																																									37	Report	Submitted	to	His	Excellency	the	President	of	the	United	States	of	Brazil,	February	23,	1924	in	Brazil	–	Report	of	British	Financial	Mission,	Australian	Prime	Minister’s	Department,	Series	number	CP660/17,	control	symbol	Bundle	1/Brazil.		34.	38	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	the	Finances	of	Western	Australia	as	affected	by	
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complete	and	satisfactory	remedy	for	her	present	disabilities,	viz.,	Secession…As,	however,	it	cannot	be	taken	for	granted	that	Secession	will	take	place,	I	have	joined	in	recommendations	having	the	object	of	relieving	(at	least	to	some	extent)	the	present	financial	disabilities.”40							To	cite	the	approach	of	Italian	Marxist	theoretician	Antonio	Gramsci,	such	talk	of	secession	among	the	largely	British-born	miners	and	their	families	in	Western	Australia,	as	well	as	the	descendants	of	transported	convict	laborers,	put	pressure	on	the	commissioners	themselves	and	on	the	elites	in	Melbourne,	which	remained	the	capital	until	1927.	Change	was	necessary	to	maintain	their	cultural	and	political	hegemony	in	fiscally	unequal	states	–	and	to	keep	the	political	peace.							The	commissioners	concluded	that	the	Commonwealth	Government’s	protectionist	policy	had	hurt	the	State’s	primary	producers	–	but	the	federation’s	customs	duties	could	not	be	lowered	“without	injuring	the	secondary	industries	of	the	Eastern	States.”41	They	were	in	a	quandary.	Two	commissioners	recommended	that	Western	Australia	regain	the	right	to	impose	its	own	tariff	for	twenty-five	years.	The	third	commissioner	dismissed	that	notion:	Individual	state	barriers	to	trade	would	only	lead	to	“a	less	prosperous	people	and	a	fuller	State	Treasury.”42								The	fastest	way	to	placate	this	dangerous	dissatisfaction	over	inequality	among	the	states	–	as	it	would	become	in	Canada	so	often	in	the	future	–	was	more	money.	But	no	one	could	agree	on	why	the	state	merited	these	funds.	Many	state	petitioners	had	argued	that	they	needed	more	money	because	the	federation	was	inherently																																																									40	Report.	x.	41	Report,	vii.	42	Report,	cxi.	
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unfair.	The	Commissioners	dodged	that	issue.	They	simply	recognized	that	the	state	treasury	could	use	more	cash	to	meet	such	increasing	needs	as	technical	training.	They	could	not	agree	on	the	exact	amount:	two	recommended	a	special	payment	of	450,000	pounds	per	year	if	the	state	did	not	regain	the	right	to	levy	its	own	tariff;	the	third	recommended	300,000	pounds	per	year.43	The	Commonwealth	settled	on	a	smaller	grant	than	the	majority	recommended	–	but	that	funding	stretched	over	five	years.44	Canada	was	already	a	minor	model:	In	the	Royal	Commission’s	consideration	of	such	state	complaints	as	the	need	for	more	grants-in-aid	for	technical	education	and	term	limits	for	Parliamentary	members,	the	report	cited	policies	in	Canada	and	the	United	Kingdom.45				
Mackenzie	King	Tackles	Regional	Woes…Belatedly					In	Canada,	Prime	Minister	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King	faced	regional	dissatisfaction	as	provinces	struggled	to	provide	more	services	to	their	citizens	in	the	anxious	post-World	War	One	world.	Crammed	into	cities,	cut	off	from	the	traditional	supports	that	extended	families	could	provide,	many	Canadians	were	beleaguered.	Their	society	was	changing	around	them.	The	skills	and	education	required	to	succeed	in	the	workplace	were	escalating.	Where	were	the	additional	funds	for	everything	from	education	to	expanded	mothers’	allowances?	What	about																																																									43	Report.	x.	44	Jim	Hancock	and	Julie	Smith,	Financing	The	Federation.	(Adelaide:	The	South	Australian	Centre	For	Economic	Studies,	2001)	28.	https://www.adelaide.edu.au/saces/publications/reports/consultancy/FinancingtheFederation.pdf	45	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	the	Finances	of	Western	Australia	as	affected	by	
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improved	basic	public	health	care	in	a	nation	that	had	just	come	through	the	lethal	Spanish	Influenza	epidemic?	There	never	seemed	to	be	enough	resources	for	a	society	that	was	changing	faster	than	the	capacity	of	any	government	to	address	those	needs.								The	poorer	provinces	could	not	cope	with	the	strain	of	inequality.	In	1923,	in	Halifax,	Conservative	MLA	H.	W.	Corning	demanded	a	referendum	on	Nova	Scotia’s	secession	from	Canada,	and	the	creation	of	an	independent	self-governing	British	Dominion.	Ottawa	was	violating	the	“spirit	of	the	Confederation	compact:”	Nova	Scotia	was	not	receiving	fair	treatment	in	“freight	rates,	railway	shipping	and	other	activities	upon	which	the	prosperity	of	the	Province	depended.”46	Worse,	Corning	maintained,	Nova	Scotia	“was	forced	to	support	the	policy	of	protective	duties	that	were	mainly	beneficial	to	upper	Provinces,	while	increasing	the	cost	of	living	at	home	with	no	balancing	benefits.”47	It	is	fair	to	speculate	that	Joseph	Howe	would	have	been	so	proud	of	his	political	comrade	in	the	battle	against	inequality.	But	such	complaints	–	and	the	suggested	remedies	–	were	fraying	social	cohesion	and	political	stability.					King	really	did	not	understand	Atlantic	Canada	and	its	already	potent	Maritime	Rights	movement	with	its	complaints	about	unfair	federal	treatment	of	the	provincial	governments.	For	decades,	Maritime	governments	had	grumbled	about	low	subsidies,	their	diminishing	political	clout,	and	Ottawa’s	offhanded	neglect.	But,	in	the	1920s,	Maritimers	nursed	a	new	and	dangerous	grievance.	Regional																																																									46	As	paraphrased	in	“Wants	Nova	Scotia	Separate	Dominion”	in	The	Globe,	Friday,	April	20,	1923.	Page	one..		47	As	paraphrased	in	“Wants	Nova	Scotia	Separate	Dominion”	in	The	Globe,	Friday,	April	20,	1923.	page	one.		
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manufacturers	had	survived	Ottawa’s	high	tariff	walls	because	the	Moncton-based	Intercolonial	Railway	had	provided	low-cost	transportation	since	the	late	1870s.	Maritime	manufacturers	could	compete	in	Western	and	Central	Canada	because	their	freight	rates	were	twenty-to-thirty-per-cent	lower	than	those	in	Ontario.48	Capital	investment	in	Maritime	manufacturing	had	actually	quadrupled	between	1900	and	1920.49						When	the	war	ended,	however,	the	federal	government	had	combined	the	nation’s	struggling	railroads	into	one	entity,	and	then	clamped	the	well-regarded	Maritime	railroad	under	the	jurisdiction	of	its	Board	of	Railway	Commissioners.	When	Central	Canadian	manufacturers	and	Prairie	farmers	demanded	lower	freight	rates	like	those	on	the	Intercolonial,	Ottawa	simply	hiked	Maritime	rates.	Worse,	in	1920,	the	railway	commissioners	had	raised	national	freight	rates	by	forty	per	cent.	Between	1916	and	September	1920,	Maritime	freight	rates	had	risen	between	140	and	216	per	cent.50					Atlantic	Canada	seethed.	Merchants	were	devastated.	The	protest	against	freight	rates	pulled	together	labour	and	business	groups,	along	with	farmers	and	fishermen,	
against	the	rest	of	the	country.51	In	the	1921	federal	election,	the	Liberals	exploited																																																									48	E.	R.	Forbes,	“The	Origins	of	the	Maritime	Rights	Movement”	in	Challenging	the	
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this	anger	over	inequality:	King	went	on	to	capture	twenty-five	of	the	region’s	thirty-one	ridings	in	a	protest	vote	against	Conservative	rate	hikes.	But	then,	typically,	King	dawdled	–	and	the	intensifying	Maritime	identity	as	a	victim	of	Confederation’s	inequalities	grew	even	stronger.	In	September	1923,	Prince	Edward	Island	voters	replaced	their	Liberal	government	with	a	Conservative	one.	By	1925,	the	price	of	inaction	was	apparent.	In	late	June,	Nova	Scotia’s	Liberal	government	fell,	and	Conservative	Premier	Edgar	Rhodes	promised	to	stop	the	flight	of	young	people	to	other	regions	in	search	of	better	jobs.	In	mid-August,	New	Brunswick	voters	also	ousted	the	Liberals;	the	new	Conservative	Premier	John	Baxter	was	a	strong	advocate	of	Maritime	Rights,	including	freight-rate	reductions.	Three	provincial	Liberal	governments	had	now	fallen	within	three	years.	In	the	federal	election	of	October	29,	1925,	the	Liberals	slipped	from	twenty-three	Maritime	seats	to	six.	It	was	only	four	short	years	since	King	had	romped	to	victory	in	the	Maritimes	by	exploiting	the	very	wave	of	discontent	that	had	now	swamped	him.								Voters	in	the	three	Maritime	Provinces	–	and	their	Premiers	–	had	sent	a	strong	message	about	the	depth	of	Maritime	discontent.	With	little	indication	of	a	response	to	their	complaints	about	fiscal	inequality,	they	had	damaged	the	Liberal	Party	elite’s	political	clout.	Prime	Minister	King	would	later	bluntly	summarize	his	peacemaking	priorities:	“We	began	with	the	Maritimes	when	they	were	in	a	state	of	insurgency.”52	The	Prime	Minister	fell	back	on	the	reliable	device	of	a	Royal	Commission.	Theoretically,	as	political	scientist	Adam	Ashforth	maintains,	Royal																																																									52	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King	to	Queen’s	University	Professor	Norman	McLeod	Rogers,	January	25,	1930.	LAC.	Prime	Ministers”	Fonds.	C2322.	Volume	180.	Reference	number	MG26	J1.	153886.	
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Commissions	can	be	viewed	as	“schemes	of	legitimation”:	their	conclusions	constitute	discourse	that	allows	the	state	to	take	collective	action	–	because	that	action	has	now	become	“thinkable,	and	therefore	organizable.”53	In	this	case,	King	needed	to	prod	his	cabinet	into	an	understanding	of	the	East’s	profound	sense	of	inequality	compared	to	the	other	provinces.					On	April	7,	1926,	the	Prime	Minister	proudly	unveiled	his	three-man	Royal	Commission,	chaired	by	British	industrialist	Sir	Andrew	Duncan,	to	report	on	Maritime	claims.	It	was	“most	undesirable,”	King	declared,	that	Maritime	residents	should	believe	that	their	interests	were	“being	knowingly	prejudiced.”54	The	Duncan	Commission	would	scrutinize	freight	rates	on	the	former	Intercolonial	Railway,	and	look	at	how	federal	policies	such	as	customs	duties	affected	the	three	provinces.	Maritimers	were	elated:	it	seemed	that	Ottawa	was	finally	addressing	their	problems	within	the	federation.	Such	scrutiny,	The	Halifax	Herald	reported,	would	“ensure	a	return	of	contentment	and	prosperity.”55							On	the	day	after	that	announcement	King	witnessed	the	depth	of	Maritime	rage	at	such	economic	and	fiscal	inequality.	He	had	not	grasped	the	threats	to	social	cohesion	and	his	government’s	very	survival.	On	the	afternoon	of	April	8,	however,	he	met	with	a	young	man	from	Nova	Scotia,	whom	he	did	not	identify	in	his	diary																																																									53	Adam	Ashforth,	Abstract	of	“Reckoning	Schemes	of	Legitimation:	On	Commissions	of	Inquiry	as	Power/Knowledge	Forms”	in	Journal	of	Historical	Sociology,	Vol.	3,	No.	1,	March	1990.	1.	54	“Sir	Andrew	Duncan	Heads	Commission	of	Investigation”	in	The	Halifax	Herald,	Thursday,	April	8,	1926.	LAC,	Prime	Ministers’	Fonds.	C3457.	Volume	102.	Reference	number	MG26	I.	58487.		55	“Sir	Andrew	Duncan	Heads	Commission	of	Investigation”	in	The	Halifax	Herald,	Thursday,	April	8,	1926.	LAC,	Prime	Ministers’	Fonds.	C3457.	Volume	102.	Reference	number	MG26	I.	58487.		
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but	who	was	probably	a	journalist.	“Sinclair	of	N.	S.	astonished	me	by	speaking	of	the	strength	of	the	secessionist	movement	in	the	Maritimes,”	King	wrote.	“It	is	a	sort	of	council	of	despair.”	[sic]56	Maritimers	lacked	markets,	and	“their	people	are	leaving	for	the	U.S.	largely.	There	is	need	for	radical	change	in	freight	rates	&	tariff	policy.”57			Chair	Sir	Andrew	Duncan	delivered	his	report	in	September	1926,	although	it	was	not	tabled	in	the	House	of	Commons	until	December	10	of	that	year.	In	a	precedent	that	Australians	would	later	note,	Duncan	declared	that	the	Maritimes	Provinces	were	partly	responsible	for	their	own	woes.	More	important,	in	another	precedent	for	Australia,	he	firmly	refused	to	blame	Confederation	for	the	plight	of	relatively	unequal	prosperity	and	development	among	the	provinces:	We	are	unable	to	take	the	view	that	Confederation	is,	of	itself,	responsible	for	this	fact….	Even	within	Confederation	there	has	been	such	a	measure	of	responsibility	resting	on	each	province	for	its	own	development	that	much	at	least	of	what	has	happened	within	the	Maritime	Provinces	must	be	related	to	their	responsibility	and	not	the	responsibility	of	the	Dominion….	If	there	are	directions	in	which	the	Maritime	Provinces	have	not	progressed,	or	have	declined	since	1867,	there	are	many	more	directions	in	which	they	have	made	enormous	advances,	and	if	the	former	are	all	to	be	ascribed	to	Confederation	merely	on	the	general	argument	of	‘After	the	event	therefore	on	account	of	the	event’,	just	as	much	must	be	the	latter.58																																																											56	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Thursday,	April	8,	1926.		http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/001059-119.02-e.php?&page_id_nbr=9805&interval=20&&&PHPSESSID=5dmic1fije5c1beg7ikvj8vlu7	57	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Thursday,	April	8,	1926.		http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/001059-119.02-e.php?&page_id_nbr=9805&interval=20&&&PHPSESSID=5dmic1fije5c1beg7ikvj8vlu7	58	Sir	Andrew	Rae	Duncan,	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission	On	Maritime	Claims	(Ottawa:	F.	A.	Acland,	Printer	to	the	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1926)	9,	10.		
	 	 	 	 	73	
					Three	decades	later,	the	equalization	program	would	adopt	Duncan’s	refusal	to	blame	the	act	of	federation	in	1867	for	present-day	inequalities.	Still,	the	Commission’s	thirty-nine	prescriptions	were	generous.	The	Commissioners	called	for	an	interim	lump	sum	increase	in	the	federal	subsidy,	pending	in-depth	federal	examination.	They	also	called	for	immediate	freight	rate	reductions	of	twenty	per	cent	and	renewed	transportation	subsidies	for	Maritime	coal.	Although	King	worried	that	Duncan	had	“gone	too	far”	on	subsidies,	the	report	suited	his	strategic	requirements	perfectly:	“All	I	need	to	do	is	to	stand	firm	on	this	report,	and	count	on	getting	back	Maritime	support	to	keep	us	strong	in	future	years.”59					In	the	spring	of	1927,	however,	King’s	cabinet	objected	to	the	cost	of	Duncan’s	plan.	Maritime	scholar	Ernest	R.	Forbes	argues	that	the	cabinet	“changed	Duncan’s	program	for	Maritime	rehabilitation	into	a	plan	for	Maritime	pacification.”60	King	raised	the	region’s	annual	subsidies	by	$1.6-million	–	“but	presented	them	only	as	temporary	grants	conditional	upon	Maritime	good	behavior”	–	and	cut	most	freight	rates	by	twenty	per	cent.	King	did	not	publicly	confirm	the	increase	as	permanent	until	all	provinces	supported	it	later	that	year.	In	the	interval,	he	was	able	to	fend	off	
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additional	claims.61	He	ignored	many	other	proposals.	But	he	shrewdly	declared	that	he	was	adopting	Duncan’s	measures	“virtually	in	their	entirety.”62		At	the	time,	few	Maritimers	noticed	the	gulf	between	what	he	said	and	what	he	did.								But	the	times	were	prosperous.	By	early	November,	at	a	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	King	could	afford	to	placate	all	the	poorer	provinces.	First,	the	nine	Provincial	Premiers	endorsed	the	Duncan	report,	ensuring	that	those	temporary	grants	became	permanent.63	That	special	increase	in	subsidies	to	handle	fiscal	inequalities	set	a	precedent	for	the	first	tentative	and	minuscule	version	of	equalization	in	the	tax-rental	agreements	of	the	1940s:	Maritimers	would	come	to	view	this	exception	to	the	theoretical	insistence	on	equal	fiscal	treatment	of	the	provinces	as	part	of	their	identity	as	Confederation	partners.					At	long	last,	harmony	prevailed.	At	that	same	1927	Conference,	King	also	secured	provincial	agreement	to	transfer	control	over	natural	resources	from	Ottawa	to	the	three	Prairie	Provinces.	That	put	them	in	a	position	of	constitutional	equality	with	the	other	six	provinces	after	six	decades	of	fierce	disputes.	The	nine	Premiers	also	refrained	from	any	objections	to	the	return	of	the	railway	lands	to	British	Columbia,	which	had	surrendered	them	to	Ottawa	in	the	19th	century	as	a	path	for	the	transcontinental	railroad.		
																																																								61	Ernest	R.	Forbes,	Maritime	Rights:	The	Maritime	Rights	Movement,	1919-1927:	A	
study	in	Canadian	Regionalism.	p.	176.	62	Ernest	R.	Forbes,	Maritime	Rights:	The	Maritime	Rights	Movement,	1919-1927:	A	
study	in	Canadian	Regionalism.	(Montreal:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	1979)	177.	63	Official	Précis	for	Wednesday	morning,	November	9,	1927.	Dominion-Provincial	
Conferences:	November	3-10,	1927;	December	9-13,	1935;	January	14-15,	1941.	(Ottawa:	Reprinted	by	Edmond	Cloutier,	King’s	Printer,	1951)	23.	
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				The	Duncan	Commission	would	become	a	model	for	nation-building	over	the	ensuing	decades.	The	Royal	Commission	allowed	politicians	to	take	collective	action	because	a	three-person	panel	with	expertise	on	the	issues	had	recommended	it.64	Although	King	would	also	resort	to	Royal	Commissions	as	a	way	to	temporize,	most	Commission	hearings	reinforced	national	bonds	anyway:	Witnesses	could	articulate	their	frustrations	to	commissioners	–	and	to	their	fellow	Canadians.	Theoretically	at	least,	mutual	understanding	among	the	regions	could	grow,	fostering	social	cohesion	and	political	stability.	But	it	would	be	an	uphill	battle.		
The	Australians	Take	Action						The	Duncan	Commission	would	also	represent	a	milestone	in	the	deepening	relationship	between	Australia	and	Canada	as	both	central	governments	scrutinized	each	other’s	approach	to	inequality.	On	July	27,	1928,	Australian	Prime	Minister	Stanley	Melbourne	Bruce	telegrammed	Prime	Minister	King:	“Would	be	grateful	for	twelve	copies	Royal	Commission	on	Maritime	Claims.	Would	also	be	glad	of	information	of	action	taken	thereon.	Similar	inquiry	here.”65	King	replied	promptly	in	the	terse	language	of	telegrams:	“Forwarding	today	twelve	copies	report	Royal	Commission	on	Maritime	Claims	also	Hansard	containing	statement	government	
																																																								64	Adam	Ashforth,	Abstract	of	“Reckoning	Schemes	of	Legitimation:	On	Commissions	of	Inquiry	as	Power/Knowledge	Forms”	in	Journal	of	Historical	Sociology,	Vol.	3,	No.	1,	March	1990.	1.	65	S.	M.	Bruce	to	Prime	Minister,	Ottawa,	Canada,	July	27th,	1928	in	General,	1928-29	
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policy.”66	A	day	later,	Bruce	formally	appointed	a	Royal	Commission	on	the	Finances	of	South	Australia	as	Affected	by	Federation.67							Once	again,	the	problem	was	the	structure	of	federalism	itself.	The	economies	of	the	individual	states	could	not	be	equal	because	of	their	unequal	circumstances.	As	Australian	historian	Russel	Ward	observed,	Prime	Minister	Bruce	had	adopted	the	practice	“of	making	special	or	‘extra’	grants	to	the	less	populous	and	prosperous	states.”68	Now	Bruce	needed	to	know:	How	was	that	slapdash	approach	to	grants	working?	How	had	the	financial	fortunes	of	the	South	Australia	state	evolved	since	federation?	After	all,	as	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	memo	reported	in	1944,	there	was	an	“absence	of	any	consistent	or	uniform	approach	to	the	problems	of	the	weaker	States.”69							The	Australians	were	also	examining	how	the	world’s	few	other	federations	were	coping.	In	mid-October,	anxious	for	information	about	the	American	approach	to	fiscal	inequality	among	the	states,	the	Royal	Commission	on	South	Australia	asked	Prime	Minister	Bruce	to	instruct	Australian	diplomats	in	the	United	States	to	find	out.	Their	diplomatic	letter	to	the	U.S.	Treasury	Department	went	unanswered	for	two	months:	Finally,	diplomats	received	a	reply	that	outlined	the	different	federal																																																									66	Mackenzie	King	to	Prime	Minister,	Canberra.	August	1,	1928.	in	General,	1928-29	
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departmental	expenditures	on	direct	payments	to	the	states	over	two	fiscal	years	along	with	references	to	two	academic	studies.	When	an	Australian	official	forwarded	the	U.S.	response	to	Canberra,	he	added	wearily:	“It	is	admitted	that…the	information	sent	forward	is	–	in	most	instances	–	wide	of	the	mark.”70	Still,	the	Royal	Commission	on	South	Australia	now	understood	that	the	American	federal	government	transferred	funds	–	albeit	in	a	haphazard	fashion	–	to	the	states	for	such	
specific	issues	as	rural	roads.	There	were	no	general	transfers	for	inequality.	That	model	for	handling	inequality	would	eventually	become	another	model	under	consideration	for	Canada	and	Australia.							Perhaps	ironically,	the	Australian	Royal	Commission	report	appeared	in	August	1929,	two	months	before	the	onset	of	the	Great	Depression.	As	economist	John	K.	Wilson	explains,	Australia	was	already	mired	in	economic	problems	prior	to	the	Wall	Street	crash	because	its	high	wages	hindered	its	exports	–	and	it	imported	many	capital	goods:	“In	1929,	British	lenders	adopted	a	more	stringent	view	of	the	Australian	capacity	to	service	debt,	and	towards	the	end	of	the	year	new	credit	effectively	stopped.”71	Historian	Ward,	in	turn,	dates	the	beginning	of	the	Australian	Depression	to	the	autumn	of	1928,	when	the	nation’s	“excessive	dependence	on	world	prices	for	wheat	and	wool”	hit	hard	when	prices	began	to	tumble.72		
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			The	Commission	report	on	South	Australia	was	succinct.	And,	while	citing	Canadian	and	American	precedents,	it	would	also	set	new	standards	for	Canada’s	handling	of	provincial	fiscal	inequalities	in	the	1930s.	Although	the	two	nations	would	look	closely	at	other	federations	such	as	Argentina,	they	were	becoming	so	intertwined	that	one	nation’s	report	would	cite	the	other’s	earlier	report	–	back	and	forth	-	as	they	grappled	with	the	challenges	posed	by	federalism.	The	Royal	Commission	report	noted	that	South	Australia	had	been	facing	“an	acute	and	pressing	problem”	before	the	establishment	of	the	Royal	Commission	in	July	1928.73							But	the	commissioners	did	not	blame	the	state’s	fiscal	woes	on	the	mere	act	of	federation.	Instead,	they	concluded	that	South	Australia’s	problems	arose	“chiefly	from	her	geographic	position,	her	adverse	natural	conditions	–	climate,	rainfall	and	natural	configuration	–	and	lack	of	natural	resources.”74	Then	they	reinforced	the	connection	with	Canada:	In	every	Federal	form	of	government	the	same	phenomena	appear.	The	advantages	and	disadvantages	follow	the	course	of	nature,	and	distribute	themselves	unevenly	as	between	the	member	States.	To	
balance	these	natural	inequalities,	it	is	found	necessary	to	make	
provision	from	time	to	time	for	some	form	of	compensation.	The	latest	instance	of	this	is	to	be	found	in	the	Report	of	the	Canadian	‘Royal	Commission	on	Maritime	Claims’	published	in	1927.	This	Royal	Commission	was	appointed	by	the	Canadian	Federal	Government…	The	result	was	a	recommendation	of	interim	lump	sum	increased	payments	amounting	to	£325,000	per	annum,	in	addition	to	many	other	suggestions	affording	relief….	The	same	principle	is	adopted	in	the	United	States	of	America.75																																																										73	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	the	Finances	of	South	Australia	as	Affected	by	Federation	Together	with	Appendices,	The	Parliament	of	the	Commonwealth	of	Australia,	1929.	National	Archives	of	Australia,	West	stack,	Call	number	NL.pf	336.942A938,	Enumeration	NL	pbk	c.1.	p.	8.	74	Report,	p.	18.	75	Report,	p.	18.	My	italics.	
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			The	Royal	Commission	on	South	Australia	was	especially	important	for	Canada	because	it	dismissed	the	attempts	of	such	specific	groups	as	farmers	to	blame	their	plight	on	the	disabilities	of	federation.	Even	pivotal	complaints	about	the	tariff	were	attributed	to	South	Australia’s	natural	inequalities,	which	put	it	at	a	disadvantage	“from	any	policy	aiming	at	the	creation	and	maintenance	of	secondary	industries	over	a	large	continent…	This	inequality	in	the	incidence	of	a	tariff	is	inherent	in	all	Federations.”76	The	report	added	crisply	that,	a	century	ago,	the	southern	American	states,	which	were	the	primary	producing	states,	had	sent	similar	complaints	to	Congress	about	the	tariffs	on	manufactured	goods	that	they	were	forced	to	buy.	The	citation	from	the	Southern	States	of	America	petition	of	1831	did	not	mention	that	labour	costs	in	a	slave-owning	plantation	economy	were	far	lower	than	those	in	the	northern	states.	Nor	did	the	Commissioners	themselves.77	The	very	notion	of	dismantling	tariff	protection	in	Australia	was	not	considered.					But	the	report	did	not	stop	there.	Instead,	it	itemized	eleven	benefits	that	federation	had	brought	to	South	Australia	including	subsidies	for	many	industries,	loans	for	railway	construction,	new	infrastructure	such	as	lighthouses,	and	payments	for	old-age	pensions	and	maternity	allowances.	As	the	report	observed	dryly,	it	was	apparent	“that	the	benefits	accruing	to	South	Australia	from	Federation	are	of	a	most	substantial	character.”78	Nonetheless,	the	report	called	for	a	special	
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grant	of		£500,000	per	year	for	two	years	because	the	state	“is	worthy	of	sympathetic	treatment.”79								But	this	was	another	ad	hoc	solution	to	the	ongoing	problem	of	inequality.	The	commissioners	confessed	that	they	could	not	find	a	general	formula	to	remedy	what	would	surely	be	fluid	situations	among	the	states	over	the	decades.	Instead,	they	recommended	that	the	Commonwealth	Government	create	a	permanent	body	of	specially	qualified	people	“who	would	be	able	from	time	to	time	to	inform	the	Commonwealth	and	the	States	authoritatively	of	the	inter-actions	of	their	policies	and	financial	proposals.”80	That	search	for	expertise	and	for	an	adequate	general	formula	for	fiscal	inequality	among	the	states	would	become	the	challenge	of	the	ensuing	decades.						Four	months	later,	on	December	6,	1929,	Australia’s	new	Prime	Minister	James	Henry	Scullin	asked	the	Parliamentary	Joint	Committee	of	Public	Accounts	to	examine	Tasmania’s	disabilities	–	in	response	to	that	state’s	ongoing	complaints.	Scullin,	who	had	defeated	Prime	Minister	Bruce	in	October,	was	clearly	anxious	to	shore	up	political	support	on	the	outlying	island.							When	the	committee	reported	on	August	7,	1930,	it	outlined	a	novel	way	of	determining	a	state’s	plight:	How	severe	was	the	state’s	taxation?	The	answer	was	very	severe.	Even	though	Tasmania	had	imposed	taxes	that	were	double	the	Australian	average	over	the	last	five	years,	“the	financial	position	was	becoming	
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acute.”81	Clearly,	“taxation	has	overstepped	the	economic	limit:	the	depression	grew	worse,	and	the	exodus	of	population	to	the	mainland	reached	unprecedented	proportions.”82	Still,	the	Commission	urged	the	State	government	to	“carefully	investigate	the	possibility	of	increasing	taxation	on	the	higher	incomes	in	Tasmania	to	the	Australian	average.”83	That,	too,	was	probably	important	for	social	cohesion.								But	the	committee	had	also	learned	from	the	investigations	of	those	earlier	commissions.	“It	was	inevitable	that	there	would	always	be	trouble	in	the	financial	relations	between	the	Commonwealth	and	the	States,”	the	report	observed	dourly.	“Similar	troubles	occurred	in	the	United	States	of	America,	Canada,	South	Africa	and	Germany.	Difficulties	occurred	particularly	where	there	was	a	great	diversity	in	the	size,	population,	development	and	resources	of	the	different	states	forming	a	union.”84	[Germany	and	South	Africa	were	also	federations.]					Then,	in	the	clearest	sign	of	the	two	federations’	increasing	reliance	on	each	other’s	experience,	the	Parliamentary	Joint	Committee	devoted	a	substantive	section	of	its	report	to	a	“remarkable	case	parallel	with	that	of	Tasmania	[that]	had	been	established	in	Canada	in	the	treatment	of	these	[Maritime]	Provinces.”[Sic]85	The	circumstances	surrounding	the	Duncan	Commission	were	so	similar	that	the	conclusions	were	“very	pertinent	to	the	present	situation	of	Tasmania.”86	In																																																									81	Report	of	the	Joint	Committee	of	Public	Accounts	on	The	General	Question	of	Tasmania’s	Disabilities,	The	Parliament	of	the	Commonwealth	of	Australia,	August	7,	1930.	National	Archives	of	Australia,	West	stack,	Call	number	Nf336.946A938,	Enumeration	N	pbk	c.	1.	p.	16.		82	Report,	16.	83	Report,	46.	84	Report,	37.	85	Report,	37.	86	Report,	37.		
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particular,	the	committee	singled	out	the	section	of	the	Duncan	report	that	urged	the	central	government	to	provide	a	sufficient	minimum	payment,	“not	in	a	spirit	of	meticulous	bargaining,	but	in	the	broad	spirit	which	arises	from	a	feeling	of	their	being	met	with	sympathy	and	fairness	rather	than	with	narrow	compromise.”87	Sharing	could	be	a	moral	duty	–	and	a	pragmatic	ploy.					More	importantly,	the	Parliamentary	Joint	Committee	repeated	the	call	of	previous	royal	commissions:	It	was	time	that	the	Commonwealth	Government	eliminated	ad	hoc	approaches.	It	recommended	the	creation	of	a	“permanent	body…to	make	a	continuous	study	of	the	financial	relations	of	the	Commonwealth	and	the	States.”	It	added	bluntly:	“An	effort	[should]	be	made	to	bring	about	uniformity	in	the	preparation	of	Commonwealth	and	State	financial	statements.”88							Australia	and	Canada	were	groping	their	way	toward	a	more	permanent	solution	to	the	problems	of	inequality	in	a	federation.	As	Canada	had	ruefully	learned,	the	economic	circumstances	of	individual	states	changed	over	time		–	so	the	federal	government	needed	a	flexible	system	of	transfers	as	opposed	to	a	static,	constitutionally-entrenched	system	of	fixed	per-capita	subsidies.							The	practice	of	special	subsidies	to	poorer	provinces	in	special	circumstances	was	one	way	around	that	problem	but	such	special	treatment	only	upset	the	richer	provinces.	Few	politicians	considered	the	possibility	of	abolishing	tariffs	–	especially	after	Sir	Wilfrid	Laurier’s	ill-fated	bid	to	introduce	free	trade	with	the	United	States	in	1911.	So	Canada	would	remain	an	east-west	construct	that	operated	for	the																																																									87	As	quoted	from	the	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	Maritime	Claims.	37.	88	Report	of	the	Joint	Committee	of	Public	Accounts	on	The	General	Question	of	Tasmania’s	Disabilities,	The	Parliament	of	the	Commonwealth	of	Australia,	August	7,	1930.	46.	
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benefit	of	Central	Canada	at	the	expense	of	many	poorer	provinces	on	the	peripheries.						The	Australian	system	of	special	grants	based	on	individual	applications	was	contentious	–	largely	because	of	its	“various	ad	hoc	processes	and	varying	criteria,”	which	could	be	based	“on	the	financial	effects	of	federal	policies”	or	were		“intended	to	offset	the	adverse	financial	circumstances	of	the	States.”89	There	had	to	be	a	better	way	to	handle	inequality	in	a	federation:	richer	and	poorer	states	–	and	richer	and	poorer	taxpayers	–	needed	the	reassurance	of	independent	appraisers	with	a	comprehensive	investigative	approach	to	a	state’s	plight	and	the	promise	of	a	fair	formula	for	resolution.	Otherwise,	grants	might	simply	reward	bad	judgment,	or	allow	states	to	get	away	with	not	doing	enough	to	help	themselves.						The	fear	of	dependency	was	in	a	tug-of-war	with	the	need	for	generosity	to	fellow	citizens.	No	one	could	find	a	satisfactory	fiscal	mechanism	that	would	remedy	inequality	and	bring	balance	to	the	seesaw	of	competing	pressures.	And	no	one	could	guarantee	that	the	states	with	the	most	clout	or	the	most	powerful	backers	would	not	capture	the	bulk	of	the	central	government’s	attention	and	funds.						None	of	the	Canadian	and	Australian	reports	make	sense	unless	they	are	set	against	the	context	of	their	changing	economic	times.	During	the	prosperous	years	of	the	1920s,	it	was	clear	that	citizens	expected	–	and	needed	–	far	more	from	their	governments	than	they	could	deliver.	Both	the	Australian	and	the	Canadian	economies	were	becoming	far	more	industrialized	within	increasingly	concentrated	geographic	areas,	leaving	many	people	on	the	sidelines,	scrambling	to	stay	afloat	as																																																									89	The	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission:	The	Last	25	Years.	(Barton,	Canberra	ACT:	The	Australian	Government,	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission,	2008)	31.	
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outdated	plants	closed	or	moved	or	struggled	to	survive.	Governments	could	not	cope	with	such	unequal	economic	development:	In	particular,	they	could	not	respond	adequately	to	the	needs	of	the	poorer	regions,	including	the	costs	of	relief	and	support	for	widowed	mothers	and	the	disabled.				
Federalism	and	the	Depression					As	the	Depression	settled	heavily	on	Australia	and	Canada,	it	became	clear	that	different	levels	of	government	lacked	the	money	or	the	power	or	even	the	basic	programs	to	deal	with	this	difficult	global	collapse.	All	levels	of	government	confronted	the	challenge	to	do	more	than	they	had	ever	deemed	appropriate.	State	officials	found	their	expertise	and	their	governmental	capacities	tested	to	the	utmost	–	and	often	failing.	Relatively	open	economies	such	as	those	in	Australia	and	Canada	were	vulnerable	to	price	fluctuations	in	such	commodities	as	wheat	and	wool.	Their	central	governments	were	trapped	amid	radically	different	regional	demands	for	tariff	adjustments	and	currency	devaluations.	Provincial	officials	faced	unprecedented	social	crises	that	the	traditional	refuges	of	churches	and	charities	could	not	come	close	to	alleviating.	Municipal	governments	could	not	handle	the	flock	of	relief	claimants	for	basic	food	and	shelter.					Politicians	and	their	bureaucrats	were	at	sea	amid	these	perplexing	and	so	far	unsolvable	demands.	This	was	not	the	world	of	the	late	19th	and	early	20th	centuries	when	the	roles	of	business,	labour,	political	and	personal	responsibility	were	delineated	–	if	frequently	challenged.	In	Australia,	on	July	28,	1930,	The	Sydney	
Morning	Herald’s	front-page	news	summary	captured	the	bad	domestic	news.	The	
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unemployed,	including	“hunger-marchers,”	had	just	held	a	conference	at	which	a	prominent	Communist	presided,	“and	the	demands	submitted	for	approval	were	of	an	extravagant	nature.”						Political	stability	was	under	threat:	The	federal	budget	proposals	“have	given	rise	to	talk	of	secession	from	the	Commonwealth	in	both	Victoria	[state]	and	South	Australia.”	The	Melbourne	Chamber	of	Commerce	president	singled	out	the	“Federal	Government’s	incapacity”	as	the	reason	for	Victoria’s	threat	to	leave.	The	Attorney-General	of	South	Australia	declared	that	his	state	“would	have	to	consider	unification	or	secession	unless	it	gets	substantial	relief.”	Sydney	merchants	decried	the	higher	duties	on	timber.	One	thousand	men	left	for	make-work	projects	in	the	countryside.90							On	that	same	day,	in	Canada,	the	federal	election	dominated	the	headlines.	The	
Globe	endorsed	the	Liberals’	support	for	a	system	of	tariff	preferences	for	British	Empire	goods,	citing	new	plant	developments	in	Canada	to	take	advantage	of	those	preferences.91	In	Regina,	in	a	radio	address,	Finance	Minister	Charles	Dunning	called	for	an	unemployment	insurance	scheme	that	the	provinces	would	operate	with	Ottawa’s	cooperation.						The	party	leaders	made	their	final	pitches.	In	a	two-hour	address	over	the	nationwide	radio	network,	Prime	Minister	King	reviewed	his	lengthy	record,	including	Empire	trade	preferences,	the	reduction	of	the	tariffs	on	producers	and	on																																																									90	All	news	items	in	“Summary”	in	The	Sydney	Morning	Herald,	Monday,	July	28,	1930,	late	edition,	p.	1.	https://www.newspapers.com/image/124099872		91	“What	It	Means	to	Canada”	in	The	Globe,	Monday,	July	28,	1930.	p.	1	
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consumer	necessities	and	“the	removal	of	grievances	in	the	Maritime	Provinces.”	He	insisted	that	Ottawa	had	been	active	in	addressing	unemployment:	Indeed,	his	government	had	offered	to	match	the	provinces	and	municipalities,	dollar	for	dollar,	“as	soon	as	we	are	advised	by	the	Provinces	concerned	that	the	unemployment,	within	its	borders,	is	of	such	magnitude	as	to	constitute	an	emergent	condition	requiring	Dominion	assistance.”92	The	Prime	Minister’s	blithe	talk	was	out	of	touch	with	an	increasingly	desperate	electorate.							Meanwhile,	in	an	Ottawa	campaign	finale	on	Sunday,	Conservative	Leader	R.	B.	Bennett	denounced	“the	tragedy	of	unemployment,	and	declared	such	a	condition	should	not	exist	in	Canada.”93	He	promised	relief	for	the	unemployed	–	and	called	for	reciprocal	trade	agreements	and	mutual	preferences.	Indeed,	he	had	vowed	to	do	whatever	was	necessary	to	combat	unemployment	“or	perish	in	the	attempt.”94	Bennett	won	a	huge	majority	–	135	seats	to	King’s	89	seats	–	although	his	share	of	the	popular	vote	had	risen	less	than	three	percentage	points.	King	viewed	the	results	as	“a	great	surprise…I	have	gone	down	if	I	have	with	flying	colours.	A	fine	record	of	govt.,	a	fine	issues	[sic],	etc.	&	before	more	difficult	times	come.”95		
																																																								92	Coast-to-Coast	Radio	Message	Sounds	Final	Call	to	Canadians	To	Mark	Ballots	for	Empire	Trade:	Premier	King,	Speaking	From	Laurier	House	to	Millions	of	Citizens,	Enunciates	Great	Doctrine	of	Empire	Commerce,	and	Asks	Support	for	‘May	Day’	Budget;	Campaign	Ends;	Voters	to	Decide”	in	The	Globe,	Monday,	July	28,	1930.	pps.	1	and	10.	93	“Ottawa	Meeting	Marks	Last	Stage	of	Tory	Campaign:	Bennett	Assails	New	Zealand	Butter	and	Soviet	Coal	Importations	Thanks	All	Electorate:	Night	of	Rain	as	Conservatives	Wind	Up	Their	Speechmaking”	in	The	Globe,	Monday,	July	28,	1930.	pps.	1	and	2.	94	R.	B.	Bennett,	June	9,	1930.		https://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/primeministers/h4-3281-e.html	95	Diaries	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Tuesday,	July	29,	1930.	pps.	174	and	175.			
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					He	was	right	about	one	thing:	It	was	a	hard	era	for	politicians.	King	blamed	many	factors	including	lack	of	organization	and	poor	publicity	for	his	defeat.	But,	as	he	conceded	in	his	diary,	“the	extent	of	unemployment	counted	for	very	much.”96								So	many	men	and	women	were	scrambling	for	any	work,	however	temporary.	So	many	children	were	hungry,	and	leaving	school	to	earn	pennies.	Between	1929	and	1932,	Dominion	expenditures	increased	by	$132	million	while	revenues	decreased	by	$140	million	“as	tax	revenues	dried	up…[But]	an	increase	of	$132	million	in	Dominion	expenditures	was	not	large	enough,	nor	sustained	long	enough…to	compensate	for	declining	expenditures	in	the	private	sector.”97	As	Statistics	Canada	has	warned,	labour	force	data	prior	to	1945	remains	approximate.	But	it	estimates	that	Canadian	unemployment	skyrocketed	from	three	per	cent	or	less	in	1929	to	19.3	percent	in	June	1933.98								In	the	Dirty	Thirties,	the	news	was	seemingly	always	bad.	Historian	James	Struthers	has	captured	Canada’s	rapidly	increasing	plight:	In	June	1931,	roughly	471,000	workers	–	or	18.6	per	cent	of	the	labour	force	–	were	unemployed;	by	February	1932,	as	the	results	of	the	1931	census	trickled	out,	the	Dominion	Bureau																																																																																																																																																																						http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=12384&		96	Diaries	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Tuesday,	July	29,	1930,	p.	175.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=12385&			97	Kenneth	Norrie,	Douglas	Owram	and	J.C.	Herbert	Emery.	The	History	of	the	
Canadian	Economy,	fourth	edition.	(Toronto:	Nelson,	Thomson,	2008)	p.	328		98	Dave	Gower,	“A	note	on	Canadian	Unemployment	since	1921”	in	Perspectives	on	
Labour	and	Income,	Autumn	1992,	Vol.	4,	Number	3,	Article	3,	pps.	1-2.		http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001-x/1992003/87-eng.pdf	
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of	Statistics	declared	the	a	“conservative	estimate	of	the	unemployed….	would	lie	between	600,000	and	700,000.”99	By	1933,	one	in	seven	Canadians	–	almost	1.5	million	people	–	depended	upon	government	relief	payments	for	survival.100	Canadians	were	turning	as	never	before	to	their	governments	for	help.	And,	as	in	all	federations,	provinces	were	turning	to	the	central	government,	desperate	for	more	assistance.	Political	certainties	and	social	cohesion	were	teetering	–	and	no	one	knew	how	to	restore	them.							Western	societies	were	evolving	with	industrialization,	urbanization,	the	shrinkage	of	so-called	extended	families	as	members	dispersed,	and	the	increase	in	life	expectancies	through	improved	sanitation	measures,	public	health	initiatives	and	medical	advances.	When	individuals	and	their	families	had	exhausted	their	traditional	sources	of	help,	they	now	turned	to	the	state	as	their	only	refuge.								The	Depression	was	slowly	bringing	home	the	flaws	of	unbridled	capitalism	to	the	battered	provinces.	Their	citizenry	needed	help	that	only	governments	could	provide.	In	the	decades	prior	to	that	catastrophe,	individual	provinces	had	already	started	to	expand	their	social	programs.	In	1914,	Ontario	introduced	Workmen’s	Compensation,	which	allowed	workers	to	collect	an	income	when	injured	on	the	job.	By	1919,	six	provinces	had	adopted	such	legislation.	Mothers’	Allowances	were	introduced	in	Manitoba	in	1916.	By	1930,	five	provinces	had	adopted	this	program.	In	1927,	Ottawa	introduced	an	Old	Age	Pension	that	picked	up	half	of	the	cost	of	means-tested	pensions	to	Canadians	who	were	seventy	and	over.	The	provinces	that																																																									99	James	Struthers,	No	Fault	of	Their	Own:	Unemployment	and	the	Canadian	Welfare	
State,	1914-1941	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1983)	pps.	61-62.	100	Struthers,	p.	91.	
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agreed	to	join	the	pension	plan	picked	up	the	other	half.	In	1931,	Ottawa	changed	its	contribution	to	seventy-five	per	cent	of	the	cost.	By	1936,	all	provinces	had	joined.						But	the	Old-Age	Pension	would	mark	the	limits	of	reform	until	World	War	Two	when	social	cohesion	and	political	stability	again	became	pressing	concerns.	As	Struthers	notes,	the	expansion	of	social	welfare	in	wartime	became	possible	because	the	number	of	people	on	relief	had	dropped,	poor	nutrition	among	the	enlisting	soldiers	had	sparked	concerns	about	children’s	health,	and	many	experts	feared	that	social	disruptions	during	wartime	could	disturb	reconstruction	in	peacetime.101								The	early	1930s	were	also	difficult	in	Australia.	In	May	1930,	Perth	accountant	H.	K.	Watson	founded	the	Dominion	League	of	Western	Australia,	which	called	for	secession	to	protest	the	state’s	unequal	position	within	the	federation.	League	founders	marshaled	the	political	clout	of	small	farmers,	sheepherders	and	gold	miners	who	resented	the	effect	of	tariffs	on	the	price	of	such	imports	as	machinery	and	consumer	goods,	and	who	blamed	the	Commonwealth	Government	for	their	shoddy	roads	and	ports.	They	were	opposed	to	the	protectionist	policies	that	were	created	to	shield	the	manufacturers	in	eastern	Australia.102						Dominion	League	members	wanted	to	form	an	independent	dominion	like	New	Zealand	within	the	British	Commonwealth.	State	Premier	Sir	James	Mitchell	called	a	plebiscite	on	secession	on	the	same	day	as	the	state	election,	April	8,	1933.	Voting	in	the	plebiscite	was	compulsory	–	although	voting	in	the	election	was	not.	The	result																																																									101	James	Struthers,	The	Limits	of	Affluence:	Welfare	in	Ontario,	1920-1970	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	Ontario	Historical	Studies	Series,	1994)		pps.	108-109.	Struthers	writes	about	Ontario	–	but	those	conditions	were	applicable	across	the	nation.		102	Russel	Ward,	The	History	of	Australia:	The	Twentieth	Century,	205-206.	
	 	 	 	 	90	
was	a	majority	of	two	to	one	in	favour	of	secession.103	Inequality	bred	dissension.	Mitchell’s	successor	arranged	for	a	deputation	to	petition	the	British	Parliament	for	an	amendment	to	the	Australian	Constitution	to	recognize	the	secession.	The	British	Government	was	taken	aback.	Eventually,	in	May	1935,	a	British	Parliamentary	committee	agreed	with	Commonwealth	legal	experts	that	the	petition	did	not	qualify	for	acceptance.104	Australia	had	dodged	a	bullet.						But	Western	Australia	had	certainly	got	the	Commonwealth	Government’s	attention.	In	1933,	in	the	wake	of	the	secession	vote,	the	federal	government	created	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	(CGC)	to	examine	state	applications	for	special	assistance.	First,	the	CGC	had	to	devise	consistent	principles.	As	a	Commission	report	would	later	explain,	the	CGC	initially	decided	that	grants	should	enable	“claimant	states	‘with	reasonable	effort,	to	put	their	finances	in	about	as	good	order	as	that	of	the	other	states’	but	they	were	not	aimed	at	equalising	incomes	or	living	standards	of	individuals	in	the	States.”105	In	1936,	in	its	third	report,	the	Grants	Commission	would	refine	that	principle	to	ensure	that	states	had	“the	amount	of	help	found	necessary	to	make	it	possible	for	that	State	by	reasonable	effort	to	function	at	a	standard	not	appreciably	below	that	of	other	States.”106	Canada	would	pay	close	attention	throughout	this	evolution.		
The	Role	of	the	State	in	the	1930s	
																																																								103	Russel	Ward,	The	History	of	Australia:	The	Twentieth	Century,	205-206.	104	Ward,	206.	105	The	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission:	The	last	25	Years.	(Barton,	Canberra	ACT:	The	Australian	Government,	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission,	2008)	31.	106	The	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission:	The	last	25	Years,	31.	
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					In	Canada,	many	factors	limited	the	expansion	of	the	social	security	system.	Some	Canadians	were	concerned	that	poorer	individuals	were	asking	for	too	much	from	their	governments	–	even	though,	in	retrospect,	they	were	getting	absurdly	little.	Demands	for	increased	state	aid	jostled	against	the	lingering	characterizations	of	the	poor.	Philosopher	Nancy	Fraser	and	historian	Linda	Gordon	are	blunt:	“In	the	strenuous	new	culture	of	emergent	capitalism,	the	figure	of	the	pauper	was	like	a	bad	double	of	the	upstanding	workingman….	Paupers	were	not	simply	poor	but	degraded,	their	character	corrupted	and	their	will	sapped	through	reliance	on	charity.”107	Such	harsh	judgments	were	also	applied	to	member	states	in	a	federation.						Indeed,	such	stereotypes	lingered	well	into	the	twentieth	century,	intersecting	disastrously	with	the	structure	of	federalism	itself.	Those	theoretically	tidy	compartments	of	federalism,	which	were	never	truly	sealed	off	from	each	other,	became	an	impediment	to	support	for	those	people	and	provinces	hit	by	disastrous	economic	change.	Some	provincial	governments	did	not	view	their	shattered	citizenry	sympathetically.	They	did	not	have	the	money	or	the	inclination	to	help	them.	More	importantly,	it	was	here	that	the	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	provinces	became	brutally	apparent.						The	debates	became	acerbic.	Historian	Shirley	Tillotson	notes	that	discussions	about	the	level	of	taxation	were	not	just	about	the	defence	of	specific	economic	interests	“but	also	about	the	morality	of	citizenship.”	Surely,	Canadians	asked	each																																																									107	Nancy	Fraser	and	Linda	Gordon,	“A	Genealogy	of	Dependency:	Tracing	a	Keyword	of	the	U.	S.	Welfare	State”	in	Signs,	Volume	19,	Number	2	(Winter	1994)	p.	316.	
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other,	there	was	a	limit	to	what	the	state	could	do	without	affecting	its	citizens’	moral	fibre?	Tillotson	has	traced	the	complicated	relationship	between	private	charities	and	public	policies.	By	the	end	of	the	1930s,	with	so	little	evolution	in	the	safety	net	through	such	despairing	times,	a	leading	charitable	funding	organization,	the	Community	Chests,	“seemed	to	have	a	chance	of	forestalling	the	welfare	state…and	appear	as	both	an	alternative	to	the	welfare	state	and	its	prototype.”108								While	Canadians	debated	the	proper	role	of	the	state,	it	was	the	states	within	the	state	–	the	very	structure	of	federalism	–	that	created	the	most	significant	impediments	to	the	expansion	of	social	security.	Ottawa	was	cautious	about	its	powers	and	its	purse	strings:	The	economies	of	the	provinces	were	so	unequal	that	joint	action	with	Ottawa	to	remedy	any	social	need	–	with	the	crucial	exception	of	relief	–	was	literally	unthinkable.	(Also,	the	provinces	had	constitutional	control	over	“eleemosynary	institutions,”	which	aided	the	poor.)109							It	is	significant	that	no	province	dared	to	ask	for	a	specific	federal	program	to	remedy	fiscal	inequality	among	the	provinces	during	these	early	decades.	That	remained	inconceivable.	Instead	they	asked	for	additional	grants	for	unemployment	relief	or	increased	subsidies	because	of	fiscal	need,	usually	in	economic	downturns.	Sometimes,	they	argued	–	to	no	avail	-	that	the	political	clout	of	other	federation	partners	had	relegated	them	to	the	role	of	underdogs.	They	did	not	address	fiscal	inequality	as	a	permanent	condition	within	the	federation	that	required	a	specific	ongoing	federal	program.																																																									108	Shirley	Tillotson,	Contributing	Citizens:	Modern	Charitable	Fundraising	and	the	
Making	of	the	Welfare	State,	1920-1966	(Vancouver:	UBC	Press,	2008)	21.	109	British	North	America	Act	1867,	clause	92,	section	7.	
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					But	the	Depression	did	witness	the	slow	growth	in	demands	for	federal	remedies	for	the	economic	collapse.	Social	groups	pushed	for	assistance	–	although	their	voices	would	remain	largely	ineffective	during	most	of	those	terrible	years.	Provincial	governments,	however,	were	becoming	increasingly	aware	of	the	fiscal	inequalities	among	themselves.	The	Premiers	of	the	richer	provinces	of	Quebec	and	Ontario	were	defensive.	The	poorer	Premiers	were	distressed	–	and	their	very	presence	at	Dominion-Provincial	Conferences	would	unsettle	Bennett	and	then	King.	They	understood	that	their	societies	had	changed,	and	their	responsibilities	to	ensure	social	cohesion	and	basic	survival	were	greater.	And	they	knew	that	they	would	lose	power	if	they	could	not	secure	more	funds:	Their	own	political	futures	and	the	stability	of	their	governments	were	at	risk.		
R.	B.	Bennett	and	the	Provincial	Premiers								The	Premiers	would	meet	frequently	with	Bennett	during	his	tenure	as	Prime	Minister	–	although	little	was	seemingly	accomplished.	Their	first	gathering	in	April	1931	was	devoted	to	discussions	about	the	Statute	Of	Westminster.	That	seems	jarring.	But	the	Bennett	government	had	appropriated	$20	million	for	relief	and	infrastructure	projects	in	1930-1931,	and	then	extended	those	provisions	for	1931-1932	with	such	unspecified	amounts	as	“might	be	deemed	expedient	for	relieving	distress,	providing	employment	and	maintaining	within	the	competence	of	
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Parliament,	peace,	order,	and	good	government	throughout	Canada.”110	(In	the	end,	Ottawa	would	spend	$42.7	million	on	relief	that	year.)111								In	April	1932,	as	the	Depression	deepened,	the	First	Ministers	gathered	in	Ottawa	for	closed-door	discussions	about	relief.	After	the	conference,	Bennett	said	that	he	had	spelled	out	Ottawa’	s	financial	position	–	it	had	added	$119	million	to	the	1931-1932	federal	debt	–	and	he	declared	that	the	Dominion	was	“not	disposed	to	assume	responsibility	for	the	unemployment	problem.”112	Instead,	Ottawa	would	confine	its	spending	to	direct	relief	in	emergency	situations	such	as	crop	failure.	The	
Globe	correspondent	William	Marchington	noted	that	many	provinces	and	municipalities	had	reached	the	“end	of	their	tether”	–	but	there	was	a	natural	limit	to	the	number	of	useful	public	works	that	could	be	undertaken.	His	solution	was	tough:	“No	work,	no	relief.”113							Despite	Ottawa’s	stand,	the	poorer	provinces	did	not	publicly	complain.	Indeed,	wealthy	Ontario	expressed	guarded	confidence:	Its	Attorney	General	W.	H.	Price	even	presumed	to	speak	for	the	Western	Provinces	by	declaring	that	they	“appeared	to	be	quite	optimistic”	about	the	coming	harvest	and	grateful	for	past	help	“in	their	time	of	need	by	the	Eastern	Provinces.”114	It	was	a	small	hint	of	the	growing	resentment	among	the	wealthier	provinces.	Ottawa	would	eventually	relent	–	and	spend	$25.9	million	on	relief	in	1932-1933.																																																									110	Survey	of	Federal	Relief	Activities	Since	1930,	Reprinted	from	The	Labour	
Gazette,	May	1935,	LAC,	RG47,	Volume	60,	File	Conferences	1935.	p.	2.	111	The	Labour	Gazette,	p.	24	112	William	Marchington,	“Joint	Public	Works	As	Relief	Measures	To	Be	Discontinued?”	in	The	Globe,	Monday,	April	11,	1932.	p.	1.		113	Marchington,	p.	2.	114	Marchington,	p.	2.	
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							In	January	1933,	at	another	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	the	rifts	between	the	richer	provinces	of	Ontario	and	Quebec	and	the	poorer	provinces,	especially	the	Prairie	Provinces,	were	deepening.		The	delegates	emerged	with	the	recommendation	that	federal	assistance	to	the	provinces	for	direct	relief	should	continue	because	of	the	“unprecedented	economic	conditions.”	But	there	were	no	ringing	public	calls	at	this	closed	conference	for	additional	federal	help.	“While	some	provinces	desire	an	increase	in	the	proportion	[of	relief]	contributed	by	the	Dominion,	other	provinces	are	satisfied	with	the	present	division	and	do	not	feel	that	an	increase	should	be	asked	for.”115	Although	The	Globe’s	William	Marchington	reported	that	the	Western	Provinces	wanted	more	federal	funds	for	relief,	there	were	no	public	complaints	against	the	richer	provinces.116						The	public	silence	ensued	because	the	First	Ministers	were	effectively	deadlocked	–	and	the	poorer	regions	hoped	to	get	more	aid	through	private	diplomacy.	They	also	could	not	agree	on	constitutional	changes	that	would	establish	federal	Unemployment	Insurance.	(Quebec	and	Ontario	withheld	consent.)117	Ultimately,	Ottawa	contributed	$30.7	million	to	relief	in	1933-1934.							The	dissension	between	the	richer	and	the	poorer	provinces	would	remain	unresolved	at	the	next	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	in	January	1934.			
Nova	Scotia	Premier	Angus	L.	Macdonald	and	the	Maritime	Plight																																																										115	Resolutions	of	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	January	17-19.	1933.	LAC,	RG47,	Volume	67,	p.	1.		116	William	Marchington,	“Ottawa	Parlay	Grapples	With	Relief	Problem”	in	The	
Globe,	Wednesday,	January	18,	1933.	p.	1.	117	William	Marchington,	“Insurance	Snag”	in	The	Globe,	Thursday,	January	19,	1933.	p.	2.		
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						The	best	of	the	Depression-era	Premiers	understood	that	the	only	way	to	survive	in	this	challenging	new	world	was	to	restructure	the	federation,	formally	or	informally,	to	shuffle	the	responsibilities	or	the	revenues	to	accommodate	pressures	that	the	Fathers	of	Confederation	did	not	anticipate.	Perhaps	it	is	not	surprising	that	a	successor	of	Joseph	Howe	–	who	was	depicted	as	the	new	Joseph	Howe	–	would	become	one	of	the	most	remarkable	advocates	for	a	revitalized	federalism.							Liberal	Angus	L.	Macdonald	won	power	in	August	1933	as	a	politician	who	“did	not	favour	an	idle	state;	rather	he	supported	government	social-insurance	programs	to	protect	the	weak	and	improve	the	general	welfare.”118	But	first,	Macdonald	needed	the	money	to	pay	for	those	programs	–	or	he	needed	to	induce	the	federal	government	to	accept	responsibility	for	his	province’s	ills.	On	the	eve	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	in	mid-January	1934,	Macdonald	joined	a	preliminary	meeting	of	the	Maritime	Premiers	in	Montreal.	The	three	Premiers	–	New	Brunswick’s	Leonard	Tilley	(the	son	of	Samuel	Leonard	Tilley),	Prince	Edward	Island’s	William	MacMillan	and	Macdonald	–	penned	a	letter	asking	Bennett	to	set	up	a	Royal	Commission	to	consider	“a	revision	of	the	financial	arrangements	between	the	Dominion	Government	and	the	Maritime	Provinces.”119							Macdonald	reiterated	the	trio’s	pleas	for	a	remedy	for	fiscal	inequality	at	the	Conference	itself:	Ottawa	should	reopen	the	question	of	subsidies	in	line	with	the	recommendations	of	the	Duncan	Report:	“He	[Macdonald]	also	asked	that	a																																																									118	T.	Stephen	Henderson,	Angus	L.	Macdonald:	A	Provincial	Liberal	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2007)	33.	119	Letter	of	the	Three	Maritime	Premiers	to	the	Prime	Minister	of	Canada,	January	16,	1934	as	quoted	in	the	Report	Of	The	Royal	Commission	On	Financial	
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commission	representative	of	the	Dominion	and	the	provinces	be	appointed	to	explore	the	possibility	of	a	re-arrangement	of	the	taxation	sources	in	view	of	the	dire	necessity	of	all	the	provinces	finding	new	sources	of	revenue.”120	The	Globe	could	not	resist	the	temptation	to	add	dourly:	“Their	[Maritime]	requests	are	based	upon	moral	rather	than	legal	grounds.”121	And,	given	the	depths	of	the	Depression,	moral	appeals	remained	difficult	for	the	other	Confederation	partners.					The	Conference	proceedings	were	more	devoted	to	the	deepening	fiscal	plight	of	the	three	Prairie	Provinces	and	British	Columbia.	Winnipeg	Free	Press	correspondent	Grant	Dexter	privately	confirmed	to	editor	John	Dafoe,	the	man	he	called	“Chief,”	that	Dafoe’s	hunch	was	correct:	Westerners	were	angry.	“The	western	delegates	are	quite	willing	to	talk	and	the	belligerent	attitude	you	noted	in	[Manitoba	Premier	John]	Bracken	is	very	much	in	evidence	among	the	others.	I	do	think	there	will	be	a	show-down	and,	perhaps,	some	serious	fighting.”122					A	day	later,	that	distress	was	publicly	confirmed.	“West’s	Dire	Straits	Forcibly	Presented	At	Premiers’	Parlay,”	trumpeted	The	Globe’s	headline	for	January	18,	1934.	“Default	on	Bond	Interest	Faces	Prairie	and	Coast	Provinces	Unless	Federal	Aid	Is	Forthcoming	–	Dominion	Hopes	to	Stimulate	Construction	Industries.”123	A	day	later,	Prime	Minister	Bennett	pointed	out	that	the	Dominion	Government	would																																																									120	“Ask	Provinces	To	Look	After	Own	Financing:	Desire	of	Federal	Government	Is	to	Shift	Responsibility	Back	Gradually”	in	The	Ottawa	Journal,	Thursday,	January	18,	
1934.	p.	2.	121	“Commission	May	Untangle	West’s	Finance:	Seek	Cause	And	Cure	Of	Fiscal	Muddles	In	Four	Provinces:	Maritime	Rights	Also	Reopened”	in	The	Globe,	Thursday,	January	18,	1934.	p.	1	122	Winnipeg	Free	Press	Ottawa	correspondent	Grant	Dexter	to	Winnipeg	Free	Press	editor	John	Dafoe,	January	17,	1934.	John	Dafoe	Fonds,	University	of	Manitoba	Archives,	Box	8,	Folder	1.	pps.	1-2.	123	Headlines	in	The	Globe,	Thursday,	January	18,	1934.	p.	1.	
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have	a	deficit	of	more	than	$100-million	in	the	current	fiscal	year.	But	the	case	for	the	West	was	grim:	“under	the	stress	of	circumstances	they	have	curtailed	expenditures	to	the	limit,	that	they	cannot	make	further	cuts	without	sacrificing	their	schools,	hospitals	or	other	essential	services.	Moreover,	they	have	taxed	their	people	until	they	have	been	threatened	with	a	taxpayers’	strike.”124							All	Premiers	finally	recognized	that	the	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	provinces	were	wrenching	–	and	the	situation	was	dire.	Western	resource	control	had	not	brought	instant	riches	–	partly	because	the	administrative	costs	were	high.	Alberta’s	net	gain	would	“not	exceed	$200,000	annually	during	the	first	five	years	of	the	1930s.”125	By	the	end	of	the	day,	Ottawa	agreed	to	continue	its	aid	to	the	western	provinces	with	the	formal	blessing	of	all	participants,	including	wealthier	Quebec	and	Ontario.	Special	ad	hoc	subsidies	to	alleviate	such	desperate	inequalities	were	becoming	the	norm	in	troubled	times.	But	there	was	no	acceptance	of	a	general	principle	to	provide	aid,	no	formula,	and	no	impartial	adjudicator	to	determine	the	amount	of	the	assistance.						In	the	midst	of	those	extraordinary	tidings	from	the	West,	Nova	Scotia’s	Macdonald	somehow	grabbed	the	spotlight,	however	briefly.	He	reiterated	the	pleas	in	the	Maritime	Premiers’	letter	at	the	Conference	itself.	Ottawa	should	reopen	the	question	of	subsidies	in	line	with	the	recommendations	of	the	Duncan	Report:	“He	[Macdonald]	also	asked	that	a	commission	representative	of	the	Dominion	and	the																																																									124	“All	Governments	Meet	Obligations,	Premiers	Decide:	Permit	No	Default	in	Canada,	Determination	As	Parlay	Ends	Against	Western	Probe”	in	The	Globe,	Saturday,	January	20,	1934.	P.	1.	125	Eric	J.	Hanson's	Financial	History	of	Alberta:	1905-1950.	eds.	Paul	Boothe	and	Heather	Edwards.	(Calgary:	University	of	Calgary	Press,	2003)	97.		
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provinces	be	appointed	to	explore	the	possibility	of	a	re-arrangement	of	the	taxation	sources	in	view	of	the	dire	necessity	of	all	the	provinces	finding	new	sources	of	revenue.”126	Bennett	guardedly	agreed	to	set	up	a	subcommittee	on	Maritime	Rights	that	would	include	an	examination	of	tariff	adjustments.	Nine	months	later,	on	September	13,	1934,	the	Prime	Minister	set	up	a	three-person	Royal	Commission	under	the	chairmanship	of	former	finance	minister	Sir	Thomas	White	to	deal	“as	speedily	as	possible”	with	the	Duncan	Commission’s	call	for	a	revision	of	the	financial	arrangements.127						Macdonald	could	not	wait	for	Bennett	to	examine	Ottawa’s	subsidies	to	the	Maritimes	and	the	reallocation	of	revenues	and	responsibilities.	On	July	27,	1934,	he	appointed	his	own	three-person	Royal	Commission	Provincial	Economic	Inquiry	[sic]	under	the	chairmanship	of	Leeds	University	economist	John	Harry	Jones.	The	two	other	members	were	former	Nova	Scotia	MP	Alexander	S.	Johnston	and	economic	geographer	Harold	Innis.								Their	mission	caught	the	fiscal	zeitgeist	of	their	Maritime	age.	They	were	to	examine	the	effect	of	federal	fiscal	and	trade	policies	on	the	province’s	economic	life.	They	were	to	scrutinize	“the	adequacy	of	present	financial	arrangements	between	the	Dominion	of	Canada	and	the	Province	of	Nova	Scotia	in	the	light	of	the	powers,	obligations,	and	responsibilities	of	the	Dominion	and	Province,	respectively,	under	
																																																								126	“Ask	Provinces	To	Look	After	Own	Financing:	Desire	of	Federal	Government	Is	to	Shift	Responsibility	Back	Gradually”	in	The	Ottawa	Journal,	Thursday,	January	18,	p.	2.	127	Report	Of	The	Royal	Commission	On	Financial	Arrangements	Between	The	
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the	Federal	constitution”;	and	they	were	free	to	look	at	any	other	matter	affecting	the	province’s	economic	welfare	or	its	relations	with	the	Dominion.128								Three	months	later,	in	early	December,	the	Jones	Commission	issued	a	complex	and	occasionally	disappointing	report.	Three	main	factors	had	contributed	to	the	province’s	“relative	economic	decline:	tariff	policies,	transportation	costs,	and	centralized,	protected	industries.”129	What	followed	was	a	thorough	examination	of	the	problems	–	but	there	were	no	solutions	to	catch	the	dispirited	public’s	fancy.								In	the	end,	Innis	did	not	sign	the	main	report	–	but	he	did	issue	a	so-called	100-page	Complementary	Report	that	aimed	to	strengthen	the	main	report	through	its	“emphasis	on	the	national	policy	in	the	broad	sense	rather	than	in	the	narrow	fiscal	sense.”130	(Indeed,	the	commissioners	were	pleased	that	his	more	historical	approach	resulted	“in	the	same	general	conclusions	and	recommendations.)131							Innis	argued	that	two	basic	trends	dominated	Canada’s	economic	history:	centralization	in	the	continental	area	and	decentralization	in	the	Maritimes.	“The	St.	Lawrence	drainage	basin	has	extended	its	influence	to	the	Pacific	coast	and	to	the	Atlantic	Coast	[sic],”	he	declared.	“In	its	extension,	centralization	has	become	increasingly	marked	and	has	been	evident	in	transportation	and	banking	
																																																								128	Province	of	Nova	Scotia,	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission:	Provincial	Economic	
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particularly.”132	Worse,	Central	Canada’s	high	tariffs	to	protect	its	manufactured	products	had	hampered	the	Maritime	reliance	on	the	export	of	raw	materials.	During	the	Depression,	“the	burden	of	railway	rates	and	customs	duties	became	increasingly	severe.”133								The	University	of	Toronto	academic	denounced	“the	callousness,	lack	of	sympathy,	and	general	disregard	of	broad	policy,	which	has	characterized	federal	supervision”	of	the	Maritimes.134	In	compensation	for	the	rigidities	of	Ottawa’s	centralization,	the	federal	government	should	adopt	a	regional	development	policy.	Perhaps,	as	in	Australia,	Ottawa	could	assume	the	debts	of	the	weaker	states,	especially	the	railway	debts.	It	should	also	better	coordinate	its	activities	with	those	of	the	provinces.	His	conclusion	was	blunt:	“Compensation	is	not	enough.”135									The	Jones	report,	including	Innis’	complementary	report,	made	little	impression	on	Central	Canada.	As	The	Globe	commented	glumly:	“The	unsatisfactory	feature	of	the	findings	–	but	perhaps	the	inevitable	one	–	is	that	most	of	Nova	Scotia’s	troubles	lie	beyond	her	own	control.”136	The	newspaper	urged	other	provinces	to	undertake	similar	studies	to	examine	the	bases	on	which	subsidies	were	granted	to	them	–	and	demand	revisions	if	necessary.	The	strains	within	the	federation	were	becoming	a	threat	to	its	unity.	But	there	seemed	no	remedy	for	the	general	passivity	about	fiscal	inequality.																																																										132	“Complementary	Report	of	Dr.	Harold	Innis,	Halifax,	October	24,	1934”	in	Province	of	Nova	Scotia,	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission:	Provincial	Economic	Inquiry.	(Halifax,	N.	S.:	Provincial	Secretary,	King’s	Printer,	1934)	p.	151.			133	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission,	p.	152.	134	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission,	p.	225.	135	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission,	pps.	225-226.	136	“The	Ills	Of	A	Province”	in	The	Globe,	Monday,	December	10,	1934.	P.	6.	
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Two	Maritime	Calls	For	Action	
						Predictably,	no	immediate	action	ensued.	But	attached	to	the	report	was	an	appendix		–		“Economic	Inquiry	–	Financial	Relations”	–	that	a	relatively	junior	Dalhousie	University	political	scientist,	Robert	Alexander	MacKay,	had	submitted	to	the	Commission	on	September	26,	1934.	The	paper	addressed	the	fiscal	inequalities	within	the	federation,	starting	with	the	province’s	entry	into	Confederation,	before	proceeding	to	elaborate	upon	the	conclusions	of	the	Duncan	Commission.	(Aggrieved	Australians	would	have	felt	thoroughly	at	home	reading	it.)								MacKay	would	continue	to	address	this	topic	throughout	the	next	six	years,	notably	as	a	member	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations.	But	his	25-page	report	on	the	province’s	financial	relations	must	have	raised	eyebrows	in	Ottawa.	MacKay	concluded	that	the	Dominion	should	increase	its	subsidies	to	the	provincial	governments	on	the	basis	of	“fiscal	need.”137	Struggling	governments	should	have	a	reasonably	efficient	administration;	they	should	perform	functions	that	“are	not	duly	in	advance	or	more	extensive	than	those	of	other	Provinces”;	and	they	should	levy	a	“fair	burden	of	taxation.”138								If	a	province	passed	those	tests,	“the	Dominion	is	clearly	under	obligations	to	come	to	the	aid	of	the	Provinces	on	the	ground	of	their	fiscal	needs	because	of	the	national	interest	in	the	due	performance	by	the	Provinces	of	their	constitutional	
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duties.”139	In	effect,	McKay	saw	inequality	as	a	condition	that	could	imperil	the	federation	–	and	concluded	that	it	was	in	the	federation’s	self-interest	to	remedy	it.						As	well,	MacKay	argued	that	his	province	“may	have	a	claim	for	revision	of	subsidies	if	it	be	established	that	the	Provincial	sources	of	revenue	have	been	impaired	by	Dominion	policies,”	notably	federal	tariff	and	income	tax	policies.140	MacKay	did	not	assert	that	this	impairment	had	occurred.	But	if	the	facts	showed	that	federal	policies	had	adversely	affected	the	province,	“Nova	Scotia,	it	seems	clear,	has	quite	as	good	a	claim	for	compensation	by	way	of	subsidies	as	had	the	western	provinces	for	federal	control	of	their	lands	or	New	Brunswick	for	loss	of	its	right	to	levy	export	taxes	on	timber.”141	MacKay	would	later	move	away	from	that	early	claim	for	compensation	for	the	inequities	caused	by	federation.	142						Finally,	and	perhaps	most	astonishingly,	MacKay	lamented	the	lack	of	“a	suitable	means	for	adjusting	subsidies	from	time	to	time	in	accordance	with	the	fiscal	needs	of	the	Provinces.”	Instead,	any	adjustments	had	been	left	to	Dominion	whims.	“In	the	light	of	the	history	of	subsidy	questions	it	now	seems	clear	that	the	principle	of	
equality	of	treatment	as	between	the	Provinces	is	subordinate	to	the	principle	of	fiscal	
need.”143	The	future	member	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations	was	quietly	building	a	case	for	equalization	payments	–	decades	ahead	of	
																																																								139	Royal	Commission	Provincial	Economic	Inquiry,	37.	140	Royal	Commission	Provincial	Economic	Inquiry,	39.	141	Royal	Commission	Provincial	Economic	Inquiry,	40.		142	He	was	a	commissioner	with	the	Royal	Commission2	on	Dominion-
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the	formal	integration	of	this	conceptual	approach	into	fiscal	and	social	policy	within	the	federation.									MacKay	was	also	pondering	the	fundamental	flaw	in	the	federation	that	Australian	and	other	Canadian	experts	could	not	resolve	satisfactorily:	how	could	the	poorer	provinces	be	truly	equal	to	the	richer	provinces	if	they	could	not	afford	to	pay	for	similar	services?	Although	Australia	had	already	implemented	a	remedy,	the	question	would	plague	both	federations	for	decades.								Two	months	after	the	Jones	Report	on	Nova	Scotia,	the	federal	White	Commission	reported,	less	than	five	months	after	it	had	started	its	hectic	examination	of	the	Maritime	Provinces.	Premier	Macdonald	had	told	this	Commission	that	“financial	necessity”	was	the	basis	of	all	federal	revisions	of	the	subsidy	since	Confederation.	The	Commission	firmly	rejected	that	assertion,	arguing	that	to	accept	that	claim	“would	inevitably	lead	to	conditions	harmful	and	dangerous	in	the	extreme	to	both	the	Dominion	and	the	Provinces	themselves….	The	Government	of	a	Province	[could	then]	demand	from	the	Dominion	Treasury	any	sums	necessary	to	meet	recurring	deficits…Power	to	spend	must	entail	responsibility	for	expenditure.”144							Still,	the	report	admitted	that	the	three	provincial	governments	had	been	“frugal”	–	and	that	they	were	handicapped	by	their	“isolated	economic	position	with	respect	to	the	rest	of	Canada,	a	stationary	or	declining	population	and	less	per	capita	wealth	
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and	taxable	capacity	than	most	if	not	all	of	the	other	provinces.”145	It	added	sagely:	“Increase	of	money	grants	to	individual	Provinces	will	not	alone	bring	about	prosperous	conditions	within	their	areas	although	it	may	indirectly	assist	by	promoting,	through	educational	and	public	welfare	services,	economic	efficiency	or	by	reducing	taxation	within	the	Province	and	thus	lessening	the	burden	upon	trade	and	industry.”146	In	effect,	some	form	of	equalization	would	benefit	all	Canadians.						The	White	Commission	seconded	the	Duncan	Commission’s	notion	that	it	was	not	possible	to	ensure	that	every	region	of	the	country	benefited	equally	from	federation.	“But	reasonable	balance	is	within	accomplishment	if	there	be	periodic	stocktaking.”147	Accordingly,	it	recommended	an	increase	in	the	subsidies	for	all	three	Maritime	Provinces	“based	upon	broad	and	general	considerations	of	fairness	and	equity…and	to	the	economic	disadvantages	to	which	the	Maritime	Provinces	are	particularly	subject….	Such	claims	are	by	their	nature	not	susceptible	of	detailed	appraisal	by	any	process	of	mathematical	calculation	as	the	basis	for	accurate	comparison	is	wanting	on	account	of	the	diversity	of	conditions	and	circumstances	of	development	of	the	several	Provinces.”148								This	was	an	argument	based	upon	the	federation’s	moral	obligation	to	its	poorer	members	–	but	it	was	also	a	hardheaded	observation.	The	Bennett	Government	complied,	increasing	Prince	Edward	Island’s	annual	payments	from	$125,000	to	
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$275,000;	New	Brunswick’s	went	from	$600,000	to	$900,000;	and	Nova	Scotia’s	payments	from		$875,000	to	$1.3-million.149					That	should	have	marked	a	pause	in	Premier	Macdonald’s	mission.	He	had	won.	But	one	of	the	three	members	of	the	White	Royal	Commission	filed	a	dissenting	report.	The	Chief	Justice	of	the	Prince	Edward	Island	Supreme	Court,	John	Alexander	Mathieson,	who	was	a	former	P.	E.	I.	Premier,	filed	a	memorandum	of	dissent	because	of	White’s	disregard	for	the	varying	fiscal	needs	of	the	provinces.	The	three	Maritime	Provinces,	Mathieson	argued,	had	been	treated	with	“less	justice	and	consideration”	than	the	Western	Provinces.	There	had	been	no	equality	of	treatment	since	the	early	days	of	Confederation.	“One	of	the	major	problems	facing	Canada	today	is	the	devising	of	some	general	plan	for	the	adjustment	of	Dominion	and	provincial	financial	relations,”	Mathieson	stated	firmly.	“The	practice	which	has	existed	from	early	days	of	dealing	with	single	Provinces	or	groups	of	Provinces	without	due	regard	to	the	interests	of	all,	may	bring	about	a	condition	of	grave	unrest	not	free	from	danger	to	Canadian	unity.”150	As	I	will	show,	Macdonald	would	remember	that	admonition	in	future	years.		
Conclusion							Most	Depression-era	politicians	could	not	deal	with	such	prescient	warnings	about	the	need	for	a	general	formula	to	remedy	fiscal	inequality	among	the	provinces	for	the	sake	of	social	cohesion	and	political	stability.	Ottawa	was	too																																																									149	“Review	of	Dominion	Provincial	Financial	Arrangements,”	John	James	Deutsch	Fonds,	n.	name,	revised	in	1955,	Queen’s	University	Archives,	Box	81,	File	770.	8.	150	“Review	of	Dominion	Provincial	Financial	Arrangements,”	John	James	Deutsch,	24.	
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worried	about	the	ongoing	impatience	within	the	Maritime	provincial	governments	and	the	deepening	crises	within	the	Western	provincial	governments,	which	were	flirting	with	bankruptcy.	But	those	Maritime	reports	with	their	warnings	and	their	desperate	hopes	would	set	the	stage	for	the	terrible	last	half	of	the	1930s.	Then,	the	Wisdom	of	Solomon	along	with	the	energy	and	strategy	of	Frederick	the	Great,	which	Sir	Joseph	Howe	had	once	deemed	essential	to	the	survival	of	a	federation,	would	prove	elusive.																
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CHAPTER	TWO:	The	Poorer	Endanger	The	Richer,	1934-1937							By	the	middle	of	the	1930s,	federal	politicians	and	bureaucrats	could	see	that	the	federation	was	not	working	for	Canadians	or	their	governments.	Many	hoped	that	Ottawa	could	somehow	maintain	social	peace	on	the	treacherous	path	through	the	1930s.	Others	could	see	that	the	federation	had	to	rebalance	its	revenues	and	responsibilities	or	it	would	not	survive.	The	principle	problem	was	the	fiscal	inequality	among	provincial	governments	and	their	municipalities,	which	were	the	constitutional	creatures	of	the	provinces.	The	profound	and	baffling	Depression	compounded	those	woes.	“No	other	industrial	downturn	in	history	was	so	massive	or	so	persistent,”	observe	Kenneth	Norrie,	Doug	Owram	and	J.	C.	Herbert	Emery	in	A	
History	of	the	Canadian	Economy.1	Commodity	markets	dwindled.	Trade	and	credit	contracted.						The	structure	of	Canada’s	federation	was	not	designed	to	handle	such	difficult	circumstances.	The	federal	government	was	not	responsible	for	social	programs	–	although	it	had	the	lion’s	share	of	the	revenues.	The	provincial	governments	were	saddled	with	social	responsibilities	–	but	many	could	not	even	pay	their	share	of	relief	payments	without	driving	themselves	further	into	debt.	Some	were	teetering	on	the	brink	of	bankruptcy	as	their	export	markets	dwindled.	Many	nurtured	resentments	against	Ottawa	and	their	fellow	provinces,	which	inadvertently	strengthened	their	political	identities	as	“Haves”	and	“Have	Nots.”	The	anxiety	was																																																									1	Kenneth	Norrie,	Douglas	Owram	and	J.C.	Herbert	Emery,	The	History	of	the	
Canadian	Economy,	fourth	edition.	(Toronto:	Nelson,	Thomson,	2008)	317.	
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pervasive.	Conservative	Prime	Minister	R.	B.	Bennett	became	concerned	that	a	provincial	bankruptcy	would	affect	the	credit	rating	of	the	federal	government,	driving	up	interest	costs	on	Ottawa’s	borrowing,	eating	into	funds	that	his	government	needed	for	its	own	programs.										There	had	to	be	an	answer.	Retrospectively,	it	might	be	difficult	to	relate	to	the	perceptions	and	complexities	of	the	inequalities	among	the	political	players	in	the	1930s.	Politicians	and	bureaucrats	spent	months	pondering	the	intricacies	of	their	finances,	their	constitutional	powers	and	their	fragile	social	supports.	But	these	were	desperate	times	–	and	any	solutions	beyond	ad	hoc	subsidies	were	not	readily	apparent.	The	senior	bureaucrats	first	looked	to	other	federations	–	to	the	United	States,	to	Argentina	and	especially	to	Canada’s	sister	Dominion	Australia	–	to	figure	out	how	they	handled	inequalities	among	states.									In	the	mid-1930s,	they	singled	out	the	Australian	“Loan	Council”	mechanism	as	worthy	of	study:	In	1929,	the	Commonwealth	Government	had	taken	over	all	state	debts,	and	then	put	responsibility	for	all	future	federal	or	state	borrowings	under	the	Council.	Apprehensive	Bank	of	Canada	and	Finance	Ministry	officials	presented	that	option	to	their	political	masters	who	suggested	it	to	the	provinces.	Initially,	federal	officials	and	politicians	refused	to	accept	the	horrified	reactions	of	many	provincial	premiers	as	rejections.	Then,	they	realized	that	they	had	luckily	dodged	the	risks	of	assuming	responsibility	for	provincial	debt	and	borrowing.	Finally,	they	weighed	plans	that	would	preserve	the	federation	in	the	short	term	with	ad	hoc	grants	and	loans	–	and	in	the	longer	term.	In	particular,	key	bureaucrats	wanted	a	
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Royal	Commission	on	Re-confederation.	And	every	step	of	the	way	–	from	the	Loan	Council	to	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	–	the	model	was	Australia.							All	federations	were	groping	for	ways	to	stay	together.	Ad	hoc	subsidies	were	no	permanent	solution	to	the	ever-widening	inequalities	among	states	as	they	were	called	in	Australia	or	provinces	in	Canada.	The	richer	provinces	were	resentful	of	the	eleventh-hour	funding	for	the	poorer	provinces	that	their	taxpayers	unwittingly	financed.	The	poorer	ones	could	never	get	enough	money	–	but	the	pleading,	the	trips	to	Ottawa,	the	ritual	of	polite-but-desperate-or-disdainful	letters	was	exhausting.	Social	cohesion	and	political	stability	were	at	risk	–	because	there	were	no	mutually	acceptable	fiscal	mechanisms	such	as	equalization	to	calm	the	unrest.							No	one	knew	if	the	counter-cyclical	prescriptions	of	British	economist	John	Maynard	Keynes	would	work:	The	politicians	and	bureaucrats	at	the	very	top	of	the	Ottawa	pecking-order	could	not	be	tempted	to	try	them	–	although	some	were	familiar	with	his	work.2	Finance	Ministry	special	assistant	W.	A.	Mackintosh	would	lead	a	delegation	to	London	in	November	1942	to	discuss	Keynes’	proposal	for	an	international	central	bank	to	clear	payments,	which	the	individual	central	banks	would	establish.3	But	Canadian	officials	would	not	discuss	his	insights	in	depth	with																																																									2	Hugh	Grant,	W.	A.	Mackintosh:	The	Life	of	a	Canadian	Economist	(Montreal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2015)	pps.	145-151;	Robert	A.	Wardhaugh,	Behind	The	Scenes:	The	Life	and	Work	of	William	Clifford	Clark	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2010)	pps.	62,122.	Robert	Skidelsky,	Keynes	and	
Canada,	Toronto	Seminar,	Tuesday	November	6,	2001.		http://www.skidelskyr.com/print/keynes-and-canada		3	Hugh	Grant,	W.	A.	Mackintosh:	The	Life	of	a	Canadian	Economist,	p.	240.	“The	Keynes	Plan”	in	The	International	Monetary	Fund	1945-1965:	Twenty	Years	of	International	Monetary	Cooperation,	volume	three,	Documents,	ed.	J.	Keith	Horsefield	(Washington:	International	Monetary	Fund.	1969)	p.	3.	
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him	in	Ottawa	until	1944-1945.4	In	fact,	economists	J.	Stephen	Ferris	and	Stanley	L.	Winer	date	the	acceptance	of	Keynesian	thought	in	Canada	to	the	White	Paper	on	Employment	and	Income	in	1945	–	and	that	was	“aimed	at	addressing	the	perceived	electoral	strength	of	the	Co-operative	Commonwealth	Federation	(CCF).”5	It	was	a	relatively	late	conversion.						Even	in	the	1930s,	however,	the	link	between	funds	for	poor	governments	and	the	provision	of	social	services	for	poor	citizens	was	clear.	Premiers	from	the	poorer	provinces	complained	that	they	could	barely	afford	relief	payments,	let	alone	find	money	for	proper	schools	and	hospitals.	True,	those	governments	were	concerned	about	how	to	perform	their	basic	government	functions	in	unruly	times.	They	feared	protests.	And	they	certainly	had	no	notion	of	expanding	social	programs	that	they	could	not	afford.	But	reforming	premiers	such	as	Nova	Scotia’s	Angus	L.	Macdonald	were	also	deeply	worried	–	as	I	will	show	–	about	their	citizens’	social	and	physical	wellbeing.	They,	too,	watched	Australia,	where	state-centred	approaches	were	far	more	advanced.	
																																																																																																																																																																					http://imsreform.imf.org/reserve/pdf/keynesplan.pdf		4	Skidelsky,	p.	1.	5	J.	Stephen	Ferris	and	Stanley	L.	Winer,	Searching	for	Keynes:	An	Essay	on	the	Political	Economy	of	Fiscal	Policy,	With	Application	to	Canada,	1870-2000.	(CESIFO	Working	Paper	Working	Paper	No.	1016.	Category	2:	Public	Choice,	August	2003,	Revised	June	2004.	p.	5.	And	Hugh	Grant,	W.	A.	Mackintosh:	The	Life	of	a	Canadian	
Economist,	p.	17.	
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=437403 
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				Indeed,	Australia	set	an	innovative	example	with	its	Loan	Council	to	consolidate	state	debts	and	its	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	to	distribute	federal	funds	through	a	neutral	commission	to	poorer	states.	Equalization	as	an	approach	would	be	hatched	in	Australia	–	despite	the	major	differences	in	their	federal	constitutions	and,	eventually,	their	formulas.	But	it	would	be	decades	before	Ottawa	would	accept	the	Australian	idea	of	a	permanent	grants	program,	which	doled	out	cash	through	a	neutral	formula	with	no	strings	attached,	as	the	solution	to	inequality	among	the	provinces.	First,	the	federation	had	to	figure	out	how	it	had	evolved	during	the	sixty	years	since	Confederation.			
The	Canadian-Australian	Contacts	Continue									The	Canadian-Australian	axis	continued	throughout	the	Depression.	The	two	nations	watched	each	other	closely	on	so	many	common	issues,	including	their	efforts	to	implement	Unemployment	Insurance.	In	late	1933,	the	Australians	told	Canberra	about	Prime	Minister	Bennett’s	promise	of	an	“economically	independent”	central	bank,	along	with	his	“pride	in	the	fact	that	the	financial	credit	of	Canada	stood	unchallenged.”6	(Australia	had	vested	its	Commonwealth	Bank	of	Australia	with	central	bank	powers	such	as	the	ability	to	issue	notes	in	the	1920s.)	Most	importantly,	the	financial	disputes	between	the	provinces	and	Ottawa	–	and	among	the	provinces	themselves	–	preoccupied	Canberra.		
																																																								6	L.L.O.	Note	–	15.12.33.	“The	Central	Bank	for	Canada”	in	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada	–	Internal	Politics,	Series	number	A981,	Control	Symbol	CAN	24,	Part	1,	Barcode	173375,	unnumbered	pages	within	file.		
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							Canada,	in	turn,	watched	Australia.	As	I	have	indicated,	Bennett	held	gatherings	with	the	provinces	during	every	full	year	of	his	mandate	–	in	1931,	1932,	1933	and	1934.	Those	meetings	reviewed	the	grave	need	for	continued	federal	payments	for	relief	–	and	the	growing	gulf	between	the	richer	and	the	poorer	provinces.	By	the	January	18-19,	1934	Conference,	as	I	have	shown	in	Chapter	One,	even	the	wealthier	provinces	finally	accepted	that	Ottawa	had	to	help	the	poorer	provinces	in	the	West	and,	later,	in	the	East	or	their	own	fiscal	position	could	be	at	risk	through	defaults.								But	there	was	an	important	theme,	largely	overlooked	at	the	time	and	certainly	not	mentioned	to	the	press	or	the	public,	running	through	that	1934	conference:	the	situation	in	Australia.	Even	Winnipeg	Free	Press	Ottawa	correspondent	Grant	Dexter,	who	had	extensive	off-the-record	access	to	politicians	and	bureaucrats,	did	not	mention	Australia	in	his	chatty	behind-the-scenes	seven-page	letter	to	his	editor	John	Dafoe,	on	January	17,	1934.						Australia	had	not	grabbed	the	public	imagination.	But	senior	bureaucrats	were	finally	probing	in	depth	their	fellow	Dominion’s	approach	to	the	Depression.	The	federal	package	for	Bennett’s	final	Conference	in	1934	included	a	22-page	academic	essay	on	how	Australia	had	reduced	real	wages,	slashed	government	expenditures,	cut	interest	charges,	expanded	central	bank	credit	to	finance	deficits	and	loans	for	necessary	works,	and	depreciated	its	currency.	“I	do	not	suggest	that	Australian	policy	is	the	only	way	out,”	wrote	University	of	Melbourne	economist	Douglas	Copland,	“but…it	has	proved	to	be	a	way	out	at	a	time	when	less	comprehensive	action	has	not	proved	so	successful	in	some	countries…The	secret	of	Australia’s	
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attack	on	the	depression	lay	in	the	combination	of	a	courageous	banking	policy	with	drastic	reductions	in	costs	and	government	expenditure.”7								There	was	more.	The	provincial	delegates	to	that	January	1934	conference	also	received	an	eleven-page	federal	memo	on	the	consolidation	of	debts	in	Australia	and	the	establishment	of	the	Australian	Loan	Council,	tracing	the	Commonwealth’s	gradual	approach	to	debt	control	from	the	first	voluntary	measures	in	1924	to	the	formal	constitutional	adoption	of	the	Council	in	1929.8	Ottawa	was	clearly	looking	to	its	fellow	Dominion	for	answers.	After	four	full	years	of	Depression,	the	federal	government	wanted	to	ease	the	debt	loads	of	the	poorer	provinces,	which	could	barely	afford	basic	relief,	let	alone	the	interest	on	their	debts.	Unfortunately,	the	ingenious	Australian	solution	to	inequality	would	not	be	an	easy	sell	to	Canada’s	suspicious	provinces	–	especially	the	“Have”	ones.	Those	suggestions	went	nowhere.							Remarkably,	the	Australians	still	viewed	the	Conference	as	a	sign	of	growing	Dominion-Provincial	agreement	on	the	tricky	issue	of	fiscal	inequality	among	the	member	states.	On	January	26,	1934,	diplomats	reported	to	Canberra	that	the	five	eastern	provinces	had	passed	a	resolution	at	that	Conference,	“expressing	appreciation	of	the	difficulties	of	the	grain-growing	provinces	of	the	west,	and	waiving	objections	to	the	continuation	of	the	Federal	loan	policy.”	Bennett,	they	added,	had	vowed	to	keep	financing	the	western	provinces	–	and	to	adopt	a	large	
																																																								7	University	of	Melbourne	economist	Douglas	Copland,	“Economic	Adjustment	in	Australia,”	Lloyds	Bank	Monthly	Review,	November	1933,	LAC,	C-1-4,	Correspondence	and	Proposals	for	Discussions	1934.	RG	47,	Volume	67.	1.	8	“Commonwealth	of	Australia:	Consolidation	of	Debts	of	Commonwealth	and	its	constituent	States	and	Establishment	of	Australian	Loan	Council,”	LAC,	C-1-4,	Correspondence	and	Proposals	for	Discussions	1934.	RG	47,	Volume	67.	Pgs.	1-11.	
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public	works	policy.9	Presumably,	Australian	politicians	took	comfort	from	the	news	that	their	Dominion’s	Depression-era	misery	had	company.	But,	by	then,	Australia	also	had	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission,	which	would	go	a	long	way	toward	easing	that	nation’s	fiscal	inequality	among	states	on	a	formal	basis	through	annual	non-conditional	grants.						Both	nations	were	somehow	coping	with	the	strains	on	their	societies	–	and	their	governments.	Barely.	Their	newspapers	were	bewildering	pastiches	of	vanishing	lifestyles	and	grim	realities.	But	governments	dominated	the	news	in	Canada	as	they	did	in	Australia	–	if	only	because	they	were	looked	upon	as	the	main	agents	of	change	in	desperate	times.	The	gap	between	richer	and	poorer	governments	could	be	seen	at	a	glance.	Ontario	Premier	George	Henry	announced	that	his	province’s	1933	year-end	surplus	was	$476,000	instead	of	the	anticipated	deficit	of	nearly	$3-million.	(The	fiscal	year	was	1933-1934.)	“It	is	largely	the	result	of	economy	without	impairment	of	efficiency	in	service,”	lauded	The	Ottawa	Journal.10							In	contrast,	the	Dominion	Government	exited	1933	with	a	shortfall	of	$100-million,	which	was	“not	something	for	which	the	Government	can	be	blamed.”	The	newspaper	summed	up	the	nation’s	plight:	“The	Government	has	cut	controllable	expenditure	to	the	bone;	is	running	the	country	practically	as	cheaply	as	it	was	run	before	the	war,	this	despite	more	services,	a	greatly	increased	interest	overhead.	What	it	couldn’t	avoid	–	no	Government	could	–	was	the	expenditure	that	had	and	
																																																								9	L.	L.	O.	Note	–	25-	1-34.	“Finance”	in	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada	–	Internal	Politics,	Series	number	A981,	Control	Symbol	CAN	24,	Part	1,	Barcode	173375,	unnumbered	pages	within	file.		10	“Public	Finance”	in	The	Ottawa	Journal,	Friday,	January	5,	1934.	p.	8.		
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has	to	be	made	for	relief,	the	losses	of	the	Canadian	National	[Railway],	the	tremendous	curtailment	of	revenues.”11					Political	scientist	Robert	M	Campbell	does	not	view	those	deficits	as	Keynesian:		The	idea	that	fiscal	policy	could	aim	at	increasing	the	level	of	demand	or	employment	had	never	taken	hold	in	the	government’s	policy	circles	[in	the	1930s].	Instead,	fiscal	policy	during	the	Depression	aimed	at	preserving	the	integrity	of	the	financial	system.	Governments	acted	to	minimize	or	eliminate	the	budget	deficits	which	developed	as	a	result	of	the	weakening	of	economic	activity.	The	federal	government’s	expenditures	grew	automatically,	as	a	result	of	increased	spending	on	relief.	On	the	other	hand,	less	tax	revenue	was	being	generated,	as	a	result	of	declining	incomes	and	employment….[D]eficits	in	the	1930s	were	unintentional,	reflecting	declining	revenues,	and	governments	were	encouraged	by	the	business	and	financial	community	to	control	or	eliminate	them.12								Bennett’s	deficits	were	reluctant.	But	they	were	a	very	necessary	concession	to	his	turbulent	times.			
Year-To-Year	Survival	On	An	Ad	Hoc	Basis												Ottawa	was	siphoning	money	into	the	provinces	on	an	ad	hoc	basis.	A	27-page	Department	of	Labour	publication	in	1935	itemized	the	numerous	federal	disbursements	under	relief	legislation:	They	amounted	to	$161	million	between	1930	and	February	1935		–	along	with	$81.8	million	in	loans	and	advances.13	The	payments	and	the	programs	varied	quite	drastically	among	provinces	–	as	Ottawa	responded	to	different	needs.	But	it	was	a	lot	of	money:	In	his	budget	in	mid-April	
																																																								11	“Public	Finance”	in	The	Ottawa	Journal.	12	Robert	A.	Campbell,	Grand	Illusions:	The	Politics	of	the	Keynesian	Experience	in	
Canada	1945-1975	(Toronto:	Broadview	Press,	1987)	p.	11.		13	“Survey	of	Federal	Relief	Activities	Since	1930”	in	The	Labour	Gazette,	May	1935.	LAC,	RG47,	Volume	60,	File	Conferences,	1935.	p.	24.		
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1934,	Finance	Minister	Edgar	Rhodes	declared	that	tax	revenues	had	netted	$272.9	million	in	1933-1934	–	but	his	government	had	spent	$406	million.14	Relief	and	other	loans	and	advances	amounted	to	hefty	tabs.		As	a	later	federal	memorandum	would	outline,	Ottawa’s	contribution	to	relief	payments	and	public	works	projects	–	which	was	in	addition	to	subsidies	-	was	a	seemingly	never-ending	expense	and	a	huge	strain	on	the	Treasury	during	those	years:		By	far	the	most	significant	payments	to	the	provinces	were	made	to	assist	in	the	provision	of	relief	during	the	depression.	While	refusing	to	accept	constitutional	liability	for	relief	the	Dominion	early	recognized	that	the	financial	burden	was	of	a	magnitude	far	in	excess	of	the	capacity	of	at	least	six	of	the	provinces.	Under	annual	Dominion	relief	acts	assistance	was	given	provincial	and	municipal	governments	on	a	variety	of	bases	and	for	a	variety	of	purposes.	During	the	first	three	or	four	years	the	Dominion	paid	approximately	one-third	of	the	cost	of	total	relief,	the	provinces	and	municipalities	sharing	the	balance	in	about	equal	proportions.	The	Dominion	also	carried	on	a	program	of	public	works	and	other	projects	of	direct	assistance.	Following	August,	1934,	the	Dominion	adopted	a	more	pragmatic	approach	and	granted	money	on	a	monthly	basis	which	varied	in	amount	with	seasonal	and	other	requirements.15								But	even	that	pragmatic	approach	to	varying	needs	did	not	end	Ottawa’s	assistance.	In	addition	to	its	contributions	for	relief	in	all	provinces,	the	federal	government	also	made	“substantial	loans	for	relief	and	other	purposes	to	the	Prairie	provinces	and	British	Columbia.	In	all	these	amounted	to	about	$175-million.”16	This	figure	did	not	include	the	later	payments	that	would	be	made	between	1937	and	1941	to	the	desperate	Prairie	Provinces	–	when	the	situation	became	even	worse.																																																									14	“The	Budget,”	editorial	in	The	Globe.,	Thursday	April	19,	1934.	p.	6.	15	“Review	of	Dominion	Provincial	Financial	Arrangements,”	John	James	Deutsch	Fonds,	n.	name,	revised	in	1955,	Queen’s	University	Archives,	Box	81,	File	770.	8-9.	My	italics.	16	“Review	of	Dominion	Provincial	Financial	Arrangements,”	9.	
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						The	Great	Depression	underscored	the	inability	of	the	federation	to	cope	with	such	pressing	financial	needs.	Ottawa	had	to	assist	every	province	with	relief	–	but	especially	the	poorer	ones.	But	it	could	not,	and	almost	certainly	would	not,	assume	constitutional	responsibility	for	the	provision	of	public	relief.	Without	a	system	of	equalization	–	of	regular	payments	to	the	provinces	that	were	calculated	using	an	accepted	formula	that	could	take	account	of	the	varying	fiscal	circumstances	in	each	province	–	the	provinces	were	left	to	rely	on	federal	goodwill,	whims,	their	regular	subsidies	and	political	calculation.	Their	societies	were	fraying.							Their	citizens	wanted	answers	–	or	they	would	switch	their	political	allegiance,	perhaps	to	the	Co-operative	Commonwealth	Federation,	which	farm	and	labour	leaders	along	with	academics	had	founded	in	1932.	On	the	eve	of	the	Depression,	Ottawa	had	transferred	$16.5-million	in	statutory	subsidies,	grants	and	conditional	subsidies	to	the	provinces.	By	1934,	that	number	was	$55.9-million.	A	year	later,	it	was	$74-million.17	And	the	provinces	were	still	scrambling	for	funds.	What	had	barely	worked	at	the	turn	of	the	century	was	now	an	anachronistic	approach	to	the	needs	of	a	modern	federation	–	as	Australia	was	demonstrating.			
The	Bureaucrats	Search	For	A	Better	Way								Senior	Finance	Ministry	bureaucrats	scrounged	for	ideas.	On	January	5,	1935,	Deputy	Finance	Minister	W.	C.	Clark	sent	a	memo	to	Bennett’s	political	advisor	and	speechwriter	R.	K.	Finlayson,	outlining	his	suggestion	of	a	three-to-five-year	federal																																																									17	Thomas J. Courchene, Equalization Payments: Past, Present and Future. 
(Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, Special Research Report, 1984) pps. 16-17.		
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guarantee	for	provincial	loans.	The	idea	was	that	the	security	of	a	federal	guarantee	would	allow	Western	Provinces,	including	British	Columbia,	to	lower	their	interest	costs	–	and	still	sell	their	bonds.	“This	would	obviously	improve	very	considerably	the	current	budgetary	position…It	would	also	improve	enormously	the	credit	of	each	province	with	its	bank	and	with	the	public;	indeed,	it	might	make	it	possible	for	the	provinces	to	finance	all	or	a	considerable	portion	of	their	unemployment	relief	expenditures	without	coming	to	us.”18					There	could	be	a	hefty	price,	however,	for	this	putative	remedy	for	fiscal	inequality.	As	Clark	explained,	that	could	include:	“Probably,	one:	an	agreement	on	the	part	of	the	province	not	to	issue	any	new	loans	without	approval	of	the	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	and,	possibly,	two:	an	agreement	on	the	part	of	the	province	to	submit	its	budget	for	the	general	approval	of	the	Governor	of	the	Bank	before	presenting	it	to	the	Provincial	Legislature.”19	Clark	added	that	many	bondholders	assumed	that	the	Dominion	would	not	let	any	province	default.	Interest	rates	were	not	lower,	however,	because	there	were	enough	skeptics	to	thwart	much	of	the	benefit	to	the	western	provinces	of	that	“implied	moral	guarantee.”20								Clark	had	been	deputy	minister	for	less	than	three	years	when	he	wrote	this	politically	naïve	memo:	The	next	two	years	would	upset	many	of	his	assumptions	–	including	his	notion	that	the	provinces	would	be	willing	to	accept	federal	budgetary	oversight	and	his	certainty	that	Ottawa	would	never	allow	a	province	to	default.	But	
																																																								18	Deputy	Finance	Minister	W.C.	Clark	to	R.	K.	Finlayson,	January	3,	1935,	LAC,	Prov.	Financial	(Conf.	File)	P-1-10-1,	RG	19,	Volume	3986.	1.	19	Clark,	2.	20	Clark,	3.	
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the	Ottawa	wheels	were	now	turning,	hunting	for	solutions	for	inequality	among	the	provinces.						In	mid-January,	1935,	the	Deputy	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	Canada,	J.	A.	C.	Osborne,	wrote	to	the	Bank	of	England	Overseas	and	Foreign	Department,	asking	for	more	information	on	the	Australian	Loan	Council,	which	had	been	featured	at	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	in	January	1934.	Osborne	was	actually	the	Secretary	of	that	British	Bank,	on	loan	for	up	to	five	years	to	the	fledgling	Canadian	institution.	His	colleague	J.	Fisher	replied	promptly,	explaining	that	Australia	had	an	amending	formula:	All	six	Australian	states	had	ratified	the	surrender	of	key	powers	to	the	federal	authority	–	and	the	Australian	voters	had	approved	the	idea	of	a	loan	council	in	a	referendum.	Canberra	had	then	passed	the	Financial	Agreement	Validation	Act	of	1929.	The	adoption	had	been	relatively	simple.	Fisher	warned	Osborne,	however,	that	any	similar	agreement	in	Canada	would	require	the	approval	of	the	Dominion	Parliament	and	every	Province	–	and	that	act,	in	turn,	would	require	the	consent	of	the	British	Parliament	to	become	law.	Unlike	Australia,	Canada	did	not	have	an	amending	formula.	21						Fisher	also	advised	Osborne	that	dramatic	problems	had	developed	quite	quickly	after	the	Australian	amendment	had	passed.	In	1931,	New	South	Wales	Governor	Jack	Lang	had	arbitrarily	reduced	the	interest	rates	on	his	state’s	loans	and	cut	the	interest	rate	for	bondholders.	The	controversy	had	embroiled	the	entire	federation,	and	split	the	governing	federal	Labor	Government.	New	South	Wales	duly	defaulted,																																																									21	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Research	fonds,	Provincial	Financing	1-1,	vol.	1	–	Loan	Councils	&	National	Finance	Council	Confidential.	J.	Fisher	of	the	Overseas	&	Foreign	Department	of	the	Bank	of	England	to	Bank	of	Canada	Deputy	Governor	J.	A.	C.	Osborne,	January	28,	1935.	pps.	1-3.	
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and	the	Commonwealth	covered	its	tab.	In	January	1932,	however,	the	United	Australia	Party	under	Prime	Minister	Joseph	Lyon	took	power,	and	promptly	passed	an	act	to	seize	the	revenues	of	New	South	Wales	in	recompense.	In	response,	Lang	withdrew	all	state	funds	from	government	bank	accounts.	In	May	1932,	State	Governor	Philip	Game	dismissed	Lang’s	government,	which	was	massively	defeated	in	the	ensuing	election	in	June	1932.	The	High	Court	of	Australia	eventually	upheld	the	validity	of	the	1932	federal	act,	which	made	the	Commonwealth	liable	for	state	debts;	and,	crucially,	it	also	upheld	the	Commonwealth’s	right	to	force	a	defaulting	state	to	pay.22						The	Bank	of	England’s	Fisher	then	provided	more	advice	to	Osborne	that	would	prove	prescient.	A	“weakness’	in	the	Australian	Government	Loan	Council	was	that	semi-government	bodies	could	still	borrow	without	council	approval,	“but	to	make	the	Agreement	all	embracing	would	have	been	very	difficult.”23	The	Canadian	bureaucrats	took	note	–	but	they	were	undeterred.	Meanwhile,	the	Bank	of	Canada	kept	researching.	It	concluded	that	the	South	African	provinces	were	“not	a	worry”	for	the	central	government	because	the	Reserve	Bank	would	not	lend	to	them	without	the	central	government’s	approval:	“There	has	even	been	talk	of	abolishing	
																																																								22	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Research	fonds,	Provincial	Financing	1-1,	vol.	1	–	Loan	Councils	&	National	Finance	Council	Confidential.	J.	Fisher	of	the	Overseas	&	Foreign	Department	of	the	Bank	of	England	to	Bank	of	Canada	Deputy	Governor	J.	A.	C.	Osborne,	January	28,	1935.	pps.	1-3.		23	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Research	fonds,	Provincial	Financing	1-1,	vol.	1	–	Loan	Councils	&	National	Finance	Council	Confidential.	J.	Fisher	of	the	Overseas	&	Foreign	Department	of	the	Bank	of	England	to	Bank	of	Canada	Deputy	Governor	J.	A.	C.	Osborne,	January	28,	1935.	pps.	1-3.	
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the	Provinces	altogether.”24	There	were	likely	many	occasions	when	the	elite	Ottawa	bureaucrats	envied	the	clout	of	the	central	governments	in	other	federations.						Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Gordon	Towers	disregarded	the	Bank	of	England’s	warnings	about	loan	councils.	In	a	memorandum,	he	described	a	conversation	on	May	16,	1935	with	British	Columbia	Finance	Minister	John	Hart	who	wanted	Ottawa	to	cut	the	interest	rates	on	its	loans	to	his	province.	Otherwise,	he	warned,	“more	drastic	action”	could	occur	in	the	western	provinces.25	Hart	asked	about	the	possibility	of	borrowing	from	the	Bank.	Towers	explained	that	such	action	was	impossible.	But,	in	that	May	17,	1935	memorandum,	he	also	hinted	that	the	Bank	might	exercise	supervision	to	assist	struggling	provinces:		I	mentioned	that	we	[federal	officials]	visualized	possible	arrangements	in	which	the	Province,	the	Bank	and	the	Province’s	chartered	bankers	would,	in	a	sense,	constitute	a	partnership	whose	chief	object	would	be	so	to	regulate	the	financial	affairs	of	the	Province	that	they	would	be	able	to	take	full	advantage	of	the	satisfactory	situation	now	existing	in	the	securities	market.26					Hart	was	pessimistic,	according	to	Towers:	“He	[Hart]	did	not	think	for	political	reasons	the	Province	could	submit	to	control	by	the	Dominion	Government	but	thought	that	such	control	could	be	given	to	the	Bank	of	Canada.”27	Both	Hart	and	Towers	wisely	did	not	commit	themselves	to	any	scheme	to	ease	inequality.		
																																																								24	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Recommendations	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	B-95,	291	Secretary,	PF1-1,	Volume	1.	“South	Africa”	memo	of	July	10,	1935.	Initials	from	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Gordon	Towers	and	Deputy	Governor	J,	A.	C.	Osborne.	25	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Towers	Memoranda	1935-1937,	0-51.	“Memorandum	of	conversation	with	Honourable	John	Hart,	Minister	of	Finance	for	the	Province	of	British	Columbia,	May	16,	1935.	p.	2	26	Towers	memoranda,	p.	1.	27	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Towers	Memoranda	1935-1937,	0-51.	“Memorandum	of	conversation	with	Honourable	John	Hart,	Minister	of	Finance	for	the	Province	of	British	Columbia,	May	16,	1935.	2.	
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							Such	discussions	did	not	seep	into	the	press.	The	politics	of	the	federal	situation	consumed	the	attention	of	Ottawa	journalists.	Against	the	terrible	backdrop	of	the	ongoing	Depression,	they	were	riveted	by	the	upcoming	election:	How	would	King	handle	Bennett?	How	would	Bennett,	who	was	famously	short-tempered	and	ill,	handle	the	stress	of	the	coming	election?	Even	Winnipeg	Free	Press	journalist	Grant	Dexter,	who	was	superbly	well-connected,	did	not	mention	the	bureaucratic	hunt	for	models	–	not	even	in	his	insider	letters	to	his	editor,	John	Dafoe.28			
The	1935	Canadian	Election								The	Australians,	in	turn,	were	keeping	an	ever-closer	watch	on	Canada’s	efforts	to	deal	with	its	economic	and	political	quandaries.	In	the	spring	of	1935,	foreign	affairs	representatives	in	the	Dominion	of	Canada,	the	Commonwealth	of	Australia	and	the	Union	of	South	Africa	agreed	to	exchange	“in	a	more	direct	manner,	current	social,	political,	statistical	and	economic	information…as	well	as	any	general	information	that	might	be	deemed	interesting	and	useful	to	the	other	Dominions.”29							But	those	Australian	diplomats	did	not	tell	their	home	country	what	was	becoming	apparent:	No	matter	what	Bennett	did,	and	he	did	much	to	change	his	strategy	for	dealing	with	the	stark	economic	inequalities	among	Canadians	and	their	provincial	governments	during	his	last	months	in	office,	he	could	not	revive	his	popularity.	In	January	1935,	in	a	series	of	five	radio	broadcasts,	the	Prime	Minister																																																									28	See	1935	letters	from	Winnipeg	Free	Press	Ottawa	correspondent	Grant	Dexter	to	editor	John	Dafoe	of	January	4,	January	7,	January	12,	January	14,	January	21,	January	23,	July	11,	etc.,	John	Dafoe	fonds,	University	of	Manitoba	Archives,	Box	8,	Folder	1.		29	W.R.	Hodgson,	assistant	secretary	of	the	Australian	External	Affairs	Department	to	The	Officer-in-Charge,	Territories	Branch,	Prime	Minister’s	Department,	May	2,	1935	in	Territories	-	Exchange	of	Information	with	Canada	and	South	Africa.,	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Series	A518,	Control	symbol	DB112/1,	Barcode	102498.	
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had	delivered	a	startling	vision	of	a	reform	agenda	that	reflected	U.S.	President	Franklin	Roosevelt’s	New	Deal.								It	was	a	remarkable	conversion	after	four-and-a-half	years	in	power	and	it	astonished	his	cabinet.	The	Prime	Minister	had	drafted	the	texts	in	private	consultation	with	his	political	advisor	and	speechwriter	R.	K.	Finlayson	and	his	brother-in-law	W.	D.	Herridge,	the	Canadian	Minister	to	Washington,	who	greatly	admired	the	American	New	Deal.30	His	cabinet	ministers	were	not	consulted.	As	Bennett’s	biographer,	historian	John	Boyko,	explains,	the	man	who	was	seen	as	a	firm	defender	of	capitalism	and	big	business	was	now	“boldly	announcing	that	capitalism	was	broken,	that	corporate	Canada	had	let	the	country	down,	and	that	radical	reform	was	needed	to	put	things	right.”31							The	Speech	from	the	Throne,	which	came	two	days	after	the	last	of	those	addresses,	echoed	that	message	with	incendiary	discourse.	Bennett’s	Government	outlined	the	failures	of	capitalism	–	and	emphasized	the	pressing	need	for	fairer	treatment	for	Canada’s	beleaguered	citizens.	“In	the	anxious	years	through	which	you	have	passed,	you	have	been	the	witnesses	of	grave	defects	and	abuses	in	the	capitalist	system,”	Bennett’s	government	declared	while	his	seriously	divided	cabinet	listened.	”Unemployment	and	want	are	proof	of	these.	Great	changes	are	taking	place	about	us.	New	conditions	prevail.	These	require	modifications	in	the	
																																																								30	Donald	Forster	and	Colin	Read,	“The	Politics	of	Opportunism:	The	New	Deal	Broadcasts”	The	Canadian	Historical	Review,	xl,	3	(1979),	327.	31	Boyko,	John.	Bennett:	The	Rebel	Who	Challenged	and	Changed	a	Nation.	(Toronto:	Key	Porter	Books	Limited,	2010)	363-364.	
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capitalist	system	to	enable	that	system	more	effectively	to	serve	the	people.”32	Bennett	promised	“legislation	to	bring	about	unemployment	insurance,	minimum	wages,	old-age	pensions,	workplace	reform,	and	changes	to	regulate	companies	and	to	help	farmers	sell	their	products.”33	It	was	one	of	the	most	extraordinary	conversions	in	Canadian	political	history.	But	it	was	too	late.	Some	historians	remain	dubious	that	it	was	heartfelt.34	But	Bennett	staked	his	reelection	on	the	plan.							The	Prime	Minister	sought	to	expand	the	flimsy	social	security	net,	gradually,	over	the	horrified	objections	of	hardline	conservatives	who	accused	him	of	socialism.	He	especially	wanted	to	replace	relief	with	the	more	dignified	alternative	of	Unemployment	Insurance	that	would	allow	employers,	employees	and	the	federal	government	to	contribute	to	a	fund	that	would	support	those	who	had	lost	their	jobs	because	of	the	economic	difficulties	of	their	firms.	As	Boyko	writes,	the	Prime	Minister’s	Unemployment	and	Social	Insurance	Act		constituted	“a	statement	as	clear	as	the	July	prairie	sun	that	the	government	should	care	for	and	about	the	welfare	of	the	governed.”35							For	Canadians	still	trapped	in	the	Depression,	Bennett’s	plan	was	a	fascinating	but	not	totally	unfamiliar	move:	The	Prime	Minister	and	his	officials	had	discussed	unemployment	insurance	with	provincial	premiers	for	at	least	three	years.	But	it																																																									32	Speech	from	the	Throne,	January	17,	1935	as	quoted	in	Janine	Brodie,	“Three	Stories	of	Canadian	Citizenship”	in	Contesting	Canadian	Citizenship:	Historical	
Readings,	eds.	Robert	Adamoski,	Dorothy	E.	Chunn,	and	Robert	Menzies	(Peterborough,	On.	:	Broadview	Press,	2002)	52.	33	Boyko,	379.	34	Donald	Forster	and	Colin	Read,	“The	Politics	of	Opportunism:	The	New	Deal	Broadcasts”	The	Canadian	Historical	Review,	xl,	3,	1979.	p.	347.		35	Boyko,	380.	
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remained	an	elusive	measure	in	the	Canadian	federal	state,	which	still	could	not	figure	out	how	to	divide	responsibilities	and	revenues	among	the	different	levels	of	government	–	despite	the	desperate	conditions	among	workers.							There	had	to	be	way	to	relieve	the	inequalities	among	provinces,	fostering	social	cohesion	and	easing	mutual	resentments.	Ottawa	took	the	initiative	in	this	hunt,	looking	for	ways	to	unite	the	provinces	under	its	leadership.	Despite	the	negative	reception	in	January	1934,	the	Loan	Council	idea	remained	alive.	In	mid-1935,	the	new	Bank	of	Canada	Secretary	Donald	Gordon	was	examining	“the	good	features	of	Australia’s	Loan	Council”	to	adapt	them	to	Canada’s	constitutionally	powerful	provinces:	An	advisory	council	could	approve	bond	issues,	he	suggested,	or	it	could	
withhold	approval	as	a	“disciplinary	weapon	to	invoke	in	case	of	an	ignoring	by	any	Province	of	the	Council’s	recommendations.”	Gordon	added:	“Now	is	the	psychological	time	to	do	something.”36					But,	throughout	that	spring	of	1935,	Bennett	would	not	venture	beyond	relief	grants	and	loans	to	the	poorer	provinces,	along	with	money	for	public	works	projects.	It	was	a	gamble.	Liberal	leader	Mackenzie	King	watched	with	a	mixture	of	glee	and	dread,	first	challenging	Bennett	to	table	the	entire	package	and	then	pecking	away	at	individual	bills	and	questioning	the	constitutional	validity	of	key	
measures	such	as	unemployment	insurance.	But	he	shrewdly	did	not	attempt	to	defeat	the	government.	Bennett	would	have	to	put	his	bills	before	the	House	–	and	on	the	line.																																																										36	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Banking	Operations	Fonds,	Provincial	Financing	–	General	–	1934-	January	1937.	“Memorandum	To	Then	Governor”	of	July	22,	1935,	File	PF	1	–	Volume	1,	Research	B1.	4,	2.	
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					By	the	late	spring,	the	Prime	Minister	was	exhausted.	He	had	endured	an	acute	respiratory	infection	and	a	heart	attack,	struggled	to	handle	the	mounting	frustration	among	unemployed	single	men	in	the	relief	camps,	and	overseen	trade	talks	with	the	United	States.	When	unemployed	men	deserted	the	British	Columbia	camps	in	April	1935	to	join	a	Vancouver	protest,	Bennett	dismissed	provincial	and	municipal	pleas	for	help	with	the	protesters:	The	Prime	Minister	had	denounced	the	capitalist	regime	but	he	could	not	empathize	with	people	that	he	viewed	as	threats	to	law	and	order.37	Somehow	his	government	managed	to	present	fourteen	pieces	of	significant	legislation,	including	Unemployment	Insurance.	“It	was,”	says	Boyko,	“a	remarkable	achievement.”38	But	his	New	Deal	package	was	also	flawed.	As	political	scientist	W.	H.	McConnell	would	later	write	in	the	Osgoode	Hall	Law	Journal:	“The	disjointedness	and	incoherence	of	the	New	Deal	–	its	lack	of	unity	or	system	–	is	attributable	to	Bennett’s	notorious	penchant	for	one-man	rule.”39							The	Canadian	New	Deal	–	with	its	tangle	of	measures	–	could	not	save	the	Prime	Minister.	The	government	had	lost	the	consent	of	the	governed:	The	voters	turned	on	the	Conservatives.	Bennett	ran	on	his	record,	insisting	that	unemployment	had	waned	since	1930.	He	talked	about	the	newly	created	Bank	of	Canada.	He	cited	his	efforts	“to	improve	wages	and	working	conditions,	and	policies	that	had	provided	jobs	and	relief	to	desperate	Canadians.”40	It	was	all	in	vain.	As	Mackenzie	King	told	voters	in	Port	Arthur,	Ont.:	“You	have	had	five	years	of	the	Bennett	Government.	I	wonder	if	any	of	you	are	as	well	off	now	as	when	it	started?”41	The	resentment	about																																																									37	Boyko,	331.	38	Boyko,	390.	39	W.	H.	McConnell,	“The	Judicial	Review	of	Prime	Minister	Bennett’s	New	Deal”	in	Osgoode	Hall	Law	Journal,	Volume	6,	Number	1	(October	1968)	40.	40	Boyko,	401.		41	Larry	Glassford,	Reaction	&	Reform:	The	Politics	of	the	Conservative	Party	Under	R.	
B.	Bennett	1927-1938	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1992.)	181.	
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inequality,	even	in	comparison	with	one’s	own	past,	was	in	the	air.	The	Liberal	leader’s	slogan	was:	“King	or	Chaos.”								On	Election	Day	on	October	14,	1935,	The	Globe	headline	trumpeted:	“Canada	Votes	Today	in	Biggest	Election	in	Her	History.”	The	number	of	parties	and	the	number	of	candidates	had	set	records.42	Six	million	people	were	eligible	to	cast	a	ballot.	In	the	end,	it	was	a	Liberal	landslide	of	173	seats.	The	fledgling	CCF	took	seven	seats.	Bennett’s	so-called	Liberal-Conservative	Party	took	only	thirty-nine	seats.	Significantly,	Bennett	took	only	one	seat	in	Alberta,	which	was	his	own,	one	seat	in	Saskatchewan	and	one	seat	in	Manitoba.	It	was	probably	impossible	for	him	to	do	better:	despite	Ottawa’s	ad	hoc	payments	for	relief	and	other	needs,	the	West	was	lurching	from	crisis	to	crisis.			
King	Takes	Control							The	spotlight	was	now	on	King,	who	remained	improbably	wedded	to	the	notion	that	the	federal	government	was	not	responsible	for	the	provinces’	fiscal	ills.	He	still	did	not	understand	the	terrible	power	of	fiscal	inequality	among	the	provinces	–	or	the	political	price	to	be	paid	for	such	inequality.	But,	while	he	resisted	pleas	for	further	intervention	in	the	economy,	he	also	knew	that	he	had	to	appear	to	be	doing	something,	if	only	to	set	a	new	tone	to	promote	social	cohesion.										He	moved	swiftly.	Within	two	days	of	the	election,	he	invited	the	Provincial	Premiers	to	Ottawa	“for	the	purpose	of	dealing	with	financial	problems	and	constitutional	difficulties	with	respect	to	reform	legislation	passed	by	the	Bennett	Government,	much	of	which,	it	is	feared,	is	invalid.”43	On	November	4,	1935,	King	and	his	cabinet	passed	an	order-in-council	to	refer	eight	Bennett	statutes	to	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada,	including	the	Unemployment	Insurance	measure.44							So	many	groups	were	divided	over	the	legality	of	the	UI	measure	–	including	provinces	such	as	Ontario	and	New	Brunswick	and	representatives	of	large																																																									42	“Canada	Votes	Today	in	Biggest	Election	in	Her	History”	in	The	Globe,	Monday,	October	14,	1935.	p.	1.	43	“Conference	of	Premiers	In	November:	Cabinet	to	Discuss	Bennett	Acts”	in	The	
Globe,	Thursday,	October	17,	1935.	p.1.	44	W.	H.	McConnell,	41.	
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industries	such	as	the	Canadian	Manufacturers	Association,	CPR	president	Edward	Beatty	and	Canadian	Bank	of	Commerce	vice-president	Sir	Thomas	White	–	that	King	wanted	clarification	before	implementation.45	Quebec	Premier	L.	A.	Taschereau	had	referred	to	the	New	Deal	as	“a	socialistic	venture	bordering	on	Communism”	–	but	he	supported	unemployment	insurance.46							Even	the	government’s	own	actuaries	had	reported	to	Parliament	that	the	policy	“has	itself	the	tendency,	for	various	reasons,	to	increase	unemployment.”47	Privately,	in	his	diary,	the	Prime	Minister	referred	to	the	laws	as	“doubtful”	so	referral	was	“a	great	step.”48	The	canny	politician	did	not	want	endless	squabbles	with	the	provincial	leaders	who	had	opposed	the	Bennett	measures	just	before	the	upcoming	Dominion-Provincial	Conference.						Three	days	before	the	conference,	Bank	of	Canada	deputy	governor	J.	A.	C.	Osborne	sent	an	oblivious	memo	to	Deputy	Finance	Minister	Clark,	airily	offering	his	views	on	procedure	at	the	upcoming	conference.	“Piecemeal	negotiations”	with	individual	provinces	would	no	longer	suffice	at	the	start	of	a	new	term	–	and	the	new	Bank	of	Canada	should	offer	advice	to	the	politicians.	The	Dominion	should	admit	its	liability	for	unemployment	insurance,	old-age	pensions	and	non-sectarian	education.		
																																																								45	Alvin	Finkel,	Business	and	Social	Reform	in	the	Thirties	(Toronto:	James	Lorimer	&	Company,	Publishers,	1979)	pps.	89-91,	96.	46	W.	H.	McConnell,	“The	Judicial	Review	of	Prime	Minister	Bennett’s	New	Deal”,	47	and	Finkel,	Business	and	Social	Reform	in	the	Thirties,	p.	89.	47	“Many	Safeguards	Held	Necessary	in	New	Legislation,”	in	The	Ottawa	Journal,	Friday,	February	15,	1935,	p.	13.	48	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Monday,	November	4,	1935,	p.	5.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=16549&		
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						Then	“it	would	only	be	a	question	of	administration”	to	decide	how	long	the	provinces	should	“act	as	agents	for	the	Dominion	in	carrying	out	Dominion	[social]	policy.”	When	that	deal	was	concluded,	it	would	only	entail	“the	necessary	loss	of	time”	to	amend	the	Canadian	constitution.	Then	Ottawa	could	proceed	to	showing	each	province	“how	to	mend	its	way	and	balance	its	budget	on	a	lower	level.”	The	Dominion,	in	turn,	could	reduce	tariffs	to	revive	trade	and	increase	its	revenues.	If	that	did	not	work,	Ottawa	could	cut	the	number	of	provinces.	If	that	not	work,	“the	Liberals	could	resign	and	let	somebody	else	have	a	shot.”49								Clark	probably	hit	the	roof:	Only	a	rather	condescending	bureaucrat	from	a	unitary	state	could	have	made	such	assertions.	Osborne	did	not	understand	how	the	partners	in	a	federation	had	to	work	together.	In	his	biography	of	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Gordon	Towers,	former	government	adviser	Douglas	H.	Fullerton	noted	that	Osborne	“was	regarded	by	the	Bank	staff	as	fair	and	impartial,	but	his	English	mannerisms	and	Bank	of	England	traditions	did	not	endear	him	to	everyone.”50	King	would	never	have	contemplated	such	measures	anyway:	he	had	already	referred	Bennett’s	far	less	intrusive	social	legislation	to	the	Supreme	Court.	And	he	was	always	hesitant	about	assuming	more	federal	responsibilities.									The	Conference	ran	from	Monday,	December	9	to	Friday,	December	13,	and	it	stands	as	a	remarkable	example	of	King’s	ability	to	temporize	under	the	guise	of	consultation.	It	also	illustrates	how	heavily	the	federal	government	was	relying	on																																																									49	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Banking	Operations	Fonds,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	–	1935,	file	PF1–2	Vol.	1	Nov.	1945,	Enclosure	of	December	3,	1935	with	covering	letter	of	December	7,	1935	from	Bank	of	Canada	Deputy	Governor	J.	A.	C.	Osborne	to	Deputy	Finance	Minister	W.	C.	Clark.	3-5.		50	Douglas	H.	Fullerton,	Graham	Towers	And	His	Times.	(Toronto:	McClelland	and	Stewart,	1986)	84.	
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Australia’s	approach	to	handling	provincial	debt	and	fiscal	inequalities	among	its	states.	Governments	at	this	Conference	recognized	that	they	were	key	players	in	tackling	fiscal	inequalities	among	themselves	and	their	struggling	citizens	during	the	Depression.	They	also	realized	that	their	voters	had	just	ousted	the	federal	Conservative	government	–	and	those	voters	were	quite	capable	of	turning	on	them.							But	they	were	very	far	apart	in	their	acceptance	of	any	possible	solution	beyond	the	continuation	of	federal	relief	contributions,	ad	hoc	grants	and	loans	to	deal	with	the	fiscal	differences	and	crises	among	them.	During	the	dangerous	depths	of	the	Depression,	they	could	not	agree	on	a	formal	mechanism	–	they	could	not	even	envision	such	a	mechanism	–	to	remedy	fiscal	inequalities	among	their	governments	to	ease	discontent	among	their	citizenry.						But	every	Premier	also	knew	that	it	was	politically	risky	for	the	richer	provinces	to	denounce	the	poorer	provinces	and	their	needs	too	strongly.	Everyone	remembered	the	March	on	Ottawa,	which	the	Regina	police	and	the	RCMP	had	violently	broken	up	on	July	1.	1935.	That	incident	had	reinforced	the	public	attitude	“that	‘Iron	Heel’	Bennett	had	little	concern	for	the	working	man.”51	As	Boyko,	notes:	“Liberal	papers	and	his	political	opponents	were	quick	and	ruthless	in	using	[the	strike,	trek,	and	riot]	as	ammunition	against	him	in	the	election	that	followed	only	months	later,	with	the	blood	on	Regina’s	streets	still	fresh	in	the	nation’s	collective	memory.”52	The	fledgling	Co-operative	Commonwealth	Federation	had	emerged	from	that	election	with	a	significant	9.3	per	cent	of	the	popular	vote.		
																																																								51	Boyko,	Bennett:	The	Rebel	Who	Challenged	And	Changed	A	Nation,	pps.	344-345	52	Boyko,	Bennett:	The	Rebel	Who	Challenged	And	Changed	A	Nation,	p.	346.	
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						But	there	were	entrenched	and	adamantly	opposed	interests	among	the	politicians.	As	Le	Devoir	noted,	“never	before,	even	in	the	worst	moments	of	the	financial	crisis	of	1931,	have	the	financial	difficulties	which	assail	the	federal,	provincial	and	municipal	governments	been	so	clearly	explained	and	so	keenly	felt…	one	is	seized	with	an	understanding	of	the	financial	malady.”53	Such	difficulties	ensured	that	the	stalemate	at	this	Conference	could	not	be	attributed	solely	to	Mackenzie	King	–	although	it	suited	him.	After	five	full	years	of	Depression,	the	provinces’	disagreements	about	how	they	should	share	with	each	other	allowed	King’s	government	to	dodge	most	immediate	demands	for	action	to	remedy	the	fiscal	inequalities	among	them.	The	Conference	did	set	up	machinery	to	study	federation	problems	that	could	not	be	resolved	that	week.	In	the	end,	those	supposedly	permanent	committees	did	not	make	much	progress	during	subsequent	months	–	and	they	eventually	lapsed.	The	December	1935	Conference	was	the	eighth	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	since	Confederation	–	and	it	would	be	the	last	until	the	grim	days	of	wartime	in	January	1941.								King	opened	the	gathering	with	a	convoluted	summary	of	his	aim:	he	wanted	to	figure	out	how	the	federation	had	changed	since	1867,	where	“provincial	responsibility	should	begin	and	federal	responsibility	should	cease…	…[and]	where,	for	various	reasons,	clear	demarcation	is	not	possible,	to	reach	with	respect	to	each	problem,	a	formula	for	co-operation	between	the	Dominion	and	the	provinces.”54																																																										53	“Les	difficultés	d’ordre	financier	sont	considérables,”	Ottawa,	Le	Devoir,	Tuesday,	December	10,	1935.	p.	1.	My	translation	from	clipping.	54	Proceedings	of	Opening	Day	Plenary	Session	in	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	
1935:	Record	of	Proceedings.	(Ottawa:	J.	O.	Patenaude,	I.S.O.,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1936)	9.		
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					Every	Premier	understood	the	issues	–	and	the	inequalities	among	them.	But	each	Premier’s	approach	to	the	solutions	was	radically	different	–	and	it	would	remain	that	way	for	decades.	Ontario	Liberal	Premier	Mitchell	Hepburn	had	campaigned	vigorously	for	King	throughout	Ontario	and	across	the	West	during	the	election	but	as	his	biographer	John	T.	Saywell	explains,	the	Prime	Minister	“saw	only	[Hepburn’s]	ambition”	to	replace	him.55	Their	relationship,	which	would	reach	its	nadir	during	the	war,	was	already	fraying.	As	the	Premier	from	fat-cat	Ontario,	Hepburn	assured	King	that	“our	presence	here	is	not	to	be	construed	as	a	raid	on	the	federal	treasury.”56	Then	he	pointedly	noted	the	problems	that	overlapping	federal	and	provincial	services	created,	discouraging	Ottawa’s	interference	in	his	province.							Quebec	Premier	Taschereau	echoed	that	independent	approach.	“Confederation	is	pretty	old	now,”	he	mused.	“We	have	to	face	to-day	problems	that	did	not	exist	in	1867.”57	The	provinces	needed	the	right	to	levy	indirect	taxes	such	as	sales	taxes	–	and	King	should	let	them	“know	exactly	where	they	stand	in	this	matter.”58	The	bottom	line	was	that	Quebec	could	help	itself	if	it	had	broader	taxing	powers.						Other	Premiers	fretted	about	dependency.	British	Columbia	Premier	T.	D.	“Duff”	Pattullo	complained	that	the	virtue	of	self-reliance	among	seasonal	workers	had																																																									55	John	T.	Saywell,	“Just	call	me	Mitch”:	The	Life	of	Mitchell	F.	Hepburn.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press:	1991)	p.	223.		56	Ontario	Premier	Mitchell	F.	Hepburn,	Proceedings	of	Opening	Day	Plenary	Session	at	the	Dominion	Provincial	Conference	1935.	Dominion-Provincial	Conferences:	
November	3-10,	1927;	December	9-13,	1935	and	January	14-15,	1941.	(Ottawa:	Reprinted	by	Edmond	Cloutier,	King’s	Printer,	1951).	p.	10.		57	Quebec	Premier	L.	A.	Taschereau,	Proceedings	of	Opening	Day	Plenary	Session	at	the	Dominion	Provincial	Conference	1935.	Dominion-Provincial	Conferences:	
November	3-10,	1927;	December	9-13,	1935	and	January	14-15,	1941.	(Ottawa:	Reprinted	by	Edmond	Cloutier,	King’s	Printer,	1951).	p.	11.	58	Taschereau,	Dominion-Provincial	Conferences:	November	3-10,	1927;	December	9-
13,	1935	and	January	14-15,	1941.	p.	12.		
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vanished:	it	was	now	“Eat,	drink,	and	be	merry,	for	to-morrow	we	go	on	relief.”	Ottawa	had	to	fund	the	construction	of	public	infrastructure	to	provide	jobs.	Otherwise,	there	would	be	political	instability	and	dependency	“because	more	and	more	this	psychology	will	prevail	among	the	people.”59							The	Manitoba	and	Saskatchewan	Premiers	confronted	desperate	inequalities	among	their	governments	and	their	citizenry	and	the	breakdown	of	social	order.	Manitoba	Premier	John	Bracken	wanted	“to	realign	the	present	sources	of	public	revenue,	on	the	basis	of	the	relative	responsibilities	allotted	to	the	three	jurisdictions	in	our	federal	system.”60	Within	the	last	ten	years,	the	value	of	Manitoba’s	agricultural	products	had	been	halved.	Within	the	last	five	years,	farmers	in	the	three	Prairie	Provinces	had	lost	$1-billion	in	purchasing	power.	Somehow,	his	government	had	provided	food,	clothing	and	shelter	for	everyone	in	need,	borrowing	$35-million	to	ensure	their	survival.	But	70,000	people	were	still	on	relief	–	and	the	interest	on	the	debt	to	pay	for	relief	was	$1.5-million	per	year.	Revenues	should	be	realigned	-	or	the	responsibilities	for	social	services	should	be	reassigned.	“[T]he	needs	of	to-day	cannot	be	met	within	the	limitations	of	the	constitution	of	sixty-eight	years	ago,”	he	declared.61																																																									59	British	Columbia	Premier	T.	D.	Pattullo,	comments	on	December	13,	1935	at	the	second	plenary	session	of	the	Dominion	Provincial	Conference	1935.	Dominion-
Provincial	Conferences:	November	3-10,	1927;	December	9-13,	1935	and	January	14-
15,	1941.	(Ottawa:	Reprinted	by	Edmond	Cloutier,	King’s	Printer,	1951).	p.	54.		60	Manitoba	Premier	John	Bracken,	Proceedings	of	Opening	Day	Plenary	Session	at	the	Dominion	Provincial	Conference	1935.	Dominion-Provincial	Conferences:	
November	3-10,	1927;	December	9-13,	1935	and	January	14-15,	1941.	(Ottawa:	Reprinted	by	Edmond	Cloutier,	King’s	Printer,	1951).	p.	13.	61	Bracken,	Proceedings	of	Opening	Day	Plenary	Session	at	the	Dominion	Provincial	Conference	1935.	Dominion-Provincial	Conferences:	November	3-10,	1927;	December	
9-13,	1935	and	January	14-15,	1941.	p.	14.	
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						Saskatchewan	Premier	William	John	Patterson	recounted	the	province’s	devastating	problems	with	drought,	drifting	soil,	plagues	of	grasshoppers	and	fungal	leaf	rust.	Eight	thousand	families	had	moved	from	the	drought-stricken	south	to	the	north	of	the	province,	and,	unless	they	could	be	helped	to	sustain	themselves,	they	were	“a	permanent	relief	problem.”62	Ottawa,	the	Saskatchewan	government	and	its	municipalities	had	spent	a	staggering	$105-million	since	1929	on	relief	and	agricultural	assistance.	To	little	avail.	“Conditions	in	Saskatchewan	have	reached	proportions	of	a	national	calamity	or	a	national	catastrophe,	far	beyond	the	capacity	of	any	one	province	to	handle…[the	municipalities]	face	in	the	immediate	future	inevitable	default.”63	He,	too,	asked	for	a	reallocation	of	taxing	and	legislative	powers	to	remedy	such	abysmal	inequality.						In	contrast	to	his	fellow	Westerners,	particularly	in	light	of	what	would	occur	in	less	than	five	months,	Alberta	Premier	William	“Bible	Bill”	Aberhart	was	publicly	bland	and	duplicitous.	“The	time	has	come	when	we	must	balance	our	budget,”	he	told	his	fellow	First	Ministers.	“It	has	been	our	desire	and	our	determination	to	so	administer	our	affairs	that	we	shall	not	have	to	come	to	the	Dominion	for	money,	but	shall	be	able	to	handle	our	own	problems	and	balance	our	budget.”	The	province	might	need	federal	public	works,	“but	we	are	very	desirous	…to	help	our	people	
																																																								62	Saskatchewan	Premier	W.	J.	Patterson,	Proceedings	of	Opening	Day	Plenary	Session	at	the	Dominion	Provincial	Conference	1935.	Dominion-Provincial	
Conferences:	November	3-10,	1927;	December	9-13,	1935	and	January	14-15,	1941.	(Ottawa:	Reprinted	by	Edmond	Cloutier,	King’s	Printer,	1951).	p.	19.	63	Saskatchewan	Premier	W.	J.	Patterson,	Proceedings	of	Opening	Day	Plenary	Session	at	the	Dominion	Provincial	Conference	1935.	Dominion-Provincial	
Conferences:	November	3-10,	1927;	December	9-13,	1935	and	January	14-15,	1941.	p.	19.	
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stand	on	their	own	feet.”64	Behind	the	scenes,	in	private	appeals	to	Ottawa,	the	Premier	and	his	Treasurer	would	tell	a	different	story.								Most	Maritime	Premiers	understood	that	their	problems	had	to	take	second	place	to	the	Prairie	Premiers’	dismal	plight.	The	remarkable	Nova	Scotia	Premier	Angus	L.	Macdonald	merely	offered	the	bland	hope	for	“conclusions	of	common	benefit	to	us	all.”65	New	Brunswick’s	Allison	Dysart	delivered	deceptively	mild	platitudes:	“It	would	be	unfortunate	indeed	if	in	our	deliberations	we	should	seek	to	limit	the	discussion	to	the	imaginary	boundary	lines	that	mark	our	geographical	limits.”66	Prince	Edward	Island’s	Walter	Lea	simply	repeated	the	familiar	complaints	about	inequality	that	his	predecessors	had	articulated	since	the	province	had	joined	Confederation	in	1873:	“When	we	look	at	the	contributions	and	loans	made	to	the	other	provinces	we	see	that	on	a	per	capita	basis	we	have	got	only	small	change.”67	Fiscal	inequality	was	a	continuing	theme	among	the	Maritime	Provinces.									When	the	opening	statements	were	concluded,	King,	a	handful	of	his	cabinet	colleagues	and	the	premiers	met	informally	with	the	mayors	of	several	cities	who	were	sinking	under	debts	to	fund	relief.	In	retrospect,	it	would	be	a	pivotal	meeting,	reinforcing	the	importance	of	municipalities	in	the	provision	of	relief	would	become	even	more	thoroughly	ingrained	in	all	politicians’	minds:	it	would	ensure	that																																																									64	Alberta	Premier	William	Aberhart,	Proceedings	of	Opening	Day	Plenary	Session	at	the	Dominion	Provincial	Conference	1935.	Dominion-Provincial	Conferences:	
November	3-10,	1927;	December	9-13,	1935	and	January	14-15,	1941.	(Ottawa:	Reprinted	by	Edmond	Cloutier,	King’s	Printer,	1951).	p.	21.	65	Premier	Angus	L.	Macdonald,	Proceedings	of	Opening	Day	Plenary	Session	in	
Dominion-Provincial	Conference	1935:	Record	of	Proceedings.	p.	12.	66	New	Brunswick	Premier	Allison	Dysart.	Proceedings	of	Opening	Day	Plenary	Session	in	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	1935:	Record	of	Proceedings,	13.		67	Prince	Edward	Island	Premier	Walter	Lea.	Proceedings	of	Opening	Day	Plenary	Session	in	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	1935:	Record	of	Proceedings	16-17.	
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municipal	governments	were	well	consulted	when	King	finally	established	a	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations.									The	Premiers	and	their	entourages	then	broke	into	six	sub-committees.	They	would	not	reconvene	in	a	plenary	session	until	3	p.m.	on	Friday,	December	13	–	when	it	would	become	clear	what	counter-revolutionary	ideas	lurked	in	Ottawa’s	briefing	memorandums.	Ottawa	did	not	want	to	shuffle	revenues	or	responsibilities	to	remedy	inequality.	Instead,	Finance	Minister	Charles	Dunning	had	provocative	suggestions	about	how	Ottawa	could	ease	provincial	debt	loads.	From	the	start,	both	Dunning	and	King	had	not	accepted	the	real	extent	of	the	provinces’	woes.	As	King’s	biographer	Blair	Neatby	has	observed,	“King	had	convinced	himself	that	Bennett’s	grants-in-aid	to	the	provincial	governments	had	encouraged	extravagance	and	waste.”68	The	Prime	Minister	even	told	his	diary	that	the	provinces	“had	almost	certainly	been	reckless	with	relief	funds	because	they	were	spending	federal	money.”69								The	real	action	took	place	in	the	committee	on	financial	questions,	which	Dunning	chaired.	And	while	an	abbreviated	and	watered-down	version	of	those	meetings	was	later	presented	to	the	full	conference,	other	confidential	memoranda	show	that	progress	there	was	shockingly	minimal.	Ottawa	wanted	to	find	another	way	to	relieve	the	provinces’	fiscal	pressures	without	increasing	its	special	grants.	Provinces	had	already	raised	taxes,	introduced	new	taxes,	and	cut	back	services.	But	their	budgets	were	still	not	balanced	and	their	debts	were	increasing.	They	were																																																									68	H.	Blair	Neatby,	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King:	The	Prism	of	Unity	1932-1939.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1976)	156.		69	H.	Blair	Neatby,	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King:	The	Prism	of	Unity	1932-1939.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1976)	156.		
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definitely	in	a	fix.	As	the	subcommittee	report	would	privately	note:	“The	financial	relationships	between	the	Dominion	and	the	provinces	are	presently	in	a	chaotic	state.	Constitutional	difficulties	and	political	uncertainties	are	obstacles	to	a	solution.	The	effect	is	damaging.”70								In	a	confidential	memorandum,	which	was	then	restricted	to	only	four	copies	and	which	summarized	three	days	of	private	discussions,	federal	officials	noted	the	demands	for	renegotiated	debt	obligations.	Nova	Scotia	Premier	Angus	L.	Macdonald	shrewdly	asked	about	the	Australian	conversion	plan	for	bondholders.	Deputy	finance	minister	W.	C.	Clark	replied	that	only	a	small	percentage	of	bondholders	were	forced	to	convert	their	bonds	to	lower	interest	rates	–	“and	their	sacrifice	was	part	of	a	comprehensive	recovery	scheme.”71	Macdonald	stipulated	that	he	preferred	a	redistribution	of	revenues	and	expenditures	to	forced	conversion	anyway.	Alberta	Treasurer	Charles	Cockroft	then	explained	that	Alberta	had	joined	the	committee	“as	a	gesture	of	courtesy	only,	as	they	had	already	taken	the	first	steps	in	working	out	their	own	conversion	scheme.”72	His	audience	would	soon	find	out	–	to	their	dismay	-	what	the	Albertans	had	devised.						The	committee	then	considered	the	example	of	Australia,	which	would	drive	the	federal	search	for	more	equality	among	governments	throughout	the	remainder	of																																																									70	Report	Of	Subcommittee	On	Financial	Questions,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	1935	Miscellaneous	general	file,	LAC,	MG	47,	Volume	62,	9.		71	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	file	PF1	–	2	Vol.	1,	Nov.	+15,	“The	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	December	1935	–	Sub-Conference	on	Financial	Questions,”	December	15,	1935	Confidential	memorandum	by	“Mr.	Skelton.”	4.		72	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	file	PF1	–	2	Vol.	1,	Nov.	+15,	“The	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	December	1935	–	Sub-Conference	on	Financial	Questions,”	December	15,	1935	Confidential	memorandum	by	“Mr.	Skelton.”	5.	
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the	decade.	As	the	committee	report	on	financial	questions	would	later	affirm:	“The	parallel	between	the	constitutional	and	financial	problems	of	Canada	and	Australia	draws	attention	to	recent	Australian	measures.”73							Federal	bureaucrats	had	provided	Dunning	with	a	15-page	memo	on	the	Australian	Loan	Council.	In	1929,	after	failed	efforts	to	find	a	formula	to	distribute	federal	revenues	to	the	states,	Canberra	had	adopted	the	Financial	Agreement	Validation	Act,	which	Australians	had	ratified	in	a	national	referendum	for	insertion	into	the	Constitution.	(This	was	the	legislation	that	had	provoked	the	crisis	with	the	Governor	of	New	South	Wales	in	the	early	1930s.)	With	this	act,	the	Commonwealth	had	taken	over	all	state	debts,	and	then	put	the	management	of	all	future	federal	and	state	borrowings	under	the	control	of	the	newly	reorganized	Australian	Loan	Council.	(The	Council	had	been	operating	since	1924	–	but	only	to	prevent	disastrous	competition	among	the	states	in	the	money	markets.)							Under	the	newly	empowered	Australian	Loan	Council,	future	loans	would	be	issued	“either	as	direct	obligations	of	the	Commonwealth	or	as	obligations	of	the	States	with	the	guarantee	of	the	Commonwealth.”74	After	describing	this	process,	the	Dominion	memo	added	with	a	tinge	of	envy:	“Australia	was	fortunate	to	begin	the	depression	with	two	effective	instruments	of	financial	control,	namely,	the	Loan	Council	and	the	central	or	Commonwealth	bank.”75		
																																																								73	Report	Of	Subcommittee	On	Financial	Questions,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	1935	Miscellaneous	general	files,	LAC,	MG	47,	Volume	62,	3.	74	“The	Australian	Loan	Council”,	Dominion	Provincial	Conference	1935,	Secret,	D.P.C.	35	(F)	1935,	Miscellaneous	general	file,	LAC,	MG	47,	Volume	62.	2.		75	“The	Australian	Loan	Council”,	Dominion	Provincial	Conference	1935,	4.		
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					Perhaps	a	Canadian	version	of	the	Loan	Council	could	secure	better	interest	rates	for	Ottawa	and	the	provinces,	lowering	the	stress	on	provincial	budgets,	and	relieving	the	pressure	of	fiscal	inequality	among	the	provinces.	In	his	biography	on	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Gordon	Towers,	former	government	adviser	Douglas	H.	Fullerton	maintained	that	Towers	provided	the	memo	on	loan	councils	to	Dunning	in	early	January	1936.	But,	appended	to	the	secret	committee	report	on	financial	questions,	was	a	memo,	“A	Suggested	Loan	Council	For	Canada,”	which	was	also	headed	“D.P.	35.”76	(That	would	indicate	Dominion-Provincial	1935.)	This	was	probably	the	Towers’	memo,	and	it	was	clearly	provided	to	the	Dominion-Provincial	delegates.	Dunning	proposed	“the	organization	of	a	Loan	Council	as	an	integral	part	of	any	conversion	scheme.”77								Journalists	were	definitely	aware	of	the	bare	bones	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	and	the	Finance	Ministry’s	approach	when	the	Conference	commenced.	The	Globe’s	Ottawa	correspondent	William	Marchington	heralded	the	creation	of	the	subcommittee	on	financial	questions,	noting	that	it	was	going	to	consider	“refunding;	[and]	the	creation	of	a	National	Finance	Council”	among	other	issues.78	He	added:		Under	the	headings	of	refunding	and	interest	rates	comes	the	question	of	reconstituting	the	Federal,	Provincial	and	municipal	debt	of	the	Dominion,	which	aggregates	between	six	and	seven																																																									76	“A	Suggested	Loan	Council	For	Canada”,	Dominion	Provincial	Conference	1935,	Secret,	D.P.	35	(F)	1935,	Miscellaneous	general	file,	LAC,	MG	47,	Volume	62.	Nine	pages.	77	“The	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	December	1935	–	Sub-Conference	on	Financial	Questions,”	December	15,	1935	Confidential	memorandum	by	“Mr.	Skelton.”	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	file	PF1	–	2	Vol.	1,	Nov.	+15,	p.10.	78	William	Marchington,	“Way	Opened	For	Changing	B.N.A.	Act”	in	The	Globe	on	Tuesday,	December	10,	1935.	p.	2.			
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billion	dollars.	It	is	believed	the	subcommittee	will	discuss	the	establishment	of	a	National	Finance	Council	for	the	purpose	of	formulating	a	comprehensive	voluntary	conversion	scheme	similar	to	those	successfully	launched	in	Britain	and	Australia.	This	would	involve	reconstitution	of	the	internal	debts	of	the	various	governmental	bodies	at	lower	rates	of	interest,	but	obligations	to	investors	in	other	countries	almost	certainly	would	be	unaffected.79										A	day	later,	The	Globe	editorial	lauded	the	idea	of	a	National	Finance	Council	that	could	end	“the	constant	claims	for	assistance	and	the	demands	for	relief	from	certain	obligations.”80	But	it	warned	that	relief	costs	were	not	the	only	drain	on	provincial	treasuries.	Provinces	and	municipalities	had	“plunged	into	prodigality	before	the	relief	problem	became	acute.”81	Rigid	federal	control	should	be	imposed	on	their	future	expenditures.	The	provinces	should	relinquish	some	taxation	sources.	“Dominion	credit	must	be	maintained,	at	whatever	cost	to	Provinces	and	cities.”82						Similarly,	in	mid-week,	The	Ottawa	Journal	reported	that	Ontario	Premier	Mitchell	Hepburn	was	espousing	federal	refinancing	of	provincial	debt,	which	would	include	“a	reduction	of	interest	rates	on	debts	already	outstanding	and	also	is	designed	to	improve	public	credit	for	future	financing.”83	The	Premier	estimated	that	this	would	result	in	an	annual	saving	of	approximately	$18	million.		
																																																								79	William	Marchington,	“Way	Opened	For	Changing	B.	N.	A.	Act”	in	The	Globe	on	Tuesday,	December	10,	1935.	p.	2.		80	“The	Program	At	Ottawa”	in	The	Globe	of	Wednesday,	December	11,	1935.	p.	4.	81	“The	Program	At	Ottawa”	in	The	Globe	of	Wednesday,	December	11,	1935.	p.	4.	82	“The	Program	At	Ottawa”	in	The	Globe	of	Wednesday,	December	11,	1935.	p.	4.	83	“Hepburn	Urging	Refunding	On	Lower	Interest	Rate	Basis,”	in	The	Ottawa	Journal,	Wednesday,	December	11,	1935.	p.	1.		
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					The	idea	of	an	expanded	fiscal	role	for	Ottawa	–	if	only	to	refinance	and	guarantee	existing	provincial	debts	–	was	now	definitely	in	the	public	realm.	But	the	model	of	Australia	received	only	brief	mention	in	the	press.					Agreement	Eludes	The	Conference					The	trouble	was	that	Ottawa’s	proposed	loan	council	would	be	heavy-handed.	Under	the	plan,	the	Dominion	Government	would	guarantee	outstanding	provincial	debts.	In	turn,	“an	essential	complement	of	such	programme	would	be	the	concession	by	the	province	to	the	Dominion	Government	of	the	power	to	control	future	borrowing	operations.”84	The	loan	council	memo	referred	to	another	accompanying	memo	on	the	Australian	model,	which	“has	reached	a	high	degree	of	success.”	That	secret	thirteen-page	memo,	in	turn,	outlined	the	history	of	the	Australian	Loan	Council,	including	an	in-depth	analysis	of	its	operations,	careful	criticism	of	its	“autocratic	powers…[that]	can	scarcely	be	said	to	be	in	accord	with	democratic	conditions,”	and	the	full	text	of	the	pertinent	legal	sections	of	the	Australian	Financial	Agreement	Validation	Act.85							The	Canadian	proposal	for	a	loan	council	also	looked	at	the	Bank	of	England’s	“centralized	and	highly	flexible”	approach	to	British	treasury	bills.	But	Britain,	of	course,	was	a	unitary	state.	The	memo	then	cited	the	state	loan	provisions	in	the	colony	of	India,	which	retained	its	status	as	a	colonial	conquest:	the	Indian																																																									84	“A	Suggested	Loan	Council	For	Canada”,	Dominion	Provincial	Conference	1935,	Secret,	D.P.	35	(F)	1935,	Miscellaneous	general	file,	LAC,	MG	47,	Volume	62.	p.	6.	85	The	Australian	Loan	Council:	Dominion	Provincial	Conference	1935,	Secret	D.	P.	C.	35	(F),	Dominion-Provincial	conference	1935	Miscellaneous	general	file,	LAC,	RG	47,	Volume	62,	p.	7.		
	 	 	 	 	143	
federation’s	new	constitution	ensured	“the	provinces	are	definitely	more	subordinate	to	the	central	government	than	the	provinces	in	Canada.”86						The	committee	on	financial	questions	did	not	wholeheartedly	embrace	the	Australian	loan	council	as	a	way	to	help	the	poorer	provinces.	Indeed,	it	shied	away	from	the	rigidities	and	the	implications	in	both	the	Australian	model	and	the	Canadian	proposal.	Instead,	it	guardedly	observed:	“A	non-political	Loan	Council,	exercising	its	advisory	functions	in	a	proper	manner,	and	re-enforcing	its	recommendations	by	publicity,	could	effectively	improve	the	situation.	It	could	exercise	a	very	favourable	influence	on	Canadian	public	finance	without	derogating	from	the	sovereignty	of	Parliament	and	the	legislatures.	The	resultant	confidence	would	react	to	the	benefit	of	both	taxpayer	and	the	investor.”87	In	effect,	any	loan	council	would	be	advisory.						That	was	faint	praise	in	a	federation	that	could	not	come	to	terms	with	the	fiscal	inequalities	among	its	members.	There	seemed	to	be	no	way	to	help	the	poorer	provinces	dodge	default	without	fundamental	adjustments	to	federal	revenues	and	responsibilities.	But	the	federation	had	no	amending	formula	–	and,	I	will	show,	King	would	not	accept	radical	change	to	responsibilities	and	revenues	anyway.						King	had	tried	to	adopt	an	amending	formula	during	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	of	1927.	But	his	proposed	approach,	which	differentiated	between	ordinary	and	fundamental	amendments	such	as	those	that	affected	provincial	and																																																									86	“A	Suggested	Loan	Council	For	Canada”,	Dominion	Provincial	Conference	1935,	Secret,	D.P.	35	(F)	1935,	Miscellaneous	general	file,	LAC,	MG	47,	Volume	62.	p.	5.		87	Report	Of	Subcommittee	On	Financial	Questions,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	1935	Miscellaneous	general	file,	LAC,	MG	47,	Volume	62,	9.		87	Report	Of	Subcommittee	On	Financial	Questions,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	1935	Miscellaneous	general	file,	LAC,	MG	47,	Volume	62,	9.	
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minority	rights	did	not	rally	support	“and	thus	became	a	dead	letter.”88	He	tried	again	at	the	1935	Conference,	suggesting	that	if	Parliament	and	two-thirds	of	the	provinces	with	at	least	fifty-five	per	cent	of	the	national	population	agreed,	Canada	could	amend	its	Constitution	on	matters	directly	affecting	the	provinces.89	Although	the	1935	Conference	created	a	continuing	committee	on	constitutional	questions,	its	proposals	were	never	adopted.90					Meanwhile,	the	situation	in	Alberta	was	becoming	increasingly	dire.	During	the	federal	election	campaign	of	1935,	Aberhart	and	his	Attorney	General	Charles	Cockroft	had	visited	Ottawa	to	push	Bennett	for	a	loan:	the	former	Prime	Minister	had	advanced	only	sufficient	emergency	funds	of	$2.25-million	to	cover	such	requirements	as	unemployment	relief	and	interest	charges	on	the	debt	until	the	election.91	On	November	22,	the	new	Liberal	government	had	loaned	another	$1-million	to	Alberta,	partly	to	meet	the	cost	of	relief.92	Just	before	the	Conference,	Acting	Alberta	Premier	Ernest	Manning	had	explained	the	province’s	straits	in	a	letter	to	Canada’s	principal	bond	dealers,	suggesting	that	the	province’s	debt	“might	be	refunded	at	lower	interest	rates.”93	As	former	senior	bureaucrat	Robert	B.	Bryce	later	recounted:	“This	action,	of	course,	destroyed	what	was	left	of	the	credit																																																									88	Daniel	Dupras,	“The	Constitution	Of	Canada:	A	Brief	History	of	Amending	Procedure	Discussions,”	Law	and	Government	Division,	Library	of	Parliament,	Government	of	Canada,	January	1992.		http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp283-e.htm	89	Dupras.		90	Dupras.	91	“Summary	of	Assistance	Requested	of	and	Given	By	The	Dominion	to	Province	of	Alberta	Since	September	3,	1935.”	Memo	dated	April	16,	1937.	LAC.	P-1-1-10.	Provincial	Matters	–	Alberta	–	Miscellaneous	–	P	–	1-1-10.	RG	19.	Vol.	3985.	N.n.	p.	1.		92	Summary	of	Assistance,	p.	1.	93	Douglas	H.	Fullerton,	Graham	Towers	And	His	Times.	74.		
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standing	of	the	Alberta	government	and	lent	considerable	urgency	to	the	search	for	some	solution	to	the	debt	problems	of	the	western	provinces	generally.”94	The	debts	were	creating	political	instability.					Perhaps	most	dramatically,	a	few	days	prior	to	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	“the	Provincial	Treasurer	called	in	person	[presumably	at	the	federal	finance	ministry	in	Ottawa]	and	left	a	document…setting	forth	certain	suggestions.”95	This	document	included	the	request	that	the	Dominion	join	with	the	provincial	government	in	negotiations	with	the	province’s	bondholders	for	a	reduction	in	interest	rates	and	a	change	in	the	dates	of	maturity.	Alberta	also	proposed	that	Ottawa	should	guarantee	Alberta’s	debt,	and	that	it	should	perhaps	consolidate	the	existing	debts	of	Calgary	and	Edmonton.96							The	delegates	discussed	that	suggestion	and	similar	suggestions	from	other	provinces	behind	closed	doors	at	the	committee	on	financial	questions.	There,	Ontario	Premier	Hepburn	demanded	that	Ottawa	convert	federal	loans	to	the	provinces	to	ones	with	lower	interest	rates.	As	the	federal	summary	noted:	“Debt	interest	and	relief	alone	exceed	revenue	collections,	in	spite	of	substantial	reductions	in	capital	and	ordinary	expenditure	and	increases	in	revenue,	with	the	result	that	the	debt	of	Ontario	has	increased	each	year	for	the	past	five	years	at	an	
																																																								94	Robert	B.	Bryce,	Maturing	in	Hard	Times:	Canada’s	Department	of	Finance	through	
the	Great	Depression.	(Kingston	and	Montreal:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	1986.)	182.	95	“Summary	of	Assistance	Requested	of	and	Given	By	The	Dominion	to	Province	of	Alberta	Since	September	3,	1935.”	Memo	dated	April	16,	1937.	LAC.	P-1-1-10.	Provincial	Matters	–	Alberta	–	Miscellaneous	–	P	–	1-1-10.	RG	19.	Vol.	3985.	N.n.	2.		96	“Summary	of	Assistance	Requested	of	and	Given	By	The	Dominion	to	Province	of	Alberta	Since	September	3,	1935.”2-3.	
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average	rate	of	$40-million	a	year.”97	Hepburn	angrily	rejected	the	idea	of	a	loan	council	as	inherently	unfair	to	the	richer	provinces:	“Ontario	would	not	only	have	to	pay	its	own	share	but	its	taxpayers	would	also	pay	over	40	per	cent	of	Ottawa’s	share.”98	Even	in	such	daunting	times,	the	richer	provinces	would	not	accept	mechanisms	that	put	its	taxpayers	on	the	hook	for	other	provinces’	debts.	The	moral	appeal	for	more	fiscal	aid	was	reaching	its	limits.											The	Globe’s	Marchington	noted	that	the	loan	council	generated	“most	of	the	contention”	in	“candid	and	lively	debates.”99	Both	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	were	“reluctant	to	part	with	sources	of	revenue,”	he	added,	but	the	provinces	were	“more	clamorous	than	before	for	either	a	share	of	some	of	the	Dominion	income	or	for	the	assumption	by	the	Dominion	of	more	of	their	burdens.”100	They	were	deadlocked.								When	Hepburn	discovered	that	Dunning	would	not	provide	debt	relief	for	his	province,	he	was	disgusted:	He	eventually	left	the	conference	before	the	concluding	plenary	session.	Within	days,	back	in	Toronto,	he	would	introduce	the	first	provincial	income	tax	“to	raise	between	$12	and	$14	million,	the	approximate	cost	of	relief.”101	Meanwhile,	it	was	left	to	his	Attorney	General	Arthur	Roebuck	to	pass	on	the	Premier’s	complaints,	including	Ottawa’s	failure	to	refinance	provincial	and	
																																																								97	“The	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	December	1935	–	Sub-Conference	on	Financial	Questions,”	December	15,	1935	Confidential	memorandum	by	“Mr.	Skelton.”	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	file	PF1	–	2	Vol.	1,	Nov.	+15,	pps.	1-2.	98	John	T.	Saywell,	“Just	call	me	Mitch”:	The	Life	of	Mitchell	F.	Hepburn.	249.	99	“Hepburn	Returns	Dissatisfied	With	Ottawa	Parley”	The	Globe	on	Saturday,	December	14.	1935.	p.	2.	100	“Hepburn	Returns	Dissatisfied	With	Ottawa	Parley”	101	John	T.	Saywell,	“Just	call	me	Mitch”:	The	Life	of	Mitchell	F.	Hepburn,	252.	
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municipal	debts.	“That	[latter	issue]	is	a	great	problem.”102	It	is	no	wonder	that	Finance	Minister	Dunning	reported	that,	given	“the	diversity	and	importance	of	the	problems,”	the	delegates	in	that	committee	could	not	reach	unanimous	agreement	on	the	solutions.103	Those	problems	were	then	deferred	to	meetings	of	the	Permanent	Committee	on	Financial	Questions	in	January	and	then	in	March.104							The	committee	on	financial	questions	did	not	–	indeed,	could	not	–	come	to	any	solutions	for	the	unequal	financial	positions	and	fiscal	capacities	of	the	provinces.	They	also	could	not	agree	on	the	need	for	a	national	loan	council	to	ease	those	inequalities.	Nor	could	they	resolve	any	duplication	of	taxation.	The	Premiers	maintained	that	they	could	only	balance	their	budgets	–	on	their	present	scale	–	if	Ottawa	transferred	“certain	sources	of	revenue	now	belonging	to	or	made	use	of	by	the	Dominion.”	Or,	if	the	Dominion	assumed	“a	larger	portion	of	the	cost	of	unemployment	relief,	and	possible	certain	other	governmental	services.”	Or,	if	Ottawa	refinanced	outstanding	provincial	and	municipal	debts	–	perhaps	under	Dominion	guarantee	–	so	that	the	annual	interest	charges	could	be	reduced.105		The	first	two	measures	would	have	ongoing	implications	–	and	they	would	almost	certainly	have	required	constitutional	change.	The	last	change	–	refinancing	those																																																									102	Attorney	General	Arthur	Roebuck,	Proceedings	of	Closing	Day	Plenary	Session	in	
Dominion-Provincial	Conference	1935:	Record	of	Proceedings.	(Ottawa:	J.	O.	Patenaude,	I.S.O.,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1936)	p.	50.	103	Report	of	the	Committee	on	Financial	Questions	in	Dominion-Provincial	
Conference	1935:	Record	of	Proceedings.	(Ottawa:	J.	O.	Patenaude,	I.S.O.,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1936)	45.	104	“Summary	of	Assistance	Requested	of	and	Given	By	The	Dominion	to	Province	of	Alberta	Since	September	3,	1935.”	Memo	dated	April	16,	1937.	LAC.	P-1-1-10.	Provincial	Matters	–	Alberta	–	Miscellaneous	–	P	–	1-1-10.	RG	19.	Vol.	3985.	N.n.	p.	3.	105	Report	of	the	Committee	on	Financial	Questions	in	Dominion-Provincial	
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debts	–	understandably	unsettled	Mackenzie	King.	He	would	not	undertake	such	major	commitments	–	despite	Hepburn’s	anger.							In	the	end,	Dunning	told	the	final	plenary	session	that	the	real	solution	to	the	problem	of	public	finance	was	an	increase	in	national	income.	He	did	not	say	how	that	could	be	accomplished.	No	one	even	mentioned	the	idea	that	Ottawa	might	surrender	control	over	key	chunks	of	revenue	–	and	create	a	program	of	permanent	transfers	to	the	poorer	provinces.	An	unconditional	transfer	to	equalize	revenues	was	unthinkable	–	and	basically	unaffordable	–	then.							There	were	no	sweeping	conclusions	–	although	another	subcommittee	did	unanimously	approve	the	establishment	of	a	National	Employment	Commission.	As	King	told	the	Conference	in	his	concluding	remarks,	the	national	commission	“would	have	supervision	of	unemployment	relief	and	[its]	duty	would	be	by	co-operation	with	public	bodies	and	in	other	ways	to	find	work	for	the	unemployed.”106	He	then	piously	quoted	from	the	Liberal	Party’s	platform:	“As	permanent	measures	the	Liberal	party	is	pledged	to	introduce	policies	which	will	serve	to	provide	employment	by	reviving	industry	and	trade.”107	King	vowed	to	establish	the	commission,	and	to	consult	with	the	provinces	on	its	personnel.	He	had	basically	deferred	the	problem.					And	that	subdued	outcome	suited	King	perfectly.	There	was	no	pressure	to	do	anything	when	Parliament	and	the	provincial	legislatures	had	not	unanimously	endorsed	any	major	recommendations.	Far	from	it.	Instead,	in	the	plenary	closing																																																									106	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	1935,	final	session,	Friday,	December	13,	1935.		
Dominion-Provincial	Conferences,	December	9-13,	1935.	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	King’s	Printer,	1951)	p.	63.	107	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	1935,	final	session,	Friday,	December	13,	1935..		
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session,	King	first	suggested	that	the	participants	should	eventually	find	a	way	to	get	rid	of	special	grants	–	but	he	did	not	say	how.	He	did	specify	that	the	municipalities	“should	not	be	relieved	of	all	responsibility	in	the	matter	of	relief	or	of	a	sense	of	their	responsibility.”	He	added,	carefully	reflecting	the	prevailing	concerns	about	dependency:	“It	would	be	a	mistake,	from	many	points	of	view,	were	the	impression	to	get	abroad	that	they	[the	municipalities]	no	longer	were	responsible.”108							Instead,	the	Prime	Minister	made	his	grand	gesture:	“We	are	prepared	to	share	with	the	provinces	the	burden	of	responsibility	in	the	matter	of	relief	to	a	greater	extent	than	has	thus	far	been	done.”	King	added	that	the	proposed	National	Employment	Commission	could	even	oversee	the	expenditures	on	relief	so	“public	moneys	may	be	voted	with	a	greater	sense	of	security.”109	Despite	that	last-minute	concession,	there	had	been	little	progress	in	dealing	with	the	fiscal	inequalities	of	the	poorer	provinces	–	or	the	damaging	rifts	in	social	cohesion.						King	had	very	little	intention	of	doing	much	anyway.	Just	before	he	went	into	that	last	plenary	session	on	Friday,	December	13,	the	Prime	Minister	had	strolled	into	a	cabinet	meeting.	There,	he	had	found	that	“a	considerable	section”	of	his	cabinet	wanted	to	make	large	grants	“to	meet	what	they	thought	was	expected	by	the	public	and	the	provinces.”	King	squashed	those	last-minute	hopes	of	a	federal	rescue	package	for	the	provinces,	the	municipalities	or	ordinary	Canadians.	As	he	told	his	diary,	he	warned	them:	“We	had	to	do	a	number	of	unpleasant	things	if	the	country																																																									108	Proceedings	of	Closing	Day	Plenary	Session	in	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	
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was	ever	to	get	ahead,	and	now	was	the	time	to	get	down	to	rock	bottom.”110	But,	under	cabinet	pressure,	he	did	make	that	one	concession	on	relief.	After	the	conference	adjourned,	King	specified	that	relief	grants	would	increase	by	seventy-five	per	cent	for	three	months.	At	the	end	of	March	1936,	convinced	that	governments	had	to	tighten	up	their	“indiscriminate	relief	process,”	he	would	cut	those	grants	by	twenty-five	per	cent.111								But	the	Prime	Minister	could	not	have	missed	the	poorer	provinces’	claim:	They	needed	more	revenues	–	or	the	federal	government	would	have	to	shoulder	more	responsibilities.	It	was	like	a	broken	record.	The	inequality	and	the	desperate	public	needs	were	crushing	them.									King’s	small	gesture	to	increase	relief	grants	was	clearly	intended	to	buy	peace.	As	he	told	his	diary,	the	cabinet	had	agreed	before	the	plenary	closing	session	“that	nothing	would	be	approved	or	endorsed	that	might	come	from	any	of	the	sub-conferences,	and	that	no	commitments	of	any	kind	would	be	made”	with	the	exception	of	the	offer	to	increase	relief	grants.112	That	increase	would	be	conditional	on	allowing	the	Dominion	Commission	on	Employment	to	supervise	all	relief	expenditures.	(This	did	not	happen.)	“Those	present,”	wrote	King,	“agreed	that	if	I	
																																																								110	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Friday,	December	13,	1935.		http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=16728	111	As	quoted	in	James	Struthers,	No	Fault	of	Their	Own:	Unemployment	and	the	
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could	get	away	with	that,	at	the	afternoon	session,	it	would	be	a	real	achievement.”113							Academics	have	proffered	reasons	for	King’s	delay	at	this	Conference	–	even	though	the	problems	with	fiscal	inequality	had	been	starkly	laid	out	for	his	ministers.	James	Struthers	concludes	that	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King	refused	to	act	boldly	against	unemployment	in	the	late	1930s	because	he	viewed	unemployment	as	“primarily	a	provincial	or	local	matter”:	“The	constitution	provided	the	excuse	but	not	the	reason	for	[his]	inaction.”114	That	was	certainly	a	factor	in	King’s	reasoning.	Historian	Roger	Riendeau	depicts	King	as	a	politician	who	was	highly	responsive	to	voter	pressure	and	polls.115	The	beleaguered	provinces	and	their	voters	had	not	mustered	enough	collective	clout	in	1935	to	demand	–	and	get	–	action.	At	the	end	of	the	day,	King	drew	odd	comfort	from	the	fact	that	there	were	only	seven	CCF	MPs.						But	many	historians	minimize	the	constraints	and	considerations	of	the	federal	system	that	King	understood	only	too	well.	The	Prime	Minister	was	a	devious,	calculating	and	self-aggrandizing	politician	–	but	he	was	also	shrewd.	He	recognized	the	need	for	economic	and	social	balance	that	federations	require	–	and	he	did	not																																																									113	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Friday,	December	13,	1935.	My	italics.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=16728		114	James	Struthers,	No	Fault	of	Their	Own:	Unemployment	and	the	Canadian	Welfare	
State,	1914-1941	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1983)	10.		115	Roger	Riendeau,	A	Brief	History	of	Canada	(Markham,	Ontario:	Fitzhenry	&	Whiteside:	2000)	234.	As	Riendeau	notes	about	King’s	conduct	in	wartime:	the	Prime	Minister	became	“even	more	interested	in	social	welfare	measures	when	a	public	opinion	poll	in	September	1943	indicated	that	the	CCF	[Co-operative	Commonwealth	Federation]	had	edged	past	the	Liberals	and	Conservatives	in	popularity.”	
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want	to	convert	Ottawa	into	the	banker	of	last	resort.	He	would	also	absorb	the	lesson	when	the	Judicial	Committee	of	the	British	Privy	Council	rejected	most	elements	of	Bennett’s	New	Deal	as	unconstitutional.	The	explanation	of	political	scientists	Richard	Simeon	and	Ian	Robinson	comes	closest	to	the	truth:	as	I	have	explained,	during	the	Depression,	the	Prime	Minister	adopted	a	strategy	of	“minimal	federal	activity,	informed	by	his	conviction	that	the	principal	threat	to	national	unity	lay	in	French-English	conflict.”116	The	Prime	Minister	distrusted	the	provinces	–	but	he	was	also	wary	of	triggering	a	fratricidal	political	war	among	them	and	with	Ottawa.		
The	Crisis	Deepens						A	month	after	the	December	1935	Conference,	provincial	representatives	gathered	in	Ottawa	for	a	meeting	of	the	permanent	committee	on	financial	questions	–	and	the	model	of	the	Australian	Loan	Council	idea	was	revived.	But	the	discussion	of	the	issue	was	“limited	and	vague.”117	Meanwhile,	the	first	province	to	buckle	under	the	financial	strain	was	Alberta.	But	it	would	only	submit	to	a	council	if	it	would	“not	affect	our	autonomous	rights…	We	would	sincerely	trust	that	in	the	best	interest	of	the	whole	Dominion	situation	no	default	would	be	forced	upon	us.”118		
																																																								116	Richard	Simeon	and	Ian	Robinson,	State,	Society,	and	the	Development	of	
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					Ottawa	overlooked	those	caveats	–	and	granted	a	federal	loan	of	$1.58-million	to	meet	bond	maturities	on	January	15,	1936.	But	it	told	the	province	that	there	would	be	no	assistance	with	its	upcoming	April	1	maturity	unless	it	accepted	the	Loan	Council.	The	two	sides	were	at	a	standstill.	Who	was	at	fault?	Former	federal	advisor	Douglas	H.	Fullerton	is	brisk.	Ottawa	showed	no	“generosity	of	spirit…Doctrinal,	political,	and	constitutional	considerations	affected	the	federal	position….	it	was	patronizing,	condescending	and	arrogant.”	The	problem	for	the	Prairie	Provinces,	he	adds,	was	not	so	much	economic	mismanagement	but	“an	abnormal	and	persistent	combination	of	drought	and	seriously	depressed	world	markets	for	wheat.”119						Meanwhile,	Bank	of	Canada	bureaucrats	were	rethinking	their	Loan	Council	plan.	Research	Chief	Alex	Skelton	was	getting	a	better	sense	of	the	careful	balancing	act	required	to	maintain	Canada’s	federation	–	and	the	damage	that	the	proposed	Loan	Council	based	upon	the	Australian	model	could	cause.	He	had	written	a	two-page	memo	that	warned	against	the	compulsory	surrender	of	provincial	control	to	the	proposed	Loan	Council	as	“impractical”	on	October	8,	1935	–	before	King	was	elected.120	In	a	second	remarkable	16-page	memorandum	on	March	20,	1936,	Skelton	explained	that	the	plan	for	the	Loan	Council	“should	be	greatly	modified,	or	better	still,	dropped	entirely	(if	the	Dominion	Government	can	back	out	gracefully).”121	The	Loan	Council	would	become	a	permanent	institution.	“[But]	the																																																									119	Douglas	H.	Fullerton,	Graham	Towers	And	His	Times,	75-76.	120	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Canadian	Loan	Council,	File	2B,	Box	400,	B400,	Volume	1,	Box	63.	Dated	10.VIII.35	and	signed	ASk	(Sandy	Skelton)	1.		121	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Recommendations	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	B-95,	291	Secretary,	PF1-1,	Volume	1.	Covering	letter	for	Federal-Provincial	Relations,	Memorandum.	1.	
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general	theories	of	federalism	and	of	democracy,	and	the	specific	exigencies	of	Canadian	politics,	demand	that	the	provinces	shall	always	have	an	alternative.”122	Federal	ultimatums	were	never	welcome.						Worse,	the	dangers	of	federal	control	over	the	poorer	provinces’	finances	and	borrowing	were	enormous	–	even	if	the	existing	inequalities	were	also	perilous	to	the	political	and	economic	stability	of	the	union.	Saskatchewan	and	Manitoba	were	teetering	on	the	brink	of	catastrophe	because	their	export	markets	for	agricultural	products	had	dwindled.	But	the	Western	Provinces	objected	to	the	usurpation	of	their	taxation	powers;	they	viewed	their	difficulties	as	temporary	while	the	council	would	be	permanent;	and	they	maintained	that	Dominion	tariff	policy	had	impoverished	them	–	as	opposed	to	their	own	policies.	“Finally,”	wrote	Skelton,	“the	provinces	may	question	that	the	dictatorship	of	the	Dominion	will	be	a	benevolent	one.	The	western	provinces	need	only	point	to	Dominion	tariff	policy	to	illustrate	the	subordination	of	their	interests	to	the	politically	dominant	east…	There	is	the	additional	fear	that	a	province	may	suffer	if	it	should	be	in	the	opposition	political	camp.”						If	the	Dominion	insisted	on	a	loan	council	to	address	inequalities,	he	explained,	the	consequences	could	be	terrible.	Provinces	might	default	to	stop	the	obligation	to	make	interest	payments	or	the	Dominion	might	relax	its	supervision	–	so	the	council	would	be	ineffective.	Worse,	British	Columbia	and	Alberta	could	opt	for	secession:	“As	independent	states	[they]	could	easily	support	their	present	debt	structure	and																																																									122	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Recommendations	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	B-95,	291	Secretary,	PF1-1,	Volume	1.	Federal-Provincial	Relations,	Memorandum.	1.	9.		
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could	gain	other	material	economic	benefits.”123	Another	scenario	could	be	catastrophic:	Suppose,	mused	Skelton,	that	a	province	accepts	the	loan	council,	and	then	a	provincial	rights	party	wins	the	subsequent	election.	“A	serious	effort	by	the	Dominion	to	realize	on	its	security	might	then	lead	to	civil	war.”124								There	was	a	downside	for	Ottawa,	too,	in	this	struggle	to	help	the	poorer	provinces.	The	Dominion	would	assume	a	large	liability	for	the	Western	Provinces,	take	responsibility	for	numerous	local	problems	which	were	fraught	“with	political	friction	and	repercussion”;	and	bear	the	blame	for	encouraging	partial	default.125	“To	summarize,”	he	added,	“effective	and	permanent	Loan	Council	control	would	destroy	the	federal	principle,	and	ineffective	control	would	simply	saddle	the	Dominion	with	new	liabilities.”126	He	had	aptly	captured	the	dangers	in	the	federal-provincial	fiscal	tug-of-war	–	and	the	damage	that	it	could	do	to	social	cohesion.						Skelton	suggested	that	Ottawa	establish	a	so-called	National	Finance	Council,	which	would	be	a	voluntary	cooperative	institution.	It	would	include	the	federal	finance	minister,	the	nine	provincial	treasurers	and	the	Bank	of	Canada	–	and	it	would	offer	advice	and	conciliation	to	any	province	that	needed	it.	Its	secretariat	should	have	“knowledge	of	public	finance	theory	and	practice	in	general,	and	federal	finance	in	particular	(U.	S.	A.,	Australia,	Argentine	and	other	South	America,	etc.).”	Although	under	political	supervision,	non-political	management	would	control	the																																																									123	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Recommendations	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	B-95,	291,	6.	124	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Recommendations	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	B-95,	291,	6.	125	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Recommendations	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	B-95,	291,	6.	126	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Recommendations	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	B-95,	291	d,	7.		
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council	itself.	The	provinces	would	“nominally	maintain	complete	autonomy,	but	in	practice	public	opinion	and	money	market	sanctions	would	keep	them	in	line.”127							He	could	not	resist	adding	another	prescription	to	his	call	for	a	finance	council	that	could	assist	the	poorer	provinces.	“The	immediate	problems	of	the	provinces	should	be	met	by	transferring	emergency	expenditures	and	certain	social	services	to	the	Dominion,”	he	wrote,	“and	with	the	clear	understanding	that	the	Dominion	has	no	further	responsibility	to	them.”128	The	Ottawa	bureaucrats	could	not	yet	see	a	less	centralizing	way	to	address	the	strained	finances	of	those	poorer	governments.						But	his	solution	was	far	more	politically	astute	than	Ottawa’s	insistence	upon	a	loan	council	along	the	lines	of	Australia.	The	memo’s	very	wording,	however,	almost	surely	rattled	the	Ottawa	elites.	His	March	20,	1936	memo	in	opposition	to	a	Loan	Council	based	on	the	Australian	model	was	dynamite.			
Alberta	Defaults							The	memo	certainly	got	Governor	Towers’	attention.	But	it	came	too	late	for	Alberta.	On	March	15,	Alberta	Treasurer	Cockroft	requested	a	federal	loan	of	$2.85-million	–	or	the	province	would	default.	On	March	17,	Dunning	replied	that	he	had	just	read	the	Premier’s	public	announcement	that	he	was	reducing	interest	rates	on	those	bonds	–	“apparently	without	reference	to	proposed	loan	council	arrangement”	–	so	“I	do	not	see	how	I	could	justify	to	Parliament	and	the	country	the	loan	for																																																									127	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Recommendations	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	B-9,	12.	My	italics.	128	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Recommendations	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	B-95,	291	Secretary,	PF1-1,	Volume	1.	Covering	letter	for	Federal-Provincial	Relations,	Memorandum.	1.	
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which	you	are	now	asking.”129	Cockroft	had	also	suggested	that	Ottawa	count	the	province’s	proposed	settlement	of	$5-million	for	the	use	of	its	natural	resources	–	a	settlement	that	Alberta	had	previously	spurned	–	against	the	new	loans.	Alberta	Premier	Aberhart	seconded	that	request.	Dunning	refused:	“As	in	the	case	of	Saskatchewan	the	natural	resources	award	would	have	to	be	offset	against	debts	already	owing	by	the	provinces	to	the	Dominion”	–	and	Alberta	owed	$24.7-million.130									Dunning	reiterated	that	Ottawa	would	not	help	unless	there	was	provision	to	oversee	future	provincial	borrowings.	The	Premier	replied	that	he	could	not	accept	that	condition.	Meanwhile,	Saskatchewan	was	able	to	obtain	Bank	of	Canada	approval	for	loans	because	it	agreed	to	accept	the	loan	council	–	which	would	require	a	constitutional	amendment	to	implement.	On	April	1,	1936,	the	Alberta	Government	defaulted	on	its	bonds.	That	default	would	mark	a	generation	of	Depression-era	Alberta	politicians	and	their	successors.	A	government	of	Prairie	farmers	who	had	taken	pride	in	paying	their	debts	was	now	effectively	insolvent.								That	episode	would	reverberate	in	Australia.	On	June	22,	1936,	diplomats	sent	a	unusually	detailed	five-page	memo	chronicling	Alberta’s	lost	struggle	to	overcome	the	inequality	between	its	revenues	and	its	responsibilities.	In	particular,	they	concentrated	on	Premier	William	Aberhart’s	refusal	to	go	along	with	the	federal																																																									129	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Recommendations	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	B-95,	291	Secretary,	PF1-1,	Volume	1.	Covering	letter	for	Federal-Provincial	Relations,	Memorandum.	5.		130	From	correspondence	read	by	Finance	Minister	Charles	Dunning	to	the	House	of	Commons	on	April	1,	1936	as	quoted	in	Eric	J.	Hanson's	Financial	History	of	
Alberta:	1905-1950.	eds.	Paul	Boothe	and	Heather	Edwards.	(Calgary:	University	of	Calgary	Press,	2003)		175.		
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demand	for	a	Loan	Council	for	Alberta.	(The	Australians	were	clearly	fascinated	by	how	their	model	–	however	modified	–	would	not	work	in	Canada.)131	The	operation	of	a	federation	was	clearly	an	ongoing	preoccupation	in	Ottawa	and	Canberra.		
The	Provinces	and	Ottawa	Still	Cannot	Agree	on	Remedies								Meanwhile,	King	and	British	Columbia	Premier	Duff	Pattullo	were	in	an	increasingly	unpleasant	standoff	about	the	council.	In	early	March,	Pattullo	had	told	King	that	he	did	“not	think	any	province	should	be	placed	in	the	position	of	either	accepting	proposal	of	the	Dominion	without	modification	or	reservation	or	being	left	to	its	own	devices.”[sic]132	On	May	1,	King	explained	that	Ottawa	had	amended	its	proposal	to	mollify	provincial	concerns	that	every	loan	would	require	federal	approval.	If	a	province	joined	the	loan	council,	it	would	need	Dominion	approval	before	it	could	issue	securities	or	incur	debt	abroad;	if	the	debt	or	obligation	were	issued	in	Canada,	the	province	could	proceed	without	the	council	–	but	those	securities	or	debts	would	not	have	Loan	Council	approval.133						King	was	doing	everything	that	he	could	to	control	provincial	spending	without	offering	more	money	or	powers	to	the	poorer	provinces.	Indeed,	the	Council	would	
restrict	provincial	powers.	But	the	federal	guarantee	of	provincial	debts	would	ease																																																									131	Memorandum	from	Australian	Trade	Commissioner	in	Canada	L.	R.	Macgregor	to	The	Secretary,	Department	of	External	Affairs,	June	22,	1936.	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada:	Internal	Politics.		Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol,	CAN	24,	Part	1,	Barcode	173375,	n.p.	in	file,	p.	1-5.	132	British	Columbia	Premier	T.	D.	“Duff”	Pattullo	to	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King,	March	14,	1936,	LAC.	RG19,	Volume	3986.	2.		133	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King	to	British	Columbia	Premier	T.	D.	“Duff”	Pattullo,	May	1,	1936.	LAC.	RG19,	Volume	3986.	pps.	1-4.	
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provincial	fiscal	inequality	by	cutting	interest	payments	for	the	poorer	provinces.	Pattullo	replied	with	asperity:		I	think	that	the	course	you	are	pursuing	is	too	rigid	and	inelastic,	and	that	your	policy	will	not	effectuate	the	employment	of	the	employable	of	the	unemployed	as	rapidly	as	could	and	should	be	done,	while	necessary	works	have	to	remain	unfulfilled.	However	I	have	so	many	times	explained	the	situation	both	by	letter	and	conversation	that	there	does	not	seem	to	be	much	use	in	pursuing	the	argument.134								Loan	Councils	as	a	solution	to	inequality	in	revenue-generating	capacity	were	losing	momentum	–	even	though	the	poorer	provinces	remained	hard-pressed	to	fulfill	such	responsibilities	as	relief	payments	and	the	interest	charges	on	their	debts.	Ottawa	went	through	the	motions	anyway.	On	May	1,	1936,	Finance	Minister	Charles	Dunning	declared	that	the	future	remained	“clouded”	by	the	“uncertain”	financial	position	of	some	provinces,	especially	the	Western	provinces.	As	The	Globe	reported,	loans	to	the	provinces	had	now	reached	$116.5	million	–	and	it	was	Ottawa’s	intention	“to	proceed	with	the	loan	council	scheme	with	some	modifications.”135							On	May	14,	1936,	King’s	Government	introduced	a	resolution	in	the	House	of	Commons,	asking	the	British	Parliament	to	amend	the	BNA	Act	“to	authorize	the	Dominion	to	guarantee	provincial	loans	on	specified	conditions,	and	to	extend	and	clarify	provincial	taxing	powers.”	It	passed	the	next	day.	But	the	Senate	delayed	it,	
																																																								134	British	Columbia	Premier	T.	D.	“Duff”	Pattullo	to	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King,	May	6,	1936.	LAC.	RG19,	Volume	3986.	P.	2.	135	“But	Dunning	Sees	Difficult	Economic	Problems	To	Solve”	The	Globe,	May	2,	1936,	p.	8.		
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and	eventually	defeated	it	–	to	King’s	infinite	relief.136	As	he	confided	in	his	diary	on	the	day	that	he	introduced	it:		I	confess	that	I	do	not	like	the	amendment…I	do	not	like	either	the	effort	even	indirectly	to	‘control’	the	provinces	in	any	of	their	acts.	I	believe	we	might	have	been	wiser	simply	to	refuse	to	loan	or	guarantee	–	tho’	this	may	have	brought	bankruptcy.	The	only	excuse	for	the	present	legislation	is	the	emergency	–	but	the	legislation	like	other	measures	for	the	purpose	may	only	serve	to	prolong	it.137						On	June	10,	1936,	a	senior	official	at	the	Bank	of	Canada	–	almost	certainly	Towers	–	submitted	a	version	of	Skelton’s	proposal	for	a	National	Finance	Council	to	Deputy	Finance	Minister	W.	C.	Clark.	A	notation	scrawled	on	the	first	page	reads:	“by	draft	–	agreed	with	Johnson	–	subsequently	modified	a	little	by	Clark	but	proposal	turned	down.”138	[Johnson	was	almost	certainly	Treasury	Solicitor	David	Johnson	who	reported	to	Clark.)139	This	clumsy	mechanism	to	ease	the	fiscal	pressures	on	the	poorer	provinces	–	freeing	more	money	for	program	spending	–	would	not	work.		
The	Mutual	Interest	Continues	
																																																								136	Robert	B.	Bryce,	Maturing	in	Hard	Times:	Canada’s	Department	of	Finance	
through	the	Great	Depression.189.		137	Diaries	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King	for	Thursday,	May	14,	1936.	His	emphasis.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=16986&		138	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Provincial	Financing	–	General	–	1934-	January	1937.	“Part	I	–	National	Finance	Council	–	June	10,	1936.”	File	PF	1-	Volume	1	–	Research	B1.	1.	139	Robert	B.	Bryce,	Maturing	in	Hard	Times:	Canada’s	Department	of	Finance	
through	the	Great	Depression.	On	p.	227,	Bryce	describes	the	staffing	of	Clark’s	office.	
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						The	Australians	were	watching	Canada	closely	because	the	parallels	to	their	situation	could	be	striking.	On	June	9,	1936,	Trade	Commissioner	L.	R.	Macgregor	sent	a	detailed	memo	chronicling	the	journey	of	the	proposed	Loan	Council	from	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	of	December	1935,	which	sought	a	solution	to	“vexatious	provincial	financial	questions,”	to	its	defeat	in	the	Senate	on	June	9,	1936.	“There	appears,	however,	to	be	pronounced	public	support	of	the	Senate’s	attitude,”	Macgregor	explained,	“although	the	Government	has	been	threatening	‘reform’	of	the	Senate.”	He	added	that	Canadians	could	not	amend	their	own	Constitution	because	“the	French-Canadian	minority	are	jealous	of	the	rights	assured	to	them	under	that	Imperial	Statute.”	[sic]140	The	Australians	really	did	not	understand	the	force	of	provincial	cultural	and	language	rights	–	and	the	need	for	them	–	in	a	federation	founded	by	different	nations.						The	fate	of	Bennett’s	New	Deal	also	preoccupied	the	Australians.	On	June	17,	1936,	Macgregor	had	cabled	Canberra	when	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	had	rejected	key	elements	of	Bennett’s	ambitious	package	including	the	Employment	and	Social	Insurance	Act.	Macgregor’s	cable	noted	that	several	Commonwealth	Government	ministries	had	expressed	interest	in	the	deal’s	fate.141	In	turn,	Canberra	officials	informed	Australian	diplomats	in	Ottawa	that	two	United	Kingdom	experts	were	scheduled	to	visit	Australia	to	discuss	the	introduction	of																																																									140	Memorandum	from	Australian	Trade	Commissioner	in	Canada	L.	R.	Macgregor	to	The	Secretary,	Department	of	External	Affairs,	June	9,	1936,	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada:	Constitutional,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol,	CAN	13,	Part	2,	Barcode	173360,	n.	p.	in	file,	pp.	2,	1.	141	Memorandum	from	Australian	Trade	Commissioner	in	Canada	L.	R.	Macgregor	to	The	Secretary,	Department	of	External	Affairs,	cable	June	17,	1936,	followed	by	full	letter	of	June	17,	1936.	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada:	Constitutional,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol,	CAN	13,	Part	2,	Barcode	173360,	n.p.	in	file,	p.	1.	
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similar	unemployment	insurance.	So	the	Canberra	Government	would	appreciate	“all	the	ideas	and	information	on	the	subject	it	can	procure”	from	Ottawa.142								The	Australian	diplomats	also	forwarded	a	June	20,	1936	article	from	the	
London	Times	headlined	“Federal	Powers	in	Canada,”	which	referred	to	the	Unemployment	Insurance	decision	and	to	the	United	States	Supreme	Court	decision	that	found	elements	of	President	Franklin	Roosevelt’s	New	Deal	to	be	unconstitutional.	“In	Canada,	as	in	the	United	States,”	the	article	noted	pointedly,	“necessary	social	and	economic	readjustments	are	hampered	by	a	written	Federal	Constitution	setting	hard	and	fast	boundaries	to	the	authority	of	the	national	Government	and	Parliament.”143	The	lesson	for	Canberra	was	clear:	Federalism	itself	–	and	its	required	constitution	–	was	an	impediment	to	the	expansion	of	social	programs	to	meet	20th	century	needs.							Not	everyone	advocated	the	expansion	of	the	social	security	network.	The	diligent	Australians	forwarded	an	extract	from	an	article	by	Canadian	Manufacturing	Association	executive	H.	W.	Macdonnell,	who	reviewed	the	state	of	social	legislation	in	Canada	for	the	CMA.	“The	reason	taxes	are	so	heavy	is	not	because	ambitious	kings	want	to	acquire	new	territory	[as	in	the	past],”	Macdonnell	explained,	“but	because	we	are	spending	money	like	drunken	sailors	on	social	services.”	People	were	losing	their	sense	of	self-reliance	and	thrift.	Young	people																																																									142	Memorandum	from	The	Secretary,	Department	of	External	Affairs,	to	Australian	Trade	Commissioner	in	Canada	L.	R.	Macgregor,	June	18,	1936,	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada	–	Internal	Politics,	Series	A981,	Control	Symbol	CAN	24	Part	1,	Barcode	173375,	p.	1.	143	“Federal	Powers	In	Canada”,	in	the	London	Times	of	Saturday,	June	20,	1936,	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada:	Constitutional,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol,	CAN	13,	Part	2,	Barcode	173360,	n.	p.	in	file,	1.	
	 	 	 	 	163	
were	letting	their	elderly	relatives	depend	upon	relief	instead	of	supporting	them.	“The	whole	object	and	trend	of	this	new	point	of	view	is	to	teach	the	individual	not	to	rely	on	himself	nor	even	look	to	his	family,	but	to	look	to	the	State.”144							That	fear	of	dependency	among	individuals	and	provinces	would	run	like	a	jarring	contrapuntal	melody	alongside	proposals	to	expand	social	security	–	and	to	tackle	provincial	fiscal	inequality	–	in	the	name	of	social	cohesion	throughout	the	decades.	There	would	be	little	further	expansion	anyway	–	with	the	exception	of	Unemployment	Insurance	and	Family	Allowances	in	Canada	in	wartime	–	until	all	federation	partners	could	afford	them.	The	two	federations	were	groping	their	way	through	the	trials	of	federalism	and	the	difficulty	of	adjusting	their	links	with	Britain.	Canada	and	Australia	would	become	even	closer	over	the	remainder	of	the	decade.			
Ottawa	Seeks	New	Options							Meanwhile,	Ottawa	was	scrambling	to	find	a	Plan	B	after	the	defeat	of	the	Loan	Council	and	the	rejection	of	the	National	Finance	Council.	In	the	summer	of	1936,	the	Bank	of	Canada	asked	University	of	Toronto	economist	A.	E.	“Dal”	Grauer	to	do	a	study	on	the	distribution	of	taxing	powers	in	Canada.	His	report	on	August	30,	1936	recommended	the	centralization	of	income	tax.	“Wealth	and	income	tends	to	arise																																																									144	“A	Review	of	Social	Legislation	in	Canada:	Motives	Which	Have	Led	to	the	Passing	of	Social	Legislation	–	Some	of	the	Enactments”	by	H.	W.	Macdonnell,	secretary	of	the	Industrial	Relations	Department	of	the	Canadian	Manufacturing	Association,	July	1936.	Covering	Memorandum	by	Assistant	Australian	Trade	Commissioner	R.	R.	Ellen	to	The	Secretary,	Department	of	External	Affairs,	July	10,	1936,	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada:	Internal	–	Part	1,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol,	CAN	21,	Part	1	Barcode	173371,	n.	p.	in	file,	p.	1.	
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in	Ontario	and	Quebec,”	the	report	observed.	So	“it	seems	equitable…that	the	main	direct	taxes	on	income	and	wealth	(the	income	and	death	taxes)	should	be	vested	in	the	central	government	as	an	offset	to	these	regional	inequalities.”145	Grauer	suggested	that	the	Dominion	might	offer	to	share	those	revenues	to	induce	provincial	cooperation	“on	the	understanding	that	the	provinces	would	get	more	revenue	than	at	present.”146						Ottawa	might	even	have	to	make	equal	per	capita	payments	to	each	province.	Unfortunately,	that	would	elicit	objections	from	the	wealthier	provinces	because	their	taxpayers	contributed	more	money	per	capita	to	Ottawa	than	the	taxpayers	in	the	poorer	provinces.	That	was	a	pivotal	notion.	Finally,	“would	the	question	of	
need	enter,	and	if	so,	how	would	it	be	evaluated?	Some	of	the	provinces	would	certainly	bring	up	the	plea	of	special	need.”147	Inequality	was	out	in	the	open.	Federal	bureaucrats	were	discussing	the	curse	of	unequal	provincial	revenues	–	even	if	they	could	not	solve	it.							Grauer’s	report	opened	a	new	path.	Bank	of	Canada	Research	Chief	Skelton	and	Governor	Towers	“rather	quickly	concluded	that	the	best	way	of	securing	major	improvements	in	the	division	of	responsibilities	for	expenditures	and	for	revenue	
																																																								145	“The	Distribution	of	Taxing	Powers	in	Canada”	by	A.	E.	Grauer,	August	30,	1936,	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	BO7-	File	28	–	170,	Vol.	1	1935-1959.	P.	49.	146	“The	Distribution	of	Taxing	Powers	in	Canada”	by	A.	E.	Grauer,	August	30,	1936,	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	BO7-	File	28	–	170,	Vol.	1	1935-1959.	49,	57.	147	“The	Distribution	of	Taxing	Powers	in	Canada”	by	A.	E.	Grauer,	August	30,	1936,	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	BO7-	File	28	–	170,	Vol.	1	1935-1959.	P.	57.	My	italics.	
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sources	would	be	to	set	up	a	royal	commission	of	inquiry.”148	After	talks	with	Finance	Minister	Dunning	and	Deputy	Finance	Minister	Clark,	Towers	drafted	a	succinct	five-page	memo,	capturing	the	incipient	pressures	for	expanded	social	security	that	were	already	jostling	against	provincial	cultural	and	linguistic	identities:	The	proposed	commission	would	“examine	the	economic	basis	of	Confederation	with	special	reference	to	modern	developments	in	the	field	of	governmental	responsibilities	for	social	and	other	expenditures	and,	in	particular,	the	division	of	these	new	burdens	between	the	various	taxing	authorities	of	the	Dominion.”149						The	commission	would	also	look	at	“the	most	equitable	possible	distribution	of	the	burden	of	taxation.”150	The	memo	drove	home	the	emphasis	on	the	escalating	costs	of	social	programs:	“Social	expenditures,	including	relief,	have	assumed	an	importance	never	contemplated	25	years	ago	–	still	less	at	time	of	Confederation.”151							Dunning	took	the	suggestion	to	King	on	Monday,	November	16.	According	to	his	record	of	this	conversation,	King	pointed	out	that	he	had	suggested	a	royal	commission	during	the	1930	election	campaign	that	would	have	looked	beyond																																																									148	Robert	B.	Bryce,	Maturing	in	Hard	Times:	Canada’s	Department	of	Finance	
through	the	Great	Depression,	190.	149	“Memorandum:	Notes	On	A	Possible	Commission	Of	Enquiry,	Confidential,	Original	sent	to	Mr.	Dunning	with	letter,”	October	20,	1936,	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Towers	Memoranda,	file	1,	1935-1937,	0-51.	p.1.	150		“Memorandum:	Notes	On	A	Possible	Commission	Of	Enquiry,	Confidential,,1.	My	italics.	151	“Memorandum:	Notes	On	A	Possible	Commission	Of	Enquiry,	Confidential,	Original	sent	to	Mr.	Dunning	with	letter,”	October	20,	1936,	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Towers	Memoranda,	file	1,	1935-1937,	0-51.	p.	2.	
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economic	issues.	Now	the	public	might	view	any	commission	“as	a	way	of	avoiding	facing	the	financial	situation	which	has	developed.	I	thought	it	better	to	seek	to	meet	that	situation	some	other	way	for	the	present	at	least,	having	regard	to	the	matters	to	be	given	attention	in	the	first	half	of	next	year.”152							Undeterred,	on	November	23,	1936,	Skelton	wrote	a	dramatic	seven-page	memo,	laying	out	“the	case	for	a	royal	commission	inquiry	on	provincial	finances.”153	The	Depression	had	driven	home	the	liabilities	of	a	sixty-year-old	constitution	that	included	“an	extensive	borderland	where	jurisdiction,	taxation	and	expenditure	may,	and	do,	now	overlap.”154	He	wanted	to	replace	“the	present	Topsy-like	structure	of	Canadian	public	finance	with	one	constructed	on	rational	and	business-like	lines.”155	Other	federations	had	different	models,	he	observed:	Australia	enforced	centralized	control	of	all	government	borrowing;	the	United	States	concentrated	“deficit	financing	in	the	hands	of	the	federal	body	with	the	most	elastic	revenues,	control	of	monetary	policy,	and	the	best	credit.”156									Canada	could	not	keep	drifting	into	an	ever-more-unequal	situation,	paralyzed	by	its	inability	to	amend	its	Constitution.	Given	the	conditions	of	the	poorer	provinces,	“serious	strains”	would	soon	plague	the	federation,	including	“secession																																																									152	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Monday,	November	16,	1936.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=17409		153	“The	Case	For	A	Royal	Commission	Inquiry	On	Provincial	Finances,”	ASk	[Sandy	Skelton],	November	23,	1936.	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	File	2B,	B400,	Vol.	1,	Box	63.	p.	1.	154	“The	Case	For	A	Royal	Commission	Inquiry	On	Provincial	Finances,”	ASk	[Sandy	Skelton],	November	23,	1936.	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	File	2B,	B400,	Vol.	1,	Box	63.	p.	3.	155	“The	Case	For	A	Royal	Commission	Inquiry	On	Provincial	Finances,”,	3.		156	“The	Case	For	A	Royal	Commission	Inquiry	On	Provincial	Finances,”,	4.		
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or	default	of	some	of	the	more	exposed	units.”157	That,	in	turn,	would	“impoverish	the	central	provinces	and	ruin	their	credit.”158	Central	Canada	should	view	a	constitutional	overhaul	as	in	its	interests:	A	continuing	system	of	federal	“loans”	to	bankrupt	provinces	or	purchases	of	provincial	securities	would	be	“only	a	palliative	of	the	most	deceptive	kind,	and	Ontario	and	Quebec	would	have	to	bear	the	cost	
with	no	compensating	advantages.”159							Decades	before	formal	equalization,	Skelton	captured	the	dangers	of	resentment	among	the	richer	provinces	for	their	poorer	kin.	Sharing	was	not	an	idealistic	venture:	There	had	to	be	something	more	in	any	deal	for	every	province	–	if	only	to	safeguard	social	cohesion	and	ensure	political	stability.	He	concluded	with	a	flourish:	“Ostrich-like	tactics	will	no	longer	do;	1937	should	become	as	memorable	a	date	in	Canadian	history	as	1867.”160								For	months,	this	debate	had	gone	on	behind	closed	doors.	Such	radical	proposals	had	not	leaked	into	the	press	or	other	institutions.	But	the	discussions	among	financial	bureaucrats	and	politicians	would	soon	percolate	into	the	public	realm.								Ottawa	Accepts	That	It	Has	to	Take	Action						There	were	portents	in	the	news.	On	December	9,	1936,	the	well-connected	Canadian	Chamber	of	Commerce	called	for	the	appointment	of	a	Royal	Commission	“to	examine	the	whole	scheme	of	national	finance…[including]	a	survey	of																																																									157	“The	Case	For	A	Royal	Commission	Inquiry	On	Provincial	Finances,”,	5.	158	“The	Case	For	A	Royal	Commission	Inquiry	On	Provincial	Finances,”,	6.	159	“The	Case	For	A	Royal	Commission	Inquiry	On	Provincial	Finances,”	6-7.	My	italics.	160	“The	Case	For	A	Royal	Commission	Inquiry	On	Provincial	Finances,”,	7.		
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Governmental	expenditures,	sources	of	revenue	in	the	Provinces	and	the	Dominion	for	the	purpose	of	suggesting	curtailment	and	producing	balanced	budgets.”161	The	Chamber	had	almost	certainly	learned	of	Ottawa’s	behind-the-scenes	discussions.						That	same	day,	Dunning	again	welcomed	the	members	of	the	Subcommittee	on	Financial	Questions	–	now	renamed	the	National	Finance	Committee	–	to	Ottawa.	It	would	be	this	committee’s	first	and	only	meeting,	running	from	the	9th	to	the	14th.	And	it	would	a	game-changer.	On	the	eve	of	that	gathering,	there	was	some	good	news:	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Towers	noted	a	“tendency	towards	progressive	improvement”	in	Dominion	and	provincial	bond	issues	throughout	the	year.162							But	such	guarded	optimism	could	not	compete	with	the	alarming	news	that	Manitoba	and	Saskatchewan	were	on	the	brink	of	default.	Manitoba	Premier	John	Bracken	asked	Towers	how	his	province	should	go	about	reducing	the	interest	on	its	bonds.	“The	final	responsibility	for	taking	a	decision	on	the	amount	of	the	interest	reduction,”	Bracken	reassured	Towers,	“would	rest	with	Manitoba.”163	When	Dunning	suggested	that	the	Bank	of	Canada	could	serve	as	the	province’s	official	financial	advisor,	Towers	demurred	–	the	bank	could	not	become	an	adviser	
																																																								161	“National	Finance	Probe	is	Asked”	[sic]	in	The	Globe	on	December	9,	1936.	p.	7.	162	“Review	Covering	(A)	Dominion	and	Provincial	Financing	During	Recent	Past	(C)	Trend	of	Interest	Rates	–	Long	Term	and	Short	Term	(B)	Present	Condition	of	Investment	Market	and	Probable	Immediate	Future	For	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	December	1936,”	(sic)	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Towers	Memoranda,	1935-1937,	0-51.	1.	163	“Memorandum	of	conversations	with	Provincial	representatives	at	the	time	of	National	Finance	Committee	meetings	and	subsequently	–	December	9-14,	1936,”	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds,	Towers	Memoranda,	1935-1937,	0-51.	P.	1.	
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just	prior	to	a	default		–	and	so	did	Bracken.	Towers’	conversation	with	Saskatchewan	Premier	W.	J.	Patterson	went	along	“very	much	the	same	lines.”164						In	public,	Dunning	put	a	brave	spin	on	the	encounter.	The	proceedings	were	a	“complete	success”	–	even	though	there	was	“little	progress”	on	such	propositions	as	the	“complete	nationalization	of	the	Bank	of	Canada,	increased	diversion	of	national	revenues	to	the	Provincial	Treasuries	and	creation	of	a	Royal	Commission	to	study	the	whole	picture	of	Dominion	and	Provincial	relations	under	the	Confederation	pact.”165	The	notion	of	a	Royal	Commission	was	out	in	the	open.						Over	the	holiday	season,	the	situation	became	more	dramatic	as	the	pressure	for	real	change	escalated.	On	January	4,	1937,	Towers	wrote	to	Dunning	that	any	attempt	to	offer	a	temporary	guarantee	of	interest	on	provincial	bonds	would	be	“a	very	dangerous	form	of	liability	for	the	Dominion.”166	Crucially,	he	added	that	the	only	way	to	deal	with	the	situation	was	through	temporary	grants	coupled	with	a	Royal	Commission	investigation	“of	the	whole	situation.”167	Towers	had	wrestled	with	other	ideas,	and	gotten	nowhere.	168There	had	to	be	“some	rearrangement	of																																																									164	“Memorandum	of	conversations	with	Provincial	representatives	at	the	time	of	National	Finance	Committee	meetings	and	subsequently	–	December	9-14,	1936,”	3.	165	William	Marchington,	“Ottawa	Highlights”	in	The	Globe	on	December	15,	1936.	p.	5.	166	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Gordon	Towers	to	Finance	Minister	Charles	Dunning,	Confidential	letter	of	January	4,	1937,	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds.	Loan	Councils	and	National	Finance	Council,	File	PF1,	Volume	1,	p.	1.	167	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Gordon	Towers	to	Finance	Minister	Charles	Dunning,	Confidential	letter	of	January	4,	1937d,	3.	
168	In	his	June	16,	1938	budget	speech,	Finance	Minister	Charles	Dunning	referred	to	“substantial”	federal,	provincial,	municipal	and	private	corporation	bond	sales	in	1937	that	raised	almost	$702-million	–	of	which	$476-million	was	earmarked	for	refunding.	Despite	the	“heavy	volume”	of	Dominion	financing	in	1937,	he	added,	interest	yields	on	bonds	were	low.	Canada:	Budget	Speech	delivered	by	Hon.	Chas.	A.	
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financial	powers	and	responsibilities	which	will	enable	the	various	Governments	to	function	more	effectively	within	their	own	domains.”169							The	debate	continued.	A	day	later,	in	a	conversation	with	Dunning,	Towers	suggested	ways	to	protect	the	Dominion	if	Ottawa	opted	for	a	temporary	guarantee	of	provincial	bonds.	In	response,	Dunning	noted	that	Ottawa	could	offer	to	act	as	a	financial	advisor	–	if	the	province	asked	for	assistance.	But	Dunning	also	affirmed	his	desire	for	a	Royal	Commission:	“Even	if	one	was	not	agreed	upon	at	the	present	time,	he	hoped	that	it	would	come	later,	say	after	the	Coronation.”170	(King	George	VI	would	be	crowned	on	May	12,	1937.)							The	flurry	of	memos	continued	into	the	next	week.	On	Sunday,	January	10,	1937,	Skelton	wrote	that	“a	passive	policy	of	non-interference”	as	Manitoba	and	Saskatchewan	toppled	“would	be	neither	virtuous,	sound,	or	expedient.”171	Ottawa	would	be	“sidestepping	responsibilities	which	are	properly	those	of	the	national	government,	i.e.	widespread	crop	failure,	national	business	depression	and	relief,	loss	of	foreign	markets,	and	a	moral	responsibility	arising	from	the	last	six	years’																																																																																																																																																																						Dunning,	Minister	of	Finance,	Member	for	Queens,	Prince	Edward	Island	in	the	House	Of	Commons,	June	16,	1938.	The	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada	–	Internal	Politics,	Series	A	981,	Control	symbol	CAN	24	Part	1,	Barcode	173375.	54-55.	I	am	grateful	to	historian	Shirley	Tillotson	who	confirmed	that	the	federal	bond	prospectus	in	1937	makes	it	“very	clear	that	the	Dominion	is	NOT	taking	any	responsibility	for	provincial	bond	issues.”	In	other	words,	Ottawa	might	have	discussed	the	possibility	of	supporting	provincial	bonds	in	theory	–	but	the	idea	went	nowhere	in	reality.		169	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Gordon	Towers	to	Finance	Minister	Charles	Dunning,	Confidential	letter	of	January	4,	1937,	4.	170	“Memorandum	of	conversation	with	Mr.	Dunning,	Tuesday,	January	5,	1937”	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds.	Loan	Councils	and	National	Finance	Council,	File	PF1,	Volume	1,	2.	171	“Provincial	Default:	The	Alternatives,	January	10,	1937,”	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds.	Loan	Councils	and	National	Finance	Council,	File	PF1-1,	Volume	1,	1.		
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assistance.”172	The	“most	desirable	alternative”	was	a	“Royal	Commission	instructed	to	recommend	changes	in	the	present	distribution	of	revenues	and	expenditures	between	provincial	and	Dominion	governments.”173	In	the	interim,	Saskatchewan	would	need	an	interim	grant;	Manitoba	might	be	able	to	survive	for	the	next	six	to	nine	months.	If	this	were	impossible,	Skelton	suggested	Dominion	intercession	with	some	guarantee	of	repayment	for	itself	and	the	bondholders.						There	were	more	memos	on	how	to	cope	with	the	desperate	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	poorer	provinces.	Back	and	forth,	the	bureaucrats	wrote	to	each	other	and	to	their	political	masters,	struggling	to	find	a	way	out	of	the	morass.	On	Monday,	January	11,	Bank	of	Canada	Secretary	Donald	Gordon	wrestled	with	how	to	handle	a	temporary	provincial	default:	the	Dominion	needed	to	provide	“a	strong	gesture	of	compromise	designed	to	show	a	recognition	of	an	unusual	situation	and	a	desire	to	meet	it	in	a	fair	minded	and	helpful	way.”174	Gordon	suggested	that	Ottawa	offer	to	guarantee	the	interest	on	any	bonds	that	were	turned	in	for	a	reduced	interest	rate	for	five	years.	Alberta	could	qualify	for	this	plan	as	well	if	it	opted	for	a	temporary	cut	–	as	opposed	to	its	current	permanent	cut	–	in	interest	rates.							On	January	12,	the	Bank’s	securities	advisor	K.	A.	“Ken”	Henderson	wrote	a	brutally	frank	memorandum	about	Western	Financial	Problems	–	and	the	notion	of																																																									172	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Gordon	Towers	to	Finance	Minister	Charles	Dunning,	Confidential	letter	of	January	4,	1937,	1.	My	italics.	173	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Gordon	Towers	to	Finance	Minister	Charles	Dunning,	Confidential	letter	of	January	4,	1937d,	2.	174	“Western	Provinces,	January	11,	1937,”	Confidential	memo	by	Secretary	Donald	Gordon.	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds.	Loan	Councils	and	National	Finance	Council,	File	PF1-1,	Volume	1.	1.	
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national	sharing:	“The	Provincial	economies	have	broken	down	in	attempting	to	expand	government	services	(including	relief)	during	a	period	of	reduced	revenue….	In	times	of	depression	it	is	much	easier	than	at	other	times	to	develop	a	
body	of	public	opinion	to	the	view	that	one	should	take	from	the	‘haves’	and	give	to	
the	‘have-nots’	without	regard	to	the	justice	or	the	ultimate	result	of	such	action.”175	In	effect,	Henderson	recognized	the	increasing	pressure	on	governments	to	maintain	and	perhaps	expand	social	services	during	the	endless	Depression	–	and	the	need	to	find	equalizing	revenues	for	the	poorer	provinces	among	the	taxpayers	of	the	richer	provinces.	The	situation	demanded	fiscal	redistribution.					A	day	later,	Towers	wrote	a	memo	on	the	Prairie	Provinces’	predicament	–	and	then	he	rewrote	the	memo	at	Dunning’s	request.	As	Towers’	notation	says,	Dunning	wanted	“only	suggestions	of	procedure	covering	temporary	guarantee	of	interest,	and	[so	it]	should	not	include	discussion	of	the	pros	and	cons.”176	He	concluded	that	the	Dominion	should	“not	tacitly	encourage	and	participate	in	a	permanent	cut	in	present	contractual	obligations.”177	It	should	not	encourage	the	provinces	to	walk	
																																																								175	“Western	Financial	Problems,	January	12,	1937,”	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds.	Loan	Councils	and	National	Finance	Council,	File	PF1-1,	Volume	1.	pps.	1,	1-2.	My	italics.	176	“Notes	on	Prairie	Provinces	situation	based	on	decision	that	a	temporary	guarantee	of	interest	is	the	type	of	arrangement	which	should	be	attempted”	January	12,	1937.	Covering	memo	written	January	15,	1937.	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds.	Loan	Councils	and	National	Finance	Council,	File	PF1-1,	Volume	1.	1.		177	“Notes	on	Prairie	Provinces	situation	based	on	decision	that	a	temporary	guarantee	of	interest	is	the	type	of	arrangement	which	should	be	attempted”	2.	
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away	from	their	debts.	Instead,	it	should	undertake	to	make	available	“sufficient	funds	to	cover	the	reduced	interest	on	the	securities	concerned.”178							The	seriousness	of	the	situation	was	becoming	very	clear.	On	Sunday,	January	17,	1937,	Towers,	Dunning	and	Deputy	Finance	Minister	Clark	met	with	Manitoba	Premier	Bracken	and	Saskatchewan	Premier	Patterson.	Dunning	and	Clark	toyed	with	the	idea	of	a	temporary	reduction	in	interest	coupled	with	the	Dominion’s	guarantee	of	those	reduced	rates.	Someone	–	Towers	did	not	record	who	–	“suggested	that	the	Bank	of	Canada	should	examine	the	situation	to	enable	the	Dominion	to	make	up	its	mind.”179	Bracken	wanted	quick	action.	Towers	concluded	that	both	sides	wanted	“a	quick	whitewash	and	Dominion	endorsement	of	rate	cuts.”180	That	would	not	happen.							Instead,	on	Monday,	January	18th,	Towers	told	Dunning	and	Clark	that	a	Dominion	endorsement	of	rate	cuts	was	dangerous,	particularly	if	the	Dominion	refused	to	appoint	a	Royal	Commission.	A	day	later,	in	response	to	Towers’	probing,	Bracken	agreed	to	a	Bank	of	Canada	examination	of	his	province’s	affairs.	Privately,	Towers	had	already	upped	the	ante.	“Our	only	recommendation	is	a	cash	grant	and	Royal	Commission,”	he	wrote	in	a	memo	that	day	to	an	undisclosed	recipient,	probably	Clark.	“Let	the	politicians	take	full	responsibility	for	the	selection	of	the	alternative	if	they	will	not	follow	our	advice,	and	let	us	keep	entirely	free	from	supplying	them																																																									178	“Notes	on	Prairie	Provinces	situation	based	on	decision	that	a	temporary	guarantee	of	interest	is	the	type	of	arrangement	which	should	be	attempted”	3.	179	“Memorandum	of	Conversations,	Sunday,	January	17,	1937	–	Conversation	with	Messrs.	Dunning,	Bracken,	Patterson	and	Clark,”	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds.	Loan	Councils	and	National	Finance	Council,	File	PF1-1,	Volume	1.	1.	180	“Memorandum	of	Conversations,	Sunday,	January	17,	1937	–	Conversation	with	Messrs.	Dunning,	Bracken,	Patterson	and	Clark,”	1.		
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with	arguments	for	the	solution	they	adopt.”181	On	Tuesday	evening,	despite	his	preference	for	a	Royal	Commission,	Towers	told	Dunning	that	the	Bank	itself	might	do	a	fast	inquiry	if	King	agreed.								On	Thursday,	January	21,	the	politicians	and	the	bureaucrats	sat	down	to	deal	with	the	overwhelming	inequalities	of	federalism	which	had	left	the	poorer	provinces	with	too	few	sources	of	adequate	revenues	and	too	many	obligations	such	as	massive	relief	payments	that	no	one	anticipated	at	Confederation.	Towers	first	met	with	Dunning	and	King	in	the	morning	to	discuss	the	West’s	pressing	debt	crises.	King	asked	Towers	for	a	Bank	of	Canada	report	on	the	situation.	Towers	initially	explained	that	such	reports	might	embarrass	the	Bank	–	and	embroil	it	in	political	controversy.	As	King	recorded	in	his	diary,	Towers	then	“came	back	to	the	old	idea	of	grants	being	made	to	the	Provinces	with	a	Commission	to	investigate	financial	relations.”182	King	said	that	there	was	“no	chance”	of	a	commission.	He	also	admitted	that	reports	on	the	poorer	provinces	might	embarrass	the	Bank.183	Later	that	day,	Towers	went	back	to	King	–	and	offered	to	do	the	reports.	As	Towers	later	explained:	“In	the	circumstances	it	was	more	reasonable	to	accept	this	risk	[of	
																																																								181	“Bank	of	Canada	and	the	West,”	January	19,	1937,	hand-written	notation	“Written	by	the	Governor.”	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds.	Loan	Councils	and	National	Finance	Council,	File	PF1-1,	Volume	1.	1.	182	Diaries	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Thursday,	January	21,	1937.		http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=17626		183	Diaries	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Thursday,	January	21,	1937.		
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embarrassment]	than	to	refuse	an	examination	and	probably	precipitate	immediate	action	on	the	part	of	the	provinces.”184	King	accepted	that	offer.						With	that	reversal,	the	Bank	of	Canada	took	action.	Towers	sent	Skelton	on	a	lightning	tour	of	two	Prairie	provincial	capitals.	In	April,	at	the	request	of	former	Prime	Minister	R.	B.	Bennett	and	the	Alberta	Government,	Skelton	also	scrutinized	that	government’s	finances.	The	three	reports	were	vivid	–	and	devastating.	In	the	Manitoba	report,	which	was	made	public	on	February	15,	1937,	Skelton	wrote	that	his	task	went	beyond	ensuring	that	the	province	could	“pay	its	way	somehow	or	other	in	the	next	few	months.”185	Rather,	the	Bank	had	to	consider	whether	Manitoba	would	become	an	ongoing	burden	on	the	rest	of	the	country	–	“a	burden	of	a	kind	which	produces	no	permanent	alleviation	to	the	province	itself.”186	He	criticized	the	province’s	decision	to	lower	taxes	from	1927	to	1930,	and	its	large	capital	expenditures	from	1929	to	1932.						But	he	concluded	that	during	most	of	the	decade,	the	province	had	“made	strong	and	commendable	efforts”	to	balance	its	books,	to	limit	its	debt	by	raising	taxes,	and	to	limit	expenditures	“without	curtailing	services	to	an	extent	which	would	not	have	been	in	the	public	interest.”187	Nonetheless,	revenues	“are	not	adequate,	or	are	not																																																									184	“Memorandum	of	two	conversations	with	Mr.	King	on	Thursday,	January	21,	1937,”	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds.	Loan	Councils	and	National	Finance	Council,	File	PF1-1,	Volume	1.	1.	185	Summary	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	report	on	the	Financial	Position	of	Manitoba,	February	12,	1937.	Douglas	Alexander	Skelton	Fonds,	Queen’s	University	Archives,	Box	1,	File	17.	p.	23.	186	Summary	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	report	on	the	Financial	Position	of	Manitoba,	February	12,	1937,	24.		187	Summary	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	report	on	the	Financial	Position	of	Manitoba,	February	12,	1937.	Douglas	Alexander	Skelton	Fonds,	Queen’s	University	Archives,	Box	1,	File	17.	p.	22.	
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sufficiently	elastic,	to	enable	the	province	to	bear	the	burdens	which	modern	practices	of	government	and	the	force	of	the	depression	have	placed	upon	it.”188							The	Saskatchewan	report,	which	was	made	public	on	March	15,	1937,	depicted	that	province	in	worse	shape	than	Manitoba,	afflicted	by	severe	drought	and	crop	failures,	struggling	to	provide	relief	to	one-third	of	its	rural	residents.	“The	total	relief	expenditures	since	1930	have	exceeded	the	total	ordinary	revenues	of	the	province	for	the	same	period.”189	Worse,	the	provincial	government	was	covering	the	costs	of	seed,	feed,	tractor	fuel	and	other	operational	expenses	to	southern	farmers:	This	amounted	to	“the	prime	costs	of	production	for	about	one-half	of	its	major	industry.”190	The	report	paid	tribute	to	the	province’s	“courageous	spirit”	in	the	face	of	“a	national	disaster,”	and	depicted	temporary	financial	aid	as	“justified.”191	It	added:	“We	do	not	see	any	solution	other	than	that	which	might	be	provided	by	a	complete	enquiry	into	the	financial	powers	and	responsibilities	of	all	our	governing	bodies.”192							The	final	Alberta	report,	which	appeared	on	April	7,	1937,	briefly	recapped	the	province’s	refusal	to	pay	fifty	per	cent	of	the	interest	on	its	bonds:	“We	can	only	deal																																																									188	Summary	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	report	on	the	Financial	Position	of	Manitoba,	February	12,	1937.	Douglas	Alexander	Skelton	Fonds,	Queen’s	University	Archives,	Box	1,	File	17.	p.	24.	189	Summary	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	report	on	the	Financial	Position	of	Saskatchewan,	March	1937.	Douglas	Alexander	Skelton	Fonds,	Queen’s	University	Archives,	Box	1,	File	17.	p.	19	190	Summary	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	report	on	the	Financial	Position	of	Saskatchewan,	March	1937.	p.	23.	191	Summary	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	report	on	the	Financial	Position	of	Saskatchewan,	March		1937.	Douglas	Alexander	Skelton	Fonds,	Queen’s	University	Archives,	Box	1,	File	17.	pps.	27,	28.	192	Summary	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	report	on	the	Financial	Position	of	Saskatchewan,	March	1937,	28.	
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with	the	situation	as	it	is	–	not	as	it	might	have	been	in	other	circumstances.	We	find	that	Alberta	can	maintain	its	governmental	services	on	as	favourable	a	basis	as	Manitoba	or	Saskatchewan	without	receipt	of	additional	assistance.”193	That	was	the	not-so-subtle	punishment	for	the	debt-dodger.	The	Bank	of	Canada	would	send	all	three	reports	to	the	Governor	of	the	Commonwealth	Bank	of	Australia.								In	mid-February	of	1937,	Towers	delivered	the	bad	news	to	Mackenzie	King:	Manitoba	and	Saskatchewan	would	default	unless	Ottawa	assisted	them.	King	understood	defaults	could	lead	“to	a	worse	condition	than	any	up	to	the	present.”194	That	is,	it	would	endanger	the	federal	government’s	credit	rating	and	force	up	the	interest	rates	that	Ottawa	would	have	to	pay	on	its	bonds.	Beset,	King	piously	told	his	diary:	“I	have	all	along	wanted	a	Commission	on	financial	allocations	and	responsibilities	of	the	provinces	and	the	Dominion.”195	(This	was	at	variance	with	his	reluctance	to	appoint	a	commission	in	1936	–	but	it	does	reflect	his	call	for	a	Royal	Commission	during	the	1930	election.)	Once	Ottawa’s	credit	rating	was	endangered,	King	moved	from	theoretical	approval	to	immediate	action.									Four	days	before	he	told	the	House	of	Commons	about	his	decision,	King	wrote	Bracken	that	he	saw	only	one	solution	to	Manitoba’s	woes:	“A	comprehensive																																																									193	Summary	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	report	on	the	Financial	Position	of	Alberta,	April	1937.	Douglas	Alexander	Skelton	Fonds,	Queen’s	University	Archives,	Box	1,	File	17.	Pps.	41-42.	194	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Tuesday,	February	16,	1937.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=17682&		195	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Tuesday,	February	16,	1937.		http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=17682&		
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enquiry	into	the	financial	powers	and	responsibilities	of	all	our	governing	bodies”	and,	pending	the	Commission’s	report,	the	extension	of	temporary	financial	aid.196		The	federal	cabinet	met	at	noon	on	February	16,	1937,	and	decided	unanimously	to	appoint	a	Royal	Commission	–	and	to	extend	temporary	aid	to	Manitoba	and	Saskatchewan.	King	announced	to	the	House	that	afternoon	that	there	would	be	a	commission	“on	financial	allocations	and	responsibilities	of	the	provinces	and	the	Dominion.”197	The	Prime	Minister	had	left	that	decision	until	the	last	moment:	the	Manitoba	Legislature	was	due	to	meet	the	next	day	–	and	the	province	would	likely	have	defaulted.	Months	later,	King	would	expand	his	definition	of	the	Commission’s	task:	It	was	to	undertake	“a	re-examination	of	the	economic	and	financial	basis	of	Confederation	and	of	the	distribution	of	legislative	powers	in	the	light	of	the	economic	and	social	developments	of	the	last	seventy	years.”198	The	Prime	Minister’s	world	had	changed	–	and,	in	his	view,	not	necessarily	for	the	better.		
The	Australians	Follow	The	Drama											The	Australians	were	tracking	Canada’s	ongoing	woes.	In	late	January	1937,	the	Judicial	Committee	of	the	British	Privy	Council	ruled	against	the	constitutionality	of	most	of	Bennett’s	New	Deal	package,	including	Unemployment	Insurance.	In	their	report,	the	diplomats	tucked	a	copy	of	McGill	University	constitutional	expert	Frank																																																									196	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King	to	Manitoba	Premier	John	Bracken,	February	12,	1937.	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds.	Provincial	Financing	–	Manitoba,	1936-1941.	PF4,	Volume	1.	p.	3.	197	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Tuesday,	February	16,	1937.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=17682&	198	“Terms	Of	Reference,	The	Rowell/Sirois	Report,	Book	I,	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Queen’s	Printer	and	Controller	of	Stationery,	1954)	p.	9.	
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Scott’s	essay	denouncing	that	decision.	Scott	noted	that	“every	Dominion	power”	that	Ottawa	invoked	in	favour	of	the	legislation	“was	found	to	be	inadequate.”199	Ottawa	was	permitted	to	use	its	emergency	powers	to	impose	temperance	in	1878,	Scott	added	bitterly,	but	the	Council	would	not	accept	the	same	argument	when	it	came	to	remedies	for	unemployment	and	labour	conditions.200									The	diplomats	also	forwarded	an	article	by	University	of	Manitoba	president	Sidney	T.	Smith	from	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press	on	February	5,	1937.	It	noted	pointedly:		It	does	appear	that	we	cannot	expect	from	the	Privy	Council	an	interpretation	of	the	constitution	that	will	enable	the	Dominion	to	take	over	some	of	the	social	services	and	the	regulation	of	industrial	activities	which	the	provincial	legislatures,	with	insufficient	revenue,	are	unable	to	undertake.	These	recent	decisions	are	characterized	by	a	narrow	legalism.	The	matters	under	discussion	were	unknown	in	1867,	but	many	Canadians	today	would	say	they	are	of	major	importance.201						The	Australians	were	clearly	fascinated	by	the	Canadian	federation’s	inability	to	handle	the	social	and	fiscal	inequalities	among	its	governments.							The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations	attracted	huge	attention	in	Canberra	–	and	it	would	remain	in	the	spotlight,	even	after	the	declaration	of	war	in	September	1939.	The	Parliamentary	record	of	King’s	announcement	of	the	commission	was	forwarded	to	Australia.	On	March	10,	1937,																																																									199	F.	R.	Scott,	“The	Privy	Council	and	Mr.	Bennett’s	‘New	Deal’	Legislation,”	extract	from	The	Canadian	Journal	of	Economic	and	Political	Science,	Volume	3,	Number	2.	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada	–	Internal	Politics,	Series	A981,	Control	Symbol	CAN	24	Part	1,	Barcode	173375,	p.	1.	200	Scott,	6.	201	“Privy	Council	Decisions”	by	University	of	Manitoba	President	Sidney	T.	Smith	in	The	Winnipeg	Free	Press,	Friday,	February	5,	1937.	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada:	Constitutional,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol,	CAN	13,	Part	2,	Barcode	173360,	n.	p.	in	file,	p.	1.	
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the	Assistant	Australian	Trade	Commissioner,	R.	R.	Ellen,	wrote	a	detailed	update	to	Canberra:		As	your	Department	is	aware	the	position	in	Canada	is	not	unlike	that	in	Australia	in	that	the	division	of	powers	and	responsibilities	between	the	Provinces	and	the	Federal	sphere	is	the	subject	of	much	controversy.	The	administrative	responsibilities	of	the	Provinces	and	municipalities	have	grown	beyond	anticipations	[sic]	in	the	minds	of	the	statesmen	instrumental	in	cementing	the	Confederation.202								Three	months	later,	Trade	Commissioner	Macgregor	updated	Canberra	on	the	financial	relations	between	the	varying	levels	of	Canadian	governments	on	the	brink	of	the	Royal	Commission	start-up.	There	were	more	than	27,000	taxing	bodies,	including	municipalities,	in	Canada.	The	total	indebtedness	of	its	governing	bodies	was	nearly	$7.4-billion.	The	direct	and	guaranteed	federal	debt	at	the	end	of	the	1936-1937	fiscal	year	was	$4.2-billion.	For	that	same	fiscal	year,	the	Ontario	Government	showed	a	surplus	of	$9.5-million.	(Ontario	Premier	Hepburn	had	announced	that	feat	“to	wild	ovations”	on	March	9,	1937.)203	While	other	provinces	were	in	trouble,	the	only	province	to	default	on	three	maturities	amounting	to	$6.1-million	was	Alberta.	There	had	been	many	municipal	defaults.	It	was	a	perfect	scene-setter	for	a	federation	trapped	on	the	brink	of	a	modernizing	world.204																																																											202	Assistant	Australian	Trade	Commissioner	R.	R.	Ellen	to	The	Secretary,	Department	of	External	Affairs,	March	10,	1937.	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada:	Constitutional,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol,	CAN	13,	Part	2,	Barcode	173360,	n.	p.	in	file,	p.	1	203	John	T.	Saywell,	“Just	call	me	Mitch”:	The	Life	of	Mitchell	F.	Hepburn,	p.	294.	204	Memorandum	from	Australian	Trade	Commissioner	in	Canada	L.	R.	Macgregor	to	The	Secretary,	Department	of	External	Affairs,	June	20,	1937.	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada:	Constitutional,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol,	CAN	13,	Part	2,	Barcode	173360,	n.p.	in	file,	pps.	1-2.	
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The	Royal	Commission	Procedure						Three	months	before	King	finally	accepted	the	need	for	a	Royal	Commission,	Deputy	Finance	Minister	W.	C.	Clark	took	Skelton’s	memo	on	the	need	for	a	Royal	Commission,	expanded	it	and	presented	it	as	a	fourteen-page	memorandum,	which	he	initialed.	He	added	a	list	of	possible	members	for	the	panel.	As	Chairman,	he	suggested	Ontario	Justice	Newton	Rowell,	among	others.	Among	the	members	–	and	he	hoped	to	limit	the	membership	to	five	–	he	proposed	Quebec	lawyer	and	future	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent	“or	a	judge	from	the	Province	of	Quebec.”	Ottawa	could	also	consider	University	of	British	Columbia	economist	Henry	Forbes	Angus.	But	Clark’s	first	choice	for	membership	was	an	Australian	outsider,	relatively	unknown	in	Canada.	“Professor	L.	F.	Giblin:	a	very	able	practical	economist	who	was	one	of	the	six	economists	responsible	for	the	‘Premier’s	Plan’	adopted	in	Australia	in	1931	and	largely	responsible	for	Australian	recovery;	also	a	member	of	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	and	as	such	thoroughly	familiar	with	the	problems	of	relations	between	state	and	central	governments	in	a	federal	country.”205	(The	Premiers’	Plan,	which	the	state	and	Commonwealth	governments	endorsed	in	June	1931,	cut	government	spending	and	reduced	the	interest	on	government	bonds.)	Although	he	would	not	become	a	commissioner,	Giblin	would	become	a	very	influential	presence.						In	a	subsequent	memo	in	Clark’s	files,	which	was	not	dated	or	signed,	there	is	a	further	outline	of	possible	staff	and	studies,	which	Alex	“Sandy”	Skelton	probably																																																									205	“Confidential	Memorandum:	Royal	Commission	on	Economic	Basis	of	Confederation”	by	W.	C.	Clark.	December	7,	1936.	LAC,	121-85-15	General	File,	RG	19	E	2	C,	Volume	22,	pps.	1-2.		
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drafted	during	the	spring	of	1936.	For	the	prestigious	post	of	Secretary,	Clark	recommended	Alexander	Skelton,	who	would	be	“ideal”	as	the	head	of	the	research	staff	because	of	his	experience	with	provincial	finance.206	As	an	assistant	to	Skelton,	Clark	suggested	future	Prime	Minister	Lester	Pearson,	who	was	then	first	secretary	at	the	Canadian	High	Commission	in	London.	Among	the	research	studies	that	the	memo	suggested,	there	was	one	that	stood	out:		A	study	of	the	working	of	Dominion	subsidies	to	provinces,	both	conditional	and	unconditional,	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	the	subsidy	principle,	the	adequacy	or	inadequacy	of	present	subsidies,	the	position,	if	any,	which	subsidies	should	occupy	in	a	federal	system,	the	working	of	subsidies	in	other	federal	countries,	
the	experience	of	Australia	with	the	Commonwealth	Grants	
Commission,	etc.,	etc.	207						The	direction	of	the	Royal	Commission	Secretariat	was	clear:		Australia	would	be	the	main	model	for	remaking	Canada.	And	Australian	star	Giblin	would	be	the	primary	guide	to	its	successful	experiment	in	easing	inequality	and	political	instability	among	the	states.			
Conclusion				After	playing	with	different	long-term	solutions	for	inequality	such	as	a	Loan	Council	and	a	National	Finance	Council,	Ottawa	finally	turned	the	entire	problem	of	inequalities	in	provincial	revenues	and	responsibilities	within	the	federation	over	to	a	Royal	Commission.	It	was	a	start	–	with	Australia	as	the	main	model.	Meanwhile,	
																																																								206	“Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations.”	LAC.	121-85-15	General	File,	RG	19	E	2	C,	Volume	22,	no	date.	No	name,	but	within	the	files	of	W.	C.	Clark,	p.	3,		207	“Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations.”	5.	My	italics.	
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the	fights	among	Canadian	federal	and	provincial	governments	would	remain	largely	about	control	of	the	revenues	to	remedy	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	provinces.	Inequality	remained	a	state-centred	woe	–	and	there	were	few	others	who	understood	the	implications.													
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CHAPTER	THREE:	The	Poorer	Versus	The	Richer	At	The	Royal	Commission,	
1937-1940	
							The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations	was	born	in	crisis.	On	February	16,	1937,	as	Manitoba	and	Saskatchewan	teetered	on	the	brink	of	insolvency,	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King	and	his	cabinet	made	two	difficult	decisions:	they	extended	temporary	aid	to	those	two	provinces;	and	they	appointed	a	Royal	Commission	to	figure	out	how	the	federation	finances	had	gone	so	astray.	As	chapter	two	explained,	King	told	the	House	of	Commons	that	wintry	afternoon	that	the	commission	would	examine	the	“financial	allocations	and	responsibilities	of	the	provinces	and	the	Dominion.”1	Months	later,	he	expanded	his	definition	of	its	task:	It	was	to	undertake	“a	re-examination	of	the	economic	and	financial	basis	of	Confederation	and	of	the	distribution	of	legislative	powers	in	the	light	of	the	economic	and	social	developments	of	the	last	seventy	years.”2										The	federation	had	changed	drastically	since	1867	when	the	social	and	economic	responsibilities	of	the	provinces	were	limited	–	and	their	revenues,	coupled	with	federal	subsidies,	could	fund	those	responsibilities.	Canadians	had	seen	their	traditional	supports	of	family	and	farm	fall	away	during	the	first	decades	of	the	20th	century	as	Canada	industrialized.	In	turn,	they	had	demanded	better	services	from	their	overextended	provincial	governments.	The	Depression	brought	
																																																								1	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Tuesday,	February	16,	1937.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=17682&	2	“Terms	Of	Reference,	The	Rowell/Sirois	Report,	Book	I,	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Queen’s	Printer	and	Controller	of	Stationery,	1954)	p.	9.	
	 	 	 	 	185	
home	the	extent	of	the	mismatch.	The	poorer	provinces	such	as	Saskatchewan	and	Manitoba	could	barely	cover	the	staggering	costs	of	relief,	their	share	of	the	Old	Age	Pension,	and	the	interest	payments	on	their	debts.	They	pleaded	with	Ottawa	for	funds	–	and	Ottawa	responded	with	ad	hoc	grants	and	loans.	The	wealthier	provinces	such	as	Ontario	resented	federal	largesse	–	although	they	were	uneasily	aware	that	provincial	defaults	could	affect	their	credit	ratings.							The	high-profile	Royal	Commission’s	job	was	to	figure	out	what	had	gone	wrong	and	how	to	change	it.	Ottawa	had	already	squandered	three	years	in	a	futile	push	for	a	Loan	Council	similar	to	the	one	in	Australia	to	control	the	debt	loads	of	the	poorer	provinces	–	only	to	realize	that	even	the	poorest	provinces	were	reluctant	to	permanently	surrender	much,	if	any,	fiscal	control.	Federal	politicians	and	bureaucrats	wanted	more,	not	less,	power	–	after	the	ruling	of	the	Judicial	Committee	of	the	British	Privy	Council	against	Ottawa’s	proposed	Unemployment	Insurance.							Ottawa	asked	the	commissioners	to	decide	how	the	federation	partners	should	rearrange	their	revenues	and	their	responsibilities.	For	the	next	two	years,	the	commissioners	crisscrossed	the	nation,	listening	to	witnesses	in	every	provincial	capital,	including	nine	major	groups	in	Quebec	City,	recording	10,702	pages	of	evidence	from	eighty-five	days	of	hearings,	reading	427	briefs,	commissioning	studies	from	thirty-six	experts,	including	examinations	of	how	other	federations	handled	such	imbalances.	3																																																									3	David	Warren	Fransen,	“Unscrewing	The	Unscrutable”:	The	Rowell-Sirois	
Commission,	the	Ottawa	Bureaucracy,	and	Public	Finance	Reform	1935-41,	unpublished	thesis,	University	of	Toronto,	1984.	p.	v.	
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					I	will	focus	on	key	provincial	briefs	–	and	on	a	relatively	arbitrary	selection	of	influential	business	and	social	organizations	–	which	I	culled	from	those	thousands	of	pages.	I	will	also	examine	the	many	commission	studies	into	how	other	federations,	particularly	Australia,	tackled	their	problems	with	inequality	among	their	member	states.	My	aim	was	to	capture	economic,	fiscal,	social	and	cultural	viewpoints,	especially	those	that	dealt	with	inequality.	The	commissioners’	search	was	exhaustive	–	and	exhausting	–	and	it	played	out	against	a	background	of	rising	impatience	with	unbridled	capitalism.	The	social-democratic	Co-operative	Commonwealth	Federation	(CCF),	which	was	founded	in	1932,	had	captured	seven	seats	in	the	1935	federal	election.	Throughout	the	latter	half	of	the	decade,	its	appeal	–	and	its	demands	for	a	more	equitable	world	–	was	growing,	especially	across	the	West.						The	times	demanded	change.	But	the	commissioners	had	a	seemingly	impossible	job.	They	were	wrestling	with	the	structure	of	a	federation	in	which	the	provincial	demands	for	federal	money	for	relief	payments,	debt	charges	and	the	provision	of	basic	social	services	were	escalating	–	and	clashing	with	strong	provincial	linguistic	and	cultural	identities	that	would	resist	any	surrender	of	fiscal	control.4	The	problem	of	control	plagued	the	commissioners:	What	level	of	government	should																																																									4	Richard	Simeon	and	Ian	Robinson	use	the	words	“territorial	identities”	to	refer	to	those	associated	with	“language,	region,	province…the	divisions	that	made	federalism	necessary	in	the	first	place	and	which	remain	fundamental	to	understanding	Canadian	federalism.”4	In	effect,	the	term	is	linked	to	a	specific	geographic	area	within	the	federation:	It	is	often	interchangeable	with	provincial	identities	but,	crucially,	not	always:	i.e.	Western	(that	is,	across	the	Prairie	Provinces)	suspicion	of	Ottawa.	Richard	Simeon	and	Ian	Robinson,	State,	Society,	
and	the	Development	of	Canadian	Federalism	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1990)	4.		
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raise	the	money	and	what	level	of	government	should	account	for	the	money?	Since	Confederation,	the	federal	government	had	juggled	per-capita	subsidies	that	were	often	rigged,	debt	allowances,	grants	and	special	grants	and	loans	to	help	the	provinces	to	fulfill	their	responsibilities.	But	there	was	no	formal	mechanism	to	remedy	the	fiscal	inequalities	among	them	–	and	to	promote	social	cohesion.	They	were	exploring	unknown	territory	in	the	Canadian	federal	bargain.									Their	three-volume	report	along	with	its	accompanying	studies	remains	a	landmark	in	Canadian	federalism.	It	was	inquisitive	in	its	approach	–	it	examined	so	many	models	–	and	daring	in	its	thought.	In	particular,	I	will	show	how	it	explored	the	way	that	Canada’s	sister	Dominion,	the	Commonwealth	Government	of	Australia,	dealt	with	inequalities	among	its	member	states.	As	I	will	also	show,	the	most	thoughtful	political	witnesses	such	as	Manitoba	Premier	John	Bracken	and	Nova	Scotia	Premier	Angus	L.	Macdonald	along	with	wealthier	groups	such	as	the	Canadian	Chamber	of	Commerce	would	cite	Australia	frequently	in	their	analyses	and	their	testimony.							The	commissioners	did	understand	how	much	their	society	had	changed.	As	the	report	outlined,	from	1874	to	1937,	total	per-capita	government	expenditures	had	“increased	by	eleven	times.”5	The	cost	of	education	and	public	welfare	had	gone	from	“the	almost	negligible	figure	of	$4-million	to	$360-million.”6	Ottawa’s	share	of	
																																																								5	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Volume	I,	p.	245.		http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/bcp-pco/Z1-1937-2-1-2-eng.pdf	6	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Volume	I,	p.	245	
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the	total	cost	of	government	had	fallen	from	two-thirds	to	less	than	one-half	–	and	that	included	federal	contributions	to	the	provinces	for	relief	and	old-age	pensions.7									The	provinces’	limited	tax	base	had	left	them	in	an	impossible	position:	They	could	not	afford	what	they	now	had	to	deliver.	And	some	provinces	were	far	less	fiscally	capable	than	others.	As	historian	and	political	theorist	Frank	Underhill,	one	of	the	founders	of	the	CCF,	later	wrote,	the	report	captured	a	nation	that	was	unusually	dependent	on	outside	forces,	caught	up	in	the	international	system	of	trade	and	finance,	scrambling	to	deal	with	the	huge	fiscal	inequalities	among	its	member	states.	The	disparities	were	especially	striking	within	poorer	provinces	such	as	wheat-exporting	Saskatchewan	that	were	most	dependent	on	international	markets.	Underhill	approvingly	quoted	excerpts	from	the	report:	“Our	‘boundless	resources’	are	worth	only	what	we	can	sell	them	for…Economically,	Canada	can	be	compared	to	a	string	of	beads,	and	they	are	not	all	pearls.”8						Such	inequality	put	the	commission	in	a	difficult	position	–	if	only	because	Ottawa	would	not	consider	the	possibility	of	non-conditional	equalization	grants.	Indeed,	the	very	thought	was	simply	inconceivable.	As	a	result,	the	commission	report	could	not	establish	an	acceptable	compromise	between	the	protection	of	provincial	rights	and	the	need	for	more	federal	funds	for	provincial	relief	payments,	basic	social	services	and	interest	payments	of	the	debt.	(Although	key	activists	such	as	the	Canadian	Welfare	Council	urged	the	commission	to	call	for	expanded	social	services	
																																																								7		8	Frank	H.	Underhill,	“The	Sirois	Commission	as	Historians”	in	The	Sirois	Report	–	A	Discussion	of	Some	Aspects,	The	Canadian	Forum,	November	1940.	p.	235.	
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such	as	better	pensions,	the	push	for	improved	social	security	would	only	become	widespread	during	the	last	years	of	World	War	Two.).									Instead,	as	I	will	show,	the	commissioners	concocted	a	plan	for	an	ideal	federation	in	which	Ottawa	centralized	revenues	and	then	redistributed	them	to	ensure	that	each	province	had	sufficient	per-capita	funds	to	provide	for	its	citizens.	The	redistribution	would	be	calculated	through	a	well-meaning	but	clumsy	scheme	for	National	Adjustment	Grants:	Ottawa	would	assess	each	province’s	spending	to	determine	its	per-capita	fiscal	needs	in	comparison	with	the	national	average.	The	plan	was	roughly	modeled	on	the	Australian	approach.	As	political	scientist	D.	V.	Smiley	observed,	the	commission	had	a	“precise	idea”	of	what	provincial	autonomy	meant:	A	province	has	genuine	independence	only	if	it	has	the	revenues	at	its	disposal	to	carry	out	those	functions	for	which	it	is	responsible,	free	from	federal	control	in	respect	to	those	functions;	the	master-solution	of	the	report	was	aimed	at	ensuring	that	each	province	was	put	in	a	financial	position	to	provide,	if	it	chose,	a	level	of	provincial	services	at	average	national	standards	without	subjecting	its	citizens	to	provincial	taxation	above	the	national	average.	9							In	the	commission’s	ideal	federation,	there	were	no	messy	provincial	identities	to	interfere	with	this	massive	constitutional	redraft.	It	would	not,	and	could	not,	work	in	Canada	–	if	only	because	it	would	have	allowed	Ottawa	to	monitor	and	evaluate	each	province’s	decisions	on	spending.	As	political	scientist	Peter	M.	Leslie	notes,	
																																																								9	D.	V.	Smiley,	“The	Rowell-Sirois	Report,	Provincial	Autonomy,	and	Post-War	Canadian	Federalism”	in	The	Canadian	Journal	of	Economics	and	Political	Science,	Vol.	28,	No.	1	(February	1962)	p.	56.	
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such	interference	would	have	destroyed	provincial	autonomy.10	But	the	National	Adjustment	Grants	would	become	another	model	for	equalization	–	albeit	with	a	different	formula	for	establishing	provincial	allotments.					The	commission	report	was	tabled	in	the	House	of	Commons	in	May	1940	as	the	Nazis	swept	toward	France.	Almost	eight	decades	later,	the	741-page	report	stands	as	a	remarkable	summary	of	the	first	sixty	years	of	Confederation.	Indeed,	it	caught	the	past	and	its	present.	But	it	could	not	foresee	the	ways	of	the	future.							Still,	through	their	hearings,	their	academic	studies	and	their	seminal	report,	the	commissioners	would	bring	Canada	much	further	along	the	road	toward	equalization.	The	members	–	along	with	Research	Director	Alex	Skelton	and	assistant	research	director	John	J.	Deutsch	–	would	be	hugely	important	players	in	the	preservation	and	development	of	the	nation.	From	their	official	appointment	on	August	14,	1937	to	the	tabling	of	their	report	on	May	16,	1940,	they	had	an	extraordinary	ride.			
The	Royal	Commissioners						King	had	picked	good	candidates	for	this	investigation	–	but	they	were	not	stars.	As	Bank	of	England	advisor	Raymond	Kershaw,	who	was	an	expert	on	Commonwealth	countries,	confided	to	his	friend,	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Gordon	Towers,	in	early	September	1937:		The	scope	of	the	enquiry	seems	wide	enough,	but	I	cannot	help	wondering	whether	the	Commission	has	enough	width	of																																																									10	Peter	M.	Leslie,	National	Citizenship	and	Provincial	Communities:	A	Review	of	
Canadian	Fiscal	Federalism	(Kingston,	On.:	Institute	of	Intergovernmental	Relations,	Queen’s	University,	1988)	p.	27.	
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experience	and	weight	of	authority	to	produce	and	put	over	a	report	that	will	do	justice	to	such	fundamental	terms	of	reference.	But	then	I	have	no	knowledge	of	the	members,	and	these	things	often	depend	on	one	man	–	who	may	be	there,	for	all	I	know.	It	is	good,	anyway,	that	you	are	likely	to	have	Skelton	associated	with	the	Commission.11							Towers	replied	that	he	was	“afraid	that	there	may	be	some	foundation	for	the	doubt	expressed	in	your	letter….	If	so,	the	moral	is	that	the	weight	of	the	report	itself	will	have	to	make	up	for	the	lack	of	a	name	for	outstanding	business	and	financial	importance.	I	believe	it	can	be	done.	Skelton	has	already	been	appointed	Secretary.”12								Still,	the	five	Rowell-Sirois	commissioners	had	led	fascinating	lives,	prowling	the	world	in	war	and	peace,	seeking	ways	to	resolve	the	century’s	challenges.	Largely	forgotten	now,	they	became	public	stars	when	they	were	chosen	–	because	Canadians	rightly	knew	that	the	federation	was	not	working	well	–	and	that	social	cohesion	and	political	stability	were	strained.	As	the	Bank	of	Nova	Scotia’s	Monthly	
Review	declared	in	June	1938:	“The	hearings	have	been	followed	with	interest	throughout	the	Dominion,	for	there	has	probably	never	been	such	a	forum	for	public	opinion	on	questions	of	national	importance	to	Canada.”13																																																										11	Bank	of	England	advisor	Raymond	Kershaw	to	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Gordon	Towers,	September	2,	1937.	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds.	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations.	B95-291.	ASK	1939.	Secretary	to	Towers.	1.	12	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Gordon	Towers	to	Bank	of	England	advisor	Raymond	Kershaw,	September	10,	1937.	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Department	of	Bank	Operations	fonds.	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations.	B95-291.	ASK	1939.	Secretary	to	Towers.	1.	13	“	‘His	Majesty’s	Right	Trusty	and	Well-Beloved’:	Royal	Commissions	–	A	Method	of	British	Democracy”	in	The	Bank	Of	Nova	Scotia	Monthly	Review,	Toronto	June	1938,	Volume	XII,	Number	six.	p.	4.	I	am	grateful	to	Bank	of	Nova	Scotia	Archivist	Andrea	McCutcheon	for	supplying	these	monthly	reviews.	
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					I	will	briefly	review	the	commissioners’	biographies	to	show	that	they	were	familiar	with	the	politics	and	policies	of	Canada.	Their	backgrounds	are	important	because	scholars	have	subsequently	wondered	why	they	embraced	a	centralizing	fiscal	scheme	that	entailed	major	constitutional	changes.	As	former	Department	of	Finance	official	Ronald	M.	Burns	noted	only	two	decades	later,	the	commissioners	took	“a	surprisingly	short-term	view”	in	their	analysis	of	the	nation’s	economic	and	social	problems:	“[But]	the	1930s	could	not	be	typical…it	was	in	the	general	recasting	of	our	political	life	in	the	economic	terms	of	the	1930’s…that	the	main	weakness	lay.”14								Perhaps	worse,	their	“political	innocence”	was	baffling:	“Recommendations	which	would	have	had	such	centralizing	effects	could	never	have	been	acceptable	to	many	of	the	provincial	governments	under	any	circumstances.”15	Burns	darkly	blamed	some	“prominent	staff	members”	for	their	approach	–	and	those	members	no	doubt	included	Secretary	Skelton	and	deputy	research	director	Deutsch.16							Chairman	Newton	Rowell	was	an	eloquent	former	politician	and	respected	jurist,	who	could	be	kindly,	but	he	was	“not	always	gentle.”17	In	1937,	he	was	also	a	69-year-old	statesman	who	had	somehow	escaped	his	partisan	roots:	As	the	leader	of	the	Ontario	Liberal	Party	in	1917,	Rowell	had	moved	from	Sir	Wilfrid	Laurier’s																																																																																																																																																																							14	Ronald	M.	Burns,	“The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations:	The	Report	In	Retrospect”	in	Canadian	Issues:	Essays	in	Honour	of	Henry	F.	Angus,	ed.	Robert	M.	Clark	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1961)	pps.	153-154.	15	Ronald	M.	Burns,	“The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations:	The	Report	In	Retrospect”,	p.	154.		16	Ronald	M.	Burns,	“The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations:	The	Report	In	Retrospect”,	p.	154	17	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	Library	and	Archives	Canada.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	261.	
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Liberals	to	Sir	Robert	Borden’s	wartime	Unionist	government	because	he	believed	fervently	in	conscription.	His	biographer,	historian	Margaret	Prang,	depicts	him	as	an	estimable	man,	curious	about	the	world	and	regarded	as	incorruptible	in	difficult	times.18	His	sudden	illness	in	May	1938	would	rob	the	commission	of	his	seasoned	political	judgment	and	common	sense.						The	role	of	Quebec	commissioner	was	more	difficult	to	fill	–	because	this	person	would	be	hugely	influential	when	it	came	to	deciding	how	to	redesign	the	federation	to	ensure	that	Quebec	was	on	side.	King	initially	appointed	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	Justice	Thibaudeau	Rinfret.	But,	before	the	Commission	hearings	could	begin	in	Winnipeg	in	late	November,	the	judge	resigned	because	of	ill	health.	To	replace	Rinfret,	Justice	Minister	Ernest	Lapointe,	who	was	King’s	trusted	Quebec	lieutenant,	consulted	the	Francophone	Counsel	to	the	Commission,	Louis	St.	Laurent.	Future	Prime	Minister	St.	Laurent	recommended	Quebec	City	notary	and	law	professor	Joseph	Sirois.	When	Sirois	demurred,	St.	Laurent	leaned	on	their	long	friendship	to	convince	Sirois	that	it	was	his	duty	to	accept	the	offer,	even	though	he	had	“no	particular	interest	in	the	work	of	the	commission	at	the	outset.”19							Although	Sirois	did	not	know	his	fellow	commissioners	when	he	joined,	it	was	a	coup	to	have	him.	Within	Quebec,	Sirois	was	hugely	admired	for	his	expertise	in	constitutional	and	administrative	law	–	he	was	also	a	Laval	University	law	professor	–	and	for	his	presence	on	top-drawer	business	boards.	He	brought	“the	prestige	of																																																									18	Margaret	Prang,	N.	W.	Rowell:	Ontario	Nationalist	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1975)	and	in	The	Canadian	Encyclopedia:	http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/rowell_newton_wesley_17E.html		19	Dale	C.	Thomson,	Louis	St.	Laurent:	Canadian.	(Toronto:	Macmillan	of	Canada,	1967).	p.	95.	
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one	of	the	oldest	legal	firms	in	Quebec	City	and…the	seal	of	approval	of	the	Quebec	élite.”20	His	opinion	would	become	a	commission	gauge	of	what	Quebec	might	accept.						The	Prairie	commissioner	was	the	fiercely	proud	Canadian	journalist	John	Wesley	Dafoe,	who	had	known	virtually	everyone	in	public	life	for	decades.	A	self-made	man,	he	became	editor	of	the	Manitoba	Free	Press	in	1901	–	and	he	would	continue	in	that	role	until	his	unexpected	death	in	1944.	He	cared	deeply	about	Western	issues	such	as	lower	tariffs	and	freight	rates	–but	his	influence	and	interests	extended	across	the	nation.								He	did	not	view	himself	as	a	centralizer	or	as	a	provincial	rights	advocate.	But,	even	before	he	took	the	job,	he	had	concluded	that	the	constitution	was	not	working	during	the	Depression	for	rank-and-file	Canadians	or	for	destitute	provinces.	The	calculating	King	had	thought	ahead.	As	historian	Ramsay	Cook	notes,	the	Prime	Minister	was	serving	notice	“on	the	extreme	proponents	of	provincial	rights	that	their	submissions	would	be	met	by	a	convinced	nationalist.”21	In	the	end,	however,	King	would	get	more	of	a	centralizer	than	he	wanted.										The	British	Columbia	commissioner	was	Henry	Forbes	Angus.	Born	in	Victoria,	he	was	an	economist	and	a	lawyer,	who	taught	economics	at	the	University	of	British	Columbia.	When	the	commission	started	its	hearings	in	November	1937,	he	was	forty-six,	and	“quite	overwhelmed	by	the	importance	of	the	assignment.”	But	his	twin	skills	of	economics	and	law	would	be	a	huge	contribution	to	the																																																									20	Dale	C.	Thomson,	Louis	St.	Laurent:	Canadian.	(Toronto:	Macmillan	of	Canada,	1967).	p.	95.		21	Ramsay	Cook,	The	Politics	of	John	W.	Dafoe	and	the	Free	Press.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1963)	p.	223.	
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commission’s	research.	And	Angus’s	own	unpublished	memoirs	would	provide	glimpses	into	the	Commission’s	private	debates	about	inequality	and	the	messy	business	of	sharing	among	unequal	governments.						The	Maritime	representative	was	the	Ontario-born	political	scientist	R.	A.	“Bert”	MacKay	who	taught	at	Dalhousie	University	in	Halifax.	In	1934	MacKay	had	written	that	crucial	appendix	–	“Economic	Inquiry	–	Financial	Relations”	–	for	the	three-man	Royal	Commission	Provincial	Economic	Inquiry	[sic]	that	Premier	Angus	L.	Macdonald	had	appointed.	That	paper	had	enumerated	the	fiscal	inequalities	within	the	federation,	starting	with	Nova	Scotia’s	entry	into	Confederation	and	expanding	on	the	conclusions	of	the	Duncan	Commission	report	of	1926.	MacKay	had	made	no	secret	of	his	support	for	the	Maritime	case	for	unequal	treatment.							But	the	43-year-old	MacKay	had	a	powerful	supporter	in	his	corner:	Prime	Minister	King	loved	the	essay	that	MacKay	had	written	on	the	political	ideas	of	his	rebel	grandfather,	William	Lyon	Mackenzie.	MacKay	had	presented	his	research	to	the	Royal	Society	of	Canada	in	May	1936	–	and	it	had	appeared	in	the	Canadian	
Journal	of	Economics	and	Political	Science	in	February	1937.	(MacKay	had	concluded:	“At	heart	Mackenzie	always	remained	a	Puritan	with	a	mission.”)22	Fourteen	months	later,	when	the	Prime	Minister	invited	the	commissioners	to	dine	at	Laurier	House,	King	would	practically	purr:	“I	was	particularly	pleased	to	have	the	talk	I	did	with	MacKay	about	my	grandfather,	whom	we	both	greatly	admire.”23																																																										22	“The	Political	Ideas	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie”	in	The	Canadian	Journal	of	
Economics	and	Political	Science,	February	1937,	Volume	III,	Number	1,	p.	3.	23	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Friday,	December	2,	1938,	p.	3.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=19655&	
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The	Royal	Commission	Gets	Underway							Before	the	Commissioners	could	gather	for	their	first	full	meeting,	Rowell	and	Dafoe	held	an	informal	gathering	in	Ottawa	on	August	4,	1937	with	Skelton,	along	with	Finance	Ministry	and	Bank	of	Canada	officials.	They	set	out	a	preliminary	list	of	research	studies	and	a	proposed	schedule	of	hearings.24	Twenty-seven	academics	would	eventually	research	the	economy	and	nine	would	look	at	legal	and	constitutional	affairs.	Their	emphasis	was	on	the	workings	of	federalism	–	and	the	search	for	alternate	ways	to	handle	social	and	economic	inequalities.	The	ensuing	scholarship	would	emerge	as	“the	greatest	research	effort	undertaken	by	a	Canadian	royal	commission	up	to	that	time.”25							Meanwhile,	the	commissioners	braced	for	the	task	ahead.	From	November	29,	1937	to	December	1,	1938,	they	would	be	on	the	road,	trundling	onto	trains,	for	eighty-five	days	of	public	hearings	in	every	provincial	capital.26	They	would	have	an	avid	national	audience.	Winnipeg	Free	Press	editor	Dafoe	wanted	to	ensure	that	all	Canadians	knew	what	the	Commissioners	were	doing	–	and	what	they	heard.	He	assigned	his	newspaper’s	Legislative	correspondent	J.	B.	“Hamish”	McGeachy	to	follow	them	across	Canada,	and	file	what	would	become	a	syndicated	column,	“Confederation	Clinic,”	under	the	byline	J.	B.	M.	While	other	journalists	such	as	Carl																																																																																																																																																																							24	Research	Director	D.	A.	Skelton	to	Royal	Commissioner	Henry	Forbes	Angus,	August	21,	1937.	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	C-6988,	RG33,	Series	23,	25	David	Warren	Fransen,	“Unscrewing	The	Unscrutable”:	The	Rowell-Sirois	
Commission,	the	Ottawa	Bureaucracy,	and	Public	Finance	Reform	1935-41,	unpublished	thesis,	University	of	Toronto,	1984.	p.	v.		26	David	Warren	Fransen,	p.	v.		
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Reinke	of	the	Canadian	Press	also	trailed	after	the	Commission,	McGeachy’s	reports	managed	to	be	both	lively	–	and	accurate	in	terms	of	the	operations	of	the	federation.	(Skelton	told	Dafoe	that	when	he	showed	them	to	Australian	federalism	expert	L.	F.	Giblin	in	August	1938,	the	Australian	pronounced	them	“as	a	really	first-rate	achievement,	in	journalism	of	the	best	kind,	-	which	is	rare	these	days.”[sic])27	I	will	cite	McGeachy	frequently	because	his	columns	were	syndicated	–	so	many	anglophone	Canadians	across	the	nation	had	access	to	them.								As	I	follow	the	commissioners,	I	will	concentrate	on	the	provincial	governments	–	because	they	provided	the	most	compelling	and	substantive	evidence	of	the	federation’s	fiscal	inequalities.	Those	governments	were	also	the	primary	actors	in	my	state-centred	analysis	of	inequality–	although	I	will	not	neglect	the	economic	and	social	groups	that	put	pressure	on	their	institutions.							As	I	will	show,	the	richer	province	such	as	Ontario	and	Quebec	expressed	their	flat-out	reluctance	to	see	Ottawa	contribute	more	to	the	poorer	provinces.		The	poorer	provinces	such	as	the	Maritime	Provinces,	Manitoba	and	Saskatchewan,	in	turn,	vividly	described	their	huge	responsibilities,	their	insufficient	revenues	and	their	crippling	debts.	As	well,	they	often	suggested	radical	rearrangements	of	the	federation	to	remedy	their	fiscal	plight.	Those	governments	often	mentioned	Australia	and,	more	rarely,	other	federations	such	as	Argentina,	which	also	relied	on	commodity	exports.	I	will	occasionally	look	at	other	important	players	as	well,	such	as	the	influential	Canadian	Chamber	of	Commerce	and	the	prestigious	Canadian																																																									27	Rowell-Sirois	Commission	Secretary	Alex	Skelton	to	Commissioner	John	Dafoe,	September	12,	1938.	John	Dafoe	Fonds,	University	of	Manitoba	Archives,	Box	14,	Folder	3.	p.	3.		
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Welfare	Council.	The	commissioners	did	read	virtually	every	brief	that	appeared	before	them.							They	bonded	with	each	other	readily	–	partly	because	of	an	accident.	Three	weeks	before	the	first	session	in	Winnipeg	in	late	November,	Anglophone	Counsel	James	McGregor	Stewart	had	slipped	on	a	wax	floor	during	a	Halifax	card	party	and	fractured	his	leg.	As	Henry	Angus	later	wrote,	it	was	an	oddly	fortunate	event	–	because	Francophone	Counsel	Louis	St.	Laurent	had	to	take	Stewart’s	place	on	this	Western	circuit	to	Winnipeg	and	Regina.	Sirois	had	been	“a	little	diffident	at	first	in	what	were	to	him	totally	new	surroundings.”	But,	in	the	presence	of	his	close	friend	St.	Laurent,	Sirois	gradually	relaxed	amid	the	totally	English-speaking	surroundings.28	That	growing	bond	with	St.	Laurent	would	become	evident	when	the	commissioners	came	to	write	their	report	on	their	unequal	world.	(And	that	report,	in	turn,	would	clearly	affect	St.	Laurent	–	when	the	time	came	to	establish	non-conditional	equalization.)							The	commissioners	were	braced	for	unrelentingly	bad	news	about	life	in	the	West.	But,	with	the	exception	of	Dafoe,	it	was	worse	than	they	had	expected.	As	a	courtesy,	their	first	witness	on	November	29	was	Manitoba	Premier	John	Bracken,	who	had	urged	King	in	late	1936	to	appoint	the	Royal	Commission.	The	Premier	could	be	verbose,	but	he	was	always	incisive	about	his	province’s	unequal	position	within	Canada.	He	could	not	pay	for	social	services	and	relief.	The	province’s	small	number	of	provincial	and	municipal-tax	payers	were	staggering	under	provincial	and	municipal	debt	that	was	equal	to	ninety-eight	per	cent	of	total	annual	income	in																																																									28	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	266-267.	
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1933.29	The	total	cost	of	relief	in	1936	for	Ottawa,	his	province	and	his	municipalities	was	$11.7-million	–	or	81.2	percent	of	Manitoba’s	ordinary	expenditures.30	He	was	blunt:	“From	the	earliest	years	of	Confederation,	there	has	arisen	in	province	after	province	protests	of	inequity	and	claims	for	adjustment,	large	numbers	of	which	have	been	found	on	examination	to	be	just	complaints.”31	Now	Manitoba	had	joined	that	queue:		In	presenting	our	case	we	shall	feel	that	we	are	not	less	Canadian	in	spirit	or	in	reality	if	we	show	that	the	economic	picture	which	Canada,	not	intentionally	but	nevertheless	actually,	has	permitted	to	be	drawn	across	this	section	of	the	Dominion	is	not	just	to	those	Canadians	who	happen	to	live	here	and	is	not	in	the	interests	of	Canada	as	a	whole.32							The	lengthy	Manitoba	proposal	frequently	cited	Australia	as	an	example	of	fairness	in	the	treatment	of	states	and	citizens.	Australia	had	depreciated	its	currency	during	the	Depression:	The	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	had	concluded	that	the	positive	effects	of	that	currency	depreciation	had	almost	balanced	the	negative	effects	of	the	Australian	tariff	on	resource	producers.	(In	his																																																									29	“Manitoba’s	Case	–	The	Effects	of	Declining	Income”	in	Manitoba’s	Case:	A	Submission	Presented	to	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG	33/23,	Part	V.	pps.	2-4.	The	Premier	did	not	specify	income-tax	payers.	30	“Analysis	of	Manitoba’s	Treasury	Problem”	in	Manitoba’s	Case:	A	Submission	Presented	to	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG	33/	23,	Volume	1.	56.	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6980/292?r=0&s=6		31	“Introduction”	in	Manitoba’s	Case:	A	Submission	Presented	to	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG	33/23,	Volumes	1.	2.	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6980/29?r=0&s=6		32	“Introduction”	in	Manitoba’s	Case:	A	Submission	Presented	to	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	5.	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6980/32?r=0&s=6		
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later	private	memo	on	the	CGC,	commissioner	Angus	would	dispute	Manitoba’s	claim	that	the	CGC	methodically	toted	up	the	effects	of	the	tariff	and	the	exchange	rate:	“This	exaggerates	the	extent	of	its	calculation.”33)					In	contrast,	the	Manitoba	brief	stated,	Ottawa’s	tariffs	and	exchange	rate	policies	to	protect	manufacturers	were	driving	up	the	cost	of	farm	production	and	impeding	Western	export	sales.	“In	Canada	the	disability	due	to	the	exchange	policy	is	to	be	
added	to	the	disability	by	the	tariffs	to	arrive	at	the	gross	loss.”34	Australia’s	efforts	to	achieve	equality	among	its	states	were	far	more	ambitious:	Ottawa’s	subsidies	to	the	provinces	were	only	one-quarter	of	the	Commonwealth’s	subsidies	to	its	states.35	The	Australians	regarded	even	private	debt	as	an	impediment	to	economic	recovery	–	so	the	Premiers’	Plan	had	cut	interest	rates	across	the	board.								It	was	powerful	plea	from	an	impoverished	government.	But,	although	Bracken	half-heartedly	suggested	that	Ottawa	abandon	”the	pretence	of	equality	of	treatment”	in	subsidies,	he	conceded	that	it	would	be	difficult	to	deal	with	the	hostility	of	the	wealthier	provinces	and	even	more	difficult	to	find	a	satisfactory	
																																																								33	“Comments	By	Prof.	Henry	Forbes	Angus	On	Federal	Finance	In	Australia,”	for	the	Royal-Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	H.	F.	Angus	file,	LAC,		RG33,	Series	23,	Volume	71.	p.	11.	34	“The	Effects	of	Federal	Monetary	Policy,	Part	IX”	in	Manitoba’s	Case:	A	Submission	Presented	to	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG	33/	23,	Volume	1.	p.	32.	Italics	in	original.		http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6980/119?r=0&s=6		35	“Dominion	and	Provincial	Budgets,	Part	IX”	in	Manitoba’s	Case:	A	Submission	Presented	to	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	pps.	14-15.	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6980/376?r=0&s=6			
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formula.36	(That	statement	captured	the	ongoing	quandary	in	tackling	inequality	among	provinces.)	Better	still,	he	said,	Ottawa	could	cancel	the	debts	for	relief	payments	that	Manitoba	and	its	municipalities	owed	to	the	federal	treasury.	And	it	could	pick	up	“one-half	of	the	cost	of	our	social	services,	chiefly	services	relating	to	public	welfare.”37	Basically,	Bracken	asserted,	the	financial	plan	of	Confederation	did	not	work	for	Manitoba.	Indeed,	Manitoba	was	one	of	the	few	provinces	that	did	not	care	what	Ottawa	did	–	as	long	as	it	did	something.	Anything.					The	response	to	Manitoba’s	plight	was	generally	favourable,	although	commission	counsel	St.	Laurent	proved	to	be	a	difficult	examiner.	(The	commissioners,	the	two	counsels,	legal	secretary	Robert	Fowler	and	Skelton	could	ask	questions.)	After	several	more	witnesses	such	as	the	Winnipeg	Real	Estate	Board	and	the	Winnipeg	Board	of	Trade	had	appeared	before	the	commissioners,	J.	B.	McGeachy	concluded	that	St.	Laurent	was	“almost	alarming…His	mind	performs	with	speed	and	his	questions	come	at	the	same	rate.	He	pursues	truth	like	an	amiable	but	enthusiastic	terrier	after	a	rabbit.”38	But	McGeachy	also	decided	that	the	provincial	government	
																																																								36		“Analysis	of	Manitoba’s	Treasury	Problem”	in	Manitoba’s	Case:	A	Submission	Presented	to	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG	33/	23,	Volume	1.	48.		http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6980/287?r=0&s=6	37	“Manitoba’s	Case	–	Summary	and	Recommendations”	in	Manitoba’s	Case:	A	Submission	Presented	to	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG	33/	23,	Volume	1.	56.		http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6980/345?r=0&s=6	38	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press,	Wednesday,	December	1,	1937.	p.	1.	
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had	acquitted	itself	“with	great	care	and	elaboration…its	briefs	are	documented	and	backed	up	with	battalions	of	statistics.”39	It	was	a	solid	presentation	of	a	dire	case.						Saskatchewan’s	plight	was	even	worse.	Premier	W.	J.	Patterson	would	win	re-election	in	June	1938	–	although	the	CCF	would	win	ten	seats.	The	Premier	could	already	see	the	discontent	among	his	voters.	Now,	in	an	introductory	letter	to	a	434-page	brief,	the	rattled	Premier	promised	to	spell	out	“the	handicaps	which	it	suffers	by	reason	of	its	location	and	the	physical	conditions	which	apply	to	its	basic	industry	of	agriculture.”	He	added	that	the	diversities	of	the	federation	“make	it	difficult	for	Federal	policies	to	apply	with	equal	benefit	to	all	sections	of	the	nation.”40	The	brief	itself	promised:	“All	this	will	be	a	very	dark	picture.”41						And	it	was.	The	province’s	per	capita	income	–	with	the	exception	of	Prince	Edward	Island	–	was	the	lowest	in	Canada	at	two-thirds	of	the	national	average.	The	fiscal	need	of	the	province	was	“very	great,”	while	the	existing	arrangements	for	provincial	support	“are	inherently	faulty.”42	More	than	407,600	people	out	of	a	population	of	928,000	were	now	on	relief.	The	Premier	expected	that	number	to	hit	500,000	before	February	but	there	was	“nobody	starving	or	cold	or	homeless.”43		
																																																								39	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press,	Wednesday,	December	1,	1937.	p.	1	40	Saskatchewan	Premier	W.	J.	Patterson,	Foreward	[sic]	to	Province	of	Saskatchewan	Submission	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	1937,”	Exhibit	34.	LAC,	RG	33/	23,	Volume	2.	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6980/844?r=0&s=1		41	Province	of	Saskatchewan	Submission	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	1937,”	LAC,	RG	33/	23,	Volume	2.	Exhibit	34,	3.		42	Saskatchewan	submission,	15	43	“Relief	Problems	Acute,	But	None	Uncared	For”	in	The	Globe	and	Mail,	Saturday,	December	11,	1937.	p.	1.	
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					Per	capita	provincial	and	municipal	debt	as	a	percentage	of	income	was	the	highest	in	Canada.	Debt	charges	consumed	an	astonishing	forty-seven	percent	of	its	revenues.	Residents	would	“not	readily	tolerate	further	reduction	or	elimination	of	expenditures	on	education,	hospitalization,	care	of	the	aged	and	destitute	and	other	expenditures	of	a	like	character….	Saskatchewan	cannot	maintain,	through	periods	of	economic	depression	and	crop	failure,	the	minimum	standards	of	social	and	
community	services	which	are,	by	common	consent,	considered	appropriate	to	
Canada.”44	This	was	an	early	appeal	to	the	still-unarticulated	principle	of	equalization,	which	would	eventually	find	its	way	into	the	Constitution	in	1982.	The	brief	added	that	spending	on	social	services	in	April	1936	was	almost	ten	times	higher	than	it	had	been	in	1911.45	The	provincial	government	could	not	stay	afloat.						Australia,	once	again,	was	cited	with	envy.	That	nation	had	learned	during	the	early	years	of	the	Depression	to	concentrate	on	its	national	income	–	as	opposed	to	Canada’s	continuing	emphasis	on	“sound	money.”	So	Australia	had	depreciated	its	currency	in	1931:	“	‘Equality	of	sacrifice’	while	alleged	to	have	potential	anti-deflationary	powers,	was	also	considered	an	equitable	and	highly	desirable	goal	in	its	own	right,”46	Australia	understood	that	the	community	at	large	should	bear	a	
																																																								44	Province	of	Saskatchewan:	Submission	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	1937,”	Exhibit	34,	46.	My	italics.	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6980/874?r=0&s=5		45	Province	of	Saskatchewan,	Submission	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	1937,”	Exhibit	34.	LAC,	RG	33/	23,	Volume	1.	274	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6980/991?r=0&s=5	46	Province	of	Saskatchewan	Submission	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	1937,	LAC,	RG	33/	23,	Volume	1.	p.	242-243.		
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portion	of	the	burden	of	the	most	vulnerable.	The	brief	added	bitterly	that	such	devotion	to	equality	did	not	exist	in	Canada:		The	tacit	assumption	was	that	the	economic	distress	could	be	localized,	that	the	vulnerable	groups	must	bear	with	fortitude	their	
unequal	burdens,	sustained	by	the	faith	that	their	martyrdom	was	but	the	price	of	the	sanctity	of	contract	and	of	the	credit	of	the	Dominion.	In	any	case,	no	policy	which	might	lead	to	a	diffusion	of	income	impairment,	or	to	the	decline	of	the	dollar,	was	to	be	countenanced.47						The	inequality	of	the	burden	clearly	rankled	–	especially	in	comparison	to	Australia.	Anyone	who	read	the	Saskatchewan	brief	would	understand	that	inequality	among	provinces	and	their	citizenry	was	dangerous	to	national	cohesion	–	and	to	the	stability	of	the	nation-state.	Or,	as	McGeachy	observed,	Manitoba	witnesses	were	“polyannas	by	comparison	with	the	Saskatchewan	citizens.	The	story	of	bankruptcy	told	here	is	the	most	dismal	the	Commission	will	hear.”48							Saskatchewan	had	proposals	for	change.	It	wanted	Ottawa	to	assume	responsibility	for	that	portion	of	the	debt	that	could	be	attributed	to	the	payment	of	relief	–	because	it	was	“incurred	in	the	discharge	of	a	national	obligation.”49	It	maintained	that	social	services	had	to	expand	in	this	new	world:	Ottawa	should	take	full	responsibility	for	relief	and	for	old-age	pensions,	which	would	have	an	eligibility	age	of	sixty-five	instead	of	seventy;	consider	health	insurance;	institute	Unemployment	Insurance;	and	enact	a	national	policy	for	labour.	Ottawa	should	also	increase	its	subsidies.	The	commissioners	should	forget	any	talk	of	parity	among	the																																																									47	Province	of	Saskatchewan	Submission	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	1937,	244.	48	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	The	Winnipeg	Free	Press	on	Saturday,	December	11,	1937.	p.	1.	49	Province	of	Saskatchewan	Submission	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	1937	331.	
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provinces:	provincial	equality	“had	to	go	down	before	actual	fiscal	need.”50	Saskatchewan	was	“the	Cinderella	of	the	Canadian	Federation.”51	This	was	a	moral	appeal	–	and	a	hardheaded	pitch	to	the	self-interest	of	all	Canadians.						The	message	from	the	Saskatchewan	Urban	Municipalities	Association	was	worse:	taxpayers	were	facing	“complete	confiscation”	of	their	homes	because	they	could	not	afford	the	high	property	taxes	that	funded	social	services	as	well	as	relief	payments	for	their	unemployed	neighbours.52	The	larger	cities	were	also	funding	medical,	optical	and	dental	care	for	families	on	relief.53	The	quality	of	infrastructure	and	schools	was	declining	as	the	cost	of	relief	decimated	city	budgets.54	Municipal	credit	had	been	“completely”	destroyed:	No	city	had	“been	able	to	sell	bonds	on	the	open	market	since	1930”;	some	cities	had	defaulted;	interest	payments	on	bank	loans	and	other	debts	were	often	“as	much	as	the	total	relief	costs	in	1932.”55							Most	poignantly,	the	land	that	was	once	the	source	of	Prairie	wealth	and	pride	“now	stands	as	a	symbol	of	liability.”56	Residents	were	getting	poorer	–	and	so	were	their	governments.	The	hearings	were	so	grim	that	Commissioner	Henry	Angus																																																									50	Analysis	of	the	Province	of	Saskatchewan	brief	in	the	Analysis	of	Evidence	Taken	At	The	Regina	Sittings	of	the	Royal	Commission,	prepared	for	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission	Report	1940,	LAC,	RG	33,	Series	23,	Vol.	60.	Pages	2,	11.	51	Province	of	Saskatchewan,	Submission	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	1937,”	Exhibit	34.	p.	285.	52	Brief	of	the	Saskatchewan	Urban	Municipalities	Association	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	2.	p.	7.	53	Brief	of	the	Saskatchewan	Urban	Municipalities	Association	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	11.		54	Brief	of	the	Saskatchewan	Urban	Municipalities	Association	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	14.		55	Brief	of	the	Saskatchewan	Urban	Municipalities	Association	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	15.		56	Brief	of	the	Saskatchewan	Urban	Municipalities	Association	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	2.	p.	16.		http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6981/199?r=0&s=5	
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reminded	his	fellow	commissioner	Joseph	Sirois	of	the	lines	from	Virgil’s	Aeneid:	When	Queen	Dido	asked	Aeneas	to	recount	his	arduous	journey,	he	replied:	“Majesty,	too	terrible	for	speech	is	the	pain	which	you	ask	me	to	revive.”57	Angus	used	the	original	Latin.								The	commissioners	listened	in	horrified	fascination.	They	understood	what	these	impoverished	governments	were	saying.	In	both	provinces,	they	peered	at	the	lines	of	despairing	men	who	pleaded	for	jobs	or	handouts	and	the	tarpaper	shacks	that	housed	their	families.	They	saw	the	abject	need	on	the	streets	outside	their	hotels.	In	Winnipeg,	unemployed	men	were	cleaning	up	the	chilly	riverbanks,	paid	with	cash	and	relief	vouchers.58	In	Regina,	donations	from	across	the	nation	had	provided	eighty	million	pounds	of	food	for	homes	in	drought-stricken	southern	Saskatchewan.59	Cows	and	other	livestock	were	starving	on	those	prairies	because	ice	had	formed	over	the	short	stubble	left	from	the	disastrous	crop	year.60								It	was	almost	impossible	to	imagine	remedies	for	such	desperate	and	seemingly	insoluble	inequality.	The	commissioners	had	good	intentions.	They	aspired	to	help	needy	governments	help	needy	people.	But,	as	they	would	discover,	sharing	among	governments	would	be	complicated.	Advocacy	groups	would	often	ask	for	federal	social	programs	that	would	provide	everything	from	health	care	to	unemployment	assistance.	Most	provincial	governments	wanted	to	protect	their	right	to	design	and																																																									57	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	275-276.	Translation	is	from	Virgil,	The	Aeneid,	trans.	W.F.	Jackson	Knight.	(Harmondsworth,	Middlesex,	England:	Penguin	Books	Ltd.,	1956)	p.	51.	58	“Work	For	Jobless”	in	The	Globe	and	Mail,	Friday,	November	19,	1937.	p.	17.	59	“80,000,000	Pounds	of	Food	For	Drought-Stricken	Are	Distributed”	in	The	Globe	
and	Mail,	Monday,	November	15,	1937.	p.	15.	60	“Cows	Starve	As	Ice	Forms”	in	The	Globe	and	Mail,	Wednesday,	December	1,	1937.	p.	8.		
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administer	any	such	social	programs.	As	I	will	show,	the	commissioners’	hearings	would	continue	in	Ottawa	after	the	holiday	season.	Meanwhile,	King’s	problems	were	just	getting	worse	–	much	as	he	wanted	the	Royal	Commission	to	make	them	go	away.			
The	Australians	Monitor	The	Commission								From	the	start,	the	Australians	followed	the	Rowell-Sirois	hearings	–	and	kept	Canberra	up	to	date.	The	diplomats	forwarded	extracts	from	a	talk	about	the	history	of	Canadian	constitutional	reform	that	University	of	Manitoba	historian	R.	O.	MacFarlane	delivered	over	the	Canadian	Broadcasting	Corporation	in	October	1937:	“The	desire	for	social	and	economic	reform	has	been	one	of	the	most	potent	stimulants	to	constitutional	change	in	Canada.”61	On	December	16,	1937,	the	Australian	External	Affairs	Secretary	told	the	Australian	Trade	Commissioner	in	Canada	that	the	Treasury	Department:		is	very	keenly	interested	in	the	enquiries	that	are	being	made	by	that	Commission…It	would	be	greatly	appreciated	if	you	would	kindly	forward	as	soon	as	possible	after	they	are	issued,	copies	of	any	progress	reports	that	may	be	published	officially,	or	of	any	press	or	other	reports	which	might	be	of	value	in	considering	the	work	that	is	being	done	by	the	[Commonwealth	Grants]	Commission.62																																																											61	“An	Historical	Approach	to	the	Canadian	Constitution:	Extracts	from	a	Broadcast	of	the	Kelsey	Club,	Winnipeg	Over	the	Network	of	the	Canadian	Broadcasting	Corporation	Recently”	in	The	Monetary	Times,	October	30,	1937.	The	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada	Constitutional,	Series	A	981,	Control	symbol	CAN	13	Part	2,	Barcode	173360,	p.	1.	62	Memorandum	for	The	Australian	Trade	Commissioner,	Canada	from	W.	R.	Hodgson,	December	16,	1937.	The	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada	Constitutional,	Series	A	981,	Control	symbol	CAN	13	Part	2,	Barcode	173360,	p.	1.	
	 	 	 	 	208	
				In	response,	the	diplomats	sent	every	major	brief	to	Canberra	until	the	central	government	finally	told	them	to	stop.	The	Commonwealth	Government	only	wanted	the	provincial	briefs	in	future:	“The	great	bulk	of	proofs…is	of	little	interest	to	this	Department.	We	are	concerned	more	particularly	with	the	cases	submitted	to	the	Royal	Commission	by	the	various	Canadian	Provinces.”63	As	I	will	show,	the	Royal	Commission	and	its	witnesses	were	even	more	interested	in	Australia’s	approach	to	inequality.		
	
Mackenzie	King’s	Woes							The	Prime	Minister	had	his	hands	full.	In	December	1937,	mere	days	after	the	Rowell-Sirois	hearings	in	Regina	finished,	he	learned	that	there	was	more	discord	ahead.	The	National	Employment	Commission,	which	he	had	appointed	in	May	1936,	was	about	to	recommend	that	Ottawa	assume	responsibility	for	all	unemployed	employables.	The	expense	would	have	been	crippling,	destroying	his	government’s	vaunted	reputation	for	fiscal	prudence.	And	the	very	idea	of	interference	in	provincial	areas	of	constitutional	responsibility	appalled	him.	As	historian	James	Struthers	has	aptly	summarized:	“In	its	final	act	the	commission	thus	brought	to	a	head	the	underlying	tensions	and	contradictions	which	had	
																																																								63	Letter	from	the	Treasury	Department	Assistant	Secretary	to	the	Department	of	External	Affairs	Secretary,	August	11,	1938.	The	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada	Constitutional,	Series	A	981,	Control	symbol	CAN	13	Part	2,	Barcode	173369,	p.	1.	
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surrounded	Ottawa’s	involvement	with	the	unemployed	since	its	first	contributions	to	relief	at	the	end	of	the	First	World	War.”64							King	was	frantic.	He	turned	to	his	idealistic	Labour	Minister	Norman	Rogers,	and	was	astonished	to	learn	that	Rogers	supported	that	advice.	“I	pointed	out	that	that	meant	the	whole	of	relief,”	an	alarmed	King	confided	in	his	diary.	“The	Party	would	never	escape	that	obligation	on	itself.”65	To	his	dismay,	Rogers	defended	“the	whole	business	as	being	the	right	thing.”66	But	the	next	morning,	at	King’s	urging,	Rogers	spoke	to	British-born	industrialist	Arthur	Purvis,	who	chaired	the	commission.	Purvis	defended	his	approach.	The	crisis	continued.	That	afternoon,	King	reminded	cabinet	that	Purvis	was	only	supposed	to	look	at	the	concrete	situation	of	unemployment	on	the	ground	–	not	the	general	problem	of	unemployment	policy.						By	the	letter	of	that	mandate,	King	was	correct.	The	Commission	had	a	specific	legal	chore:	to	consider	a	possible	apprenticeship	program;	to	outline	the	conditions	that	would	allow	a	province	to	qualify	for	relief;	to	examine	employment	for	the	disabled	and	ex-soldiers;	to	recommend	public	works	that	would	provide	employment;	and	to	outline	“comprehensive	measures	constituting	a	long-range	plan	of	development	which	may	be	proceeded	with	or	not,	as	conditions	warrant.”67	
																																																								64	James	Struthers,	No	Fault	of	Their	Own:	Unemployment	and	the	Canadian	Welfare	
State	1914-1941	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1983)	p.	175.	65	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King	for	Monday,	December	20,	1937.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=18593&		66	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King	for	Monday,	December	20,	1937.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=18594&	67	“Unemployment	And	Relief	in	Canada:	Issued	as	a	Supplement	to	The	Labour	
Gazette”,	April	1936	(Ottawa:	J.	O.	Patenaude,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	
	 	 	 	 	210	
The	Prime	Minister	did	not	want	to	hear	about	the	bigger	picture.	He	viewed	the	report	as	a	potential	catastrophe.	To	his	relief,	cabinet	backed	him.						But	the	impasse	blighted	King’s	Christmas.	In	early	January,	he	concluded	that	the	dangers	the	report	posed	were	“more	disturbing	than	anything	I	have	seen	thus	far	in	my	public	life”	with	the	exception	of	the	First	World	War.68	In	mid-January	1938,	at	Rogers’	request,	Purvis	spoke	with	Royal	Commission	chairman	Rowell	about	what	Rowell	viewed	as	their	apparently	overlapping	terms	of	reference.	Two	weeks	later,	after	all	seven	members	of	the	Purvis	Commission	met	with	Rowell,	Purvis	agreed	to	cut	much	of	the	contentious	material	from	his	report.								King	rejoiced.	Rogers	was	isolated	within	cabinet.	Purvis	had	backed	down.	The	Prime	Minister	then	declared	that	the	Purvis	report	should	not	be	tabled	until	it	was	translated.	By	then,	he	reasoned,	Parliament	would	be	distracted	with	other	problems.	But	the	episode	would	leave	him	with	an	enduring	mistrust	of	the	finance	ministry	bureaucrats,	especially	those	from	the	Queen’s	University	economics	department	such	as	W.	A.	Mackintosh	and	W.	C.	Clark.	They	had	been	working,	King	concluded	dourly,	to	bring	about	constitutional	change	“which	will	lead	to	a	centralization	of	powers	and	away	from	the	present	order	of	things.”69	That	distrust	extended	to	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission	staff,	including	Secretary	Alex	Skelton.																																																																																																																																																																							Majesty:	1936)	2.	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada	–	Economic	&	Financial,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol	CAN	18	Part	I,	Barcode	173366.	n.p.	in	file.	68	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King	for	Wednesday,	January	12,	1938.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=18685&		69	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King	for	Tuesday,	January	25,	1938.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=18721&	
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							Still,	he	had	dodged	a	bullet.	King	had	seen	the	corrosive	conscription	crisis	split	the	nation	during	World	War	One	when	Quebec	was	isolated	in	its	opposition	to	enforced	enlistment.	The	Prime	Minister	viewed	the	preservation	of	national	unity	as	his	primary	job.	As	political	scientists	Richard	Simeon	and	Ian	Robinson	have	observed,	“As	long	as	there	was	no	clear	English-speaking	majority	position	on	the	appropriate	role	of	the	state,	electoral	politics	left	King	with	room	to	manoeuvre…King	preferred	to	avoid	the	kind	of	economic	and	social	policy	initiatives	that	[Quebec	Premier	Louis-Alexandre]	Taschereau	denounced	in	1935.”70	(Taschereau	had	opposed	the	efforts	of	younger	Liberals	under	the	leadership	of	Paul	Gouin	to	abandon	laissez-faire	and	to	adopt	“an	extensive	scheme	of	labour	and	social	legislation	which	would	raise	the	incomes	and	provide	greater	economic	security	for	the	working	class.”)71								As	the	Prime	Minister	would	later	remark	when	key	cabinet	ministers	wanted	to	disallow	Quebec’s	draconian	Padlock	Law	to	shut	down	so-called	communist	media,	which	the	Quebec	Legislative	Assembly	had	adopted	in	March	1937:	“I	took	the	view	that	in	the	last	resort,	the	unity	of	Canada	was	the	test	by	which	we	should	meet	all	these	things….	[We]	had	to	consider,	in	our	action,	its	effect	upon	the	nation.”72	Although	the	Prime	Minister	disliked	the	legislation,	he	refused	to	disallow	it.	
																																																																																																																																																																						70	Richard	Simeon	and	Ian	Robinson,	State,	Society,	and	the	Development	of	Canadian	
Federalism	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1990)	p.	82.		71	As	quoted	in	Simeon	and	Robinson,	p.	71.	72	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King	for	Wednesday,	July	6,	1938.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=19223&		
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				It	was	only	in	the	late	1930s	that	the	voices	of	those	who	saw	the	nation	through	the	lens	of	social	needs	–	which	could	often	be	heard	through	the	witnesses	before	the	Rowell-Sirois	Royal	Commission	–	started	to	compete	with	the	voices	of	those	who	espoused	provincial	language	and	cultural	rights.	Their	voices	were	weak.	But,	as	Simeon	and	Robinson	have	observed,	they	wanted	Ottawa	to	take	a	more	active	role	in	social	policy:	“These	elements	[advocates	for	social	security]	argued	that	only	the	federal	government	possessed	the	fiscal	resources	and	technical	expertise	to	implement	progressive	social	and	economic	policies.”73							But	in	early	1938,	King	still	did	not	hear	them.	He	did	not	want	to	upset	the	provinces,	especially	Quebec,	by	interfering	with	their	constitutional	responsibility	for	relief.	He	did	not	want	Ottawa	to	centralize	more	power	in	the	name	of	social	cohesion	and	political	stability:	in	his	view,	such	actions	would	only	destabilize	the	federation.	He	now	had	a	wonderful	excuse	for	delay:	The	federal	government	had	happily	punted	the	fate	of	the	unemployed	employables	to	the	Rowell-Sirois	Royal	Commission.	Surely	it	was	logical	that,	as	the	commissioners	tackled	their	mandate	to	redesign	“the	distribution	of	legislative	powers	in	the	light	of	the	economic	and	social	developments	of	the	last	seventy	years,”	they	would	examine	the	fate	of	the	unemployed	employables.74	Why	should	Ottawa	act	until	Rowell-Sirois	reported?			
The	Commission	Carries	On																																																									73	Simeon	and	Robinson,	83.	74	Terms	of	Reference	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	August	14,	1937,	in	the	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	p.	9.	http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/Committees/Rowell-Sirois/book1-cover-intro-toc-tor.pdf	
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					While	King	dodged	and	feinted	with	Purvis	and	Rogers,	the	Commissioners	ploughed	through	their	onerous	schedule	of	hearings.	They	spent	the	last	two	weeks	of	January	1938	in	Ottawa,	querying	a	parade	of	witnesses	from	national	organizations.	The	Trades	and	Labour	Congress	demanded	that	labour	and	employment	conditions	“be	uniform	throughout	Canada	for	competition	to	be	fair.”75	The	commissioners	were	becoming	wary	of	that	word	“fair”	–	which	different	groups	would	define	far	differently.							The	Canadian	Medical	Association	wanted	Ottawa	to	take	responsibility	for	the	“health	of	the	casual	and	chronic	unemployed.”76	As	CMA	General	Secretary	T.	C.	Routley	earnestly	told	the	commissioners:	It	does	seem	to	us	illogical	to	say	to	an	unfortunate	individual	or	family,	the	Government	will	provide	you	with	a	house	and	fuel	to	keep	you	warm,	clothing	to	keep	you	covered,	and	food	to	sustain	you,	but,	if	you	have	the	misfortune	to	become	ill,	then	you	must	take	your	chances	of	living	or	dying,	because	so	far	as	the	Federal	Government’s	responsibility	goes,	it	washes	its	hands	of	the	whole	matter.77							But	the	CMA	shied	away	from	any	call	for	national	health	insurance	even	as	it	acknowledged	that	German	Chancellor	Otto	von	Bismarck	had	introduced	health	insurance	in	1883,	future	British	Prime	Minister	David	Lloyd	George	had	done	so	in	1911	as	Chancellor	the	Exchequer	and	forty	other	nations	now	had	similar	plans.																																																									75	Analysis	of	Trades	and	Labour	Congress	brief	in	Evidence	Taken	At	The	Regina	Sittings	of	the	Royal	Commission,	prepared	for	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,	LAC,	RG	33,	Series	23,	Vol.	60.	p.	105.	76	Analysis	of	Canadian	Medical	Association	brief	in	Evidence	Taken	At	The	Regina	Sittings	of	the	Royal	Commission,	prepared	for	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,	LAC,	RG	33,	Series	23,	Vol.	60.	p.	77	Canadian	Medical	Association	before	the	Royal-Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	January	21,	1938.	P.	3002.	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6991/86?r=0&s=4	
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Instead,	it	called	for	studies	on	how	each	province	might	handle	the	issue,	effectively	using	the	complications	of	federalism	as	an	escape	hatch	from	an	unwelcome	policy.78									The	Canadian	Tuberculosis	Association	warned	that,	despite	advances	in	health	care,	deaths	were	not	declining	among	the	First	Nations	population:	Aboriginals	constituted	one	per	cent	of	the	population	–	but	represented	eleven	per	cent	of	the	deaths	from	tuberculosis.	Ottawa,	which	had	constitutional	responsibility	for	Indians,	should	increase	its	spending	on	First	Nations’	health	care	by	$500,000.	There	was	a	pattern	here:	Advocacy	groups	–	even	those	that	thought	Ottawa	was	neglecting	its	duties	–	were	usually	looking	to	Ottawa	–	not	the	provinces	–	for	solutions	to	those	needs.							Then	the	Royal	Commissioners	swung	east	to	Halifax	and	Charlottetown.	The	commissioners	could	be	cynical	about	those	portions	of	the	Maritime	presentations	that	used	any	pretense	to	demand	more	money.	One	Nova	Scotia	municipality	asked	for	$80	to	cover	the	cost	of	an	inquest	into	the	death	of	a	rumrunner	who	had	been	shot	at	sea	during	a	run-in	with	federal	customs	officers.79	When	the	lawyer	for	one	province	–	probably	Nova	Scotia	–	claimed	that	it	had	lost	heavily	when	it	entered	Confederation,	Rowell	pointedly	compared	the	federation	to	a	marriage.	“Would	it	not	be	better	to	think	twice	before	separating	and	to	remember	that	you	had	taken	
																																																								78	Canadian	Medical	Association	before	the	Royal-Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations.	79	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	278.	
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each	other	for	better	or	for	worse.”80	Silence	ensued.	When	local	residents	later	explained	that	the	lawyer	had	just	gone	through	what	was	then	a	very	rare	divorce,	Methodist	Rowell	was	unrepentant.	Prince	Edward	Island	wanted	compensation	for	the	profits	that	it	might	have	made	from	liquor	during	Prohibition	if	it	had	remained	outside	Confederation.81	That	undoubtedly	offended	Rowell,	too.							But	the	huge	inequalities	that	existed	in	both	provinces	compared	with	the	richer	provinces	also	horrified	the	commissioners.	Public	health	services	in	Prince	Edward	Island	were	meagre:	That	government	wanted	Ottawa	to	take	responsibility	for	the	treatment	of	communicable	and	preventable	disease.	Nova	Scotia	contributed	one-eighth	of	its	revenues	to	education	–	but	the	provincial	and	local	governments	had	reached	the	limits	of	their	ability	to	pay.	The	average	salary	of	rural	schoolteachers	was	$536,	which	was	low,	even	by	the	standards	of	1938.82	Resources	were	stretched	to	their	limits.						Once	again,	the	commissioners	heard	about	the	example	of	Australia.	In	his	brief,	Nova	Scotia	Premier	Angus	L.	Macdonald	cited	the	Australian	experience	with	equalizing	grants.	The	Premier	suggested	that	Canada	create	a	permanent	commission	“patterned	to	some	extent	upon	the	Grants	Commission	in	Australia”:	If	provincial	taxes	were	“appreciably	above	the	normal	rate”	and	government	services	were	“appreciably	below	such	normal	standard,”	those	conditions	should	be																																																									80	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	261.	81	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	278.	This	reference	does	not	appear	in	the	commission’s	analysis	of	the	evidence,	no	doubt	because	the	commission	dismissed	it	out	of	hand.		82	Analysis	of	Nova	Scotia	Government	brief	in	Evidence	Taken	At	The	Halifax	Sittings	of	the	Royal	Commission,	prepared	for	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,	LAC,	RG	33,	Series	23,	Vol.	60.	p.	52.	
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corrected	“by	an	appropriate	special	grant.”83	This	was	a	remarkable	early	effort	at	devising	a	system	of	equalization.							Macdonald	wanted	Ottawa	to	assume	full	responsibility	for	Old-Age	Pensions	and	mothers’	allowances,	perhaps	through	a	constitutional	amendment,	because	a	poorer	province	“through	no	fault	of	its	own	cannot	obtain	sufficient	revenue	to	support	the	normal	standard	[of	services].”84	He	also	wanted	Ottawa	to	enact	Unemployment	Insurance.											Then	he	turned	to	the	principle	of	fiscal	need,	moving	through	the	Duncan	and	White	Royal	Commission	reports	to	the	Australian	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission.	Macdonald	carefully	culled	lengthy	quotations	from	the	CGC’s	first	four	reports.	He	maintained:		The	principle	of	fiscal	needs	having	been	accepted	as	a	basis	of	adjustment	of	differences	in	the	Australian	federal	system	after	most	careful	consideration	and	analysis,	there	is	no	reason	why	in	Canada	every	effort	should	be	made	to	conceal	the	fact	that	fiscal	need	has	been	the	determining	factor	as	shown	in	practically	all	subsidy	re-allocations.	If	it	is	practicable	in	Australia	to	work	out	a	standard	of	grants	on	this	basis	it	is	equally	practicable	to	do	so	in	Canada.85								The	Nova	Scotia	brief	cited	dozens	of	examples	of	the	CGC’s	wisdom,	outlined	how	it	chose	its	personnel,	demonstrated	the	scope	its	inquiries,	and	included	charts	on	the	amounts	of	its	annual	grants.	The	experience	of	Australia,	in	fact,	was	a	theme	that	ran	throughout	the	141-page	brief,	including	its	involvement	with																																																									83	Submission	By	The	Government	Of	The	Province	of	Nova	Scotia	To	The	Royal	Commission	On	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	February	1938,	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	six,	pps.	25-26.		84	Nova	Scotia	Submission,	38.	85	Nova	Scotia	Submission,	72.	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6982/908?r=0&s=4	
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constitutional	reform,	the	effect	of	its	tariffs,	the	location	of	its	industries,	the	establishment	of	its	marketing	agencies	and	the	setting	up	of	regular	Dominion-Provincial	Conferences.	In	effect,	Australia	was	the	model	for	Angus	L.	Macdonald’s	lucid	proposals	–	and	those	proposals	would	influence	the	Commission’s	report.							The	presentation	–	and	its	setting	–	had	a	remarkable	effect	on	the	stalwart	McGeachy.	Macdonald	looked	like	“a	bookkeeper	with	poetic	aspirations.”86	But	“when	he	speaks,	the	effect	is	astonishing.	He	is	the	first	witness	to	testify	with	utter	self-confidence,	no	fumbling	for	words	or	ideas.”87	While	Westerners	outlined	their	recent	troubles,	Nova	Scotia	chronicled	grievances	that	were	seventy	years	old,	“something	bred	in	the	bone.”	Macdonald	even	“sounded	a	little	world-weary.	He	seemed	to	be	telling	the	Commission	he	had	been	through	this	argument	so	often	he	doubted	if	a	repetition	was	worth	while.”88								As	the	testimony	stretched	into	a	second	day,	the	veteran	journalist	was	impressed	with	Macdonald’s	frequent	references	to	Australia.	He	also	lauded	his	approach,	which	was	“an	essay	on	economic	trends,	with	the	odd	illustrative	statistic	thrown	in,	which	is	the	elegant	way	to	do	it.”89	McGeachy	stressed	the	Premier’s	emphasis	on	Nova	Scotia’s	unequal	position	within	the	federation	–	because	of	the	tariff,	transportation	costs,	the	isolation,	and	the	relative	poverty	in	resources.	Macdonald	added	that	Nova	Scotians	were	“poorer	than	other	Canadians,	citing	how	little	their	taxes	yield	though	high	in	rate	and	their	shortage	of	radios	and																																																									86	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press	on	Friday,	February	4,	1938.	p.	1.	87	McGeachy.	88	McGeachy.	89	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press	on	Saturday,	February	5,	1938.	p.	1.	
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motor	cars.”90	(Rowell	could	not	resist	observing	that	they	had	more	boats.)	The	journalist	gravely	noted	Macdonald’s	contrast	of	“federal	grants	to	Australian	states,	running	to	$20	a	head,	with	the	$3	a	head	Nova	Scotia	gets	from	Ottawa.”91							Such	complaints	from	the	poorer	provinces	about	inequality	left	the	commissioners	with	little	patience	for	the	grievances	of	the	wealthier	provinces.	In	mid-March,	in	Victoria,	British	Columbia	Premier	Duff	Pattullo	argued	that	his	province	was	also	in	an	unequal	position	because	Ottawa	took	more	tax	money	out	of	his	province	than	it	put	back	into	it.	But	British	Columbia	needed	the	money:	His	province	was	“still	in	a	pioneering	stage	and	dependent	in	the	main	on	primary	products	for	income.”92	Its	expenses	–	especially	for	resource	development	and	social	services	in	“modern	times”	–	were	enormous.93	Once	again,	Australia	appeared	in	a	Province’s	narrative:	“Canada,	unlike	Australia	or	the	Argentine,	had	no	special	monetary	policy	planned	to	meet	economic	distress”:	So	while	Canada	“relied	on	protection	of	her	manufacturing	industries	to	regain	prosperity…..	British	Columbia	suffered	from	this	policy	and	received	no	special	benefit.”94							Pattullo’s	government	faced	political	challenges.	As	the	Premier’s	biographer,	historian	Robin	Fisher,	observes,	“The	conditions	of	the	depression	decade	had	both	
																																																								90	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press	on	Saturday,	February	5,	1938.	p.	1.	91	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press	on	Saturday,	February	5,	1938.	p.	1.	92	Brief	of	the	Province	of	British	Columbia	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	8.	p.	177.	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6984/148?r=0&s=5	93	Brief	of	the	Province	of	British	Columbia	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	177.	94	Robin	Fisher,	Duff	Pattullo	of	British	Columbia,	318-319.	
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raised	people’s	expectations	and	increased	government’s	responsibilities.”95	The	Premier	espoused	the	ideal	of	“socialized	capitalism”:	Capital	should	recognize	“the	duty	and	the	desirability	of	giving	larger	consideration	to	the	needs	and	welfare	of	society	generally.”96	Governments,	in	turn,	should	redistribute	that	wealth.	Ottawa	should	assume	responsibility	for	unemployment	relief,	for	health	and	welfare	services	for	transients,	and	for	infrastructure	and	resource	development	projects.	Ottawa	should	also	make	room	for	the	province	to	increase	its	income	tax.	“Inequalities	and	disabilities	existing	by	reason	of	the	application	of	the	tariffs	and	freight	rates	should	be	adjusted.”97						But,	and	this	was	crucial,	British	Columbia	was	fed	up	with	sharing	with	the	Rest	of	Canada.	Pattullo	insisted	that	his	province	had	been	treated	inequitably:	It	had	“not	been	dealt	with	in	a	measure	of	parity	in	comparison	with	the	treatment	accorded	to	the	other	Provinces	by	the	Dominion.”98	He	submitted	a	statement	of	claim	based	on	fourteen	specific	demands,	starting	with	British	Columbia’s	“debts	and	liabilities”	that	existed	at	the	time	of	Union	with	Canada	in	1871.99	The	Premier	even	demanded	that	Ottawa	pave	the	old	wagon	road	that	travellers	had	originally	
																																																								95	Robin	Fisher,	Duff	Pattullo	of	British	Columbia.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1991)	p.	320.	96	Robin	Fisher,	Duff	Pattullo	of	British	Columbia.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1991)	p.	215.	97	Brief	of	the	Province	of	British	Columbia	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG33/23,Volume	eight.	p.	351.		98	Province	of	British	Columbia,	Claim	for	Readjustment	of	Terms	of	Union,	Presented	by	Hon.	T.	D.	Pattullo,	Attorney-General	Hon.	G.	McG.	Sloan,	Minister	of	Finance	Hon.	John	Hart,	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG33/23,Volume	eight.	p.31.		99	British	Columbia	Claim,	32.	
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used	before	Ottawa	constructed	a	railway	across	the	province	in	the	1880s.100	As	Royal	Commissioner	Angus	later	recalled,	Pattullo	freely	confessed,	behind	the	scenes,	that	he	was	itemizing	vast	numbers	of	needs	so	that	he	could	later	horse-trade	with	the	federal	government.101								But	his	main	aim	was	clear:	British	Columbia	did	not	want	more	of	its	citizens’	federal	tax	dollars	to	be	allocated	to	poorer	provinces.	Indeed,	it	wanted	to	send	less	money	to	Ottawa.	It	did	not	want	to	share	more.	Even	“the	local	press”	dismissed	that	approach	“as	narrow	and	parochial”	–	but	the	Premier	was	undeterred.102	As	he	would	later	tell	the	editor	of	the	Vancouver	Province:	“The	centralisers	almost	force	one	to	appear	in	the	light	of	a	provincialist.”103	And	Pattullo	viewed	the	commissioners	as	centralizers.						The	Premier’s	presentation	ran	contrary	to	the	views	of	the	provincial	CCF,	which	had	snared	roughly	29	per	cent	of	the	vote	in	the	June	1937	election.	As	MLA	Dorothy	G.	Steeves	later	wrote,	modern	federations	required	“social	planning,	social	security	and	provision	for	collective	international	agreement…	These	are	functions	which	can	only	be	carried	out	by	strong,	centralized	action.”	Steeves	added	that	there	was	“vociferous	public	demand”	for	public	health	and	hospitalization	“to	which	even	Liberal	governments	have	to	lend	an	ear.”104	Pattullo	was	undeterred.																																																											100	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	277	101	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	276.	102	Robin	Fisher,	p.	322.	103	As	quoted	in	Robin	Fisher,	Duff	Pattullo	of	British	Columbia.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1991)	p.	322.	104	Dorothy	G.	Steeves,	“A	British	Columbia	View”	in	The	Sirois	Report	–	A	Discussion	of	Some	Aspects,	The	Canadian	Forum,	November	1940.	P.	238.	
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					McGeachy	cast	a	dubious	eye	on	most	of	the	province’s	proposals	–	although	he	did	report	the	province’s	claim	that	it	was	shortchanged	in	the	queue	for	Dominion	aid.	“This	seems	to	be	proved	by	the	figures,”	McGeachy	observed	cautiously,	adding	that	the	figures	were	“presumably	not	cooked	to	excess.”105	Then	he	riffed	on	federal	subsidies:	“The	subject	is	complicated.	The	system	of	federal	subsidies	in	Canada	is	certainly	one	of	the	craziest	arithmetical	puzzles	ever	hatched	in	the	hallucinated	brains	of	public	financiers.	A	long	lifetime	would	be	needed	to	get	the	hang	of	it.”106			But	McGeachy	noted	pointedly	that	Pattullo	believed	that	Dominion	grants	should	“not	be	based	solely	on	either	population	or	‘fiscal	need’	…but	on	a	survey	of	each	province’s	economic	position.”107	The	Premier’s	ploy	of	asking	for	the	moon	would	not	work.	Pattullo	would	talk	compulsively	about	his	disappointment	with	the	Royal	Commission	for	the	remainder	of	his	political	life.108						Throughout	the	spring	of	1938,	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission	continued	its	weary	slog	across	the	nation.	Only	two	provincial	governments	–	Alberta	and	Quebec	–	had	refused	outright	to	cooperate.	Both	provinces	just	wanted	Ottawa	to	leave	them	alone	with	enough	revenue	to	fulfill	their	responsibilities.	As	well,	Alberta	was	still	irate	over	Ottawa’s	failure	to	extend	financial	assistance	prior	to	its	April	1936	default.	Since	then,	the	relationship	had	only	grown	worse.	In	1937,	Alberta	Premier	William	”Bible	Bill”	Aberhart	had	attempted	to	restrict	freedom	of																																																									105	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press	on	Friday,	March	18,	1938.	p.	1	106	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press	on	Friday,	March	18,	1938.	p.	1	107	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press	on	Thursday,	March	24,	1938.	p.	1.	108	Robin	Fisher,	Duff	Pattullo	of	British	Columbia.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1991)	p.	357-358.	
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the	press	and	to	put	the	banks	under	provincial	control.	Lieutenant	Governor	John	C.	Bowen	had	refused	to	sign	those	Social	Credit	bills	into	law,	arguing	that	they	were	unconstitutional.	He	had	referred	them	to	the	Supreme	Court,	which	would	eventually	agree	with	Bowen.	But	the	Lieutenant	Governor’s	principled	conduct	–	he	had	been	a	Baptist	minister	–	had	infuriated	Premier	Aberhart.	The	populist	Premier,	who	preached	his	blend	of	fundamentalism	and	Pentecostalism	on	a	weekly	radio	show,	objected	to	Ottawa’s	determination	to	uphold	its	constitutional	rights.	The	federal	government	would	disallow	eleven	Alberta	statutes	between	1937	and	1941.109								Aberhart	also	objected	to	the	Royal	Commission’s	very	existence.	When	Prime	Minister	King	had	formally	announced	the	Commission	in	mid-August	1937,	Aberhart	had	furiously	telegraphed	his	objections	to	the	personnel	and	the	mandate.	He	detected	renewed	hints	about	the	imposition	of	a	loan	council.	“Other	equally	dangerous	and	undesirable	possibilities	for	centralizing	financial	control	and	weakening	the	sovereignty	of	THE	PEOPLE	of	each	Province	are,	in	our	view,	certain	to	arise	from	these	particular	terms	of	reference	and	this	particular	Commission.”110	[Sic]	Aberhart	added	a	final	shot:	He	was	certain	that	King	had	moved	with	“precipitate	haste”	in	announcing	the	commission	so	that	it	would	coincide	with	Ottawa’s	recent	disallowance	of	his	provincial	legislation.111	
																																																								109	Howard	Palmer	with	Tamara	Palmer,	Alberta:	A	New	History.	(Edmonton:	Hurtig	Publishers	Ltd.,	1990)	p.	274.	110	Alberta	Premier	William	Aberhart	to	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King,	August	26,	1937,	LAC,	Provincial	Matters	–	Alberta	–	Miscellaneous	P	1-1-10,	RG	19,	Volume	3985,	p.	3.		111	Aberhart	to	King,	4.	
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						King	rebutted	every	point	in	the	letter.	There	were	no	hints	of	a	loan	council	in	his	press	release.	He	had	first	announced	the	commission	in	the	House	of	Commons	in	February	1937.	The	commissioners	had	no	mandate	to	change	the	constitution.	Finally,	King	could	not	ignore	“the	offensive	remark	in	your	last	paragraph	…	It	appears	to	be	part	of	a	studied	attempt	to	insinuate	that	there	were	ulterior	motives	in	the	appointment	of	the	Royal	Commission.	Only	to	yourself	will	it	be	necessary	to	deny	unequivocally	that	there	was	any	connection…”112							It	was	clear	that	there	was	no	leeway	for	compromise.	The	Premier	refused	to	participate	in	the	Rowell-Sirois	hearings	in	Edmonton	in	the	spring	of	1938	–	but	his	government	did	prepare	a	377-page	submission	along	with	seventy	extra	pages	of	summaries	and	appendices,	which	it	sent	to	Ottawa,	which,	in	turn,	forwarded	it	to	the	commission.	That	submission	listed	Alberta’s	complaints	about	the	“faulty	financial	system”	and	touted	its	monetary	magic,	which	promised	to	replace	cash	with	credit	notes.113	It	called	for	Ottawa	to	assume	responsibility	for	unemployment	relief	and	old-age	pensions,	to	recognize	the	“disabilities	borne	by	the	Province	arising	out	of	national	policies	such	as	the	tariff	and	the	present	freight	rate	structure,”	and	to	take	responsibility	for	the	special	disabilities	arising	from	Dominion	monetary	policy.114	Ottawa	should	also	inaugurate	grants-in-aid	for	public	health,	education,	mothers’	allowances	and	highway	construction,	pending	
																																																								112	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King	to	Alberta	Premier	William	Aberhart,	August	31,	1937.	Australian	Trade	Commissioner	L.	R.	Macgregor	to	the	Department	of	External	Affairs	Secretary,	p.	4.	113	The	Case	for	Alberta:	Dominion/Provincial	Relations	1938,	Part	11,	(Edmonton:	A.	Shanks,	King’s	Printer,	Government	of	Alberta,	1938)	p.	25.	114	The	Case	for	Alberta:	Dominion/Provincial	Relations	1938,	375.376.	
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“the	transition	period	to	a	new	economic	order.”115	In	effect,	Alberta	maintained	that	Ottawa	had	put	the	province	in	an	unequal	fiscal	position	–	and	it	had	to	pay	for	it.							Despite	the	mercurial	Premier’s	absence,	the	commission’s	visit	to	Edmonton	was	dramatic.	Under	the	guise	of	a	frugality	that	seemed	suspiciously	like	revenge,	Aberhart	cut	off	the	utilities	at	Government	House.	The	Commissioners	were	guests	at	a	luncheon	there	when	Aberhart	turned	off	the	water	to	force	the	Bowen	family	to	move.	No	lieutenant	governor	would	ever	reside	there	again	–	although	the	Jacobean	Revival-style	building	is	now	used	for	government	dinners	and	receptions.									McGeachy	was	irrepressible.	As	he	noted:	“In	other	capitals	the	visitors	have	had	polite	bids	to	lunch,	or	even	dinner,	from	the	powers	that	be.	Here	they	live	in	a	social	vacuum.”116	Canadians	surely	shook	their	heads,	especially	when	McGeachy	imagined	Aberhart	dining	“in	solemn	solitude	at	the	town’s	leading	cafeteria.”117						But	the	commissioners	did	receive	a	significant	64-page	brief	from	the	Edmonton	Chamber	of	Commerce,	which	effectively	called	for	equalization.	The	Chamber	outlined	the	five	disabilities	“that	rendered	Alberta	so	vulnerable	when	the	recent	depression	began.”118	Those	included:	the	cost	of	pioneer	development	and	railway	branch	lines,	excessive	freight	costs,	high	interest	rates,	and	Ottawa’s	high	tariffs.	In	
																																																								115	The	Case	for	Alberta:	Dominion/Provincial	Relations	1938,	377.	116	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press	on	Thursday,	March	31,	1938.	p.	1.	117	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press	on	Thursday,	March	31,	193.	118	Brief	of	the	Edmonton	Chamber	of	Commerce,	p.	39.	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6985/90?r=0&s=5	
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stark	contrast	with	Ottawa’s	approach,	the	Edmonton	Chamber	complained,	Australia	and	Argentina	had	depreciated	their	currencies	during	the	Depression.119							Meanwhile,	the	cost	of	its	social	responsibilities	was	crippling	Alberta.	Ottawa	should	assume	responsibility	for	“unemployment	relief,	unemployment	insurance,	old	age	pensions,	pensions	for	the	blind,	widowed	mothers’	allowances,	public	health,	hours	of	work,	minimum	wages,	workmen’s	compensation,	gaols	and	reformatories,	and	life,	fire	and	other	forms	of	insurance.”120	It	should	also	increase	its	grants	to	the	provinces	for	education	and	transportation	infrastructure.							But	its	most	striking	recommendation	was	buried	in	a	paragraph	near	the	end	of	the	brief	when	it	demanded	that	Ottawa	duplicate	Australia’s	approach	to	fiscal	inequality	among	states:		The	establishment	by	the	federal	parliament	of	a	permanent	board	or	commission,	somewhat	after	the	pattern	of	the	Australian	Grants	Commission,	for	the	purpose	of	reconsidering,	at	regular	intervals,	what	subsidies,	subventions	or	grants	should	be	paid	by	the	Dominion	to	the	various	provinces;	such	reconsideration	to	be	automatic,	non-political	and	based	upon	submissions	by	the	various	provinces	as	to	what	would	constitute	fair	subsidies	in	view	of	their	respective	positions	within	the	Dominion	and	the	varying	incidence	upon	them	of	past	and	present	current	national	policies.121		
						The	commissioners	carried	on,	united	in	their	growing	camaraderie	amid	the	constant	complaints	about	inequality	and	unfair	treatment	from	the	poorer	and	the	wealthier	provinces.	And	then	came	their	hearings	in	Ontario	–	and	the	week	that	they	would	lose	their	chairman.	Newton	Rowell	was	the	cornerstone	of	the																																																									119	Brief	of	the	Edmonton	Chamber	of	Commerce,	p.	41.	120	Brief	of	the	Edmonton	Chamber	of	Commerce,	p.	52.		121	Brief	of	the	Edmonton	Chamber	of	Commerce,	p.	63.	
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commission,	the	chief	justice	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Ontario,	and	the	link	to	Ontario’s	obstreperous	and	relatively	wealthy	Liberal	government,	which	was	deeply	suspicious	of	the	commission.	When	Ontario	Premier	Mitchell	Hepburn	appeared	on	May	2,	1938,	he	seemed	unsettled	by	Rowell’s	very	presence.	Commissioner	Angus	would	later	speculate	that	Hepburn	was	embarrassed.	The	Premier	mispronounced	words.	His	jokes	fell	flat.	He	was	rattled.122						But	that	did	not	check	Hepburn’s	anti-Ottawa	diatribe.	Ottawa	should	not	have	empowered	a	Royal	Commission	to	handle	this	serious	issue	of	redesigning	the	federation,	fumed	Hepburn.	It	should	have	called	a	Dominion-Provincial	conference.123	The	commissioners	should	remember	that	$75-million	to	$80-million	of	Ontario	residents’	tax	dollars	went	to	the	Maritimes	and	the	Prairies	every	year	–	which	represented	$21	per	capita.124								Ontario	was	doing	its	best	amid	its	squawking	provincial	dependents:	“It	is	almost	incredible	that	the	Prairie	Provinces	should	now	claim	disability	against	the	rest	of	Canada	because	the	wheat-growers	of	the	Prairie	Provinces	were	not	enabled	to	enter	into	competitive	devaluation	of	currency	with	Australia,”	the	Premier	observed.125	Meanwhile,	he	declared,	Prairie	economists	had	proven	that	Nova	Scotia’s	claim	for	compensation	for	the	disabilities	of	the	federation	was	incorrect.																																																									122	Brief	of	the	Edmonton	Chamber	of	Commerce,	262.	123	Statement	of	Honourable	Mitchell	F.	Hepburn	to	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	April	1938.	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	12.	p.	25.	124	Statement	of	Honourable	Mitchell	F.	Hepburn	to	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	April	1938.	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	12.	p.		21.	125	Statement	of	Honourable	Mitchell	F.	Hepburn	to	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	April	1938.	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	12.	p.	16.	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6986/550?r=0&s=4		
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“Perhaps,	one	could	not	find	a	more	striking	illustration	of	the	practicalities	of	compensating	provinces	for	the	disabilities	they	claim	(even	the	real	ones)	as	a	result	of	federal	policy.”126	In	other	words,	provinces	should	not	be	permitted	to	blame	the	very	act	of	federation	for	their	fiscal	woes.						Once	again,	Australia	figured	in	a	province’s	arguments.	Ontario	opposed	any	centralization	of	social	programs	–	despite	the	inequalities	among	the	provinces.	The	provincial	brief	cited	a	quotation	from	the	CGC,	which	observed	that,	despite	the	confusions	of	federalism,	it	was	more	efficient	to	have	provincial	administration	of	social	programs	than	to	unify	the	administration	in	Canberra	–	or,	it	added,	in	Ottawa.127	Ontario	also	objected	to	any	attempt	to	compensate	provinces	for	the	disabilities	of	the	federation,	especially	the	tariff.	As	the	brief	noted	tartly,	Australia	had	rejected	any	claim	for	grants	based	on	such	disabilities	as	the	effects	of	the	tariff:	the	Grants	Commission	had	deplored	“the	validity	of	the	whole	basis	of	making	claims	on	the	grounds	of	the	uneven	effects	of	either	individual	or	total	federal	policy.”128							There	was	a	limit	to	Ontario’s	generosity,	and	there	should	be	a	limit	to	Ottawa’s	redistribution	for	the	sake	of	national	unity.	“The	Government	of	Ontario	believes	that	the	people	of	Ontario	have	carried	their	share,	and	more	than	their	share	of	the	
																																																								126	Statement	of	Honourable	Mitchell	F.	Hepburn,	21.	127	Statement	by	the	Government	of	Ontario	to	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	12,	p.	13.		http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6986/584?r=0&s=6		128	Statement	by	the	Government	of	Ontario	to	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	12,	p.	79.	
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financial	burden	of	Confederation,”	Hepburn	maintained.129	There	was	more.	“Equality	between	the	Provinces	is	impossible…and	yet,	somehow,	we	must	get	along	together,”	the	Premier	proclaimed.	“The	Provinces	are	fiscal	entities;	and	governments,	like	individuals,	must	learn	to	manage	within	their	means.”130	The	other	provinces	had	to	curb	their	spendthrift	ways.	Ottawa	had	to	scale	back	its	share	of	income	tax	because	“it	is	poor	politics,	and	worse	economy,	that	one	government	should	tax	for	another	to	spend.”131	The	Premier	concluded:	“A	sense	of	sectional	injustice	has	too	long	retarded	the	national	aspirations	of	the	Canadian	people.”132	In	effect,	he	wanted	the	poorer	provinces	to	get	over	it.								It	was	an	extraordinary	performance	–	and	a	strong	assertion	of	provincial	rights	–	or	at	least,	the	rights	of	the	richer	provinces.	As	McGeachy	observed	almost	gleefully:		The	Great	Hepburn,	defender	of	hard-pressed	Ontario	against	the	idle	rich	of	Saskatchewan	and	Manitoba….	looked	as	sleek	and	round	as	usual	but	less	vivacious…As	his	jokes	fell	like	pancakes	in	a	puddle,	Mr.	Hepburn	was	obviously	unhappy	though	he	never	lost	his	aplomb…..	He	was	expected	to	put	up	a	battle	for	provincial	rights	but	nobody	supposed	his	statement	would	be	quite	as	full	of	half-baked	economics,	appeals	to	prejudice,	jumbled	logic	and	parish	politics	as	it	was.133																																																											129	Statement	of	Honourable	Mitchell	F.	Hepburn	to	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	April	1938.	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	12.	p.	22.	130	Statement	of	Honourable	Mitchell	F.	Hepburn	to	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	April	1938.	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	12.	Tuesday,	May	3,	1938,	p.	11.	131	Statement	of	Honourable	Mitchell	F.	Hepburn	to	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	April	193,	10.		132	Statement	of	Honourable	Mitchell	F.	Hepburn	to	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	April	193,	21.	133	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press	on	Tuesday,	May	3,	1938.	p.	1.	
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				The	journalist	noted	that	Hepburn	divided	the	provinces	into	two	apparently	irreconcilable	camps	–	and	he	viewed	Western	proposals	to	give	new	tasks	and	enlarged	taxing	powers	to	Ottawa	as	“nothing	but	an	unashamed	raid	by	the	orphans	of	Confederation	on	the	pockets	of	Central	Canada.”134	McGeachy	added:	“It	was	a	hilarious	performance,	but	the	atmosphere	was	pretty	grim.	The	Commission	was	not	amused.”135							Although	it	is	important	to	remember	that	McGeachy	was	an	employee	of	the	
Winnipeg	Free	Press,	and	presumably	inclined	to	favour	the	prevailing	Western	viewpoint,	it	appears	that	Hepburn	really	did	go	too	far.	Commissioner	Henry	Angus	recalled	that	Hepburn’s	“somewhat	truculent	presentation…shocked	the	newsmen	and	deeply	hurt	the	Chief	Justice…[He]	was	very	distressed	by	the	Commission’s	reception	in	his	home	province.”136	After	Hepburn	finished	speaking,	the	dignified	Rowell	was	sufficiently	upset	to	make	a	brief	statement:	The	commission	was	simply	a	“fact-finding	body”	that	would	issue	recommendations	for	the	consideration	of	a	Dominion-Provincial	Conference.137	No	more	than	that:	It	had	no	power	to	change	the	Constitution.	To	add	to	Rowell’s	worries,	he	was	also	concerned	about	an	important	case	before	his	Ontario	court.138																																																										134	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press	on	Tuesday,	May	3,	1938.	p.	1.	135	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press	on	Tuesday,	May	3,	1938.	p.	1.	136	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	pp.	261-262.	137	Digest	of	Briefs	and	Evidence	for	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	FA	33-	20	(Series	23)	part	2.	p.	12.		And	“Conference	Necessary	Before	Commission’s	Findings	Acted	Upon”	in	The	Globe	and	Mail,	Tuesday,	May	3,	1938.	p.	2.	138	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	p.	262.	
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					But	Rowell	did	not	hold	grudges.	He	did	appear	at	a	dinner	on	Wednesday,	May	4,	1938,	that	Hepburn	threw	for	the	commissioners	and	their	staff	along	with	his	cabinet	members	at	the	King	Edward	Hotel.	The	party	was	sedate	until	the	abstemious	Rowell	left.	Then,	as	Maritime	commissioner	R.	A.	“Bert”	MacKay	told	his	horrified	wife	Kathleen,	the	scotch	flowed	freely	while	Hepburn	and	the	dean	of	the	Saskatchewan	law	school,	Frederick	Clinton	Cronkite,	sang	an	off-colour	duet.	There	were	more	songs	and	stories.	The	commissioners	who	stayed	for	the	party	and	their	staff	could	“not	help	liking	him	[the	Premier],	even	though	[they]	might	thoroughly	disagree	with	him.”139	Unlike	Hepburn,	however,	the	commissioners	were	clearly	leaning	toward	greater	financial	equality	among	the	governments.	But	they	were	coming	to	understand	the	varying	notions	of	federalism	–	and	the	limits	to	remedying	inequality.									During	the	party,	two	Ontario	cabinet	ministers	and	Deputy	Provincial	Treasurer	Chester	Walters	apologized	to	MacKay	for	Hepburn’s	speech,	which	confirmed	MacKay’s	view	that	Hepburn	had	formed	a	defensive	alliance	against	Ottawa	with	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis:	“Circumstances	were	such	that	he	[Hepburn]	more	or	less	had	to	do	it	(no	doubt	his	bargain	with	Duplessis)	though	he	thoroughly	disliked	it.”140	Hepburn	himself	“quit	singing	and	remarked	in	my	ear	to	
																																																								139	Royal	Commissioner	R.	A.	MacKay	to	his	wife	Kathleen	MacKay,	May	8,	1928.	LAC.	Royal	Commission	–	Personal	letters	–	Mackay	to	his	wife	Kathleen,	1937-38.	MG30,	Series	E159.	Volume	1d,	eight.	140.	Royal	Commissioner	R.	A.	MacKay	to	his	wife	Kathleen	MacKay,	May	8,	1928.	LAC.	Royal	Commission	–	Personal	letters	–	Mackay	to	his	wife	Kathleen,	1937-38.	MG30,	Series	E159.	Volume	1,	seven.	
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the	effect	that	Ontario	wasn’t	so	damned	provincially	minded	and	that	we	were	all	Canadians	anyway.”141							MacKay	credited	the	party	for	the	more	conciliatory	tone	at	the	remaining	Commission	hearings	in	Toronto.	But	Rowell	was	failing.	His	health	could	not	stand	the	stress.	Five	days	after	Hepburn’s	diatribe,	on	May	7,	1938,	Rowell	suffered	a	heart	attack	followed	by	a	crippling	stroke.	His	colleagues	were	stricken.	Rowell	had	been	well	acquainted	with	Dafoe	before	the	commission,	and	he	had	bonded	with	the	other	three	during	their	arduous	cross-country	tours.	The	commissioners	had	known	that	Rowell’s	health	had	never	been	good.	They	had	noticed	that	he	rationed	his	strength	for	hard	work.	But	those	hearings	were	really	intensive.						He	was	probably	beyond	help	after	the	heart	attack	and	the	stroke.	In	Rowell’s	absence,	Sirois	became	Acting	Chairman.	He	would	become	Chairman	when	Rowell	resigned	in	November	1938.	By	early	August,	Rowell	could	read	a	little	–	and	apparently	understand	what	was	said	to	him.	And	that	was	all.	But	he	would	not	die	until	November	1941,	trapped	in	his	silent	netherworld.	As	his	biographer,	historian	Margaret	Prang,	observes:	“Not	a	few	wondered	whether	his	encounter	with	the	brash	and	vulgar	Hepburn	had	contributed	to	his	illness.”142							The	commissioners	were	left	reeling.	But	they	somehow	carried	on.	They	finished	their	hearings	in	Toronto,	and	then	continued	in	mid-May	to	Quebec	City.	There,	they	met	with	formidable	representations	of	provincial	cultural	and	linguistic	rights.																																																									141	Royal	Commissioner	R.	A.	MacKay	to	his	wife	Kathleen	MacKay,	May	8,	1928.	LAC.	Royal	Commission	–	Personal	letters	–	Mackay	to	his	wife	Kathleen,	1937-38.	MG30,	Series	E159.	Volume	1d,	seven.	142	Margaret	Prang,	Newton	Rowell:	Ontario	Nationalist.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1975)	496.	
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Despite	Francophone	Counsel	St.	Laurent’s	pleas,	Quebec	Premier	Duplessis	refused	to	appear	as	a	witness	–	or	to	answer	any	of	the	twenty-three	questions	that	Saint	Laurent	had	submitted.	(Sample:	“What	is	the	view	of	the	Quebec	Government	as	to	the	inclusion	in	the	Canadian	Constitution	of	safeguards	for	fundamental	rights	of	citizenship,	such	as	freedom	of	speech,	of	the	press,	of	assembly,	and	of	access	to	the	Courts?”)143								Instead,	on	the	Quebec	government’s	behalf,	Quebec	lawyer	Emery	Beaulieu	read	an	eleven-page	memo	that	endorsed	Ontario	Premier	Mitchell	Hepburn’s	opposition	to	centralization,	depicting	it	as	a	feature	“in	countries	that	we	call	totalitarian.”144	How	dare	Ottawa	ask	a	royal	commission	to	look	into	provincial	finances?	“Under	our	federal	system,	each	province,	in	its	own	sphere,	constitutes	an	autonomous	state,	enjoying	all	the	prerogatives	of	a	sovereign	state	and	not	subject	to	federal	power,”	Beaulieu	read.	(My	translation.)145	If	Quebec	recognized	the	Royal	Commission’s	authority,	it	would	have	to	“consent	to	sacrifice	the	prerogatives	of	provincial	authority.”146							Ottawa	was	not	entitled	to	examine	Quebec’s	financial	position.	If	it	wanted	to	pry	into	the	nation’s	finances	–	and	it	should	because	Confederation	had	“prejudicially																																																									143	Questions	On	Which	The	Commission	Would	Be	Glad	To	Have	The	Views	Of	The	Government	Of	Quebec,”	Royal	Commission	On	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	13,	p.	4.		http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6987/329?r=0&s=5		144	Statement	of	Province	of	Quebec	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	13	p.	7.		145	Statement	of	Province	of	Quebec	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	13	p.	2.		146	Statement	of	Province	of	Quebec	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	3.	
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affected”	Ontario	and	Quebec	–	it	should	work	with	the	provincial	legislatures.	Provinces	needed	higher	subsidies	–	and	Ottawa	should	free	up	more	tax	room	for	provinces	to	raise	their	own	revenues.	Duplessis	even	thanked	Hepburn	for	dismissing	the	complaints	of	the	West	about	the	disabilities	of	federation.147	Quebec	would	share	with	its	fellow	provinces	–	but	it	would	not	abridge	its	rights	under	“the	fallacious	pretense	of	working	for	the	common	weal.”148							The	Fathers	of	Confederation	“belonging	to	two	great	races	and	two	parties”	had	designed	the	federation	to	protect	the	rights	of	minorities.149	Quebec	would	protect	its	distinct	identity	of	francophone	culture,	religion	and	language	–	and	any	federal	interference	in	those	provincial	rights	would	damage	the	Confederation	pact.	It	was	an	unmistakable	warning	that	Ottawa	could	not	impose	its	terms	on	the	province.	Le	
Devoir	printed	the	entire	text	of	Beaulieu’s	statement	under	the	headline,	“Ottawa	should	have	started	by	consulting	all	the	provinces.”150	The	statement	would	demonstrate	why	any	postwar	effort	to	centralize	revenues	to	deal	with	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	provinces	would	fail.							The	ever-curious	McGeachy	confirmed	that	Hepburn	and	Duplessis	–	“the	Jonathan	and	David	of	Canadian	politics”	–	had	collaborated	in	their	approach	to	the	commission:	“On	learning	that	Mitch’s	address	to	the	Commission	was	to	be	a	snooty	repudiation	of	all	responsibility	to	be	helpful,	Maurice	agreed	to	co-operate																																																									147	Statement	of	Province	of	Quebec	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	13.	p.	8.	148	“Quebec	Denies	Power	of	Dominion	to	Probe	Provincial	Finances”	in	The	Globe	
and	Mail,	Friday,	May	13,	1938.	p.	15.	149	Statement	of	Province	of	Quebec	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	13	p.	10.	150	Le	Devoir,	Thursday,	May	12,	1938.	p.	My	Translation	
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on	that	basis.”151	Le	Devoir	journalist	Léopold	Richer	noted	that	the	Commission	could	recommend	anything	that	it	wished,	but	“the	federal	government	will	think	twice	before	recommending	constitutional	reforms…because	of	the	attitude	of	Ontario	and	Quebec….no	federal	party	will	know	what	to	do	in	the	face	of	the	combined	opposition	of	Ontario	and	Quebec.”152	That	was	a	prescient	insight.	The	next	day,	the	Commission	heard	from	four	witnesses,	including	the	Montreal	Board	of	Trade,	the	Montreal	division	of	the	Chamber	of	Commerce,	and	lawyer	Hector	Lalonde	from	La	Société	Saint-Jean-Baptiste	de	Montréal.	The	Société’s	brief	was	a	constitutional	review	of	Quebec’s	place	within	Canada,	and	a	fierce	affirmation	of	the	province’s	rights.	“In	fact,	and	in	law,	Canada	is	a	mixed	nation:	it	constitutes	two	races,	two	cultures,	two	civilizations…we	wish	to	review	the	consistency	of	this	phenomenon	back	through	the	double	Canadian	personality	which	has	generated	it.”153								Then	the	Société	started	with	Jacques	Cartier’s	voyage	in	1534,	scrolling	up	to	the	present.	“If	one	admits	that	the	life	of	a	province,	its	economic,	social,	political	life,	must	be	organized	in	a	manner	that	allows	the	province	to	conserve	its	moral	and	spiritual	heritage	–	culture	and	civilization	–	it	is	necessary	that	its	political	climate	allows	it	to	grow	in	its	innate	fashion…If	the	federal	government	sincerely	wants	to	do	a	great	service	to	the	Province	of	Quebec,	which	service	will	also	benefit	all	of																																																									151	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press	on	Friday,	May	13,	1938.	p.	1.	152	Léopold	Richer,	“Sur	l’accueil	plûtot	frais	de	l’Ontario	et	du	Québec	à	la	commission	Rowell,”	Le	Devoir,	Friday,	May	13,	1938.	pps.	1-2.	My	translation.	153	Brief	of	the	Société	Saint-Jean	Baptiste	de	Montréal,	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	13,	p.	186.	(Text	page	p.	3)	My	translation.		
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Canada,	it	is	not	through	centralizing	the	administration	of	social	laws,	but	in	supporting	the	economic	recovery.”154	It	was	a	discreet	warning	that	the	absent	Duplessis	would	surely	have	cheered.							But	the	Quebec	Premier	was	not	without	politesse.	The	commissioners	had	lunch	at	Government	House	on	the	same	day	–	and	the	Premier	sat	next	to	the	bilingual	Angus.	“He	was	quite	genial	and,	in	a	somewhat	malicious	way,	witty,”	Angus	later	recalled.155	The	commissioners	still	hoped	that	Duplessis	would	relent	–	and	testify	–	addressing	the	list	of	twenty-three	questions	that	St.	Laurent	had	posed.	The	Premier	then	invited	everyone	to	dinner	at	the	Chateau	Frontenac.	They	accepted,	again.	Still	hoping.	It	turned	into	a	rowdy	evening.	As	historian	Dale	C.	Thomson	notes:	“An	ardent	baseball	fan,	Duplessis	proved	expert	in	knocking	out	electric	light	bulbs	with	champagne	glasses.”156	The	party	continued	throughout	the	night.	Angus	recalled	that	St.	Laurent	had	asked	him	after	Hepburn’s	Toronto	party	what	the	people	of	Ontario	would	say	about	the	conduct	of	their	leaders.	Now	he	could	not	resist	posing	the	same	question	to	the	dignified	St.	Laurent.157	He	did	not	record	the	answer.						Duplessis	never	did	appear	before	the	commission.	As	his	biographer	Conrad	Black	explains,	he	and	Hepburn	were	annoyed	at	Ottawa	for	its	refusal	to	authorize	hydroelectric	exports	to	the	United	States.	This	would	remain	a	“considerable																																																									154	Brief	of	the	Société	Saint-Jean	Baptiste	de	Montréal,	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations.	p.	199.	(Text	page	28).	My	translation.	155	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	281.	156	Dale	C.	Thomson,	Louis	St.	Laurent:	Canadian.	(Toronto:	Macmillan	of	Canada,	1967).	p.	95.	157	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	281.	
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irritant	to	federal-provincial	relations	for	many	years.”158	But	Duplessis	would	stop	drinking	at	the	beginning	of	1942.	And	he	would	become	one	of	the	key	proponents	of	provincial	rights	who	would	force	Ottawa	to	find	a	better	way	to	share	among	the	provinces.						The	fiscal	gulfs	within	the	federation	were	now	much	clearer	to	the	commissioners.	After	Quebec	City,	at	the	commission’s	next	stop	in	Fredericton,	New	Brunswick,	the	provincial	government	pleaded	for	the	ability	to	improve	the	quality	of	its	social	services	for	its	faltering	communities.	The	Province	rejected	any	principle	of	equality	among	the	provinces	when	calculating	federal	subsidies:		It	was	“quite	apparent	from	the	record	that	the	grants	to	the	provinces	have	always	been	based	upon	the	principle	of	fiscal	need….[But]	the	fiscal	need	of	one	province	may	be	quite	different	from	the	fiscal	need	of	another	province.”159		The	Province	of	New	Brunswick	had	been	unfairly	placed	in	an	unequal	situation:	Wealth	is	centralized	in	one	or	two	provinces	and	the	future	of	the	Dominion	depends	upon	a	proper	adjustment	of	revenue,	and	the	consideration	of	the	resources	of	one	province	as	compared	with	other	provinces.	We	do	not	advocate	a	redistribution	of	all	the	wealth	in	Canada	but	what	we	say	is	that,	to	the	extent	that	allowances	are	necessary	in	some	provinces,	the	burden	should	fall	upon	the	provinces	which	have	most	profited	by	the	operation	of	the	Confederation	system.160									For	New	Brunswick,	social	cohesion	and	national	unity	were	at	risk	if	Ottawa	did	
not	share	more	funds	with	the	poorer	provinces	in	recognition	of	their	fiscal	need.																																																									158	Conrad	Black,	Render	Unto	Caesar:	The	Life	and	Legacy	of	Maurice	Duplessis	(Toronto:	Key	Porter	Books	Limited,	1998)	p.	156.		159	Submission	by	The	Government	Of	The	Province	Of	New	Brunswick	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Part	1,	LAC,	RG33/23,	Volume	13	p.	10.	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6987/345?r=0&s=4		160	New	Brunswick	submission,	p.	11.	
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The	province	needed	money	to	expand	social	programs.	Illiteracy	rates	were	the	highest	in	Canada.161	Less	than	8,500	of	92,000	children	of	secondary	school	age	in	New	Brunswick	were	actually	attending	school.162	The	province	spent	half	as	much	per	pupil	as	Ontario	did.163	New	Brunswick	had	a	plan	for	the	exhausted	commissioners:	Ottawa	should	set	the	standards	for	education	and	then	hand	over	the	cash	to	fund	those	programs	to	the	provincial	government,	which	would	administer	the	programs.	The	province	would	make	sure	that	the	money	went	where	it	was	needed.	If	the	outcome	was	unsatisfactory,	Ottawa	could	revoke	the	grants	because	they	would	have	a	specific	time	limit.164							McGeachy	was	baffled	when	the	province	suggested	that	“income	tax,	sales	tax,	and	succession	duties	should	all	be	reserved	for	the	provinces.”165	When	the	Commissioners	inquired	as	to	“how	the	Dominion	could	find	the	money	to	finance	social	services	if	deprived	of	these	sources,	[the	province’s	lawyer]	was	not	sure.”166						Other	witnesses	guardedly	backed	the	impoverished	provincial	government.	The	Union	of	New	Brunswick	Municipalities	related	the	plight	of	the	failing	pulp-and-paper	town	of	Newcastle.	The	town	had	spent	$3,300	on	education	in	1901	and	
																																																								161	Analysis	of	the	Union	of	New	Brunswick	Municipalities	brief	in	the	Analysis	of	Evidence	Taken	At	The	Regina	Sittings	of	the	Royal	Commission,	prepared	for	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,	LAC,	RG	33,	Series	23,	Vol.	60.	p.	50.	162	Analysis	of	the	Union	of	New	Brunswick	Municipalities	brief	in	the	Analysis	of	Evidence	Taken	At	The	Regina	Sittings	of	the	Royal	Commission,	prepared	for	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,	LAC,	RG	33,	Series	23,	Vol.	60.	p.	50.	163	Analysis	of	the	Union	of	New	Brunswick	Municipalities	brief.	50.	164	Analysis	of	the	Union	of	New	Brunswick	Municipalities	brief.	50.		165	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press	on	Thursday,	May	19,	1938.	p.	1.	166	J.	B.	McGeachy,	“Confederation	Clinic”	in	the	Winnipeg	Free	Press	on	Thursday,	May	19,	1938.	p.	1.	
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$33,000	in	1931	–	“with	practically	no	increase	in	population.”167	The	New	Brunswick	Teachers	Association	appealed	for	federal	funds	“to	equalize	educational	opportunities”	within	the	province	–	and	presumably	within	the	Rest	of	Canada.168	Those	were	the	laments	of	the	impoverished	who	could	never	raise	enough	money	on	their	own.									When	the	hearings	resumed	in	Ottawa	in	late	May,	the	influential	Canadian	Welfare	Council	(CWC)	emphasized	the	key	role	of	the	State	in	the	security	of	the	individual.	Citizens	should	be	able	to	find	such	employment	“as	will	make	possible	at	least	minimal	subsistence.”	When	that	could	not	be	sustained,	“it	devolves	upon	the	state	to	assure,	directly	or	indirectly,	the	provision	of	aid	necessary	to	the	survival	of	life.”169	Intriguingly,	the	brief	viewed	increased	social	aid	as	the	remedy	for	
dependency:	“The	persisting	and	increasing	extent	of	dependency	among	our	population	taps	at	the	very	source	of	national	virility	and	that	sense	of	reasonable	security,	necessary	to	the	growth	of	courage,	freedom	and	independence.	The	task	immediately	before	us	is	to	work	out,	within	the	present	Canadian	social	structure,	reasonably	tolerable	conditions	of	social	well-being	in	our	generation,	without	
																																																								167	Analysis	of	the	Union	of	New	Brunswick	Municipalities	brief	in	the	Analysis	of	Evidence	Taken	At	The	Regina	Sittings	of	the	Royal	Commission,	prepared	for	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,	LAC,	RG	33,	Series	23,	Vol.	60.	p.	51.	168	Brief	of	the	New	Brunswick	Teachers	Association	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG	33,	Series	23,	Vol.	14.	p.	7.	169	“Welfare	Services	for	the	Canadian	People:	A	summary	of	the	submission	of	The	Canadian	Welfare	Council	to	the	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Ottawa,	May	1938,”	RG33/23,	Volume	13	p.	1.	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6988/123?r=0&s=5		
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prejudice	to	the	Canada	of	a	hundred	years	hence.”170	The	brief	went	on	to	outline	a	complicated	system	of	contributory	and	non-contributory	services	that	different	levels	of	government	could		administer:	Ottawa,	for	one,	could	handle	Unemployment	Insurance,	health	insurance	and	Old-Age	Pensions.171									A	few	days	later,	on	May	30,	1938,	the	five-person	delegation	from	the	Canadian	Chamber	of	Commerce	bustled	into	the	hearing	room	at	the	Board	of	Railway	Commissioners	with	a	brief	that	presented	“a	national	standpoint	and	a	businessman’s	standpoint”	on	Canada’s	problems.172	Perhaps	unsurprisingly,	the	Chamber	called	for	balanced	budgets,	smaller	government	and	federal	old-age	pensions.	But	the	Chamber	representative	H.	W.	Morgan	pushed	for	the	establishment	of	a	loan	council	similar	to	the	Australian	Loan	Council:	If	a	province	needed	loans	from	Ottawa	to	meet	its	financial	obligations,	the	federal	loan	council	would	provide	“some	supervision	of	[the	province’s]	expenditures	and	the	conditions	of	the	loan.”173						Even	more	surprisingly,	the	Chamber	called	for	the	establishment	of	a	permanent	grants	commission	–	similar	to	the	Australian	Grants	Commission	–	to	investigate																																																									170	“Welfare	Services	for	the	Canadian	People:	A	summary	of	the	submission	of	The	Canadian	Welfare	Council	to	the	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations	d,	p.	1.	171	“Welfare	Services	for	the	Canadian	People:	A	summary	of	the	submission	of	The	Canadian	Welfare	Council	to	the	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations	d,	p.	3.	172	H.	W.	Morgan,	Representative	of	the	Canadian	Chamber	of	Commerce,	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations.	May	30,	1938.		http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6995/1098?r=0&s=4		173	H.	W.	Morgan,	Representative	of	the	Canadian	Chamber	of	Commerce,	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations.	May	30,	1938.	p.	9553.	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6995/1146?r=0&s=4		
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the	“fiscal	needs”	of	the	provinces	at	regular	intervals.174	As	Morgan	explained:	“The	Grants	Commission	would	very	definitely	investigate	the	necessity	of	assisting,	of	increased	subsidies.”[Sic]	If	a	province	needed	funds	for	a	specific	purpose,	the	grants	commission	would	examine	that	request	from	“the	standpoint	of	the	Canadian	citizen”	rather	than	the	standpoint	of	governments.175	Morgan	did	not	say,	and	probably	could	not	have	said,	how	that	could	be	accomplished.	But	the	Chamber’s	stand	was	an	indication	of	how	the	fiscal	plight	of	the	poorer	provinces	–	and	the	Australian	solution	–	had	riveted	public	attention.					The	commissioners	were	also	treated	to	one	of	Research	Director	Skelton’s	pranks.	He	slotted	Tim	Buck,	general	secretary	of	the	Communist	Party	of	Canada	(CPC)	into	the	witness	line-up	–	just	before	the	appearance	of	the	president	of	the	National	Research	Council	of	Canada,	temporarily	retired	Major-General	Andrew	McNaughton,	who	would	later	command	the	Canadian	forces	in	Europe.	Skelton	might	have	wished	to	provoke	fireworks	between	the	two	as	they	crossed	paths.					But	the	Commissioners	likely	disappointed	Skelton	because	they	approached	both	witnesses	with	fascinated	questions.								Buck	was	an	extreme	centralizer	in	the	quest	for	social	security:	he	wanted	Ottawa	to	provide	Unemployment	Insurance	and	relief,	health	insurance,	minimum	educational	standards,	Mothers’	Allowances,	Old	Age	Pensions,	aid	to	youth,	and	housing	and	labour	standards.	He	also	wanted	Ottawa	to	assume	control	over	all	companies,	which	were	now	the	“complete	dictators	of	the	economic	life	of	the																																																									174	H.	W.	Morgan,	Representative	of	the	Canadian	Chamber	of	Commerce,	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations.	May	30,	1938,	p.	9553.	175	H.	W.	Morgan,	Representative	of	the	Canadian	Chamber	of	Commerce,	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations.	May	30,	1938d,	p.	9554.	
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country.”176	Corporate	bosses	had	become	the	modern	family	compact	that	controlled	the	government.						The	CPC	General	Secretary	told	the	commissioners	that	his	brief	did	not	represent	his	party’s	final	goal,	which	was	“the	collectivization	of	industry,	mines,	railways	and	factories.”177	He	also	reassured	the	commission	that	“armed	struggle”	had	been	eliminated	from	the	CPC’s	constitution.178	When	the	commission’s	Anglophone	Counsel	James	Stewart	asked	if	extreme	views	on	one	side	provoked	extreme	views	on	the	other	–	“if	fascism	was	not	the	fruit	of	communism”	–	Buck	denied	that	Communists	were	extreme.	“I’m	a	very	conservative	individual,”	he	maintained.179						Despite	such	political	jousting,	the	commissioners	were	more	interested	in	Buck’s	parsing	of	the	national	income,	which	used	Dominion	Bureau	of	Statistics	figures	to	underline	the	ongoing	inequality	among	individual	Canadians.	Roughly	3,600	people	–	or	six-tenths	of	one	per	cent	of	the	population	–	had	pocketed	more	than	twenty-five	per	cent	of	total	Canadian	income	in	1934.180	In	contrast,	Buck	maintained,	3.4	million	people	–	that	is,	ninety	per	cent	of	the	employed	–	received	fifty-one	per	cent	of	the	national	income.181	Remarkably,	the	commissioners	questioned	Buck	for	much	of	that	sunny	June	day.																																																									176	“Toward	Democratic	Unity	for	Canada,”	Submission	of	the	Dominion	Committee,	Communist	Party	of	Canada,	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	ed.	Alderman	Stewart	Smith.	(no	publisher	listed	and	no	date)	p.	41.		177	“Reds,	Peaceful,	Buck	Declares”	in	The	Globe	on	Thursday,	June	2,	1938.	p.3.		178	“Reds,	Peaceful,	Buck	Declares”	in	The	Globe	on	Thursday,	June	2,	1938.	p.3.	179	“Reds,	Peaceful,	Buck	Declares”	in	The	Globe	on	Thursday,	June	2,	1938.	p.3.	180	General	Secretary	Tim	Buck	of	the	Communist	Party	of	Canada	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations	on	June	1,	1938.	p.	9728:	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6995/1327?r=0&s=6	181	Buck,	p.	9732.		http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6995/1331?r=0&s=6	
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					In	contrast,	Major-General	McNaughton	of	the	National	Research	Council	(NRC)	was	relatively	brief	–	but	he	did	offer	a	stout	defence	of	organized	scientific	research	in	Canada,	which	had	been	“almost	non-existent”	prior	to	the	twentieth	century.182	He	pleaded	for	the	continuation	of	funding	for	national	scientific	research	–	despite	the	existence	of	provincial	research	councils.			
The	International	Models				The	workings	of	the	Australian	federation	–	particularly	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	–	were	a	topic	of	great	fascination	in	Canada	during	the	1930s.		In	June	1936,	the	Interim	Report	of	the	National	Employment	Commission	had	called	for	the	establishment	of	“demonstrated	need”	as	a	basis	for	Dominion	grants-in-aid	to	the	provinces.	That	captured	the	emerging	approach	to	fiscal	inequality	during	that	era.183	In	May	1938,	the	Bank	of	Nova	Scotia	devoted	its	entire	Monthly	
Review	to	an	examination	of	special	grants	in	the	Australian	federation:	“There	can	be	no	doubt	that	it	has	achieved	its	primary	purpose	of	saving	the	three	States	from	extreme	financial	embarrassment…It	does	not	seem	to	have	contributed	to	
																																																								182	Major-General	Andrew	McNaughton	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations	on	June	1,	1938.	p.	9879.		http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6996/51?r=0&s=4		183	Interim	Report	Of	The	National	Employment	Commission,	June	1,	1936	to	June	30,	1937.	(Ottawa:	J.	G.	Patenaude,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty:	1937)	19.	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada	–	Economic	&	Financial,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol	CAN	18	Part	I,	Barcode	173366.	n.p.	in	file.	
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extravagance	on	the	part	of	the	States	and	the	method	used	to	determine	the	grants	should	be	protection	against	such	a	development	in	the	future.”184									The	commissioners’	hearings	carried	on	in	tandem	with	their	search	for	international	models	for	federal	sharing.	As	I	will	show,	there	were	many	reports	on	Australia.	There	were	also		several	on	Argentina,	Switzerland,	and	the	United	States.	Several	of	those	reports	were	filed	informally	with	Commission	records	–	and	were	not	recorded	as	official	research	studies.	But,	officially	and	unofficially,	the	Royal	Commission	was	diligent.								Perhaps	the	most	significant	clue	as	to	their	thoughts	occurred	just	before	the	hearings	commenced.	As	the	chairman	of	the	Institute	of	Pacific	Relations	and	one	of	the	founders	of	the	Canadian	Institute	of	International	Affairs,	commissioner	Dafoe	knew	many	foreign	dignitaries.	On	November	24,	1937,	he	wrote	to	his	Australian	friend,	the	chairman	of	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission,	F.	W.	Eggleston.	“I	note	that	in	the	studies	that	are	being	carried	on	by	our	economic	and	taxation	experts,	much	attention	is	being	paid	to	experiments,	if	I	may	call	them	so,	which	are	being	carried	out	by	Australia.	There	is,	I	think,	exceptional	interest	in	the	work	of	the	Special	Grants	Commission	[sic]	of	which	I	note	you	are	chairman.”185						The	cordial	reply,	which	would	not	arrive	until	April	1938,	probably	startled	Dafoe.	Eggleston	sent	copies	of	CGC	reports	and	newspaper	supplements.	And	he	added	a	rueful	observation.	“A	good	many	financial	authorities	from	[North]																																																									184	“Special	Grants	in	the	Australian	Federation,”	The	Bank	of	Nova	Scotia	Monthly	
Review,	Toronto,	May	1938.	The	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada	–	Internal	Politics,	Series	A	981,	Control	symbol	CAN	24	Part	1,	Barcode	173375.	p.	4.	185	Royal	Commissioner	J.	W.	Dafoe	to	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	Chairman	F.	W.	Eggleston,	November	24,	1937.	National	Archives	of	Australia,	MS423,	15.	9.	1.		
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America	have	been	in	Australia	recently,”	Eggleston	wrote.	“They	all	express	interest	and	general	approval	of	our	principles,	but	say	they	would	not	do	in	United	States	of	America	or	Canada	as	the	case	may	be.”	Eggleston	added	that	he	did	not	quite	understand	the	reason	for	this	rejection.	“But	[I]	presume	that	it	is	because	of	the	different	financial	situation	of	the	Constitutional	members,	especially	as	to	debit.	My	theory	is	that	in	a	Federation	it	is	most	unlikely	that	the	operation	of	various	factors	will	produce	equality,	and	this	must	be	rectified	after	careful	assessment.”186	Dafoe	would	do	his	best	to	follow	that	advice	–	and	Australia	was	clearly	in	his	sights.					Meanwhile,	Secretary	Alex	Skelton	started	to	produce	international	experts	for	the	commissioners’	Ottawa	hearings.	On	January	28,	1938,	they	interviewed	former	German	Chancellor	Heinrich	Brüning	on	the	operation	of	federalism	during	the	then-vanished	Weimar	Republic.	He	described	how	richer	states	such	as	Hanover	and	Prussia	were	compelled	to	transfer:		a	certain	part	of	the	income	tax	normally	to	be	refunded	to	them	and	this	was	re-distributed	on	a	very	complicated	key	[sic],	taking	into	consideration	the	amount	of	population,	not	the	amount	of	wealth	of	taxable	income,	but	the	actual	number	of	population,	the	expenditure	for	education	and	for	welfare,	for	unemployment	benefit	and	everything	like	that.	And	by	that	way	the	poorer	states	got	a	special	grant	out	of	the	pocket	of	the	rich	industrial	states.187								On	April	21,	1938,	the	Commissioners	heard	from	University	of	London	law	professor	Ivor	Jennings,	who	explained	how	the	unitary	state	of	England	handled																																																									186	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	Chairman	F.	W.	Eggleston	to	Royal	Commissioner	J.	W.	Dafoe,	April	22,	1938.	University	of	Manitoba	Archives,	John	W.	Dafoe	Fonds,	Box	8,	Folder	3.	p.	2.	My	italics.	187	Evidence	of	former	German	Chancellor	Heinrich	Brüning	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	January	28,	1938,	LAC,	RG	33,	Series,	23,	Volume	20.	pp.	3743-3744.	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6991/751?r=0&s=6		
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the	division	of	powers	among	lower	levels	of	government.	When	Commission	lawyer	Carl	Goldenberg	asked	if	the	national	government’s	assumption	of	services	reflected	“the	fact	that	local	taxation	is	not	sufficiently	flexible	or	elastic	to	meet	modern	needs,”	Jennings	first	hedged	his	reply	with	the	weary	assertion	that	local	authorities	always	insisted	on	corresponding	grants	when	new	services	were	established.188	When	Commissioner	MacKay	posed	that	question	again,	Jennings	agreed	tersely.						On	May	25,	1938,	mere	weeks	after	Rowell	became	incapacitated,	Skelton	even	produced	the	famed	Swedish	political	economist	Gunnar	Myrdal	who	described	his	nation’s	taxation	system	along	with	its	relatively	new	social	support	systems.	The	“big	trouble”	was	the	great	variation	in	the	rates	among	different	counties	and	communities:		In	Stockholm	here	a	number	of	the	large	corporations	have	their	site,	and	where	a	lot	of	rich	people	live	we	have	a	rather	low	taxation	and	still	we	can	go	on	with	very	large	expenditures,	while	in	poorer	country	districts	the	taxation	is	high	and	the	standard	of	expenditure	is	low.	That	is	our	difficulty,	to	get	rid	of	that,	and	our	way	of	doing	it	is	to	give	over	more	and	more	to	the	state	of	expenditure	and	also	to	give	much	more	percentage	of	rate	to	the	poor	districts.189			
																																																								188	Evidence	of	University	of	London	law	professor	Ivor	Jennings	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	April	21,	1938,	LAC,	RG	33,	Series,	23,	Volume	25.	pp.	6714D-6715D.	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6993/1043?r=0&s=6	189	Evidence	of	Stockholm	University	political	economy	professor	Gunnar	Myrdal	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	May	25,	1938,	LAC.	RG33,	Series	23,	Volume	28.	pps.	9142-9143.	http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c6995/712?r=0&s=4		
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			He	added	dolefully	that	Sweden	still	had	“not	solved	the	problem.”190	But	it	was	a	fascinating	description	of	the	struggle	to	assist	poorer	governments	as	the	demand	for	social	services	escalated	within	the	modern	nation-state.								Then	came	experts	on	American	federalism,	including	the	Acting	Director	of	the	U.	S.	Budget	Bureau,	D.	W.	Bell,	who	discussed	the	division	of	powers	between	states	and	the	federal	government	in	education,	highways,	social	services	and	relief,	and	the	Under	Secretary	for	the	Treasury,	Roswell	Magill,	who	reviewed	the	taxation	aspects	of	federal	finance.191	In	October	1938,	the	research	director	of	the	Rockefeller	Center	in	New	York,	Canadian-born	Bryce	M.	Stewart,	outlined	how	the	United	States	handled	unemployed	insurance	and	basic	social	services	such	as	old-age	assistance	–	and	what	that	nation	should	have	done	differently.192						Meanwhile,	the	thousands	of	pages	on	federalist	models	in	the	Royal	Commission	files	remain	astonishing.	Calgary	lawyer	H.	E.	Crowle,	who	was	on	contract	to	the	Commission,	wrote	a	fourteen-page	report	on	Argentina	–	“Argentina	is	in	the	happy	position,	due	largely	to	the	preponderating	power	of	the	federal	capital,	which	is	a	state	of	itself	directly	under	the	federal	power,	of	having	a	federation	whose	federal	government	is	in	a	very	real	sense	the	dominant	government”	–	along	with	studies	on	Switzerland,	New	Zealand	(which	was/is	not	a	federation),	and	marketing	and																																																									190	Evidence	of	Stockholm	University	political	economy	professor	Gunnar	Myrdal	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	May	25,	1938.	p.	9144.	191	Research	Director	D.	A.	Skelton	to	Acting	Director	of	the	U.	S.	Budget	Bureau,	Daniel	Bell,	May	23,	1938,	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	C-6988,	RG33,	Series	23,		192	Evidence	of	New	York’s	Rockefeller	Center	research	director	Bryce	M.	Stewart	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	October,	20,	1938,	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	C-6988,	RG33,	Series	23,	Volume	30,	pps.	9988-10077.	
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price	control	in	Sweden	and	Denmark.193	Crowle	wrote	eighty-one	pages	on	such	topics	as	Australian	banking	and	the	Premiers’	Plan.194	He	also	wrote	a	nine-page	report	on	Australia’s	financial	history,	including	the	workings	of	the	Loan	Council	and	the	Premiers’	Plan.	He	marveled	at	“the	extent	of	the	powers	given	to	the	Australian	Federal	Parliament…by	the	amendment	of	the	Constitution	[in	1929].”195							Other	researchers	pried	into	every	aspect	of	federalism.	University	of	Toronto	dean	of	law	W.	P.	M.	Kennedy	compared	the	distribution	of	legislative	powers	over	welfare,	taxation,	labour,	treaty-making	and	residual	powers	in	Argentina,	Australia,	the	United	States	and	Switzerland.	The	meticulous	47-page	section	on	Australia	concluded	that	the	federation	had	endured	“inadequate	distribution	of	powers,	their	conflicts,	duplication	of	governmental	machinery	and	a	host	of	uncoordinated	services,”	which	extra-constitutional	conferences	had	remedied.196	Kennedy’s	166-page	report	likely	dashed	any	notions	that	Australia	had	devised	the	perfect	approach	to	federalism.	But	Kennedy	did	not	examine	federal	transfer	payments	to	
																																																								193	H.	E.	Crowle,	“Comparative	Federalism:	Report	on	the	Republic	of	Argentina,”	Report	for	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC.	RG33,	Series	23,	Volume	60.	p.	1.		194	H.	E.	Crowle,	“Comparative	Federalism:	“Preliminary	Report	on	Banking	in	Australia”;	“Transportation	In	Australia”;	“Commercial	Law	In	Australia:	Final	Report	On	Marketing	And	Price	Control”;	“Preliminary	Report	On	Insurance	and	On	Corporations	In	Australia”;	“Preliminary	Report	On	Incorporation	And	Regulation	of	Corporations	In	Australia”;	“Commercial	Law	in	Australia”;	“Preliminary	Report	On	Australian	Refunding	Agreements.”	H.	E.	Crowle,	Australia:	Comparative	Federalism,	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG	33,	Series	23,	Volume	60,	pps.	1-81.	195	H.	E.	Crowle,	“Comparative	Federalism:	Report	on	Australian	Refunding	Agreements,”	LAC.	RG	33,	Volume	60.	P.	8.	196	University	of	Toronto	dean	of	law	H.	P.	M.	Kennedy,	“Study	of	Federal	Constitutions,”	LAC,RG33,	Series	23,	Volume	38,	p.	55	
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the	states	to	remedy	inequality,	which	were	becoming	the	focus	of	the	commission’s	studies.								It	is	clear	that	the	Royal	Commission	was	concentrating	on	remedies	for	fiscal	inequality	within	a	federation	–	if	only	to	preserve	cohesion	and	political	stability.	Was	there	a	better	model	than	the	continuation	of	ad	hoc	grants	and	loans	for	ensuring	that	poorer	states	were	compensated	for	their	inequalities	–	so	that	they	could	provide	better	services	to	their	citizenry?	Skelton	asked	one	of	his	former	research	staffers	at	the	Bank	of	Canada	to	do	a	special	report	on	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission:	as	John	Dafoe	would	later	tell	Henry	Angus	in	a	chatty	letter	from	Winnipeg	on	July	5,	1938:	“Jimmy	Coyne	who	has	been	making	a	detailed	study	of	the	operation	of	the	Grants	Commission	tells	me	(he	is	here	on	his	holidays)	that	his	paper	runs	to	225	pages…A	Grants	Commission	on	the	Australian	model	would	never	do	for	Canada	and	I	don’t	think	it	will	have	a	welcome	for	much	longer	in	Australia.”197	So	much	for	prescience.	That	“Jimmy”	would	replace	Towers	as	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	in	1955:	he	would	be	in	office	when	Ottawa	introduced	equalization	legislation	–	albeit	based	upon	a	different	formula	–	in	1956.	And	the	Australian	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	is	still	in	operation.							Coyne’s	meticulous	report	for	the	Royal	Commission	was	entitled	“Federal-State	Financial	Relations	in	Australia,	July	1938.”	It	eventually	ran	to	185	pages,	including	a	24-page	summary.	It	would	review	everything	from	the	early	constitutional	approach	to	financing	state	equality	through	to	the	establishment	of	the	
																																																								197	John	Dafoe	to	Henry	Angus,	July	5,	1938.	University	of	Manitoba	Archives,	John	W.	Dafoe	Fonds.	Box	14,	folder	1,	pps.	3-4.	
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Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	and	the	Premiers’	Plan.198	Coyne	also	wrote	a	79-page	report	on	“Federal-Provincial	Financial	Relations	in	the	Argentine	Republic,”	which	bears	the	inscription:	“It	was	thought	that	a	summary	of	recent	public	finance	history	in	the	Argentine,	similar	to	that	prepared	for	Australia,	would	be	useful.”199	It	was	also	dated	July	1938,	and	it	also	analyzed	federal	and	state	government	functions,	as	well	as	federal	and	state	taxation.							Commissioner	Henry	Angus	also	wrote	a	concise	(and	lively!)	20-page	summary	of	Federal	Finance	in	Australia,	covering	the	evolution	of	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	and	the	Loan	Council	from	1901	to	1937.	The	economist	elicited	broad	principles	from	Australian	legislation	and	from	each	annual	CGC	report.	His	criticism	could	be	trenchant:	Angus	explained	that,	in	its	fourth	year,	the	CGC	had	adopted	the	same	qualifications	for	aid	as	in	previous	hearings,	but	it	had	added	that	it	would	entertain	other	arguments.	“The	result	is	another	very	long	report	with	almost	incredible	repetition.”200	The	solution	for	inequality	was	always	elusive.									By	then,	Dafoe	was	already	wary	of	any	attempt	to	transplant	the	Australian	model	without	adjustments.	As	he	told	Grants	Commission	chair	Eggleston	in	a	revealing	hand-written	letter	on	July	5,	1938	–	the	same	day	that	he	told	Angus																																																									198	“Federal-State	Financial	Relations	in	Australia,	July	1938,”	Coyne,	J.	E.,	“Federal	State	financial	relations	in	Australia,”	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG33,	Series	23,	Volume	59.	pps.	1-25	(Summary)	and	pps.	1-159	(Full	report).		199	“Federal-Provincial	Financial	Relations	In	The	Argentine	Republic,	July	1938,”	Coyne,	J.	E.,	Federal-Provincial	financial	relations	in	the	Argentine	Republic,”	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG33,	Series	23,	Volume	59.	pps.	1-82.	200	“Comments	By	Prof.	Henry	Forbes	Angus	On	Federal	Finance	In	Australia,”	for	the	Royal-Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	H.	F.	Angus	file,	LAC,		RG33,	Series	23,	Volume	71.	p.	15.	
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about	Coyne’s	visit	–	the	Royal	Commission	had	sparked	Canadian	debate	about	the	state	of	the	federation:	“There	has	been	more	discussion	and	study	of	our	national	difficulties	and	problems	in	the	last	six	months	than	in	the	previous	15	years.	There	has	been	a	revelation	of	conflicting	interests	and	loyalties	that	has	shocked	and	stirred	up	opinions,	which	is	all	to	the	good.”	Then	Dafoe	added	pointedly:	“Australia	has	figured	largely	in	the	discussions	and	I	believe	we	are	to	have	the	benefit	of	a	talk	with	[Australian	expert	L.	F.]	Giblin	next	month.	But	Australia	and	Canada	are	very	different	propositions.”201							Still,	as	I	will	show,	Dafoe	and	his	fellow	commissioners	would	eventually	adopt	key	aspects	of	Australia’s	approach	to	fiscal	inequality	among	the	states	in	their	report	–	including	the	emphasis	on	fiscal	need	when	calculating	grants,	as	opposed	to	an	analysis	of	the	“disabilities”	that	federation	inflicted	on	its	members.	(Modern	equalization,	of	course,	is	based	on	the	ability	to	raise	tax	revenues.)	But	that	would	take	many	more	debates.		
The	Problem	of	Fiscal	Need							Indeed,	despite	so	much	expert	work,	one	fundamental	issue	remained	unresolved.	The	commissioners	and	their	staff	could	not	resolve	the	serious	questions	about	fiscal	inequalities	among	governments	–	and	the	remedy	for	it.	On	July	22,	1938,	Skelton	told	Dafoe	that	the	research	team	had	“not	yet	done	any	of	the	work	you	suggested	on	possible	fiscal	need	formulae	and	can	do	very	little”	until	the																																																									201	Royal	Commissioner	John	W.	Dafoe	to	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	Chairman	F.	W.	Eggleston,	July	5,	1938.	National	Archives	of	Australia,	MS423,	1/55.	p.	2.			
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reports	on	federal	finances	and	national	income	were	completed.202	Dafoe	was	looking	for	remedies	for	fiscal	inequalities	based	upon	the	principle	of	what	the	provinces	needed	to	pay	for	government	operations	–	as	was	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	that	he	investigated.								As	Canadians	now	knew,	the	Australian	Commission	did	accept	fiscal	need	as	a	basis	for	assistance.	But	it	had	repeatedly	refused	to	recognize	the	disabilities	that	the	mere	act	of	federation	had	imposed	on	individual	states	as	a	justification	for	grants.	In	early	1938,	in	its	Fifth	Report,	the	CGC	explained,	with	some	asperity,	that	it	had	continually	rejected	such	disabilities	–	and	that	states	should	stop	citing	them.									Suppose,	the	report	added,	that	grants	were	awarded	on	the	basis	of	disabilities	stemming	from	federation?	The	more	prosperous	states	might	then	qualify	for	a	grant	–	even	though	their	wealth	“would	mean	that	other	favorable	influences	had	counterbalanced	the	unfavorable	effect	of	the	item	of	federal	policy	shown	to	be	adverse.”203	If	states	wanted	to	claim	for	disabilities,	the	CGC	report	asserted,	they	would	also	have	to	count	the	benefits	of	federation.	And	that	would	be	difficult.	Moreover,	the	report	added,	individuals	as	well	as	states	experienced	the	effects	of	federal	policies	such	as	the	tariff.	But	it	would	be	“absurd”	to	compensate	a	claimant	
																																																								202	Research	Director	Alexander	Skelton	to	Commissioner	John	Dafoe,	July,	22,	1938.	John	W.	Dafoe	Fonds,	University	of	Manitoba	Archives,	box	14,	folder	three,	p.	2.			203	Fifth	Report	(1938)	of	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission,	Applications	made	by	the	States	of	South	Australia,	Western	Australia	and	Tasmania,	for	Financial	Assistance	in	1938-39	from	the	Commonwealth	under	Section	96	of	the	Constitution.	(Canberra:	L.	F.	Johnston,	Commonwealth	Government	Printer,	1938)	National	Archives	of	Australia.	Series	AWM68,	Control	Symbol	3DRL	8052/129	Part	1A,	Barcode	496892,	p.	41.		
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state	“because	some	of	its	citizens	suffered,	and	not	to	compensate	other	States	or	individuals	affected	in	a	similar	way.”204							The	Sixth	CGC	report,	which	appeared	in	early	1939,	was	equally	vehement:	“We	are	convinced	that	it	is	impracticable	to	assess	special	grants	on	the	basis	of	disabilities	arising	from	federation	and	from	the	operation	of	federal	policy….	We	
believe	that	our	method	of	assessing	grants	on	the	basis	of	financial	needs	has	much	to	commend	it.”205	That	report	was	vehement	about	the	crucial	need	for	such	assistance	within	a	federation:	“If	a	federal	system	is	to	work	effectively	some	equalizing	adjustment	such	as	we	have	attempted	is	required…Financial	adjustment	is	a	fundamental	necessity	in	a	federal	system,	and	all	federations	are	now	being	forced	to	recognize	the	need	for	some	equalizing	distribution	of	federal	revenues.”206	Although	neither	the	Fifth	nor	the	Sixth	report	would	mention	Canada,	Australian	diplomats	had	ensured	that	Canberra	was	well	aware	of	Canada’s	search	for	a	viable	method	of	establishing	relative	fiscal	equity	among	the	provinces.							The	determination	of	fiscal	need	–	however	defined	–	would	be	the	key.	But	there	were	problems	to	solve.	As	Angus	explained:	“Whether	in	a	federal	state	regional	inequalities	of	wealth	were	radically	different	from	regional	inequalities	within	a	
																																																								204	Fifth	Report	(1938)	of	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission,	p.	41.	205	Sixth	Report	(1938)	of	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission,	Applications	made	by	the	States	of	South	Australia,	Western	Australia	and	Tasmania,	for	Financial	Assistance	in	1939-40	from	the	Commonwealth	under	Section	96	of	the	Constitution.	(Canberra:	L.	F.	Johnston,	Commonwealth	Government	Printer,	1939)	National	Archives	of	Australia.	Series	CP211/2,	Control	Symbol	69/12,	Barcode	250523,	p.	10-11.	My	italics.		206	Sixth	Report	(1938)	of	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission,	78.	
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unitary	state.”207	He	was	not	certain	that	they	were.	But	he	added	cynically:	“An	attempt	to	compensate	for	regional	disadvantages	even	if	the	local	economy	were	barely	viable	seemed	as	inevitable	politically	as	it	was	unsound	economically.”208	The	Commissioners	did,	however,	decide	that	the	disabilities	of	federation	could	not	be	used	as	a	justification	for	subsidies:	“It	was	impossible	to	disentangle	the	comparative	benefits	and	burdens	of	Confederation	province	by	province	so	as	to	calculate	why	compensation	should	be	paid	by	some	and	received	by	others.”209								They	were	groping	for	wisdom.	But	all	commissioners	knew	that	the	state	had	to	do	something	about	inequality	among	people	and	governments.	Using	political	scientist	Smiley’s	model,	the	state	–	in	this	case,	Ottawa	–	was	now	a	major	funder	of	the	activities	of	the	provinces	–	and	thus	active	within	the	lives	of	their	citizens.	Skelton	captured	that	view	in	a	letter	to	Dafoe:	“It	is	no	longer	sufficient	to	set	the	scene	and	let	the	play	go	on;	the	state	must	now	take	a	direct	hand	in	the	part	of	every	individual	actor.”	Then	he	added	a	remark	that	some	provinces	might	have	viewed	as	a	threat:	“And	whether	there	are	lines	enough	to	go	round	or	not,	the	play	must	go	on.	This	particular	development	in	political	philosophy	has	obviously	the	greatest	importance	to	public	finance	and	Dominion-provincial	relations.”210	He	clearly	assumed	that	Ottawa	would	direct	the	play.						But	they	were	in	a	quandary.	Wealthier	provinces	such	as	Ontario	maintained	that	they	were	bearing	the	financial	burden	of	Confederation.	The	poorer	provinces																																																									207	Angus,	282.	208	Angus,	282.	209	Angus,	284.	210	Research	Director	Alexander	Skelton	to	Commissioner	John	Dafoe,	December	21,	1938.	John	W.	Dafoe	Fonds,	University	of	Manitoba	Archives,	box	14,	folder	three,	p.	2.			
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could	barely	educate	their	children	or	heal	their	sick.	Such	inferior	social	services	could	leave	citizens	at	a	disadvantage,	unable	to	contribute	their	best	to	their	society	–	or	to	compete	with	their	fellow	Canadians	in	the	wealthier	provinces.	But	how	could	Ottawa	ever	figure	out	a	way	to	deal	fairly	with	Quebec	if	it	wanted	to	create	new	national	social	programs?	How	could	the	commissioners	possibly	redesign	Confederation	when	the	partners	agreed	on	almost	nothing?	It	appeared	as	though	political	stability	was	at	stake	–	no	matter	what	they	did.							Perhaps	worse,	like	Mackenzie	King,	the	commissioners	were	beginning	to	have	doubts	about	the	controlling	and	centralizing	views	of	their	own	staff	–	especially	after	an	unsettling	lunch	with	Skelton.	They	knew	that	Anglophone	Secretary	Skelton	and	his	assistant	director	of	research,	economist	John	Deutsch,	would	write	large	portions	of	the	report’s	initial	draft.	They	admired	both	men.	But	they	were	troubled	by	their	staff’s	Ottawa-centric	approach	-	and	their	determination	to	promote	Ottawa’s	clout	within	Confederation.							Commissioner	MacKay	would	later	note	that	Skelton	had	a	close	circle	of	advisors,	starting	with	his	father,	the	most	powerful	bureaucrat	in	Ottawa,	O.	D.	Skelton,	who	was	under-secretary	of	state	for	external	affairs.	Sandy	Skelton	could	also	reach	out	to	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Gordon	Towers,	Deputy	Finance	Minister	W.	C.	Clark,	and	Queen’s	University	economist	W.	A.	Mackintosh,	who	was	doing	work	for	the	Commission.211	Those	Ottawa	Men	had	advocated	stronger	federal	control	over	the	provinces	through	a	loan	council	before	the	Royal	Commission	was																																																									211	R.	A.	MacKay,	“Some	Personal	Reminiscences	of	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,	July	26,	1963,”	R	A.	MacKay	Fonds,	Correspondence	and	Personal	Reminiscences	of	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,	LAC,	MG30,	Volume	10,	pps.	1-2.	
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appointed.	They	had	advised	Skelton	when	he	had	drafted	an	outline	of	the	research	program	in	1937.	And	they	were	still	there,	supporting	Skelton	whenever	he	needed	advice.								The	commissioners	were	afraid	of	being	cut	out	of	the	loop.	As	Angus	later	remarked,	Skelton	and	Deutsch	“worked	admirably	together	but	not	very	easily	with	anyone	else.”212	Skelton	had	accompanied	Newton	Rowell	when	he	visited	all	provincial	governments	at	the	outset	of	the	Commission.	He	knew	ministers	and	civil	servants	in	all	provincial	capitals	–	and	he	was	in	“far	closer	contact”	with	the	Ottawa	elites	than	anyone	except	Newton	Rowell.213	And	they	had	lost	Rowell.						They	were	right	to	worry.	After	Rowell	had	his	stroke,	Skelton	actually	invited	the	four	remaining	commissioners	to	a	meeting	at	Ottawa’s	Roxborough	Hotel	with	his	legendary	father	Oscar,	deputy	finance	minister	Clark	and	himself.	There,	as	Angus	recalled,	Skelton	explained	that	the	commissioners	were	“taking	too	much	into	their	own	hands.”214	They	should	stick	to	their	regional	hearings	–	which	Skelton	viewed	as	“little	more	than	a	formality”	–	while	the	staff	wrote	the	report.	Angus	remained	calm	and	firm.	The	commissioners	were	not	“a	mere	façade.”215	They	would	do	the	
																																																								212	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	308.	213	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	270.	214	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	271.	215	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	270.	
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job	that	they	were	asked	to	do.	Not	what	Skelton	wanted	them	to	do.	The	younger	Skelton	later	admitted,	“that	he	had	been	a	damn	fool.”216						But	he	had	done	it.	The	commissioners	took	that	unsettling	lunch	to	heart.	Thereafter,	they	were	on	their	guard	against	any	attempt	by	Skelton	and	Deutsch	to	impose	their	views	on	the	report.	Economist	Angus	strongly	disputed	what	he	called	the	“literary	thesis”	of	Deutsch,	who	wanted	the	report	to	depict	“an	emasculated	federal	government	surrounded	by	virile	provinces.”	With	the	support	of	his	fellow	commissioners,	Angus	rebutted	that	approach	with	his	explanation	of	Ottawa’s	philosophy	during	the	1920s:	“Fashionable	indolence	and	emasculation	are	not	the	same	thing.”217	But	the	commissioners	still	struggled	to	define	fiscal	need	along	with	new	roles	for	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	without	upsetting	that	fine	balance.			
Australia	and	the	Australian	Star	Witness					The	Australians	had	watched	virtually	every	major	Canadian	move	during	those	crucial	years.	On	January	12,	1938,	Trade	Commissioner	L.	R.	Macgregor	had	penned	a	ten-page	memorandum	on	political	conditions	that	itemized	seventeen	pivotal	issues	–	and	captured	the	complexities	of	Canadian	federalism.	Those	issues	included	the	upcoming	opening	of	Parliament,	which	was	expected	to	be	so	fractious	that	Macgregor	highlighted	Finance	Minister	Charles	Dunning’s	remark	that	“the	
																																																								216	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	271.	217	Henry	Angus	to	John	Dafoe,	February	23,	1940.	University	of	Manitoba	Archives,	John	Dafoe	Fonds,	Box	14,	folder	2,	p.	1.	
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very	structure	of	Confederation	is	facing	a	crisis.”218	The	Australian	trade	commissioner	went	on	to	examine	the	Prairie	Provinces,	Albert’s	Social	Credit	government,	the	tension	between	the	federal	government	and	the	Ontario	government,	the	alliance	between	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis	and	Ontario	Premier	Mitchell	Hepburn,	and	the	Dominion’s	new	push	for	a	constitutional	amendment	to	establish	Unemployment	Insurance.						Pivotally,	in	Macgregor’s	discussion	of	the	Rowell-Sirois	Royal	Commission,	he	noted	how	Canada	was	wrestling	with	the	structure	of	its	federation	–	and	the	frequent	references	by	witnesses	to	Australia.	“There	has	been	a	frequent	citing	of	Australian	precedents,	particularly	in	such	matters	as	the	setting	up	of	the	Australian	Loan	Council,	various	aspects	of	the	Financial	Rehabilitation	Scheme,	depreciation	of	currency,	etc.	There	has	been	a	good	deal	of	public	controversy	as	to	results	achieved	or	disabilities	suffered	in	Canada	under	federation	arising	out	of	public	evidence	before	the	Royal	Commission.”219	As	in	Australia,	the	Depression	had	ensured	that	federations	could	no	longer	gloss	over	fiscal	inequalities	among	their	members	when	provincial	obligations	to	their	citizenry	were	so	great.	Finally,	citing	commissioner	Dafoe’s	address	to	the	Canadian	Club	in	Vancouver,	Macgregor	pulled	out	a	pivotal	excerpt:	“The	Canadian	federation	has	stood	the	strain	of	time	
																																																								218	Australian	Trade	Commissioner	L.	R.	Macgregor	to	the	Department	of	External	Affairs	Secretary,	Memorandum	on	Political	Conditions	in	Canada,	January	12,	1938.	National	Archives	of	Australia.	Canada	–	Internal	Part	I,	Series	number	A981,	Control	Symbol	CAN	21	Part	1,	Barcode	173371.	n.	p.	in	file,	p.	1.	219	Analysis	of	the	Union	of	New	Brunswick	Municipalities	brief,	6-7.		
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better	than	the	other	federal	systems	of	the	English-speaking	world,	though	it	still	has	inherent	weaknesses.”220								On	March	21,	1938,	in	a	wonderful	example	of	cross-pollination,	the	Australian	External	Affairs	Secretary	told	the	Australian	Trade	Commissioner	that	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	would	be	starting	its	annual	hearings	into	states’	claims	on	April	11.	Would	there	be	“any	objection	to	quotation	at	hearings	from	Canadian	briefs	and	submissions	forwarded	by	you?”221	(In	the	end,	there	would	be	no	reference	to	Canada	in	the	Commission’s	formal	Fourth,	Fifth	or	Sixth	reports	–	but	it	is	possible	that	the	commissioners	cited	Canada	during	their	questioning	of	state	witnesses.)						The	monitoring	was	relentless,	especially	on	the	issue	of	fiscal	inequality.	On	May	19,	1938	Australian	diplomats	sent	an	American	study	on	“The	Administration	of	Canadian	Conditional	Grants,”	which	the	Committee	on	Public	Administration	of	the	Social	Science	Research	Council	in	Washington	had	published.	That	report	by	American	political	scientist	Luella	Gettys	criticized	the	“relatively	slight	and	ineffective	degree	of	Dominion	supervision	and	guidance	exercised	in	connection	with	the	administration	of	federally	aided	activities.”	She	added:		“The	idea	that	the	Dominion	might	effectively	provide	administrative	leadership…seems	to	have	made	little	headway.”222	Gettys	did	not	grasp	the	degree																																																									220	Analysis	of	the	Union	of	New	Brunswick	Municipalities	brief,	10.	221	“Draft	Cablegram	To	Australian	Trade	Commissioner,	Canada”	on	March	21,	1938.	The	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada:	Constitutional,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol	CAN	13,	Part	2,	Barcode	173360,	p.	1.	222	Luella	Gettys,	The	Administration	of	Canadian	Conditional	Grants	(Washington:	Public	Administration	Service,	1938)	Quotations	are	from	the	review	in	The	Annals	
of	the	American	Academy	of	Political	and	Social	Science,	November	1938,	p.	324.		
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of	fierce	provincial	autonomy	in	Canada	–	and	the	resistance	to	federal	supervision.	Still,	the	Australian	diplomats	assumed	that	the	work	“may	prove	of	interest”	to	Canberra	–	given	the	hearings	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations.223							On	June	9,	1938,	they	singled	out	Finance	Minister	Charles	Dunning’s	move	to	nationalize	the	Bank	of	Canada	as	a	completely	publicly	owned	institution.224	(King’s	government	had	already	amended	the	Bank	of	Canada	Act	in	1936	to	ensure	majority	federal	ownership	and	a	majority	of	federal	directors	in	the	board.)								A	week	later,	they	sent	Dunning’s	56-page	budget	speech	of	June	16,	1938	to	Canberra,	drawing	pen	lines	along	the	side	of	the	document	to	emphasize	Canada’s	desire	for	bilateral	trading	relationships	with	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom	as	well	as	with	all	countries	of	the	British	Commonwealth.225	Dunning	saw	increased	trade	as	the	answer	to	Canada’s	enduring	economic	pain.	The	Finance	Minister	also	went	out	of	his	way	to	dismiss	the	“frequent	controversy”	about	Australian	cuts	to	the	rate	of	interest	on	its	outstanding	bonds:	The	Australian	rates	were	initially	much	higher	than	the	Canadian	rates	in	1931;	in	1938,	the	Australian	rates	remained	higher	than	the	Canadian	rates	–	because	Canada	had	followed	“a																																																									223	Australian	Trade	Commissioner	L.	R.	Macgregor	to	the	Secretary	of	the	External	Affairs	Department,	May	19,	1938.	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada	–	Internal	Part	I,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol	CAN	21,	Part	I,	Barcode	173371,	n	.p.	in	file,	p.	1.		224	“Extract	from	‘Toronto	Daily	Star’,	June	9,	1936,	The	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada	–	Internal	Politics,	Series	A	981,	Control	symbol	CAN	24	Part	1,	Barcode	173375.	n.	p.	in	file.	p.	1.		225	Canada:	Budget	Speech	delivered	by	Hon.	Chas.	A.	Dunning,	Minister	of	Finance,	Member	for	Queens,	Prince	Edward	Island	in	the	House	Of	Commons,	June	16,	1938.	The	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada	–	Internal	Politics,	Series	A	981,	Control	symbol	CAN	24	Part	1,	Barcode	173375.	54-55.	
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different	and	more	normal	policy.”226	The	comparisons	with	Australia	had	clearly	stung	Dunning.	What	remains	striking	today,	however,	is	his	rejection	of	Keynesian	economics:	The	experience	of	several	countries	with	expansionist	policies	during	the	last	few	years	has	proven	that	only	a	rise	in	the	rate	of	new	investment	can	provide	a	durable	basis	for	an	upswing	in	business	activity.	Attempts	to	stimulate	consumption	by	government	expenditure	or	by	suddenly	improving	labour	conditions	have	been	tried	on	more	than	one	occasion	but	in	every	case	they	have	been	found	wanting…Under	our	system	at	least,	Government	expenditures	cannot	take	the	place	of	private	enterprise,	and	I	do	not	think	that	our	people	are	prepared	to	accept	the	alternative	system	of	regimentation	under	which	all	or	practically	all	expenditures	would	be	Government	expenditures.227												The	rejection	of	Keynes	was	not	universal.	But	support	for	his	theories	was	concentrated	among	the	more	junior	members	of	the	finance	ministry	and	younger	Canadian	academics.	None	of	them	had	enough	power	to	change	the	minds	of	their	departmental	masters.	A.	F.	W.	Plumptre,	who	would	become	deputy	finance	minister	in	1954,	had	studied	under	Keynes	at	Cambridge	but,	in	the	last	half	of	the	1930s,	he	was	a	university	lecturer	and	economic	analyst.	Robert	Bryce,	who	had	also	studied	under	Keynes,	would	not	become	powerful	within	the	ministry	until	wartime.	And	another	Keynesian,	W.	A.	Mackintosh,	who	did	research	for	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,	would	later	become	special	assistant	to	the	deputy	finance	minister.	But	he	would	not	join	the	department	until	1939.	It	was	only	in	
																																																								226	Canada:	Budget	Speech	delivered	by	Hon.	Chas.	A.	Dunning,	Minister	of	Finance,	Member	for	Queens,	Prince	Edward	Island	in	the	House	Of	Commons,	June	16,	1938,	pps.	12-13.	227	Canada:	Budget	Speech	delivered	by	Hon.	Chas.	A.	Dunning,	Minister	of	Finance,	Member	for	Queens,	Prince	Edward	Island	in	the	House	Of	Commons,	June	16,	1938,	p.	8.	
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October	1942	that	Mackintosh	led	a	Finance	Ministry	delegation	to	consult	with	Keynes	in	Britain.228						The	news	from	Ottawa	to	Canberra	in	those	challenging	times	never	stopped.	On	June	13,	1938,	Assistant	Australian	Trade	Commissioner	R.	R.	Ellen	noted	that	the	Canadian	Chamber	of	Commerce	had	told	the	Royal	Commission	that	the	Dominion	should	collect	personal	and	corporate	taxes	–	and	establish	“a	loan	council	and	a	Grants	Commission	on	the	lines	of	the	Australian	plan.”229	Canada	was	inching	closer	to	the	Australian	ideals	of	equalization	–	although	it	would	take	almost	twenty	years	and	a	different	formula	to	implement	it.				Meanwhile,	what	was	perhaps	the	most	influential	Royal	Commission	meeting	occurred	on	a	warm	sultry	morning	in	Ottawa	on	August	8,	1938.230		The	commissioners	knew	that	their	Australian	star	witness	was	brilliant	and	eccentric.	They	knew	most	of	his	lifetime	highlights:	Cambridge	mathematician,	gold	prospector,	northern	British	Columbia	lumberman	and	hunter,	Solomon	Islands	explorer,	political	economist,	expert	seaman,	rugby	player,	orchid	cultivator,	sheep	farmer,	martial	arts	teacher,	fruit	grower,	Labour	politician	in	the	Tasmanian	
																																																								228	Robert	W.	Dimand,	“Comment:	Expectations,	Confidence	and	the	Keynesian	Revolution”	in	The	State	of	Interpretation	of	Keynes,	ed.	John	B.	Davis.	(New	York:	Springer	Science	+	Business	Media	New	York,	1994)	p.	126.		229	Assistant	Australian	Trade	Commissioner	R.	R.	Ellen	to	the	Australian	Department	of	External	Affairs	Secretary,	June	13,	1938.	The	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada	–	Internal	Politics,	Series	A	981,	Control	symbol	CAN	24	Part	1,	Barcode	173375.	54-55.	230	I	am	indebted	to	Tasmanian	Parliamentary	Archivist	Sarah	Ravanat	and	to	former	Tasmanian	Premier	Michael	Field,	now	Chancellor	of	the	University	of	Tasmania,	for	assistance	with	the	biographies	of	Giblin	and	his	father,	former	Tasmanian	Premier	William	Robert	Giblin.	
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Assembly,	decorated	(Military	Cross)	war	hero,	former	Tasmanian	Statistician,	and	friend	of	John	Maynard	Keynes	and	the	Bloomsbury	Group.231							The	commissioners	also	knew	that	this	pioneering	University	of	Melbourne	economist	was	a	member	of	the	Australian	Commonwealth	Bank	Board.	More	importantly,	Giblin	was	one	of	the	three	founding	members	of	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission,	which	distributed	money	from	the	central	government	to	the	poorer	Australian	states.							The	Canadians	needed	to	know	the	secret	to	Giblin’s	success	in	bringing	greater	equity	and	stability	to	state	finances	after	so	many	complaints	and	confrontations.	Australia	had	seethed	with	grievances	–	and	Giblin	understood	them	and	their	danger	to	social	cohesion.	In	1933,	it	was	Giblin	who	had	devised	the	Grants	Commission’s	so-called	“fair”	formula,	which	put	more	federal	money	into	the	coffers	of	the	poorer	state	governments.							The	Australian	mechanism	had	worked	–	because	the	formula	was	really	dependent	on	Gibson’s	meticulous	calculations	of	fiscal	need	including	“the	degree	of	economy	in	administration,	the	scale	of	social	services	and	the	severity	of	taxation.”232	He	had	added	suitable	quirks:	no	poorer	state	could	get	more	per	capita	than	any	richer	state	could	raise,	no	matter	what	the	so-called	formula	seemed	to	indicate.	As	well,	the	apolitical	commission	was	almost	above	dissent.																																																										231	As	quoted	from	the	Daily	Mirror,	September	24,	1962	in	Michael	Field,	Lyndhurst	
Falkiner	Giblin,	1872-1951:	Economist,	Eccentric,	and	Hero.	Unpublished.	(Hobart,	Tasmania:	Tasmanian	Parliamentary	Library,	June	7,	1994),	p.	17.	232	“Special	Grants	in	the	Australian	Federation,”	The	Bank	of	Nova	Scotia	Monthly	Review,	May	1938.	The	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada	–	Internal	Politics,	Series	A	981,	Control	symbol	CAN	24	Part	1,	Barcode	173375.	p.	4.	I	am	also	grateful	to	Bank	of	Nova	Scotia	Archivist	Andrea	McCutcheon	for	confirming	this	report	–	and	supplying	other	monthly	reviews.	
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							It	was	a	satisfactory	statistical	and	politically	adept	approach	to	inequality	–	in	Australia.	The	poorer	states	were	mollified:	They	had	enough	money	to	make	a	visible	difference,	which	quelled	the	incipient	secessionists	in	Western	Australia.	The	richer	states	were	satisfied:	The	amounts	were	not	high	enough	to	encourage	the	dreaded	twin	problems	of	dependency	and	wasteful	expenditures.	And	the	CGC	had	the	power	to	chide	states	–	indeed,	penalize	them	–	for	“past	culpability	as	reflected	in	losses	on	loan	expenditure.”233	Citizens	in	richer	states	did	not	object	to	
their	federal	taxes	subsidizing	governments	of	poorer	states.						Indeed,	the	CGC	was	a	nation-building	endeavor	that	promoted	social	cohesion	among	states	and	their	citizenry.	The	commissioners	were	fascinated.	As	Angus	later	observed:	“Canada	was	a	profoundly	discontented	country,	every	region	of	which	was	obsessed	with	a	sense	of	injustice	and	a	sense	of	self-pity.”234							And	now,	after	the	loss	of	their	chairman,	the	commissioners	and	their	staff	had	found	a	rare	highlight.	As	R.	A.	MacKay	would	write	enthusiastically	to	his	wife	Kathleen	on	August	9,	“the	dean	of	Australian	economists….	had	a	lot	of	interesting	information	and	ideas.”235	Decades	later,	in	writing	a	brief	unpublished	memoir	about	the	commission,	MacKay	would	observe	that	the	hearings	had	generated	vast	amounts	of	data.	“But	they	[the	hearings]	were	on	the	whole	not	very	useful	in	suggesting	remedies,”	he	recalled.	“One	important	exception	was	the	evidence	of																																																									233	H.	P.	Brown,	“Giblin	and	the	Grants	Commission”	in	Giblin:	The	Scholar	and	the	
Man,	ed.	Douglas	Copland.	ed.	Douglas	Copland.	(Melbourne:	F.	W.	Cheshire,	1961)	p.55.	234	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	274.	235	Royal	Commissioner	R.	A.	MacKay	to	Kathleen	MacKay,	August	9,	1938.	LAC,	Sirois	Commission,	MG	30,	Series	E159,	Vol	10.	p.	1.		
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Giblin,	the	Australian	economist	said	to	be	the	father	of	the	Australian	Grants	Commission.”236	The	commission’s	former	legal	secretary,	Robert	Fowler,	would	dispute	MacKay’s	dismissal	of	other	witnesses:	“The	provincial	government[s]	had	real	views	to	give.”237						But	Giblin	was	entrancing	–	and	frank.	The	Australian	states	did	differ	among	themselves	in	political	outlook	and	social	standards	and,	especially,	in	economic	strength.	But	it	was	possible,	within	the	existing	Australian	constitution,	to	make	financial	adjustments	“without	great	difficulty	which	will	enable	the	machinery	of	federated	governments	to	work	efficiently.”238	That	is,	the	central	government	could	shuffle	revenues	among	the	states	without	huge	opposition.							Canada	was	very	dissimilar.	There	were	marked	differences	“in	political	ideals	and,	what	is	more	serious,	in	political	responsibility”	among	the	regions.239	Worse,	some	provinces	spent	twice	as	much	per	capita	as	other	provinces	whereas	the	gap	among	the	Australian	states	was	no	more	than	twenty	per	cent.	The	variance	was	
																																																								236	“Some	Personal	Reminiscences	of	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,”	July	26,	1963,	Correspondence	and	Personal	Reminiscences	of	R.	A.	MacKay,	LAC,	MG	30,	Vol.	10,	Series	E	159.	p.	2.	237	Former	legal	secretary	R.	M.	Fowler	to	former	commissioner	R.	A.	MacKay,	August	6,	1963.	Correspondence	and	Personal	Reminiscences	of	R.	A.	MacKay,	LAC,	MG	30,	Vol.	10,	Series	E	159.	p.	3.	238		Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Transcripts	of	Public	Hearings,	1937-38,	Testimony	of	August	8,	1938	(Ottawa:	LAC,	RG	33/23,	Volume	16-30).	p.	2.	239	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Transcripts	of	Public	Hearings,	1937-38,	Testimony	of	August	8,	1938,	2.	
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too	great:	“These	transfers	would	be	too	large	to	be	regarded	as	reasonable,	and	the	conclusion	would	be,	‘Why	not	be	one	country	at	once	and	have	done	with	it?’”240						Those	discouraging	words	did	not	deter	the	commissioners	–	if	only	because	they	did	not	dare	to	advocate	a	unitary	state.	Angus	asked	if	there	was	any	economically	sound	way	to	compensate	for	regional	differences	–	if	only	because	such	action	appeared	to	be	politically	inevitable.	He	had	become	convinced	that	inequality	was	the	nation’s	most	serious	dilemma.	As	he	would	later	tell	Dafoe,	one	section	of	their	report	should	end	with	the	statement	that	“the	great	problem	before	the	nation	(as	at	August	[1939]	last,	of	course)	is	how	to	obtain	an	adequate	national	income,	and	ensure	its	proper	distribution.”241							Legal	Secretary	Robert	Fowler	pointed	out	to	Giblin	that	the	Australian	states	had	more	responsibility	for	services	than	the	Canadian	provinces	–	which	might	be	one	reason	why	the	CGC	grants	were	comparatively	large.	Also,	the	scale	of	the	Canadian	subsidies	was	currently	“very	much	lower	than	the	scale	in	Australia.”	So	there	was	“the	possibility	in	Australia	of	taking	up	considerably	more	of	the	difference	between	the	highest	and	the	lowest.”242	The	implication	was	that	Canadian	grants	did	not	have	to	be	as	proportionately	large	as	the	Australian	ones	to	bring	social	cohesion	and	political	stability	to	the	federation.									Dafoe	put	their	quandary	bluntly:	Ottawa	could	vary	the	size	of	its	subsidies	to	take	account	of	provincial	needs	or	it	could	take	over	more	provincial																																																									240	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Transcripts	of	Public	Hearings,	1937-38,	Testimony	of	August	8,	1938	(Ottawa:	LAC,	RG	33/23,	Volume	16-30).	p.	8.		241	Henry	Angus	to	John	Dafoe,	March	27,	1940.	University	of	Manitoba	Archives,	John	Dafoe	Fonds,	Box	14,	folder	2,	p.	1.	242,	pps.	8-9.		
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responsibilities?	Yes,	said	Giblin.	“You	must	take	one	road	or	the	other,”	observed	Dafoe.243	Yes,	said	Giblin,	but	the	subsidies	would	still	have	to	be	“very	much	larger	than	at	present,	though	not	so	large	as	my	figures	suggest,	in	view	of	Mr.	Fowler’s	point,	that	the	actual	functions	of	the	provinces	are	not	so	great	as	in	Australia.”244	So	there	it	was.	But	it	would	take	almost	two	decades,	and	dangerous	journeys	on	both	roads,	before	wisdom	would	be	found.			
Writing	The	Report										After	Skelton’s	rash	bid	to	control	the	report,	the	commissioners	took	steps	to	ensure	that	his	strong	views	would	not	dominate	theirs.	During	the	winter	of	1938-1939,	they	“met	daily	to	consider	drafts	prepared	by	our	secretariat	and	to	go	over	them	line	by	line	and	sometimes	word	by	word.”245	Angus	shared	a	room	at	the	Roxborough	Hotel	with	Mackay.	Then	MacKay	spent	the	hot	summer	of	1939	in	Ottawa,	revising	and	editing,	as	the	nation	slipped	toward	war.	It	was	perhaps	a	mark	of	how	strongly	most	Commissioners	now	felt	about	inequality	that,	just	before	King	George	VI	and	Queen	Elizabeth	visited	Ottawa	in	May	1939,	MacKay	told	his	spouse	Kathleen	that:		a	group	of	single	unemployed	men….	had	been	turned	out	of	shelter	because	appropriation	had	come	to	an	end,	and	who	insisted	on	interviewing	the	mayor	and	the	govt.,	and	parading	with	placards	such	as	‘We	are	Canada’s	lost	generation.’	‘We																																																									243	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Transcripts	of	Public	Hearings,	1937-38,	Testimony	of	August	8,	1938	(Ottawa:	LAC,	RG	33/23,	Volume	16-30).	p.	9.	244	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Transcripts	of	Public	Hearings,	1937-38,	Testimony	of	August	8,	1938,	9.	245	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	282.	
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fought	for	king	and	country	and	now	we	starve.’	And	so	on.	It’s	significant	that	the	unveiling	of	the	[new	war]	memorial	is	a	morning-dress-top-hat	affair.246							Dafoe	and	Sirois	would	appear	frequently	for	consultations.	In	the	end,	Dafoe’s	centralist	impulses	came	through	–	more	than	even	King	expected.	In	his	view,	Canada	was	not	a	compact	among	the	provinces.	It	was	not	an	agreement	between	two	nations:	Quebec	with	its	distinct	identity	and	the	Rest	of	Canada.	Instead,	Dafoe	saw	only	one	country.	That	vision	could	be	difficult	on	occasion	–	and	oddly	limiting.	As	his	fellow	commissioner	Angus	would	later	note,	the	“Winnipeg	Liberals”	wanted	to	impose	sanctions	on	Germany	during	the	dark	days	before	the	Munich	agreement	to	carve	up	Czechoslovakia	in	September	1938.	“Mackenzie	King	with	his	solicitude	for	Canadian	unity	would	never	threaten	war	to	avoid	war,”	Angus	mused.	But	the	Winnipeg	Liberals	would	have	done	so	“and	would	have	assumed	that	Canadian	unity	was	not	worth	preserving	if	it	could	not	stand	the	strain.”247								Dafoe	tried	to	control	his	preconceived	notions.	“[He]	never	called	his	opinions	by	the	foolish	adjective	‘unalterable’,”	recalled	Angus.	“He	had	a	journalist’s	acceptance	of	hard	facts	–	a	sort	of	retroactive	tolerance	that	can	be	a	most	valuable	political	quality.”248	But	Dafoe	had	already	talked	about	the	establishment	of	“certain	minimum	standards”	for	provinces	and	people	before	the	hearings	even	
																																																								246	Commissioner	R.	A.	MacKay	to	Kathleen	MacKay,	May	14,	1939.	Royal	Commissioner	R.	A.	MacKay	to	Kathleen	MacKay,	August	9,	1938.	LAC,	Sirois	Commission,	MG	30,	Series	E159,	Vol	10.	p.	1.			247	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	265.	248	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	266.	
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commenced.249	In	the	end,	the	Winnipeg	editor	helped	to	convince	his	fellow	commissioners	–	to	King’s	dismay	–	that	the	survival	of	the	nation	depended	on	reclaiming	a	strong	role	for	Ottawa	within	the	federation.							Along	the	way,	the	three	anglophone	commissioners	also	came	to	have	“unlimited	confidence”	in	Sirois,	partly	because	he	“never	represented	Quebec	as	being	irreconcilable.”250	He	listened	to	his	colleagues.	When	the	commissioners	were	finalizing	their	report,	Sirois	considered	writing	a	minority	opinion	–	because	he	wanted	to	preserve	the	provinces’	right	to	impose	income	taxes	and,	especially,	succession	duties.251	After	prolonged	discussions	with	Francophone	Counsel	St.	Laurent	and	Anglophone	Counsel	Stewart,	however,	Sirois	conceded	that	only	a	national	government	could	effectively	aid	“Canadians	in	need	in	every	part	of	the	country.”252	(The	commissioners	also	believed	that	Sirois	changed	his	confessor	for	someone	“who	assured	him	that	he	could	safely	follow	his	conscience	in	constitutional	and	financial	matters.”)253							It	was	a	pivotal	moment:	Sirois	concluded	that	the	centralization	of	key	tax	revenues	would	empower	the	provinces,	particularly	Quebec,	to	fulfill	their																																																									249	As	quoted	from	a	letter	from	John	Dafoe	to	commission	research	director	Alex	Skelton	on	August	27,	1937	in	Ramsay	Cook,	The	Politics	of	John	W.	Dafoe	and	the	
Free	Press.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1963)	225.	250	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	267.	251	Letter	from	R.	M.	Fowler	to	R.	A.	MacKay,	August	6,	1963,	Correspondence	and	Personal	Reminiscences	of	R.	A.	MacKay,	LAC,	MG	30,	Vol.	10,	Series	E	159.	p.	4.		252	Dale	C.	Thomson,	Louis	St.	Laurent:	Canadian.	p.	102.	253	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	283.	Angus	attributes	the	story	to	the	commission’s	Francophone	Secretary	Adjutor	Savard.	Letter	from	R.	A.	MacKay	to	R.	M.	Fowler,	August	9,	1963.	Correspondence	and	Personal	Reminiscences	of	R.	A.	MacKay,	LAC,	MG	30,	Vol.	10,	Series	E	159.	p.	1.	
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responsibilities.	Thereafter,	he	never	wavered	from	his	defence	of	federal	Unemployment	Insurance	and	centralized	tax	collection	–	because	that	would	allow	Canadians	to	share	with	one	another.						But	Sirois	also	fiercely	defended	Quebec’s	rights.	He	presciently	argued	that	“Quebec	must	never	stand	in	the	way	of	the	other	provinces	doing	as	they	wished	but	should	be	free	to	stand	out.”254	In	turn,	his	colleagues	listened	to	him.	In	early	January	of	1940,	Angus	reported	to	the	ailing	Dafoe	that	a	recent	meeting	in	Ottawa	with	the	secretariat	had	been	“exasperating”	–	because	the	commissioners	had	bogged	down	in	changing	phrases	that	Sirois	viewed	as	open	to	attack	from	Quebec.	Angus	felt	that	it	“was	futile	to	attempt	to	eliminate	every	vulnerable	phrase.”	But	then	he	captured	the	admiration	that	Sirois	had	inspired:	“I	feel	that	Dr.	S.	has	gone	so	much	further	than	we	ever	thought	possible	that	one	should	do	something	to	meet	his	wishes.”255							The	commissioners	also	took	delight	in	Sirois’s	dry	humour	and	succinct	summaries.	After	a	formal	dinner	at	King’s	residence,	the	Prime	Minister	took	Sirois	aside	for	long-winded	remarks	about	the	timing	of	the	report	and	the	timing	of	the	federal	election,	which	was	held	in	late	March	of	1940.	As	Angus	recalled:		His	[King’s]	long	tortuous	statement	was	followed	by	a	gruff	voice	with	something	of	a	French	accent.	‘If	I	understand	you	correctly,	Mr.	Prime	Minister,	you	want	us	to	report	not	too	soon	and	not	too	late.’	Mr.	King	was	a	bit	taken	aback	by	this	paraphrase	of	his	
																																																								254	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	267.	255	H.F.	Angus	to	John	Dafoe,	January	3,	1940.	University	of	Manitoba	Archives,	John	Dafoe	Fonds,	Box	14,	Folder	2.	p.	1.		
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carefully	chosen	words	and,	with	at	least	an	appearance	of	embarrassment	said,	‘Yes,	yes,	quite	so.’256										His	turn-of-phrase	could	be	deft.		As	the	report	finally	neared	publication,	Sirois	summarized	the	approaches	of	his	three	fellow	commissioners	–	and	himself:	“We	are	prepared	to	explain	our	Report,	but	not	defend	it,	nor	apologize	for	it.”257		
The	Failure	of	the	Final	Report						The	report	would	appear	in	May	1940	as	the	Nazis	rolled	through	the	Low	Countries,	heading	toward	the	Channel	ports.	(I	will	examine	its	reception	further	in	Chapter	Four.)	Four	months	later,	King	appointed	Sirois	as	chairman	of	Ottawa’s	new	Unemployment	Insurance	Commission.	It	was	the	PM’s	mark	of	respect	for	the	commissioner’s	brave	stand.	But	the	61-year-old	Sirois	did	not	live	long	enough	to	take	up	his	duties:	He	died	of	what	was	probably	congestive	heart	failure	in	a	Quebec	City	hospital	in	mid-January	of	1941.	His	fellow	commissioner	Henry	Angus,	who	was	fluently	bilingual,	understood	why	the	Rowell-Sirois	report	did	not	figure	prominently	in	the	Quebec	tributes	to	him.	“The	Commission	service	was	only	a	very	small	(and	not	well	understood)	part	of	Dr.	Sirois’s	life,”	he	explained	to	MacKay,	who	attended	the	service.258	Angus	later	remarked:	“In	his	way	Dr.	Sirois	was	as	
																																																								256	Unpublished	Biography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	268.	257	Joseph	Sirois	to	his	three	fellow	commissioners,	H.	F.	Angus,	J.	W.	Dafoe	and	R.A.	MacKay,	April	26,	1940.	University	of	Manitoba	Archives,	John	Dafoe	Fonds,	Box	14,	folder	2,	p.	1.	258	H.	F.	Angus	to	R.A.	MacKay,	January	28,	1941.	LAC,	MG30,	Series	E159,	Volume	8.	p.	1.	
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good	a	Canadian	as	[commissioner	John]	Dafoe	with	perhaps	a	greater	appreciation	of	the	difficulties	of	unity.”259						Angus	would	remember	the	commission	with	great	fondness	–	although	he	had	few	delusions	about	Mackenzie	King’s	response.	How	would	the	timid	and	compromising	federalist	King	react	to	its	call	for	the	centralized	collection	of	key	tax	revenues	–	and	Ottawa’s	assumption	of	provincial	debts?	What	about	the	commission’s	call	for	grants	to	the	poorer	provinces	that	would	allow	them	to	fulfill	their	responsibilities?	Angus	knew	that	those	recommendations	would	be	political	dynamite.	As	the	report	neared	publication,	Angus	mused	to	Dafoe:	“Someday	I	should	like	to	hear	what	the	P.M.	really	thinks	of	it.”260	That	would	never	occur.							The	Commissioners	stood	by	their	conclusions	throughout	their	lifetimes.	On	January	9,	1944,	John	Dafoe	would	die	suddenly	in	Winnipeg:	“Dafoe	said	he	was	willing	to	live	to	be	a	hundred	–	but	no	more	–	and	he	quite	evidently	expected	to	achieve	this	age.”261	Both	Angus	and	MacKay	worked	together	at	the	External	Affairs	Department	in	Ottawa	during	wartime.	MacKay	retained	his	fascination	with	foreign	policy:	he	was	Ottawa’s	permanent	representative	at	the	United	Nations	when	the	federal	government	finally	figured	out	how	to	share	through	equalization	payments	in	the	mid-1950s.	He	eventually	returned	to	teaching	at	Carleton	University	–	and	he	died	in	Ottawa	in	1979.	Angus	also	lived	to	see	the	solution	to	Ottawa’s	equalization																																																									259	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	267.	260	Henry	Angus	to	John	Dafoe,	February	21,	1940.	University	of	Manitoba	Archives,	John	Dafoe	Fonds,	Box	14,	folder	2,	p.	1.	261	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	264.		
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dilemma	–	just	after	he	had	retired	as	the	first	dean	of	graduate	studies	at	the	University	of	British	Columbia.	(A	building	on	the	UBC	campus	is	named	in	his	honour.)	He	lived	to	celebrate	his	one-hundredth	birthday	in	1991.			
Conclusion							Almost	lost	amid	the	fog	of	war,	burdened	with	Mackenzie	King’s	quiet	opprobrium,	the	report	would	somehow	endure	as	a	thorough	and	fascinating	formula	to	remedy	the	inequalities	that	could	have	torn	Canada	apart.	It	enunciated	the	daring	notion	that	modern	federations	could	not	tolerate	inequalities	among	member	states	if	they	wanted	to	survive.	But,	oddly,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	Four	,	it	was	not	daring	enough.							Journalists	had	dubbed	the	commissioners	as	“The	Fathers	of	Re-Confederation.”262	But,	although	they	produced	a	theoretically	coherent	plan	for	the	redesign	of	a	federation,	it	could	not	work	in	Canada’s	messy	political	reality.	The	Liberal	Government	had	asked	them	to	examine	the	equity	and	efficiency	of	public	expenditures	and	the	taxation	system	within	the	federation.263	The	commissioners	concluded	that	responsibilities	and	revenue-raising	capacities	were	unequally	distributed	between	the	federal	and	provincial	governments;	they	also	found	that	the	burden	of	taxation	fell	unequally	on	different	taxpayers	in	different	provinces.264																																																									262	“Wide	Revision	of	Canada’s	Fiscal	Structure	Advocated”	in	The	Gazette,	Friday,	May	17,	1940.	p.	12.	The	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada	Constitution,	Series	A	981,	Control	symbol	CAN	13	Part	1,	Barcode	173359.	n.p.	263		Terms	of	Reference	in	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Books	I,	II	and	III	in	one	volume.	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Queen’s	Printer	and	Controller	of	Stationery,	1954)	p.	10.			264	Terms	of	Reference,	Book	II,	pps.	15,	150.	
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But,	as	I	will	show,	the	Commission’s	redesign	of	revenues	and	responsibilities	within	the	federation	–	in	the	name	of	the	equity	and	efficiency	that	Ottawa	
specifically	demanded	–	proved	to	be	unfeasible.	The	centralizers	could	never	prevail	for	long	in	the	precarious	Canadian	federation.																					
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CHAPTER	FOUR:	Provincial	Rights	Versus	Social	Rights	In	War	and	Peace,	
1940-1946									In	mid-May	1940,	Canadians	were	distraught.	The	nation	was	at	war	with	Germany	–	for	the	second	time	in	twenty-five	years.	The	news	from	abroad	was	ominous.	On	April	9,	the	Nazis	had	invaded	Norway	and	Denmark	–	and	handily	defeated	the	British	Territorial	Brigade.	Now,	on	May	10,	the	Nazis	launched	their	Blitzkrieg	against	the	Netherlands,	Belgium	and	France,	starting	the	encirclement	of	the	Allied	armies	that	would	push	them	toward	the	Channel	ports.	On	that	same	day,	British	Prime	Minister	Neville	Chamberlain	resigned	–	and	Sir	Winston	Churchill	replaced	him.	In	Ottawa,	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King	cabled	Chamberlain	–	and	telephoned	Churchill.	Then	he	met	with	Royal	Commission	Chairman	Joseph	Sirois,	Anglophone	Secretary	Alex	Skelton	(“Skelton’s	son”),	and	Francophone	Secretary	Adjutor	Savard,	who	presented	him	with	a	specially	bound	copy	of	their	massive	report.	The	ceremony	was	brief,	and	almost	cursory.							The	Prime	Minister	was	distracted.	He	toddled	off	to	a	press	conference,	where	he	explained	that	he	had	just	received	the	report	–	and	then	he	raised	the	possibility	of	making	it	public	on	Monday,	May	13th	or	Thursday,	May	16th.	The	journalists	agreed	on	the	Thursday	as	the	release	date,	when	the	report	would	also	be	presented	to	Parliament.	They	asked	for	immediate	copies,	which	they	pledged	not	to	publicize.	Subsequent	news	reports	explained	that	King	had	delayed	the	report’s	release	for	three	days	“because	of	the	new	crisis	in	Europe.”1	That	was	true.																																																										1	“Report	To	Wait	Until	Thursday,”	The	Globe	and	Mail,	May	11,	1940.	5.		
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						Six	days	later,	King	tabled	the	Royal	Commission	report	with	a	perfunctory	flourish.	Then	he	did	nothing	about	it	for	weeks	–	until	he	could	no	longer	avoid	its	implications.	The	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations	–	with	its	“three	principal	volumes	of	more	than	two	hundred	pages	each,	together	with	twenty-nine	additional	volumes	of	appendices	and	other	data,	a	total	of	thirty-two	crimson-covered	quarto	volumes	containing	some	3,855	pages,	with	an	attractive	format	and	plenty	of	statistics,	though	without	graphs	and	maps”	–	was	seemingly	forgotten.2								But	appearances	were	deceptive.	Behind	the	scenes,	many	Canadians	–	and	many	Australians	–	were	drawn	to	the	report	as	a	possible	remedy	for	the	divisiveness	of	federalism.	The	report’s	key	recommendations	constituted	a	remarkably	coherent	blueprint	for	how	a	20th	century	federation	could	work	to	ensure	relative	equality	and	social	cohesion	among	its	members.	Theoretically.	As	political	scientist	Peter	Leslie	notes,	“The	report	is	a	useful	reference	point	because	of	the	comprehensiveness	and	the	internal	coherence	of	its	recommendations.”3									It	was	in	the	real	political	world	that	the	troubles	with	the	report’s	approach	soon	became	evident.	The	commission	proposed	that	the	Dominion	centralize	revenues,	take	over	provincial	debts	and	assume	responsibility	for	unemployed	employables	and	Old-Age	Pensions.	And,	most	important	but	much	overlooked	at																																																									2	“Canadian	Federalism	In	Transition,”	by	Albert	Lepawsky,	Public	Administration	Review,	autumn	1940,	The	Journal	of	The	American	Society	for	Public	Administration,	article	filed	November	1,	1940	in	Secretary’s	fonds,	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	File	291.	p.	9.	3	Peter	M.	Leslie,	National	Citizenship	and	Provincial	Communities:	A	Review	of	
Canadian	Fiscal	Federalism	(Kingston,	On.:	Institute	of	Intergovernmental	Relations,	Queen’s	University,	1988)	p.	13.	
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the	time,	provinces	would	receive	“lump	sum,	annual,	unconditional	National	Adjustment	Grants	for	the	support	of	education	and	welfare	at	an	average	national	standard.”4									This	recommendation	would	eventually	provide	one	of	the	main	theoretical	foundations	for	equalization	–	albeit	with	a	far	different	formula	–	even	though	the	Royal	Commission’s	larger	blueprint	for	federalism	would	be	abandoned.	As	I	will	show,	that	proposal	for	adjustment	grants	would	be	radically	overhauled	in	the	different	world	of	federal-provincial	relations	that	would	prevail	only	seventeen	years	later.	But	the	idea	that	poorer	provinces	should	be	able	to	provide	social	services	that	were	roughly	comparable	to	those	in	richer	provinces	with	the	right	to	extra	federal	funds	was	an	enormous	breakthrough.								The	Royal	Commission	had	finally	jettisoned	the	fiction	that	each	province	was	theoretically	equal	to	its	fellow	provinces.	That	conceptual	breakthrough	would	eventually	allow	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	to	work	together	to	expand	the	nation-state	–	and	the	rights	of	social	citizenship.	As	historian	James	Struthers	has	observed:	“It	was	this	call	for	a	redistribution	of	the	nation’s	wealth	and	the	establishment	of	national	standards	in	social	services	that	earned	Rowell-Sirois	its	reputation	as	a	blueprint	for	the	Canadian	welfare	state.”5						Indeed,	the	Rowell-Sirois	report	was	the	vital	first	step	toward	the	adoption	of	those	national	programs.	As	political	scientist	Douglas	M.	Brown	observes,	“In	many	modern	federal	systems	(e.g.	the	United	States	of	America,	Australia,	Switzerland																																																									4	Canadian	Federalism	In	Transition,”	by	Albert	Lepawsky,	in	Public	Administration	
Review,	1.	5	James	Struthers,	“No	Fault	of	Their	Own:	Unemployment	and	the	Canadian	Welfare	
State	1914-1941	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1983)	205.	
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and	Canada)	the	basic	constitutional	design	[of	some	form	of	equalization]	preceded	the	development	of	the	expanded	role	of	government	implied	in	the	“welfare	state”	and	its	attendant	expenditure	requirements.”6	The	report	mattered	enormously	in	Canada	–	even	though	it	was	not	wholeheartedly	adopted	as	its	authors	hoped.											This	chapter	will	first	look	at	the	frustrations	leading	up	to	the	report’s	publication.	Then	it	will	examine	how	the	report	percolated	throughout	the	federation	from	the	dark	day	that	it	was	tabled	in	May	1940	into	the	immediate	post-war	era.	Abroad,	it	fascinated	the	Australian	diplomats	and	politicians,	who	would	pore	over	its	proposals	and	its	reception.	At	home,	it	became	an	underground	sensation.	As	historian	and	political	theorist	Frank	Underhill,	one	of	the	founders	of	the	CCF,	observed	in	late	1940	in	wonderment:	The	report	“has	been	out	of	print	since	early	last	summer…This	is	something	that	never	happened	to	any	book	of	any	contemporary	Canadian	professor,	and	is	encouraging.”7								The	report	was	the	basis	for	a	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	in	1941	–	at	which	Ontario,	British	Columbia	and	Alberta	vehemently	resisted	any	permanent	loss	of	their	revenues.	Wealthy	Ontario	particularly	resented	the	sharing	of	its	residents’	federal	taxes	with	the	poorer	provinces	through	National	Adjustment	Grants.	Later,	the	report	became	a	factor	–	that	was	largely	ignored	–	in	the	follow-up	Post-War	Conference	that	would	stretch	through	1945	into	mid-1946.	By	then,	many	advocates	of	expanded	social	security,	who	had	developed	increasing	clout,	had	grasped	its	vision	of	funds	for	expanded	provincial	social	services.	A	few	even																																																									6	Douglas	M.	Brown,	Equalization	On	The	Basis	Of	Need	In	Canada	(Kingston:	Institute	of	Intergovernmental	Relations:	Queen’s	University,	1996)	p.	2.	7	Frank	H.	Underhill,	“The	Sirois	Commission	as	Historians”	in	The	Sirois	Report	–	A	Discussion	of	Some	Aspects,	The	Canadian	Forum,	November	1940.	p.	233.	
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understood	its	caveat	that	all	provinces	should	be	able	to	afford	those	services.	But	the	report	was	overshadowed	–	because	Prime	Mackenzie	King	had	also	tabled	an	expansive	Green	Paper	blueprint	for	social	reform.	It,	too,	would	not	succeed.				The	Delay	in	Publication	of	the	Royal	Commission	Report						It	was	a	small	miracle	that	the	Royal	Commission	report	had	even	appeared	amid	the	disruptions	of	war.	Since	September	10,	1939,	when	Canada	had	declared	war	on	Germany,	the	federal	government	had	become	almost	single-minded:	Little	else	mattered	–	except	the	war	effort,	at	home	and	abroad.	Royal	Commissioner	R.	A.	MacKay	captured	the	capital	with	a	cynical	eye	in	a	letter	to	his	wife	Kathleen	on	October	14,	1939:	“There	is	an	air	of	suppressed	excitement	and	purposeful	activity	everywhere.	What	a	pity	we	could	not	have	shown	the	same	activity	and	enthusiasm	for	getting	rid	of	unemployment,	or	finding	decent	housing,	or	suppressing	diseases	and	social	evils.”8	The	hearings	had	deeply	affected	him.						Amid	this	climate	–	which	seemed	strikingly	at	odds	with	the	Commission’s	search	for	fiscal	harmony	–	the	members	had	worried	about	how	Canadians	would	regard	their	report.	Legal	secretary	Robert	Fowler	told	commissioner	John	W.	Dafoe	that	he	had	“turned	over	many	of	the	points	in	my	mind	and	I	believe	nearly	all	the	conclusions	are	strengthened	rather	than	weakened	by	the	advent	of	war.”9	Dafoe	agreed:	“The	impact	of	war	upon	our	economy	will	be	to	strengthen	the	view	that																																																									8	Royal	Commissioner	R.	A.	MacKay	to	his	spouse	Kathleen	MacKay,	October	14,	1939,	Sirois	Commission.	Personal	letters:	MacKay	to	his	wife	Kathleen	1939-40.	Library	and	Archives	Canada,	MG	30,	Series	E159,	Volume	10.	pps.	5-6.	9	Commission	legal	secretary	Robert	Fowler	to	Commissioner	John	W.	Dafoe,	September	24,	1939.	University	of	Manitoba	Archives,	John	W.	Dafoe	Fonds,	Box	14,	Folder	2,	p.	2.	
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Canada	has	got	to	be	a	nation	in	every	sense	of	the	word.	If	it	has	not	this	result,	the	disruption	of	Confederation	is	one	of	the	possibilities	of	our	participation	in	the	war.”10	Both	men	understood	that	they	were	engaged	in	a	nation-building	exercise	amid	a	society	in	turmoil.						But	time	was	slipping	away	on	them.	In	January	1940,	almost	five	months	before	the	report’s	debut,	Ottawa	anticipated	a	key	recommendation:	King	espoused	Unemployment	Insurance	as	a	federal	initiative.	In	March,	the	Prime	Minister	persuaded	the	last	reluctant	premiers	to	buy	into	the	scheme.	On	June	10,	1940,	after	agreements	with	every	province,	the	Canadian	Constitution	was	amended	to	grant	responsibility	for	Unemployment	Insurance	to	Ottawa.	The	subsequent	Unemployment	Insurance	Act	1940	would	be	fast-tracked	through	both	Houses	of	Parliament	–	and	would	receive	Royal	Assent	on	August	7,	1940.11	It	would	take	effect	on	July	1,	1941.								Such	speed	evoked	the	commissioners’	envy.	They	and	their	staff	were	still	working	on	the	report	–	and	the	accompanying	research	–	into	the	eighth	month	of	the	war.	In	mid-December	1939,	MacKay	told	Kathleen	that	Skelton	and	assistant	research	director	J.	J.	Deutsch	were	behind	schedule	–	and	“it	was	probably	impossible	to	herd	them	on.”12	In	early	March,	Skelton	left	with	his	powerful	father																																																									10	Commissioner	John	W.	Dafoe	to	Commission	legal	secretary	Robert	Fowler,	September	30,	1939.	University	of	Manitoba	Archives,	John	W.	Dafoe	Fonds,	Box	14,	Folder	1,	p.	1.	My	italics.	11	http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/aia/index.asp?lang=eng&page=hist&sub=eip-pac&doc=eip-pac-eng.htm		12	Royal	Commissioner	R.	A.	MacKay	to	his	spouse	Kathleen	MacKay,	December	15,	1939.	Sirois	Commission,	Personal	letters:	MacKay	to	his	wife	Kathleen	1939-40.	LAC,	MG	30,	Series	E159,	Volume	10.	pps.	5-6.	
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O.	D.	Skelton	by	rail	to	New	York	City,	then	on	a	ship	to	Havana	and	Vera	Cruz,	and	then	to	Mexico	City,	where	he	planned	to	stay	ten	days.	When	Skelton	airily	informed	Sirois	of	the	trip,	he	was	stunned:	“Would	I	expose	myself	to	an	action	in	damages,”	Sirois	wrote	MacKay,	“if	I	expressed	to	you	my	opinion	that	they	are	all	gone	crazy	in	Ottawa.”13	His	colleagues	were	equally	unsettled.	“It	would	be	charitable	to	assume,”	Dafoe	wrote	to	Angus,	“that	Skelton	père,	going	on	a	much-needed	vacation,	carried	off	Alex,	but…I	still	feel	a	degree	of	exasperation	over	the	mishaps	and	delays	of	the	closing	stages	of	the	work	of	the	Commission.”14							Such	delays	disturbed	everyone	who	had	dedicated	so	much	time	to	the	report.	Would	this	massive	report	still	remain	relevant?	Bureaucrats	in	the	Bank	of	Canada	and	the	Finance	Ministry	wrestled	with	the	topic	constantly,	finally	convincing	themselves	that	the	report	would	survive	amid	the	wartime	news.	On	May	8,	eight	days	before	the	Prime	Minister	tabled	the	report	in	Parliament,	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Graham	Towers	wrote	to	King’s	special	assistant	L.	W.	Brockington,	emphasizing	the	report’s	importance	as	a	remedy	for	efficiency	and	equity	in	wartime	and	peacetime:			The	recommendations	–	whatever	they	may	be	–	are	of	vital	concern	to	every	Canadian	citizen….	With	world	conditions	as	they	have	been	for	many	years	–	and	as	they	may	be	post-war	–	the	struggle	for	survival	is	so	intense	that	countries	cannot	afford	the	handicap	of	bad	organization.	In	periods	of	active	development	–	such	as	the	growing	period	of	Canada	from	Confederation	to	1914	–	waste	was	apparently	not	a	cause	for	great	concern.	There	was																																																									13	Royal	Commission	Chairman	Joseph	Sirois	to	Commissioner	R.	A.	MacKay,	March	5,	1940,	Rowell	Sirois	Correspondence	1938-1940,	MG30.	Series	E159,	Volume	8.	p.	1.	14	Royal	Commissioner	John	W.	Dafoe	to	Royal	Commissioner	Henry	F.	Angus,	March	29,	1940.	University	of	Manitoba	Archives,	John	W.	Dafoe	Fonds,	Box	14,	Folder	1,	p.	1.	My	punctuation	of	pere.	
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enough	and	to	spare.	Existing	difficulties	–	and,	for	the	moment,	I	am	not	referring	to	the	war	–	and	the	much	larger	part	played	by	
governments	in	the	lives	of	individuals,	have	produced	a	situation	where	inefficient	organization	has	a	very	definite	effect	on	the	standard	of	living	of	the	people.	The	people	must	insist	on	efficient	organization	of	our	whole	governmental	setup	–	and	if	they	don’t,	they	are	the	ones	who	will	suffer.15									Today	we	would	refer	to	Towers’	notes	as	“talking	points”	for	Mackenzie	King.	The	conversations	were	agonizing.	As	Sandy	Skelton	later	explained	in	a	confidential	memorandum:	
	The	Commission	decided,	after	deliberation,	to	complete	the	Report	exactly	as	it	would	have	been	completed	had	War	not	been	declared.	Although	it	is	true	that	the	War	is	certain	to	produce	great	changes	in	the	structure	of	the	Canadian	economy,	it	is	equally	true	that	the	nature	and	extent	of	these	changes,	dependent	as	they	are	on	the	length	and	intensity	of	the	struggle,	cannot	be	predicted	at	the	present	time.	The	basic	recommendations	of	the	Commission	concerning	the	re-allocation	of	the	functions	of	government	and	the	financial	relations	of	the	Dominion	and	the	provinces	were	framed	with	the	possibility	of	emergencies	in	mind	and	are,	it	is	hoped,	sufficiently	flexible	to	be	adjusted	to	any	situation	which	the	War	may	produce.16													Initially,	such	hopes	were	dashed.	After	the	report’s	publication	on	May	16,	the	news	from	abroad	only	got	worse.	At	home,	the	potentially	blockbuster	report	was	largely	submerged	amid	the	turbulence	of	war.	With	the	exception	of	the	first	day	of	headlines,	the	Royal	Commission	report	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations	was	largely	relegated	to	the	back	pages	amid	the	Nazi	advance.	On	May	20,	Canada	and																																																									15	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Graham	Towers	to	L.	W.	Brockington,	special	assistant	to	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King,	May	8,	1940.	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Secretary’s	Fonds.	File	291-B95.	p.	2.	My	italics.	16	D.A.	Skelton,	“Sirois	Report	and	the	War,”	Confidential	Memorandum	of	July	24,	1940.	John	James	Deutsch	papers,	Queen’s	University	Archives.	Box	109,	folder	1295.		
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Britain	called	for	a	day	of	prayer	to	ask	for	“strength	and	victory	for	the	Empire	and	its	Allies.”17	The	next	day,	the	Nazis	reached	the	English	Channel.								One	day	later,	remarkably,	Ontario	Premier	Mitchell	Hepburn	charged	that	King	had	withheld	publication	of	the	report	“for	no	other	purpose	in	mind	but	to	draw	people’s	attention	away	from	[Canada’s]	lack	of	war	effort.”18	If	that	was	King’s	intention	–	and	it	almost	certainly	was	not	–	it	did	not	work.	But	Hepburn’s	attack	sparked	a	proliferation	of	anti-King	bumper	stickers	and	posters,	criticizing	the	federal	war	effort,	across	the	nation.19	The	report	was	now	embroiled	in	a	highly	politicized	dialogue.	On	May	28,	as	Belgium	surrendered,	King	told	Senate	Government	Leader	Raoul	Dandurand	“that	not	only	Britain	but	France	could	be	defeated	in	this	war.”	He	added	grimly	that	Dandurand	“turned	visibly	white.”20			
The	Report	Attracts	Attention							Despite	those	calamitous	events,	slowly,	as	the	report	percolated	across	the	nation,	it	reached	an	audience.	Academics,	politicians	and	social	advocates	recognized	its	“daring	and	dramatic”	presentation	of		“thorough	research,	keen	analysis,	skillful	presentation,	and	masterful	writing.”21	There	had	been	eighty-five																																																									17	“Canada	Sets	Day	for	Prayer,”	in	The	Globe	and	Mail,	Monday,	May	20,	1940.	p.	17.		18	“Hepburn	Holds	Sirois	Report	Is	Red	Herring,”	The	Globe	and	Mail,	May	22,	1940,	5.	19	John	T.	Saywell,	“Just	call	me	Mitch”:	The	Life	of	Mitchell	F.	Hepburn.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1991)	p.	450.		20	Diary	of	Prime	Minister	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Tuesday,	May	28,	1940.		http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=21703&		21“Canadian	Federalism	In	Transition,”	by	Albert	Lepawsky,	Public	Administration	
Review,	autumn	1940,	The	Journal	of	The	American	Society	for	Public	
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days	of	public	hearings	in	ten	cities	with	more	than	ten	thousand	pages	of	evidence,	154	briefs	from	municipal	groups	and	public	administration	organizations,	and	many	witnesses.22	Too	many	people	had	an	interest	in	its	recommendations	to	tackle	provincial	inequalities	in	revenues	and	responsibilities	–	including	the	defenders	of	provincial	rights,	who	were	alarmed,	and	the	advocates	of	expanded	social	security,	who	were	intrigued	–	to	let	it	slip	away	without	serious	consideration.									Some	recommendations	were	quite	radical.	(Today,	they	would	be	extreme.)	The	report	called	for	the	centralization	of	all	provincial	revenues	from	personal	and	corporate	income	taxes	as	well	as	succession	duties.	Ottawa	should	assume	responsibility	for	all	current	provincial	debts.	It	should	include	all	future	provincial	debts	in	any	calculation	of	emergency	aid	–	if	the	proposed	advisory	Dominion	Finance	Commission	approved	such	provincial	borrowing.	(This	proposal	was	clearly	the	non-compulsory	version	of	a	loan	council	that	Skelton	had	first	devised	in	1936.)							The	Dominion	should	assume	responsibility	for	unemployment	relief,	Unemployment	Insurance,	old-age	pensions,	labour	legislation,	and	advances	to	farmers	and	primary	industries.	There	should	be:	regular	Dominion-Provincial	conferences,	along	with	a	secretariat	to	oversee	federal-provincial	machinery;	and	development	grants	for	highway	and	conservation	expenditures	along	with	supplementary	emergency	grants	in	case	of	abnormal	conditions.																																																																																																																																																																							Administration,	article	filed	November	1,	1940	in	Secretary’s	fonds,	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	File	291.	9.		22	Canadian	Federalism	In	Transition,”	by	Albert	Lepawsky,	Public	Administration	
Review,	9.	
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The	Groundbreaking	National	Adjustment	Grants						It	was	only	belatedly	that	politicians	and	bureaucrats,	along	with	other	policy	experts,	considered	the	proposed	National	Adjustment	Grants	(NAG)	to	the	poorer	provinces	to	fund	the	provision	of	social	services.	Those	nation-building	grants	were	pivotal	to	the	Commission’s	blueprint.	They	were	a	huge	leap	in	the	conception	of	Canadian	federalism.	As	the	report	stressed:	“They	[the	grants]	are	a	complete	break	
from	the	traditional	subsidy	system	and	the	principles	ostensibly	underlying	it….	
They	are	designed	to	make	it	possible	for	every	province	to	provide	for	its	people	
services	of	average	Canadian	standards	and	they	will	thus	alleviate	distress	and	shameful	conditions	which	now	weaken	national	unity	and	handicap	many	Canadians.”23							They	represented	a	first	version	of	equalization.	As	political	scientist	Peter	Leslie	observes:	“In	effect,	but	without	saying	so,	the	commission	proposed	that	Canada	adopt	the	centerpiece	of	fiscal	federalism	in	Australia,	adopted	in	1933.”24	There	were	differences	–	largely	because	the	size	of	the	NAGs	was	pegged	to	provincial	spending	on	specific	programs.	Poorer	provinces	and	municipalities	would	receive	funds	for	their	joint	per-capita	spending	on	public	welfare	and	education	–	“after	adjustment	in	some	cases	for	costs	of	living	and	other	local	circumstances”	–	in																																																									23	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Book	II,	Recommendations	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Queen’s	Printer	and	Controller	of	Stationery,	1954)	p.	125.	24	Peter	M.	Leslie,	National	Citizenship	and	Provincial	Communities:	A	Review	of	
Canadian	Fiscal	Federalism	(Kingston,	On.:	Institute	of	Intergovernmental	Relations,	Queen’s	University,	1988)	p.	15.		
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comparison	with	the	national	average	for	spending	on	those	programs.25	The	grants	would	also	compensate	poorer	provinces	for	their	annual	average	expenditures	on	highways,	agriculture	and	public	domain	expenditures.	That	is,	the	grants	would	be	tied	to	the	amount	of	each	province’s	spending	in	explicit	areas.						There	were	more	conditions.	Recipients	would	have	to	tax	their	citizens	at	an	average	standard	of	severity.	That	would	be	measured	as	“the	proportion	of	total	provincial	and	municipal	taxation	to	the	total	income	of	each	province…compared	with	the	national	average.”26	The	stipulation	was	a	precaution:	“No	province	would	be	penalized	for	having	provided	superior	services	if	it	had	done	so	by	having	taxed	its	residents	with	more	than	average	severity,	and	no	province	would	receive	a	payment	to	enable	it	to	improve	inferior	services	if	it	had	chosen	to	have	inferior	services	in	order	to	tax	its	residents	less	severely	than	the	[national]	average.”27	Provinces	could	not	charge	low	taxes,	provide	inferior	services,	cry	poor	and	pocket	federal	grants.	The	cost	of	future	loans	could	only	be	included	in	the	calculation	of	grants	if	the	Dominion	Finance	Commission	had	approved	the	borrowing.							Theoretically,	the	provinces	were	free	to	spend	the	funds	within	any	of	those	vaguely	specified	policy	areas.	But	they	would	have	to	account	to	their	voters	for	their	choices.	In	effect,	the	commissioners	cherished	an	optimistic	dream	of	enticing	the	provinces	to	adopt	better	spending	priorities.	The	very	existence	of	federal																																																									25	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Book	II:	Recommendations	(Ottawa:	Edmund	Cloutier,	Queen’s	Printer	and	Controller	of	Stationery,	1954)	p.	125.	26	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Book	II:	Recommendations,	p.	125.	27	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Book	II:	Recommendations,	p.	125.	
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grants	based	on	fiscal	need	might	prompt	the	provinces	to	explain	their	priorities	to	their	voters,	including	their	taxation	levels.	Provincial	residents,	for	example,	might	see	that	federal	grants	were	earmarked	for	frivolous	purposes	or	completely	devoted	to	road	construction	–	along	with	the	politically	popular	ribbon-cutting	ceremonies	to	open	those	roads	–	while	educational	systems	faltered.	In	an	ideal	world,	those	voters	would	then	force	change	upon	their	politicians	–	or	change	them.						As	the	report	emphasized	in	a	crucial	section:		It	should	be	made	clear	that	while	the	adjustment	grant	proposed	is	designed	to	enable	a	province	to	provide	adequate	services	(at	the	average	Canadian	standard)	without	excessive	taxation	(on	the	average	Canadian	basis)	the	freedom	of	action	of	a	province	is	in	no	way	impaired.	If	a	province	chooses	to	provide	inferior	services	and	impose	lower	taxation	it	is	free	to	do	so,	or	it	may	provide	better	services	than	the	average	if	its	people	are	willing	to	be	taxed	accordingly,	or	it	may,	for	example,	starve	its	roads	and	improve	its	education,	or	starve	its	education	and	improve	its	roads	–	exactly	as	it	may	do	today.	But	no	provincial	government	will	be	free	from	the	pressure	of	the	opinion	of	its	own	people	and	if,	when	it	applies	for	an	increased	adjustment	grant	on	the	basis	of	need,	it	has	to	produce	figures	which	indicate	that	although	it	might,	without	specially	heavy	taxation,	have	provided	better	education	but	did	not	do	so,	it	has,	of	course,	to	justify	this	to	its	own	voters.28							The	report	defended	the	grants	with	the	same	argument	that	had	convinced	Commission	Chairman	Joseph	Sirois	to	support	them:	“They	illustrate	the	Commission’s	conviction	that	provincial	autonomy	in	these	fields	must	be	respected	
																																																								28	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Book	II:	Recommendations	p.	84.	
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and	strengthened,	and	that	the	only	true	independence	is	financial	security.”29	As	well,	as	political	scientist	David	Milne	underlines,	the	commissioners	argued	that	such	equalization	“should	also	be	justified	on	moral	grounds,	as	a	question	of	decency	and	social	justice	in	a	country	where	federal	economic	policies	in	a	national	market	economy	necessarily	‘enrich’	provinces	in	some	regions	while	it	‘impoverishes’	others…Although	the	commission	was	careful	to	dismiss	the	notion	that	the	Dominion	was	directly	responsible	as	such	to	a	province	for	the	adverse	effects	of	federal	policy	on	it,	it	nonetheless	argued	that	Ottawa	should	support	a	province	in	fiscal	need.”30				The	Report’s	Fatal	Flaw							Such	daring	concepts	could	be	mesmerizing.	More	than	800	orders	for	the	massive	report	were	placed	within	three	months.31	But	the	first	serious	qualms	about	its	approach	appeared	soon	after	its	publication.	At	least	one	commissioner,	economist	Angus,	had	expected	them.	He	understood	that	the	replacement	of	subsidies	with	adjustment	grants	would	open	deep	divides	between	the	“Have”	and	the	“Have	Not”	provinces.	As	provincial	politicians	and	bureaucrats	did	the																																																									29	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	Book	II:	Recommendations	(Ottawa:	Edmund	Cloutier,	Queen’s	Printer	and	Controller	of	Stationery,	1954)	p.	125.	30	David	Milne,	“Equalization	And	The	Politics	Of	Restraint”	in	Equalization:	Its	
Contribution	to	Canada’s	Economic	and	Fiscal	Progress,	eds.	Robin	W.	Boadway	and	Paul	A.	R.	Hobson	(Kingston:	John	Deutsch	Institute	For	The	Study	Of	Economic	Policy,	Queen’s	University,	1997)	p.	186.	31	Australian	High	Commission	Secretary	Nöel	Deschamps	to	The	Secretary,	Department	of	External	Affairs,	August	2,	1940.	Canada:	Constitution,	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol	CAN	13	PART	1,	Barcode	173359,	p.	1.	
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arithmetic,	they	would	come	up	with	“a	rather	disconcerting	result.”	As	he	later	explained	in	his	unpublished	autobiography:		At	the	outset	every	province	except	Ontario	would	benefit	in	the	sense	of	receiving	more	in	benefits	than	it	gave	up	in	revenues.	Ontario	could	complain	–	and	did	–	that	a	Commission	on	which	Ontario	had	no	representation	made	the	recommendations.	A	more	serious	shortcoming	was	that	the	recommendations	took	no	account	of	the	need	for	developmental	expenditures	and	did	not	face	the	issue	of	whether	these	should	be	made	by	the	federal	government	where	the	return	would	be	greatest	or	where	the	need	for	greater	income	was	most	intense.32							Angus	had	“tried	hard”	to	convince	his	colleagues	that	the	report	should	emphasize	that:		initially	the	major	(possibly	the	entire)	burden	would	fall	on	Ontario	and	that	all	other	provinces	(with	the	possible	exception	of	British	Columbia)	would	be	beneficiaries.	Anyone	with	a	sharp	pencil	could	calculate	this	result	in	a	few	minutes	and	I	thought	the	Commission	should	avoid	the	danger	of	being	accused	of	concealing	it….	the	risk	was	that	opposition	could	be	aroused	in	Ontario	for	what	would	appear	a	large	financial	benefit	to	Quebec	at	the	expense	of	Ontario.33							Angus	was	prescient:	The	Commission	report	tilted	away	from	the	proper	balance	among	the	federation	partners	–	and	perilous	results	ensued.	The	Royal	Commission’s	vision	could	not	work.	Its	nation-building	blueprint	envisioned	permanent	centralization	of	key	revenues	–	with	far	too	little	grasp	of	the	importance	of	provincial	autonomy	over	those	revenues	and	provincial	identities	of	language	and	culture.								Perhaps	more	importantly,	I	maintain	that	the	report’s	authors	did	not	understand	that	generosity	has	to	have	clear	limits	or	social	cohesion	frays:	the																																																									32	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus,	Chapter	7,	LAC.	MG30,	Series	E274,	Vol.	1,	p.	287.	Once	Rowell	left,	of	course,	Ontario	had	no	representation.		33	Unpublished	Autobiography	of	Henry	Angus.	
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grants	pegged	to	average	social	and	infrastructure	spending	were	simply	too	open-ended.	The	wealthier	provincial	governments	proclaimed	the	lesson	loudly	at	Dominion-Provincial	conferences	over	the	next	fifteen	years:	they	needed	their	taxpayers’	money	for	their	own	government	needs	–	and	they	fostered	voter	resentment	against	what	they	perceived	as	unduly	generous	federal	efforts	to	spend	tax	revenues	on	their	poorer	kin.							Sharing	is	difficult.	Done	properly	with	a	neutral	fiscal	mechanism	that	balances	the	needs	of	the	participants	in	the	bargain,	sharing	among	governments	fosters	social	cohesion	and	political	stability.	Done	improperly,	without	respect	for	the	boundaries	of	the	donors	or	the	bottom-line	needs	of	the	recipients,	equalization	can	be	a	huge	strain	on	federal-provincial	relations.	Equalization	only	became	possible	when	Ottawa	hit	upon	a	neutral	formula	of	non-conditional	grants	that	provided	that	balance,	and	won	the	very	grudging	consent	of	the	rich	and	the	poor	provinces.	Even	then,	as	I	will	show	in	Chapter	Five,	the	Maritimes	objected	to	the	lack	of	generosity	–	while	the	rich	Conservative	government	of	Ontario	turned	against	the	federal	Liberals	for	their	excessive	generosity	to	the	poorer	governments.							All	governments	are	actors	–	and	there	was	too	much	discord	on	the	political	stage	between	the	Have	and	the	Have-Not	provinces	in	wartime.	The	idealism	of	the	Royal	Commission	report	–	which	inspired	so	many	individual	Canadians	–	came	up	against	the	practical	realities	of	Canadian	federalism:	ironically,	the	report	could	not	find	a	way	to	implement	the	concept	of	equalization	as	a	tool	for	social	cohesion	without	threatening	national	unity.		
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Australia	Keeps	Watch						The	Australians	did	not	yet	have	the	same	pressure	on	their	doorstep	that	Canada	now	experienced	with	U-Boats	in	the	Atlantic	–	and	the	Nazis	in	control	of	mainland	Europe.	(Australian	troops	were	only	brought	home	from	the	Mediterranean	and	the	Middle	East	in	early	1942	as	the	Japanese	swept	through	Southeast	Asia.)							But	every	step	of	the	way,	throughout	the	war	and	into	peacetime,	they	watched	their	sister	Dominion.	On	the	cusp	of	summer	in	1940,	the	new	High	Commissioner	Sir	William	Glasgow	noted:	“’Hitler	weather’	appears	to	have	reached	Ottawa	from	across	the	Atlantic	in	the	past	few	days	and	the	brilliant	sunshine	seems	to	mock	the	gloom	which	assails	us	and	to	heighten	the	sense	of	futility	which	at	times	threatens	us.”34	In	a	separate	memo,	Glasgow,	who	had	attained	the	rank	of	Major-General	in	World	War	One,	outlined	the	mobilization	of	manpower	and	resources	in	Canada:	“Canadian	armed	forces	were	now	on	duty	in	Newfoundland	and	the	first	contingent	of	a	Canadian	expeditionary	force	had	already	landed	in	Iceland	for	the	purpose	of	maintaining	the	security	of	the	North	Atlantic	sea	lanes.”35						The	most	wrenching	enclosure	to	Canberra	was	what	was	customarily	the	dreariest:	Minister	of	Finance	J.	L.	Ralston’s	budget	speech	in	late	June	1940	“at	the	most	critical	hour	in	our	history”:	“The	Hun	is	hammering	at	the	gate…	A	new	‘Dark	
																																																								34	Australian	High	Commissioner	to	Canada	T.	W.	Glasgow	to	External	Affairs	Minister,	Canberra.	June	20,	1940.	National	Archives	of	Australia.		Australian	High	Commissioner	in	Canada	–	Memoranda	from.	Series	number	A461,	Control	symbol	D348/1/15,	Barcode	1950707.	p.	1.	This	is	memo	No.	M.	9/	40.	35	This	is	a	separate	memo	from	Glasgow	to	the	Australian	External	Affairs	Minister	–	but	it	was	also	written	on	June	20,	1940.	It	is	No.	M.	10/	40.	p.	2	
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Ages’	may	not	be	the	figment	of	a	wild	imagination.”36	Ralston	offered	an	economic	forecast	that	might	“meet	conditions	probably	more	unforeseeable	than	those	of	any	period	in	our	history.”37	But,	he	added	firmly,	Canada	would	“fail	neither	the	Commonwealth	nor	the	cause.”38	Notably,	the	Finance	Minister	did	not	mention	the	Royal	Commission	report	–	or	its	implications	for	his	bottom	line.						But	the	Royal	Commission	report	fascinated	the	Australians.	They	watched	its	reception	as	a	remedy	for	political	instability	–	especially	in	wartime.	And	they	were	not	heartened	by	the	ensuing	rhetorical	fracas.	Throughout	1940,	there	were	dozens	of	memos	about	the	Commission	report	–	back	and	forth,	between	Canberra	and	Ottawa.	The	Australians	were	absorbed	in	Canada’s	struggle	to	remake	its	federation.	On	May	14,	1940,	two	days	before	the	report	was	officially	tabled,	the	Australian	External	Affairs	Secretary	in	Canberra	wrote	to	the	High	Commission	in	Ottawa	to	ask	for	copies.	On	June	7th,	the	High	Commission	managed	to	procure	one	copy	of	the	report	–	along	with	a	three-page	summary	from	the	Monetary	Times	–	for	Canberra.39	It	also	sent	a	four-page	memorandum	from	High	Commission	Secretary	Nöel	Deschamps,	which	parsed	the	report’s	history	and	its	recommendations.40	On	
																																																								36	Budget	Speech,	Delivered	by	Honourable	J.	L.	Ralston,	Minister	of	Finance,	Member	for	Prince,	Prince	Edward	Island	in	the	House	Of	Commons,	Monday,	June	24,	1940.	Canada:	Economic	&	Financial,	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol	CAN	18	PART	2,	Barcode	173367,	p.	1.		37	Budget	Speech,	Delivered	by	Honourable	J.	L.	Ralston,	Minister	of	Finance,14.	38	Budget	Speech,	Delivered	by	Honourable	J.	L.	Ralston,	Minister	of	Finance,	32.	39	“Dominion-Provincial	Relations,”	Extract	From	“Monetary	Times	18-5-40.	Canada:	Constitution,	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol	CAN	13	PART	1,	Barcode	173359,	pps.	1-3.	40	Memorandum	to	The	Secretary,	Department	of	External	Affairs	from	Australian	High	Commission	Secretary	Nöel	Deschamps,	June	7,	1940.	Canada:	Constitution,	
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June	20th,	it	sent	a	full	set	of	the	special	studies.	On	July	18th,	High	Commission	Secretary	Deschamps	ruefully	told	Canberra	that	the	report	“is	out	of	print	and	will	not	be	available	for	another	six	weeks.”41							The	Australians	were	impatient:	They	wanted	nine	copies	for	distribution.42	In	early	August,	Deschamps	wearily	explained	that	the	three	volumes	of	the	report	itself	were	out	of	print	–	and	there	had	been	no	authorization	for	reprinting	“in	spite	of	the	fact	that	800	orders	for	the	Report	have	been	received.”43	By	late	August,	“as	a	result	of	pressure	on	the	Prime	Minister’s	[King’s]	Office,”	four	copies	were	secured	–	and	forwarded	to	Canberra.44	In	mid-November,	Deschamps	finally	obtained	five	more	copies	–	“only	now	made	available	by	the	King’s	Printer.”45	The	report	was	an	improbable	hit	in	Australia.																																																																																																																																																																								National	Archives	of	Australia,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol	CAN	13	PART	1,	Barcode	173359,	pps.	1-4.	41	Australian	High	Commission	Secretary	Nöel	Deschamps	to	The	Secretary,	Department	of	External	Affairs,	July	18,	1940.	Canada:	Constitution,	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol	CAN	13	PART	1,	Barcode	173359,	p.	1.		42	Draft	Telegram	To	High	Commissioner,	Ottawa	from	External,	August	8,	1940.	Canada:	Constitution,	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol	CAN	13	PART	1,	Barcode	173359,	p.	1.	43	Australian	High	Commission	Secretary	Nöel	Deschamps	to	The	Secretary,	Department	of	External	Affairs,	August	2,	1940.	Canada:	Constitution,	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol	CAN	13	PART	1,	Barcode	173359,	p.	1.	44	Australian	High	Commission	Secretary	Nöel	Deschamps	to	The	Secretary,	Department	of	External	Affairs,	August	28,	1940.	Canada:	Constitution,	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol	CAN	13	PART	1,	Barcode	173359,	p.	1.	45	Australian	High	Commission	Secretary	Nöel	Deschamps	to	The	Secretary,	Department	of	External	Affairs,	November	14,	1940.	Canada:	Constitution,	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol	CAN	13	PART	1,	Barcode	173359,	p.	1.	
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Interest	Grows	At	Home						The	report	was	also	building	traction	within	Canada.	In	September	1940,	the	Canadian	Institute	of	International	Affairs	published	a	15,000-word	summary	of	the	report,	which	would	go	into	four	printings	by	January	1941.	The	authors	–	Dalhousie	University	historian	S.	A.	Saunders	and	researcher	Eleanor	Back	–	also	wrote	a	slightly	smaller,	rather	disjointed	pamphlet	criticizing	the	report.46	(Perhaps	this	was	understandable:	Secretary	Alex	Skelton	had	experienced	great	difficulties	with	the	regional	studies	for	the	Commission	–	“very	mixed	nature	and	inferior	quality”	–	and	he	and	Saunders	had	clashed.)47							In	November	1940,	as	I	have	mentioned	in	Chapter	Three,	The	Canadian	Forum	devoted	seven	pages	to	three	essays	on	key	aspects	of	the	report,	including	Frank	H.	Underhill’s	pivotal	observation:	“Incidentally,	though	there	was	not	a	single	Marxian	who	got	within	miles	of	the	commission’s	deliberations	save	when	Tim	Buck	appeared	to	present	the	Communist	party	brief,	the	whole	report	in	almost	every	sentence,	every	paragraph,	every	volume,	is	a	powerful	exercise	in	the	economic	interpretation	of	history.”48							The	avid	analysis	continued.	In	December	1940,	the	Bank	of	Nova	Scotia’s	
Monthly	Review	devoted	all	four	pages	to	a	review	of	the	report	that	reflected	the	anxieties	of	wartime	and	the	economic	pressures	of	maintaining	troops	at	home	and																																																									46	S.	A.	Saunders	and	Eleanor	Back,	The	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,	Part	I,	A	Summary	
of	the	Report	and	Part	II,	A	Criticism	of	the	Report.	(Toronto	&	Halifax:	The	Ryerson	Press,	September	1940)	pps.	45	and	37.		47	Commission	Secretary	Alex	Skelton	to	Commissioner	John	W.	Dafoe,	June	23,	1938.	University	of	Manitoba	Archives,	John	W.	Dafoe	Fonds,	Box	14,	Folder	3,	p.	1.	48	Frank	H.	Underhill,	“The	Sirois	Commission	as	Historians,”	in	The	Sirois	Report	–	A	Discussion	of	Some	Aspects,	The	Canadian	Forum,	November	1940.	D.	A.	Skelton	Fonds,	Queen’s	University	Archives,		
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abroad.	The	commission’s	conclusions	were	“workable	and	suitable	to	the	needs	of	the	Canadian	federation	as	we	know	them	to-day…	The	alternative,	indeed,	appears	to	be	–	drift.”49	[Sic]	As	it	was,	the	state	of	Dominion-Provincial	relations	was	“undoubtedly	conducive	to	friction	and	inefficient	in	Canadian	economic	life	and	may	thus	be	regarded	as	hampering	the	war	effort.”50	The	National	Adjustment	Grants	to	remedy	inequalities	would	“achieve	and	maintain	financial	balance	in	our	federal	system”	through	“greater	stability	in	provincial	expenditures.”51						That	same	month,	the	Canadian	Association	for	Adult	Education	and	the	Canadian	Institute	of	International	Affairs	jointly	published	a	slim	booklet,	“A	Comment	on	the	Rowell-Sirois	Report.”	It	was	the	work	of	the	Commission’s	legal	secretary,	Toronto	lawyer	R.	M.	Fowler,	who	wanted	to	stress	that	the	report’s	debut	“may	some	day	be	regarded	as	a	day	equal	to	July	1st,	1867,	in	significance	to	Canadians.”52	Fowler	was	well	aware	of	the	continuing	competition	for	attention:	“As	the	German	legions	thundered	into	France,	the	news	of	battle	almost	succeeded	in	driving	from	the	headlines	of	Canadian	newspapers	an	event	of	supreme	national	importance.”53	He	wanted	to	keep	the	report	alive.												That	was	emphatically	not	the	way	that	Mackenzie	King	saw	the	report:	He	initially	wanted	to	postpone	any	consideration	of	it	for	the	duration	of	the	war.	He																																																									49	“The	Rowell-Sirois	Report:	A	Brief	Survey	of	Its	Financial	Recommendations,”	
Monthly	Review,	The	Bank	Of	Nova	Scotia,	Toronto,	December	1940,	Vol.	XIV,	No.	12.	p.	4.	I	am	grateful	to	Bank	of	Nova	Scotia	Archivist	Andrea	McCutcheon	for	these	reports.	50	“The	Rowell-Sirois	Report:	A	Brief	Survey	of	Its	Financial	Recommendations,”,	4.	51	“The	Rowell-Sirois	Report:	A	Brief	Survey	of	Its	Financial	Recommendations,”,	2.	52	R.	M.	Fowler,	A	Comment	on	the	Rowell-Sirois	Report	(Toronto:	the	Canadian	Association	for	Adult	Education	and	the	Canadian	Institute	of	International	Affairs,	December	1940).	53	R.	M.	Fowler,	1.	
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was	certainly	not	interested	in	the	report’s	call	for	relatively	equalized	grants	to	the	provinces	in	return	for	their	key	tax	revenues.	He	wanted	provincial	tax	revenues	to	prosecute	the	war,	not	to	subsidize	the	poorer	provincial	governments.	And	he	would	never	endanger	national	unity	in	wartime	to	accomplish	the	permanent	constitutional	change	in	revenues	and	responsibilities	that	the	Commission	recommended.						But	–	if	only	because	of	the	allure	of	its	remedies	for	financial	inequality	among	the	provinces	–	the	report	would	not	go	away.	In	his	unpublished	PhD	thesis,	historian	David	Fransen	depicts	King	as	buffeted	between	two	forces.	On	one	side	were	many	senior	bureaucrats	at	the	Bank	of	Canada	and	the	Finance	Ministry	along	with	a	few	cabinet	ministers.	That	group	included	including	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Graham	Towers,	former	Rowell-Sirois	research	director	Alex	Skelton,	who	was	now	back	at	the	Bank	of	Canada,	Deputy	Finance	Minister	Clifford	Clark,	Finance	Ministry	special	advisor	W.	A.	Mackintosh,	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley	and	Mines	and	Resources	Minister	T.	A.	Crerar.54	Skelton’s	powerful	father	O.	D.	Skelton,	who	was	Under	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	supported	them.							They	believed	that	the	Depression	had	demonstrated	“that	too	many	hands	at	the	levers	of	an	economy	with	the	regions	as	interrelated	as	were	Canada’s	exacerbated	the	decline	and	retarded	recovery….	It	seemed	unjust,	as	far	as	the	mandarins	were	
																																																								54	David	Fransen,	“Unscrewing	The	Unscrutable:”	The	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,	the	
Ottawa	Bureaucracy,	and	Public	Finance	Reform	1935-1941.	Unpublished	thesis.	Department	of	History,	University	of	Toronto,	1984.	pps.	417.	
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concerned,	that	governments	and	individuals	in	some	provinces	should	struggle	just	to	survive	while	others	continued	to	live	in	relative	comfort.”55								Accordingly,	they	espoused	the	report’s	call	for	the	centralization	of	key	revenues.	Political	scientist	Peter	Leslie	maintains	that	key	members	of	the	commission	staff	aimed	to	put	Ottawa	in	the	fiscal	driver’s	seat	for	the	sake	of	stability	and	fairness:	“Some	of	the	younger	commission	staff	…had	become	persuaded	of	the	virtues	of	the	Keynesian	doctrine….	[the	report]	would	transfer	to	Ottawa	precisely	those	taxes	that	would	be	needed	to	implement	a	set	of	policies	for	economic	stabilization.”56										On	the	other	side	of	the	discussion	were	less	powerful	Finance	Ministry	officials,	including	tax	expert	Ken	Eaton	and	departmental	solicitor	Ross	Tolmie.	Support	also	came	from	income	tax	commissioner	Fraser	Elliott	from	the	Department	of	National	Revenue	–	along	with	the	clear	majority	of	the	cabinet.57	They	had	King’s	ear.	As	the	Prime	Minister	later	recounted,	there	was	strong	cabinet	opposition	to	the	briefing	documents	on	the	report	from	his	special	assistant	Leonard	Brockington	and	Deputy	Principal	Secretary	J.	W.	Pickersgill,	“with	the	Bank	of	Canada	in	the	background.”58							He	noted	with	grim	satisfaction:	“It	was	interesting	how	the	point	of	view	of	the	intelligentsia	by	whom	I	am	surrounded…was	attacked	from	the	entire	cabinet	
																																																								55	David	Fransen,	“Unscrewing	The	Unscrutable:”	The	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,	the	
Ottawa	Bureaucracy,	and	Public	Finance	Reform	1935-1941.	Unpublished	thesis.	Department	of	History,	University	of	Toronto,	1984.	pps.	451-452.	56	Leslie,	p.	17.	57	David	Fransen,	“Unscrewing	The	Unscrutable:”	The	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,	the	
Ottawa	Bureaucracy,	and	Public	Finance	Reform	1935-1941,	p.	417.	58	As	quoted	in	David	Fransen,	“Unscrewing	The	Unscrutable:”	The	Rowell-Sirois	
Commission,	the	Ottawa	Bureaucracy,	and	Public	Finance	Reform	1935-1941.,	p.	426.	
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circle.”59	The	intelligentsia	wanted	King	to	push	unreservedly	for	complete	implementation	of	the	report.	The	majority	of	the	cabinet	wanted	King	to	moderate	Ottawa’s	position,	to	be	conciliatory	during	discussions	with	the	provinces	on	the	report,	not	to	dictate	adoption	of	its	terms.	That	approach	suited	King	perfectly.	And	that	is	what	he	would	do.								
The	Intelligentsia	Push	For	Implementation						The	high-level	bureaucratic	and	political	push	to	implement	the	report	had	commenced	within	three	months	of	its	tabling.	In	mid-September,	under	pressure	from	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Towers,	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley	presented	cabinet	with	several	options:	“postpone	action	until	after	the	war;	hold	a	Dominion-provincial	conference;	or	implement,	as	a	wartime	measure,	the	report’s	most	urgent	recommendations.”60	King	appointed	a	cabinet	subcommittee	under	Ilsley	to	consider	the	options	for	dealing	with	the	report.	As	historian	J.	L.	Granatstein	reports,	Ilsley	went	back	to	cabinet	with	a	report	of	dissension	among	the	provinces.61						King	then	read	a	letter	to	cabinet	that	he	had	received	from	Manitoba	Premier	John	Bracken:	As	he	told	his	diary,	the	Manitoba	Premier	was	“strongly	recommending”	a	conference.62	But	the	ministers	were	uneasily	aware	of	Ontario																																																									59	David	Fransen,	“Unscrewing	The	Unscrutable:”	The	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,	the	
Ottawa	Bureaucracy,	and	Public	Finance	Reform	1935-1941..	pps.	425-426.	60	Douglas	H.	Fullerton,	Graham	Towers	And	His	Times,	(Toronto:	McClelland	and	Stewart,	1986)	p.	153.	61	J.	L.	Granatstein,	Canada’s	War:	The	Politics	of	the	Mackenzie	King	Government,	1939-1945	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1990)	pps.	164-165.	62	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Thursday,	October	22.	1940.	p.	22131.	
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Premier	Hepburn’s	private	message	that	he	was	“unalterably	opposed”	to	the	report	–	“and	would	fight	it	to	the	limit.”63	Given	that	inflammatory	rhetoric,	the	cabinet	resolved	that	a	conference	would	be	“unwise.”	King	should	explain	to	Parliament	“why	holding	of	conference	at	this	time	was	likely	to	be	of	little	avail.”64	King	added	that,	if	there	had	been	a	possibility	of	agreement	at	a	conference,	he	would	“probably	have	arranged	for	one	forthwith	notwithstanding	the	possibility	of	criticism	of	diverting	our	energies	from	the	war	effort.”65	He	was	equivocating	–	even	with	himself.							In	early	November,	however,	Ilsley	came	back	to	cabinet	with	a	modified	proposal	for	a	conference	–	and	cabinet	agreed.	As	Granatstein	explains,		The	warnings	of	impending	financial	disaster	from	Ilsley’s	Department	could	not	be	ignored;	the	pressing	demands	of	Premier	Bracken,	supported	by	his	fellow	Manitoban,	[federal	Resources	Minister]	T.	A.	Crerar,	could	not	readily	be	delayed	further;	and	the	federal	government	would	be	on	much	stronger	ground	if	it	could	appear	to	the	public	as	having	been	balked	by	provincial	obstinacy.66						The	poorer	provinces	needed	to	reach	for	the	reassurance	of	equality	and	extra	cash,	especially	in	wartime.	The	richer	provinces	were	appalled	at	this	proposed	permanent	loss	of	their	taxpayers’	federal	revenue	–	which	would	go	to	the	poorer	provinces.	The	Bank	of	Canada	files	include	multiple	newspaper	articles	about	Hepburn’s	rage	including:	“Hepburn	May	Call	Election	For	Test	Of	Public	Opinion	On																																																									63	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Thursday,	October	22.	1940.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=22131&		64	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Thursday,	October	22.	1940.	65	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Thursday,	October	22.	1940..	66	J.	L.	Granatstein,	Canada’s	War:	The	Politics	of	the	Mackenzie	King	Government,	
1939-1945	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1975,	1990)	p.	165.		
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Issue	of	Sirois	Report”	in	mid-November,	which	conveyed	Ontario’s	objection	to	being	“forced	to	swallow	unfair	provisions.”67	Economist	Angus	was	right	about	the	richer	provinces’	dismay.				King	agreed	to	the	conference.	But	he	confided	his	misgivings	to	his	diary:		I	must	confess	I	have	little	hope	of	getting	anything	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	conference,	nor	am	I	personally	wholly	satisfied	that	the	Sirois	report	should	be	accepted	holus	bolus.	[Sic]	Financial	interests	are	so	strong	behind	it	all	that	I	feel	a	bit	suspicious	about	a	report	not	according	with	more	democratic	views	that	should	be	made	to	prevail	once	this	war	is	over.	It	will	require	careful	study	in	advance.68							By	mid-December,	with	the	exception	of	Resources	Minister	Crerar,	cabinet	members	essentially	concluded	that	the	upcoming	conference	“would	amount	to	nothing.”69	King	suspected	that	Hepburn	wanted	to	form	a	coalition	against	him	to	assume	the	leadership	of	the	federal	party	–	and	that	he	would	use	the	upcoming	conference	to	boost	his	chances.70	Ever	shrewd,	the	Prime	Minister	told	his	ministers:		We	would	have	to	construct	a	mattress	that	would	make	it	easy	for	the	trapeze	performers	as	they	dropped	to	the	ground	one	by	one.	I	have	never	believed	that	the	conference	could	succeed	at	this	time																																																									67	“Sirois	Report	Spells	$10,000,000	Annual	Loss	to	Ontario:	Hepburn	May	Call	Election	For	Test	Of	Public	Opinion	On	Issue	Of	Sirois	Report,”	in	The	Evening	
Telegram,	Toronto,	Friday,	November	15,	1940.	n.p.	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Secretary’s	fonds,	File	291,	B95.		68	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Friday,	December	6,	1940.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=22227&		69	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Friday,	December	13,	1940.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=22241&		70	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Friday,	December	13,	1940.			
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of	war.	Were	the	government	not	to	make	the	attempt,	it	would	be	blamed	for	whatever	financial	disasters	will	follow,	as	it	certainly	will,	in	the	course	of	the	next	year	or	two.71		
The	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	1941					The	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	is	dismissed	today	as	a	failure:	After	opposition	from	two	relatively	wealthy	provinces	–	Ontario	and	British	Columbia		–	and	from	monetary	renegade	Alberta,	the	Dominion	dropped	its	proposal	to	implement	the	Royal	Commission	report;	instead,	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley	simply	proclaimed	Ottawa’s	right	during	wartime	to	assume	control	of	provincial	revenues	from	income	taxes	and	succession	duties,	invoking	the	power	of	the	War	Measures	Act.	When	the	Conference	broke	up	acrimoniously,	Ilsley	concluded	tax	rental	deals	with	all	provinces	for	the	duration	of	the	war	plus	one	year.	Ottawa	“aimed	to	ensure	that	a	single	tax	base	and	a	single	schedule	of	rate	applied	uniformly	across	the	country…it	would	equip	Ottawa	to	pursue	a	Keynesian	stabilization	policy,	an	intent	announced	in	1945.”72						I	contend	that	the	Conference	illustrates	a	classic	example	of	Donald	Smiley’s	dictum	that	governments	are	central	players	in	policy	formation.	Canada	could	not	have	an	expanded	network	of	universal	social	programs	until	every	province	could	afford	roughly	similar	programs	at	roughly	similar	levels	of	taxation.	Equalization	would	eventually	solve	that	dilemma	–	because	it	would	transfer	federal	funds	on	a	non-conditional	basis	to	those	provinces.	But	the	Rowell-Sirois	report’s	scheme	to																																																									71	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Friday,	December	13,	1940.		http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=22242		72	Leslie,	p.	19.	
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centralize	revenues,	which	would	ensure	that	all	provinces	were	largely	dependent	on	Ottawa’s	generosity	through	compensatory	grants,	simply	reinforced	federal	clout	at	the	expense	of	provincial	autonomy.							Nation	building	required	an	alternative,	which	was	not	on	the	table.	The	Rowell-Sirois	report’s	master	plan	for	the	federation	could	not	work	amid	the	clashing	social	and	provincial	identities	and	the	huge	inequalities	in	money	and	political	power	among	the	provinces.	Instead,	it	became	a	recipe	for	political	instability	and	social	dissension.	King	did	not	want	to	implement	the	report	anyway:	he	did	not	want	more	responsibility	for	Ottawa	–	and	he	was	desperate	to	preserve	national	unity,	especially	amid	the	eruption	of	another	debate	over	conscription.	The	Rowell-Sirois	report	was	not	a	recipe	for	social	cohesion,	especially	with	Quebec.							But	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	of	1941	does	epitomize	why	Ottawa	had	to	back	away	from	the	Commission’s	proposal	to	centralize	revenues	and	provide	explicit	adjustment	grants	to	the	poorer	provinces.	Otherwise,	the	federal	government	would	eventually	have	found	itself	pinned	between	the	growing	influence	of	the	advocates	for	social	security	and	fiscal	equality	such	as	social	scientist	Leonard	Marsh	with	his	Report	on	Social	Security	in	Canada	in	1943	along	with	the	Canadian	Welfare	Council	–	and	the	fierce	protectors	of	provincial	rights	and	fiscal	autonomy.	The	three	principal	protectors	of	provincial	rights	–	Ontario,	Alberta	and	British	Columbia	–	were	vocal	in	their	opposition	to	the	report	at	the	1941	conference.	That	stance	would	come	at	a	price:	They	were	pilloried	as	petty-minded	politicians	who	guarded	their	turf	at	the	expense	of	the	war	effort.	But	they	
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clearly	represented	the	limits	of	generosity	within	the	federation	–	and	the	need	to	respect	each	province’s	constitutional	rights	and	responsibilities.					Indeed,	their	messages	were	strikingly	antagonistic	to	any	suggestion	that	their	taxpayers’	funds	could	be	used	to	help	their	poorer	kin.	British	Columbia	Premier	Duff	Pattullo	attacked	the	very	notion	of	equalization	payments.	“The	tendency	of	the	course	recommended	by	the	[Royal	Commission]	would	be	to	lower	the	general	standard	of	development	rather	than	to	raise	it.	It	would	be	a	backward	instead	of	a	forward	step...[British	Columbia}	does	not	want	to	be	pushed	down	either	to	the	bottom	or	half	way,	there	to	turn	the	treadmill	of	mediocrity	in	perpetuity.”73			
					Alberta	Premier	William	Aberhart	viewed	the	Royal	Commission	report	as	”diametrically	opposed	to	the	grand	old	British	ideal	of	good	government.”74	He	suggested	that	there	was	“a	concerted	and	deliberate	attempt	being	made	by	the	money	powers	to	increase	centralized	control	of	our	national	life	while	our	attention	is	fully	occupied	with	the	prosecution	of	the	war	effort.”75	Instead,	he	asked	for	Ottawa’s	help	in	renewing	his	bonds	at	a	lower	rate	of	interest,	and	“we	will	be	able	to	get	along	and	look	after	our	own	problems.”76								Ontario	Premier	Mitchell	Hepburn,	who	loathed	King	(and	vice	versa),	delivered	a	lengthy	denunciation	of	Ottawa	–	and	its	works–	including	recent	increases	in	federal	income	tax.	The	constitutional	changes	that	the	report	proposed	were	extremely	controversial.	There	were	already	complaints	that	Quebec	would	be																																																									73	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941.	Dominion-Provincial	
Conferences	:	:	November	3-10,	1927;	December	9-13,	1935	and	January	14-15,	1941.	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	King’s	Printer,	1951)	39.	74	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941,	56.	75	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941,	59.	76	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941.	61.	
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“getting	preferred	treatment”	through	the	commission’s	proposed	national	adjustment	grants.	The	Premier	added	that	Ontario	would	“stand	solidly”	beside	Quebec	if	any	constitutional	change	threatened	its	minority	rights.77	But	Ontario	would	not	endorse	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission’s	report.	“To	me	it	is	unthinkable	that	we	should	be	fiddling	while	London	is	burning,”	he	told	his	fellow	First	Ministers.	“This	is	a	peace-time	document,	and	we	believe	honestly	and	sincerely	that	the	time	to	discuss	it	is	not	now.”78						The	remaining	six	provinces	were	also	divided.	There	were	three	relatively	neutral	provinces	–	Quebec,	New	Brunswick	and	Nova	Scotia	–	that	depicted	themselves	as	listeners.	This	did	not	mean	that	they	were	content.	Intriguingly,	this	group	included	Quebec	Premier	Adélard	Godbout	who	owed	his	electoral	victory	in	October	1939	to	the	intercession	of	federal	Liberals.	Mackenzie	King’s	ministers	had	intervened	strongly	on	his	behalf	in	that	election:	the	campaigners	had	included	Postmaster	General	Charles	“Chubby”	Power	and	Justice	Minister	Ernest	Lapointe,	who	had	declared	that	King’s	Quebec	ministers	“would	resign	unless	the	Liberal	party	received	a	vote	of	confidence	from	Quebecers	at	the	provincial	level.”79								In	return	for	that	boost,	Godbout	toned	down	the	vehement	defence	of	provincial	rights	that	former	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis	had	espoused.	Instead,	Godbout	was	conciliatory.	He	did	not	denounce	King	for	his	attempted	violation	of	Quebec’s	constitutional	rights.	But	he	was	no	pushover.	Any	temporary	wartime	tax	measures	should	not	determine	“the	permanent	future	of	Canada…Never	shall	we	build	a	great																																																									77	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941,	15.	78	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941,	16.		79	Patricia	Dirks,	The	Failure	of	L’Action	Libérale	Nationale,	(Montreal	and	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	1991)	142.	
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country	on	provinces	which	have	not	sufficient	liberty	of	action	and	responsibility	for	the	development	of	that	great	incentive	to	progress	which	is	necessary	in	public	affairs.”80							The	Premier	emphasized	that	he	would	not	jeopardize	provincial	autonomy:	His	willingness	“to	study	problems	must	not	be	understood	as	involving	a	willingness	to	sacrifice	provincial	rights	or	autonomy….a	scrupulous	respect	for	provincial	rights	is	essential	to	Canadian	unity	and	Canadian	progress.”81	And	he	pointedly	put	on	the	record	the	extent	of	his	province’s	wartime	contribution:	“The	financial	provisions	in	the	[Rowell-Sirois]	report	involve	serious	financial	sacrifice	for	Quebec.”82								Godbout	defended	his	province’s	constitutional	right	to	maintain	the	vibrancy	of	his	province’s	language	and	culture	–	while	premiers	such	as	Hepburn	argued	that	the	national	well-being	depended	on	a	healthy	federation	with	strong	member	governments.	Le	Devoir	was	fascinated.	Godbout’s	statement	was	“neither	fish	nor	fowl”	(“ni	chair	ni	poisson”)	while	Hepburn	had	effectively	“torpedoed	a	dangerous	movement	destined	to	accentuate	the	centralization	of	Ottawa’s	powers.”	(The	sub-headline	was	“Mr.	Hepburn	throws	his	bomb.”)83							Nova	Scotia	Premier	A.	S.	MacMillan	was	a	newcomer	to	the	table:	the	veteran	cabinet	minister	had	replaced	Angus	L.	Macdonald	when	the	Premier	had	joined	Mackenzie	King’s	government	as	defence	minister	for	naval	services	in	July	1940.	Almost	predictably,	MacMillan	blamed	Confederation	for	his	province’s	descent																																																									80	Quebec	Premier	Adélard	Godbout,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	p.	17.		81	Quebec	Premier	Godbout,	January	15,	pps.	82-83.	82	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941.	83.	83	Léopold	Richer,	“Elle	paraît	marcher	vers	un	échec	éclatant”	in	Le	Devoir,	Wednesday,	January	15,	1941.	My	translation.	
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from	prosperity	to	near-poverty	since	the	mid-19th	century.	Federal	policies	in	transportation,	settlement	and	tariffs	“were	formulated	primarily	to	assist	the	economic	development	of	the	central	and	western	provinces.”84	MacMillan	embraced	the	Royal	Commission’s	call	for	National	Adjustment	Grants	that	could	be	spent	on	his	province’s	social	and	economic	needs.	As	he	told	his	fellow	Premiers,	he	needed	“sufficient	finances	to	meet	and	care	for	our	provincial	responsibilities	…with	average	severity	of	taxation.”85	In	effect,	he	wanted	the	program	that	did	not	yet	exist:	equalization.	But	he	was	not	an	outright	cheerleader	for	the	recommendations.						New	Brunswick	Premier	J.	B.	McNair,	who	was	also	a	relative	rookie,	complained	that	the	Commission	had	rejected	his	province’s	demand	for	special	treatment	at	the	hearings.	But	he	declared	that	it	was	“too	early”	to	adopt	an	opinion	on	the	report’s	financial	proposals.86					And	then	there	were	three	provinces	–	Manitoba,	Saskatchewan	and	Prince	Edward	Island	–	that	supported	the	implementation	of	the	report	–	because	their	budgets	were	so	strained	and	their	inequality	was	so	glaring.	For	Manitoba	Premier	John	Bracken.	Prince	Edward	Island	Premier	Thane	A.	Campbell,	and	Saskatchewan	Premier	W.	J.	Patterson,	the	proposed	National	Adjustment	Grants	were	models	of	sharing.	Their	taxes	were	almost	unreasonably	high;	they	could	not	afford	to	deliver	comparable	social	services	to	their	citizenry.	Their	budgets	were	close	to	breaking	–																																																									84	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941	in	Dominion-Provincial	
Conferences	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	to	the	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1941)	17.	85	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941.	18.	86	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941,	19.	
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and	their	political	fates	could	hang	on	their	ability	to	secure	more	funds	from	Ottawa.	Patterson,	in	fact,	would	lose	to	the	Co-operative	Commonwealth	Federation	in	1944,	largely	because	the	CCF	promised	a	more	socially	active	government.	These	three	Premiers	argued	that	the	nation	would	be	stronger	through	sharing.	Of	course,	the	model	of	equalization	was	not	on	the	table:	It	would	have	been	political	suicide	to	suggest	that	Ottawa	simply	transfer	non-conditional	funds	to	them	–	especially	in	wartime.	That	solution	would	probably	not	have	occurred	to	them	anyway.	
				It	had	been	the	same	old	song	for	these	Premiers	for	several	years.	And	they	were	weary.	Manitoba	Premier	Bracken	warned	that,	if	the	First	Ministers	did	not	implement	the	report,	they	would	“be	encouraging	a	drift	toward	disunity	–	a	drift	toward	balkanization	of	the	nine	provinces	and	five	economic	areas	of	this	dominion.”87	(Presumably,	he	meant	the	Maritimes,	Ontario,	Quebec,	the	Prairie	Provinces	and	British	Columbia.)	He	emphasized	that	Manitoba	did	not	have	adequate	revenues		“to	maintain	an	average	Canadian	standard	of	social	and	educational	services,	and	at	the	same	time	pay	these	relief	costs	and	service	our	debt.”88						Prince	Edward	Island	Premier	Campbell	berated	those	provinces	that	had	lowered	the	interest	on	their	bonds:	his	province	had	dutifully	met	the	interest	costs	on	its	bonds	while	Alberta	had	defaulted.	He	concluded	that	the	National	Adjustment	Grants	would	be	in	every	government’s	interest,	rich	or	poor:	“There	are	very	many	transactions	to	which	both	parties	to	every	one	of	them	are	winners,	as	is	illustrated																																																									87	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941.	23.	88	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941.	25.	
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by	ordinary	transactions	of	trade,	whether	between	individuals	or	nations.	The	man	who	parts	with	his	money	is	not	by	any	means	always	the	loser.”89	But,	poor	as	his	province	was,	Campbell	could	not	resist	a	note	of	resentment:	Because	PEI	had	the	lowest	per-capita	debt	among	the	provinces,	“it	would	seem	that	we	shall	be	called	upon	to	share	the	burden	of	those	provinces	whose	per	capita	debts	are	higher	than	ours.”90						Saskatchewan	Premier	W.	J.	Patterson	argued	that	the	report	should	be	implemented	because	“if	Ottawa	and	the	provincial	governments	are	not	functioning	effectively	and	to	the	maximum	of	their	capacity	we	cannot	effectively,	or	at	least	as	effectively	as	we	should,	prosecute	our	war	effort,	nor	can	we	as	effectively	deal	with	the	problems	which	will	arise	after	the	war.”	This	was	the	exact	opposite	of	Ontario	Premier	Hepburn’s	reasoning:	implementation	was	necessary	in	wartime.	Patterson	added	that	all	Canadians,	no	matter	where	they	lived,	should	“enjoy	a	somewhat	comparable	measure	of	service	and	attention	from	the	government	under	which	they	happen	to	live.”91							The	Conference	was	a	failure.	But	it	was	a	microcosm	of	the	conflicting	impulses	that	prevailed	throughout	Canada.	Then	and	now.	On	the	afternoon	of	the	second	day,	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley	explained	that	Ottawa	needed	roughly	one	billion	dollars	per	year	to	finance	the	war	effort.	That	was	twice	the	size	of	its	peacetime	budget	–	and	larger	than	the	combined	total	of	all	annual	federal,	provincial	and																																																									89	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941.	Dominion-Provincial	
Conferences	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	King’s	Printer,	1951),	44.	90	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941.	Dominion-Provincial	
Conferences	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	King’s	Printer,	1951),	48.	91	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941.	Dominion-Provincial	Conferences	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	King’s	Printer,	1951),	54.	
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municipal	expenditures	during	peacetime.	He	supported	the	report	because	the	divisions	within	Canada	were	“economic	divisions,	not	racial	and	religious	
divisions.”92							And	now	came	the	bad	news.	Since	the	provinces	could	not	agree	among	themselves,	Ottawa	would	use	its	power	to	invade	the	provincial	fields	of	taxation	for	income	tax	and	succession	duties.	Ilsley	explained	that	Canada	needed	a	tax	system	“which	will	enable	us	to	distribute	the	burden	as	fairly	as	human	ingenuity	can	devise	over	the	people	of	Canada	as	a	whole,	whatever	region	they	may	live	in	or	whatever	economic	class	they	may	represent	–	and	fairness	in	taxation	means,	in	my	opinion,	‘in	accordance	with	ability	to	pay’.”93	Ilsley	was	not	aiming	to	provide	better	services:	he	aspired	for	relatively	equal	levels	of	taxation	in	all	provinces	to	wage	war.	And	he	was	explicit	about	his	powers:	“There	is	no	question	of	our	power	to	do	the	things	that	are	necessary.	Under	the	British	North	America	Act	our	taxing	authority	is	not	limited.	Under	the	War	Measures	Act	we	may	do	what	is	necessary	as	a	war	measure.”94							King	concluded	the	conference	with	the	offer	to	reconvene	if	the	nine	provinces	could	reach	unanimity.	The	Conference	closed	with	the	singing	of	the	national	anthem.	The	Royal	Commission	members	were	dashed	–	especially	because	of	the	resistance	from	Hepburn,	Pattullo	and	Aberhart.	As	Henry	Angus	in	Vancouver	wrote	privately	to	his	fellow	Commissioner,	R.	A.	(Bert)	MacKay	in	Halifax:																																																									92	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941.	Dominion-Provincial	Conferences	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	King’s	Printer,	1951),	73.	My	italics.	93	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941.	Dominion-Provincial	Conferences	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	King’s	Printer,	1951).	73.	94	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	January	14-15,	1941.	Dominion-Provincial	
Conferences	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	King’s	Printer,	1951).	75.	
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“Personally	I	think	a	definite	bust-up	was	much	better	than	prolonged	and	fruitless	debate.	The	three	stalwarts	are	strange	bed-fellows	and	they	face	something	of	an	anti-climax	in	explaining	how	they	have	helped	to	win	the	war.”95	Alex	Skelton	shared	their	dismay.	As	he	told	Winnipeg	Free	Press	Ottawa	correspondent	Grant	Dexter,	the	politicians	had	missed	a	golden	opportunity	to	centralize	revenues	permanently.	Instead,	they	had	adopted	“a	poor	second	best	[plan]…buying	out	the	‘sons-of-bitches.’”96						That	reaction	was	at	odds	with	King’s.	As	the	Prime	Minister	later	told	his	diary	with	brutal	frankness,	he	was	“distinctly	relieved	and	happy”	about	the	result:	“While,	to	appearances,	it	has	been	a	failure,	in	reality	it	has	served	the	purpose	we	had	in	view,	of	avoiding	attack	for	not	having	called	the	conference,	and	particularly	what	would	certainly	have	followed,	invasion	of	provincial	sources	of	revenues.	We	have	now	got	the	pledge	of	the	provinces	to	let	us	take	their	revenues	if	we	need	them	–	a	tremendous	achievement.”97												The	tax	agreements	ensured	that	Ottawa	and	its	provincial	partners	maintained	fiscal	harmony	throughout	the	war.	The	poorer	provinces	secured	adequate	compensation	for	their	needs	for	the	duration	of	the	war.	The	wealthier	ones	preserved	their	constitutional	right	to	key	revenues	–	in	return	for	a	temporary	loss	of	control.	All	provinces	might	argue	with	federal	finance	officials	about	the																																																									95	Henry	Angus	to	R.A.	MacKay,	January	28,	1941.	LAC,	MG30,	Series	E159,	Vol.	8,	File:	Rowell	Sirois	Correspondence,	1938-1941,	p.	1.	96	Winnipeg	Free	Press	Correspondent	Grant	Dexter	to	Editor	John	Dafoe,	May	13,	1941,	as	quoted	in	Fransen,	p.	464.	97	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Wednesday,	January	15,	1941.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=22332&		
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details	of	their	tax-rental	agreements.	But	they	would	not	bother	Mackenzie	King	about	the	implementation	of	the	Rowell-Sirois	report	throughout	the	tough	years	of	the	war.							But	the	reputations	of	the	three	dissenting	Premiers	would	suffer.	Aberhart	would	die	in	May	1943	–	still	a	polarizing	renegade.	As	Pattullo’s	biographer,	historian	Robin	Fisher,	notes,	“those	two	days	in	Ottawa	were	to	determine	the	course	of	the	rest	of	his	political	career.”98	Branded	as	a	saboteur	of	the	wartime	effort,	he	would	emerge	from	the	October	1941	election	with	a	minority	government	and	a	rebellious	caucus	–	and	he	would	resign	in	early	December.	Hepburn,	too,	was	pilloried	on	his	return	from	Ottawa,	although	his	biographer,	historian	John	T.	Saywell,	notes	that	he	was	“not	contrite”:	“He	was	so	incensed	by	the	criticism	of	his	stand	at	the	Conference	that	the	government	placed	large	ads	in	provincial	newspapers.”99	But	Hepburn	had	made	dangerous	enemies	in	Ottawa	and	within	his	own	caucus.	He	would	resign	as	Premier	in	October	1942.	King	rejoiced.100			
Mackenzie	King,	the	Australians	and	the	Report								The	cautious	King	would	never	share	the	fascination	with	the	report.	He	was	in	frequent	touch	with	Australia	as	a	sister	Dominion-in-Arms	during	the	war	–	although	not	about	the	report.	Initially,	the	relationship	was	cooperative:	The	two	nations	developed	the	British	Commonwealth	Air	Training	Plan	–	and	agreed	to																																																									98	Robin	Fisher,	Duff	Pattullo	of	British	Columbia	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1991)	334.	99	John	T.	Saywell,	“Just	call	me	Mitch”:	The	Life	of	Mitchell	F.	Hepburn.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1991)	462.	100	John	T.	Saywell,	“Just	call	me	Mitch”:	The	Life	of	Mitchell	F.	Hepburn,	493.	
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exchange	High	Commissioners	–	after	the	outbreak	of	war.	So	far,	so	good.	But	when	King	recalled	High	Commissioner	Charles	J.	Burchell	in	July	1941,	he	selected	a	disastrous	replacement,	Major-General	Victor	Odlum.	In	January	1942,	Odlum	impulsively	promised	Canadian	military	aid	to	Australia	without	authorization.	When	a	desperate	Australia	gratefully	accepted,	and	the	new	Labor	Government	of	Prime	Minister	John	Curtin	took	heart,	King	did	not	initially	contradict	his	High	Commissioner.	The	drawn-out	disappointment	of	the	eventual	rejection	would	plague	diplomatic	relations	until	King	retired	in	1948,	and	the	Australians	defeated	their	Labor	Government	in	1949.101							True,	there	remained	grounds	for	some	cooperation:	after	all,	they	were	allies	in	the	war.	They	would	gracefully	receive	each	other’s	visiting	delegations.	King’s	diaries	reflect	his	mixed	reactions	to	those	contacts.102	But	the	Prime	Minister	would	
never	pay	attention	to	the	Australian	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission.	Although	Ottawa	would	deliver	grants	to	the	provinces	in	wartime	that	were	effectively,	if	only	minimally,	equalized	–	because	each	province	pocketed	the	same	per-capita	amount	even	though	the	wealthier	ones	raised	more	money	with	each	percentage	point	of	tax	–	the	principle	did	not	preoccupy	federal	governments.			
					The	Australians	had	followed	the	drama	at	the	conference	closely.	But	they	did	not	comprehend	King’s	devious	strategy	–	so	they	did	not	view	it	as	an	escape	for	King.	Instead,	in	a	lengthy	account	to	the	External	Affairs	Secretary	in	Canberra,																																																									101	Galen	Perras,	“’She	Should	Have	Thought	of	Herself	First”:	Canada	and	Military	Aid	to	Australia,	1939-45”	in	Parties	Long	Estranged:	Canada	and	Australia	in	the	
Twentieth	Century,	eds.	Margaret	MacMillan	and	Francine	McKenzie	(Vancouver:	UBC	Press,	2003.	p.	144.	102	I	went	through	every	reference	to	Australia	in	King’s	Diaries	from	1938	through	to	1949.		
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High	Commissioner	Sir	William	Glasgow	concentrated	on	the	political	instability	that	three	Provinces	had	created	when	they	resisted	the	implementation	of	the	report.	Ontario’s	Hepburn,	Alberta’s	Aberhart	and	British	Columbia’s	Pattullo	“made	the	proceedings	lively	from	the	outset”	when	they	flatly	refused	to	discuss	the	details	of	the	report.103	While	some	commentators	blamed	King	for	calling	the	conference	in	wartime,	Sir	William	Glasgow	explained,	the	“majority	of	responsible	newspapers”	condemned	the	three	Premiers	“for	destroying	national	unity.”104							Ever	mindful	of	the	need	for	national	unity,	especially	in	wartime,	Glasgow	admiringly	singled	out	Quebec	Premier	Adélard	Godbout’s	declaration:	“We	come	here	as	Canadians,	with	as	strong	a	spirit	of	Canadianism	as	anyone	has.”105							The	High	Commissioner	did	not	concentrate	on	the	problem	of	fiscal	inequality		although	he	noted	that	King	had	linked	implementation	of	the	report	to	a	more	effective	war	effort.	The	implied	lesson	was	that	federations	were	particularly	tricky	creatures	in	wartime	–	and	harmony	among	the	partners	could	be	the	key	to	political	survival	and	social	stability.	The	High	Commissioner	did	not	grasp	King’s	relief	at	the	failure	to	achieve	this	unanimity	at	the	ironic	price	of	national	unity.		
The	Bank	Of	Canada	Plots	to	Pick	Up	The	Pieces	
																																																								103	Australian	High	Commissioner	to	Canada	Sir	William	Glasgow	to	Australian	External	Affairs	Secretary	in	Canberra,	January	20,	1941.	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Australian	High	Commissioner	in	Canada	–	Memoranda	from,	Series	A461,	Control	Symbol	D348/1/15,	Barcode	1950707,	p.	1.	104	Australian	High	Commissioner	to	Canada	Sir	William	Glasgow	to	Australian	External	Affairs	Secretary	in	Canberra,	January	20,	1941,	p.	2.	105	Australian	High	Commissioner	to	Canada	Sir	William	Glasgow	to	Australian	External	Affairs	Secretary	in	Canberra,	January	20,	1941,	p.	1.	
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					Meanwhile,	in	Ottawa,	Bank	of	Canada	officials	were	struggling	to	deal	with	the	fallout	from	the	deadlocked	conference.	As	advocates	of	the	Royal	Commission	report,	they	did	not	want	to	abandon	it.	In	a	memorandum	on	January	20,	1941,	the	deputy	chief	of	the	research	department,	J.	R.	Beattie,	sketched	out	a	strategy	that	could	resolve	the	difficult	discussions.	“The	most	serious	objection	made	at	the	Conference	to	the	implementation	of	the	Report	was	that	permanent	measures	were	not	justified	to	meet	a	temporary	situation.	….	[But]	all	the	recalcitrant	or	doubtful	provinces	said	that	they	were	willing	to	take	any	action,	or	bear	any	burden,	which	was	necessitated	by	the	war,	for	the	duration	of	the	war.”	Therefore,	Ottawa	should	ask	the	provinces	to	temporarily	yield	the	three	great	fields	of	direct	taxation	to	Ottawa.	Otherwise,	it	would	“be	impossible	to	finance	the	enormous	total	of	war	and	other	governmental	expenditure	with	even	a	minimum	degree	of	equity.”106							That	appeal	for	fiscal	equity	in	wartime	was	a	new	argument.	Beattie	did	not	want	to	arouse	jealousy	among	the	individual	taxpayers	in	the	different	provinces	who	were	funding	the	war	effort:	if	Ottawa	imposed	those	three	taxes	at	the	same	rates	across	the	nation,	the	burden	could	be	shared	equally.	In	return,	Ottawa	could	provide	“temporary	assistance”	to	those	provinces	that	surrendered	control.107									Beattie	had	a	larger	post-war	scheme	in	mind,	too.	In	the	short-term,	Ottawa	should	ensure	that	the	word	‘temporary’	was	“plastered	all	over	the	agreement.”108	In	the	longer	term,	“it	would	greatly	facilitate	final	adoption	of	the	Report	if	any	temporary	arrangements	which	have	to	be	made	could	conform	to	the	broad	outline																																																									106	Memorandum	from	Bank	of	Canada	Deputy	Chief	of	Research	J	R.	Beattie,	January	20,	1941.	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Secretary’s	fonds,	B95	File	291,	p.	1.	My	italics.	107	Memorandum	from	Bank	of	Canada	Deputy	Chief	of	Research	J	R.	Beattie,	p.	1.	108	Memorandum	from	Bank	of	Canada	Deputy	Chief	of	Research	J	R.	Beattie,	p.	2.	
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of	[the	Royal	Commission]	proposals	as	closely	as	possible.”109	Despite	the	strong	objections	from	the	three	dissenting	Premiers,	at	least	some	Ottawa	officials	had	not	given	up	hope	that	they	could	implement	the	Royal	Commission	report	in	peacetime.	They	did	not	yet	understand	that	the	loss	of	social	cohesion	and	the	danger	to	national	unity	was	too	big	a	price	to	pay	for	forced	fiscal	equality.		
The	Tax	Rental	Deals					Such	calls	for	permanent	constitutional	change	would	have	appalled	King.	Thanks	to	Ilsley,	he	had	secured	the	funds	to	fight	the	war	without	federal	entanglement	in	costly	schemes.	But	although	the	Prime	Minister	would	not	live	to	realize	it,	he	had	also	taken	the	first	tiny	steps	toward	equalization.	One	after	another,	by	May	1942,	all	provinces	signed	tax	rental	agreements	with	Ottawa	that	would	run	until	a	year	after	the	end	of	the	war.	Under	those	deals,	the	provinces	were	asked	to	refrain	from	levying	personal	and	corporate	income	taxes	and	succession	duties.							In	turn,	they	would	receive	grants	based	on	one	of	two	mechanisms.	Under	the	first	option,	grants	would	be	based	on	the	revenues	collected	within	a	province’s	boundaries	from	those	three	taxes	in	1941.	Quebec,	Ontario,	Manitoba,	British	Columbia	and	initially	Alberta	selected	this	option,	which	economist	Thomas	Courchene	views	as	“the	antithesis	of	equalization”	because	it	was	based	on	each	individual	province’s	tax	take.110		
																																																								109	Memorandum	from	Bank	of	Canada	Deputy	Chief	of	Research	J	R.	Beattie,	p.	3.	110	Thomas	J.	Courchene,	Equalization	Payments:	Past,	Present	and	Future	(Toronto:	Ontario	Economic	Council,	1984)	27.	
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					Under	the	second	option,	grants	would	be	based	on	the	net	cost	of	servicing	a	province’s	debt	in	1940-41	–	minus	succession	duties	collected	in	that	year.	Four	poorer	provinces	–	Saskatchewan	and	the	three	Maritime	provinces	–	selected	this	option.	The	existence	of	the	two	options	was	fascinating	in	itself:	“It	is	possible	to	argue	that	the	availability	of	a	choice	of	options	embodied	some	consideration	of	fiscal	need,”	notes	Courchene.111	(Alberta	would	later	move	to	the	second	option.)						Perhaps	more	important,	however,	the	Dominion	agreed	to	augment	those	payments	“by	appropriate	fiscal	need	subsidies	where	it	can	be	shown	that	these	are	necessary.”112	Former	senior	federal	finance	official	R.	M.	Burns	notes	that	Ottawa	“had	always	been	reluctant	to	acknowledge	fiscal	need	per	se	as	a	basis	for	grants	to	the	provinces,	preferring	adjustments	to	statutory	subsidies	or	special	grants	to	acknowledge	any	fundamental	disabilities	within	the	federation.”113	But	the	grants	that	Ottawa	had	introduced	for	the	Maritimes	in	the	late	1920s	and	the	mid-1930s	–	in	response	to	the	Duncan	and	White	reports	–	had	already	recognized	special	needs,	at	least	indirectly.	Now,	officially,	Ottawa	crossed	this	rhetorical	bridge:	the	rental	agreements	would	effectively	replace	the	special	grants	to	the	West	and	the	awards	to	the	Maritimes	with	subsidies	based	on	existing	fiscal	need.	Ottawa	also	guaranteed	that	provincial	revenues	from	liquor	and	gasoline	sales	would	not	fall	below	the	level	of	1940.		
																																																								111	Thomas	J.	Courchene,	Equalization	Payments:	Past,	Present	and	Future	(Toronto:	Ontario	Economic	Council,	1984)	27.	112	As	quoted	in	R.	M.	Burns,	The	Acceptable	Mean:	The	Tax	Rental	Agreements,	1941-
1962	(Toronto:	Canadian	Tax	Foundation,	1980)	32.	113	R.	M.	Burns,	29.	
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				In	effect,	the	tax	rental	deals	established	a	vital	point:	the	poorer	provinces	would	now	get	extra	revenue	in	return	for	cooperating	with	Ottawa	–	although	no	province	actually	had	a	legal	choice	to	ignore	the	deals.	“It	was	the	war	that	changed	everything,”	Burns	remarks.	“On	both	patriotic	and	constitutional	grounds,	the	Dominion’s	unlimited	authority	under	wartime	emergencies	was	fully	established.”114			
The	Australian-Canadian	Relationship	in	Wartime					The	Australian	interest	in	Canada	continued	throughout	the	war	–	and	into	peacetime.	Australian	diplomats	paid	special	attention	to	Canadian	unity	–	perhaps	because	instability	plagued	their	own	domestic	political	parties.	In	April	1941,	the	High	Commission’s	Official	Secretary	Noël	Deschamps	forwarded	a	lengthy	report	from	The	Montreal	Gazette	along	with	an	emphatic	covering	letter,	outlining	the	speech	of	Montreal	Cardinal	Jean-Marie-Rodrigue	Villeneuve	to	a	prestigious	Toronto	audience.	The	Cardinal	had	appealed	for	national	unity,	denying	the	existence	of	“any	strong	separatist	movement”	in	Quebec.”115	Australian	Deschamps	depicted	the	positive	speech	as	“an	authoritative	statement	of	the	French	Canadian	Attitude	at	the	present	time.”116		
																																																								114	R.	M.	Burns,	35.	115	High	Commission	Secretary	Noël	Deschamps	to	External	Affairs	Department	Secretary,	Memorandum,	April	24,	1941.	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Canada-	Internal	Part	1,	Series	number	A981,	Control	symbol	CAN	21	Part	1,	Barcode	173371.	p.	1.	116	High	Commission	Secretary	Noël	Deschamps	to	External	Affairs	Department	Secretary,	Memorandum,	April	24,	1941.	p.	1.	
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					The	interest	was	mutual	–	but	King	never	dealt	with	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	during	those	years.	There	was	little	room	in	his	wartime	life	for	the	consideration	of	federal-provincial	grants	to	the	poorer	provinces,	let	alone	the	Australian	model	for	delivering	such	grants.	But	there	are	several	hundred	references	to	Australia	sprinkled	throughout	his	Diaries	from	1939	through	to	the	end	of	the	war	and	its	aftermath.				
The	Push	For	Social	Citizenship								As	the	Dominions	struggled	to	maintain	stability	at	home,	the	world	was	changing	around	them.	Among	the	North	Atlantic	allies,	the	pressures	for	expanded	social	security	were	growing	–	if	only	to	preserve	social	stability.	Politicians,	academics	and	social	organizations	such	as	the	National	Council	of	Women	of	Canada,	which	was	a	pivotal	if	relatively	privileged	voice	for	Canadian	women,	and	the	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour,	were	now	advocating	the	creation	of	a	better	post-war	world	with	extended	rights	to	social	security.	Those	groups	wrestled	with	the	same	apparently	conflicting	notions	of	sharing	and	dependency	as	their	politicians:	balance	seemed	difficult	to	attain.							But	they	would	no	longer	accept	constitutional	excuses	for	any	failure	to	act:	there	had	to	be	a	way	to	extend	social	security	despite	the	provinces’	responsibility	for	education,	health	care	and	social	services.	Their	effect	on	their	politicians	as	they	demanded	these	rights	–	especially	within	Anglophone	Canada	–	would	become	increasingly	powerful.	As	James	Struthers	notes,	there	was	a	“symbolic	change	of	thinking	about	wartime	social	policy	which	underpinned	Canada’s	emerging	welfare	
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state…	This	shift	in	emphasis	from	charity	to	entitlement	has	long	been	viewed	as	a	central	metaphorical	turn	in	the	construction	of	the	welfare	state.”117									But	idealism	was	not	the	principle	motivator.	Historian	Jennifer	Stephen	has	aptly	summarized	the	process:	key	federal	social	policies	“are	more	accurately	read	as	the	collective	product	of	a	strategic	compromise	to	meet	the	economic	and	political	challenges	confronting	Canadian	federalism	in	the	1940s	rather	than	a	broad	endorsement	of	democratic	principles.”118	In	other	words,	the	politicians	had	to	act	to	preserve	stability	and	their	own	hegemony.							The	reformers	nurtured	a	sentiment	that	had	been	percolating	over	the	last	few	decades:	social	assistance	for	struggling	people	was	a	moral	duty	for	individuals	–	but	it	was	also	a	moral	obligation	that	wealthier	states	owed	to	their	poorer	federal	kin.	As	early	as	the	1920s,	as	political	scientist	R.J.	May	writes,	the	Premiers	of	the	Australian	states	had	stoutly	defended	the	continuation	of	their	per-capita	payments	from	the	Commonwealth	as	a	“moral	right.”	Tasmanian	Premier	J.	A.	Lyons,	who	would	later	become	Australian	Prime	Minister,	had	buttressed	his	case	for	continued	per-capita	payments	to	the	states	with	the	claim	that	“the	effect	[of	
																																																								117	James	Struthers,	“Family	Allowances,	Old	Age	Security,	and	the	Construction	of	Entitlement	in	the	Canadian	Welfare	State,	1943-1951”	in	The	Veterans	Charter	and	
Post-World	War	II	Canada,	eds.	Peter	Neary	and	J.	L.	Granatstein	(Montreal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	1998)	p.	179.	118	Jennifer	A.	Stephen,	Pick	One	Intelligent	Girl:	Employability,	Domesticity,	and	the	
Gendering	of	Canada’s	Welfare	States,	1939-1947	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2007)	p.	9.	Stephen	said	that	she	was	paraphrasing	Struthers	–	but	her	summary	was	far	more	succinct.		
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abolition]	would	be	much	more	serious	on	the	smaller	states.”119	Fiscal	inequalities	among	governments	could	not	be	brushed	aside.						During	the	1930s,	that	moral	right	to	social	resources	was	reinforced	with	an	implicit	threat	to	social	cohesion	if	it	were	not	recognized.	As	historian	David	M.	Kennedy	notes,	U.S.	President	Franklin	Roosevelt	told	Congress	in	June	1935	that	the	federal	tax	system	was	contributing	to	an	“unjust	concentration	of	wealth	and	economic	power…Social	unrest	and	a	deepening	sense	of	unfairness	are	dangers	to	our	national	life	which	we	must	minimize	by	rigorous	methods.”120	Roosevelt	introduced	the	landmark	Social	Security	Act	of	1935,	which	provided	aid	to	dependent	children	and	pensions	for	the	elderly.							More	importantly,	the	act	levied	a	federal	tax	on	employers	of	eight	or	more	workers,	which	would	finance	Unemployment	Insurance.	States	could	administer	their	own	UI	plans,	capturing	about	ninety	per	cent	of	the	federal	levy	through	tax-offset	plans.	(Within	the	next	few	years,	all	states	would	join	the	plan.)	As	Kennedy	adds:	“Security	is	the	leitmotif	of	virtually	everything	the	New	Deal	attempted…	Its	cardinal	aim	was	not	to	destroy	capitalism	but	to	devolatilize	it,	and	at	the	same	time	to	distribute	its	benefits	more	evenly.”121						A	year	later,	on	June	7,	1936,	Roosevelt	accepted	his	party’s	nomination	with	a	paean	to	the	role	of	government	in	hard	times:	“There	is	a	mysterious	cycle	in	
																																																								119	R.J.	May,	Financing	the	Small	States	in	Australian	Federalism	(Melbourne:	Oxford	University	Press,	1971)	13.	120	David	M.	Kennedy,	Freedom	From	Fear:	The	American	People	in	Depression	and	
War,	1929-1945	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1999)	275.	121	David	M.	Kennedy,	Freedom	From	Fear:	The	American	People	in	Depression	and	
War,	1929-1945	(New	York	and	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1999)	365,	372.	
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human	events.	To	some	generations	much	is	given.	Of	other	generations	much	is	expected.	This	generation	of	Americans	has	a	rendezvous	with	destiny.”122						That	sentiment	of	moral	obligation	to	lower-income	citizens	spilled	into	Canada	as	wartime	sacrifices	engendered	dreams	of	a	better	world.	In	early	1939,	the	cabinet	had	created	an	Economic	Advisory	Committee	(EAC)	of	state	officials	to	oversee	the	war.	123	It	would	eventually	be	drawn	into	planning	for	peacetime.	In	September	1941,	as	University	of	Winnipeg	economist	Hugh	Grant	notes,	the	cabinet	had	formally	recognized	the	existence	of	an	Advisory	Committee	on	Reconstruction,	which	the	president	of	McGill	University,	Cyril	James,	chaired	and	social	scientist	Leonard	Marsh	served	as	secretary.124							That	committee	agreed	on	three	assumptions:	social	security	measures	would	be	conducive	to	a	healthy	economy	and	full	employment;	the	postwar	years	could	bring	“considerable	economic	and	social	dislocation”;	and	perhaps	most	importantly,	“inevitably,	the	state	and	the	bureaucracy	would	have	to	continue	to	exercise	in	the	post-war	world	at	least	a	portion	of	the	powers	they	had	assumed	to	handle	the	wartime	emergency.”125							The	release	of	its	“extremely	modest”	interim	report	in	the	autumn	of	1942	fueled	a	simmering	a	turf	war	between	National	Health	Minister	Ian	Mackenzie	and	
																																																								122	Kennedy,	281.		123	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Friday,	July	16,	1943.	p.	25623.	124	Hugh	Grant,	W.	A.	Mackintosh:	The	Life	of	a	Canadian	Economist	(Montreal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2015)	p.	270.	125	Doug	Owram,	The	Government	Generation:	Canadian	Intellectuals	and	the	State,	
1900-1945	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1986)	p.	282.	
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Finance	Ministry	and	Bank	of	Canada	officials.126	What	was	the	role	of	the	state	in	fostering	employment	–	and	how	should	it	tackle	the	issue?	As	Stephen	observes,	the	manpower	crisis	“was	a	battleground	upon	which	the	varying	rights	of	citizenship	and	property	would	be	contested	by	employers,	veterans’	organizations,	trade	unions,	and	individual	men	and	women.”127					The	social	activists	within	the	government	envisaged	a	better	community	–	indeed,	a	better	world.	They	were	well	aware	of	the	report	that	social	reformer	William	Beveridge	had	submitted	to	the	British	Parliament	in	November	1942,	which	proposed	a	minimum	standard	of	living	for	all	citizens.	In	December	1942,	Health	Minister	Mackenzie	pointedly	reminded	the	cabinet’s	Advisory	Committee	on	Reconstruction	that	Canada	had	subscribed	“immediately”	to	the	Atlantic	Charter	which	U.S.	President	Franklin	Roosevelt	and	British	Prime	Minister	Winston	Churchill	had	drawn	up	in	August	1941.128	In	that	Charter’s	statement	of	principles,	the	two	leaders	had	vowed	to	ensure	that	“all	the	men	in	all	lands	may	live	out	their	lives	in	freedom	from	fear	and	want.”129							Mackenzie	stressed	that	the	Prime	Minister	“has	repeatedly	underlined	and	emphasized	the	determination	of	this	country	to	establish	for	all	our	people	security																																																									126	Doug	Owram,	The	Government	Generation:	Canadian	Intellectuals	and	the	State,	
1900-1945,	283.	127	Jennifer	A.	Stephen,	Pick	One	Intelligent	Girl:	Employability,	Domesticity,	and	the	Gendering	of	Canada’s	Welfare	States,	1939-1947	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2007)	p.	20.	128	Chairman	Ian	Mackenzie	from	the	Minutes	of	Proceedings	of	the	House	of	Commons	committee	on	reconstruction,	Special	joint	meeting,	December	4,	1942.	LAC,	MG28,	Series	I103,	Vol.	195,	File:	Federal	Government	House	of	Commons	Special	Committee	on	Reconstruction	and	Re-establishment	195-16,	p.	5.	129	Quotation	from	Atlantic	Charter:		http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp		
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from	the	great	fears	which	haunt	the	majority	of	mankind	from	infancy	to	the	grave	---	the	fear	of	ill	health,	the	fear	of	unemployment,	the	fear	of	hunger,	and	the	fear	of	an	impoverished	old	age.”130	Mackenzie	would	lose	that	bureaucratic	battle	–	but	he	had	driven	home	“the	necessity	of	planning	for	reconstruction”	–	especially	within	a	federation.131						The	bureaucratic	wheels	turned	slowly.	In	early	1942,	the	cabinet	appointed	a	formal	Advisory	Committee	on	Health	Insurance.	In	1943,	Prime	Minister	King	swung	behind	the	concept,	using	the	Speech	From	the	Throne	to	call	for	a	“comprehensive	national	scheme	of	social	insurance.”132	Both	Houses	of	Parliament	created	committees	to	study	the	issue	–	and	Health	Minister	Mackenzie	tabled	a	proposal	for	national	health	insurance	in	cabinet.	As	medical	historian	Dr.	C.	David	Naylor	explains,	Mackenzie	argued	that	socialism	had	become	“a	national	political	menace,”	and	that	a	federal-provincial	conference	should	consider	draft	health	legislation	“as	soon	as	possible.”133	Mackenzie	wanted	the	Liberals	to	pull	the	rug	out	from	under	any	so-called	socialist	appeal	from	the	Co-operative	Commonwealth	Federation.							In	mid-March	1943,	the	Advisory	Committee	on	Health	Insurance	reported	to	the	House	of	Commons	Committee	on	Social	Security.134	The	massive	558-page																																																									130	Chairman	Ian	Mackenzie	from	the	Minutes	of	Proceedings	of	the	House	of	Commons	committee	on	reconstruction,	Special	joint	meeting,	December	4,	1942.	LAC,	MG28,	Series	I103,	Vol.	195,	File:	Federal	Government	House	of	Commons	Special	Committee	on	Reconstruction	and	Re-establishment	195-16,	p.	5.	131	Owram,	286.	132	Owram,	290.	133	Naylor,	p.	120.	134	Health	Minister	Brooke	Claxton,	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	August	6,	1945.	Dominion-Provincial	Submissions	and	Plenary	
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Advisory	Committee	report	included	two	draft	bills:	one	set	out	the	mechanism	to	retain	federal	influence	over	the	provinces	through	conditional	grants-in-aid	for	health	care	to	the	provinces;	the	second	outlined	draft	provincial	legislation	to	establish	a	commission	that	would	administer	health	insurance.135	Ottawa	would	pay	three-fifths	of	the	provincial	cost	through	the	grants-in-aid;	the	provincial	governments	would	pay	the	remaining	two-fifths	through	a	tax	of	$12	imposed	upon	each	adult.136									The	movement	gathered	momentum.	In	January	1944,	the	Speech	From	The	Throne	outlined	Ottawa’s	intention	“to	bring	in	a	nation-wide	system	of	health	insurance	as	soon	as	suitable	arrangements	could	be	made	with	the	provinces.”137	In	May	1944,	provincial	ministers	and	bureaucrats	met	in	Ottawa	to	discuss	the	draft	Health	Insurance	bill	–	and	how	to	meet	those	costs.	According	to	a	later	federal	summary,	most	provinces	“indicated	their	strong	desire	that	health	insurance	should	be	proceeded	with	by	stages	and	that	any	scheme	adopted	should	be	flexible	
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enough	to	permit	the	provinces	to	build	on	the	varying	services	in	each	province.”138	Optimism	was	in	the	air.							The	Australians	were	fascinated,	reporting	to	Canberra	on	the	salient	social	measures	that	the	federal	government	was	considering:	Ottawa	wanted	to	establish	the	men	and	women	of	the	armed	forces	“in	useful	and	remunerative	employment	after	the	war.”139	It	aimed	to	secure	“adequate	income	and	full	employment	after	the	war	for	primary	producers.”140	Perhaps	most	important:		Government	believes	that	a	comprehensive	national	scheme	of	social	insurance,	which	will	constitute	charter	of	social	security	for	whole	of	Canada,	should	be	worked	out	at	once.	It	proposes	early	appointment	therefore	of	Select	Committee	to	examine	and	report	on	most	practicable	measures	of	social	insurance,	including	national	system	of	health	insurance.141								But	it	was	social	scientist	Leonard	Marsh	who	would	outline	the	most	comprehensive	proposal	in	the	wake	of	the	restrained	Advisory	Committee	on	Reconstruction	report.	In	March	1943,	Marsh	presented	a	300-page	package	to	House	of	Commons	Committee	on	Reconstruction,	calling	for	a	comprehensive	social	minimum	that	included	unemployment	assistance,	employment	retraining,	health	insurance,	and	children’s	allowances.142																																																										138	C.	David	Naylor,	Private	Practice,	Public	Payment:	Canadian	Medicine	and	the	
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						Two	months	later,	an	International	Labour	Office	Review	of	the	Marsh	report	and	Ottawa’s	proposed	health	insurance	legislation	noted:	“Social	security	has	become	identified	with	that	better	world	for	which	they	[Canadians]	are	fighting.”143	In	a	hint	at	the	continuing	anxiety	about	dependency,	however,	the	ILO	analysis	added:	“Social	insurance	benefits	must	be	less	than	the	earnings	of	the	self-supporting	individual,	while	social	assistance	payments	must	be	less	than	the	earnings	of	the	unskilled	worker.”144							It	is	important	to	note	that	reports	such	as	those	from	Leonard	Marsh	and	Ian	Mackenzie	dealt	with	inequality	among	people:	they	did	not	tackle	the	glaring	inequalities	among	governments	that	remained	a	basic	barrier	to	social	reform	within	the	federation.	Ottawa	could	dream	–	but	it	still	lacked	the	practical	fiscal	mechanism	to	implement	those	dreams.	Provinces	could	not	instigate	full	social	programs	until	there	was	relative	fiscal	equality	among	the	federation	members.			
The	Yearning	For	A	Better	World					The	federal	Liberal	government	was	uneasily	aware	that	it	could	not	just	win	the	war	–	it	had	to	win	the	peace	–	if	it	was	going	to	meet	its	voters’	expectations.	Perhaps	the	August	1943	report	from	the	reconstruction	committee	of	the	Canadian	Teachers’	Federation	best	epitomized	this	yearning:	it	embraced	the	idea	of	The	Good	Life,	which	American	educator	George	S.	Counts	had	propounded	during	the																																																									143	Social	Security	Planning	In	Canada:	The	Marsh	Report	and	Proposed	Health	Insurance	Legislation”	in	the	International	Labour	Review,	Vol.	XLVII,	No.	5,	May	1943	(Montreal:	International	Labour	Office,	1943)	2.	144	“Social	Security	Planning	In	Canada:	The	Marsh	Report	and	Proposed	Health	Insurance	Legislation”	in	the	International	Labour	Review,	Vol.	XLVII,	No.	5,	May	1943	(Montreal:	International	Labour	Office,	1943)	5.	
	 	 	 	 	326	
1930s.	“The	Committee	feels	that	a	true	democracy	can	be	content	with	nothing	less	than	what	has	become	generally	known	as	The	Good	Life	for	all	the	people….	That	somehow	as	a	result	of	this	terrible	struggle,	this	Good	Life	may	be	attained	fully	or	in	large	part	by	the	millions	of	plain	folk	who	comprise	the	Democratic	nations…Constantly	we	hear	voiced	the	sentiment	that	this	is	what	our	boys	are	fighting	for.”145	The	federation	called	for	“a	comprehensive	and	all-inclusive	plan	of	Social	Security	for	all	citizens…covering	unemployment,	health,	accidents,	marriage,	childbirth,	allowance	for	children	and	retirement	for	the	aged.”146	And	they	looked	to	Ottawa	to	deliver	this	package.							Other	groups	wanted	to	strengthen	the	resources	of	the	provinces	in	key	areas	in	the	post-war	era.	The	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour	wanted	more	assistance	for	the	provinces,	which	were	responsible	for	education.	In	a	memorandum	to	Ottawa	that	summarized	their	members’	views,	the	CCL	explained:	“The	wide	diversity	in	educational	standards,	in	text	books,	and	curricula	in	Canada	was	regarded	as	a	source	of	disunity…	the	Federal	Government	should	make	available	to	the	provinces	financial	assistance	which	will	enable	them	to	raise	educational	standards	to	the	highest	possible	level.”147									Federal	officials	knew	that	they	were	in	a	sticky	situation,	trapped	between	the	aspirations	of	many	Canadians	and	the	constitutional	provisions	for	strong	provincial	identities.	In	December	1943,	an	unsigned	Bank	of	Canada	memo	on	post-																																																								145	Canadian	Teachers’	Federation,	Education:	The	Keystone	of	Democracy,	Report	of	
the	Reconstruction	Committee	of	the	Canadian	Teachers’	Federation,	LAC,	MG	28,	Vol.	11,	p.	7.	146	CTF	IBID,	page	11.	147	Memorandum	submitted	to	the	Dominion	Government	by	the	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour,	April	24,	1945.	LAC,	MG28,	Vol.	171.	p.	3.	
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war	provincial	finance	summarized	Canada’s	plight:	“It	seems	clear	that	the	provinces	cannot	finance	any	major	extension	of	welfare	services	out	of	their	own	resources.”148	This	was	a	an	important	recognition	of	the	link	between	provincial	fiscal	equity	and	the	provision	of	social	security.							Worse,	if	the	tax-rental	agreements	with	their	fiscal-need	grants	ceased	to	operate,	some	provinces	would	“find	it	difficult	or	impossible	to	finance	even	the	present	level	of	services.”149	This	would	present	a	danger	to	social	cohesion:	“Welfare,	like	prosperity,	or	peace,	is	indivisible.”150	Presciently,	the	memo	suggested	one	of	two	courses:	“Transfer	the	constitutional	responsibility	for	certain	welfare	services	(such	as	health	insurance?)	from	the	provinces	to	the	federal	government,”	which	would	require	constitutional	amendment.	151					Or,	more	importantly,	Ottawa	could	work	out	a	system	to	transfer	federal	funds	to	the	provinces	“on	the	basis	of	need,	which	will	provide	adequate	checks	against	misuse	of	funds	but	will	not	encroach	upon	the	essentials	of	provincial	autonomy.”152	This	course	could	be	equally	fraught	–	because	equalizing	payments	could	also	damage	social	cohesion	if	they	were	improperly	balanced.	The	memo’s	author	captured	the	dilemma:			If	applied	on	too	large	a	scale	[they]	would	pose	serious	political	problems	of	a	continuing	character.	It	would	be	difficult	to	define	welfare	services	in	sufficiently	objective	and	specific	terms,	and	determine	their	cost	closely	enough,	to	make	effective	supervision	of	the	relevant	provincial	expenditures	possible.	But	unless	this																																																									148	“Post-War	Provincial	Finance,”	unsigned	memorandum	of	December	10,	1943,	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	Research	Fonds,	File	28-500,	Volume	1,	p.	1.	149	“Post-War	Provincial	Finance,”,	p.	8.	150	“Post-War	Provincial	Finance,”,	p.	12.	151	“Post-War	Provincial	Finance,”,	p.	16.	152	“Post-War	Provincial	Finance,”,	p.	16.	
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could	be	done,	provincial	governments	would	be	in	a	position	to	determine	the	expenditure	of	large	sums	of	money	which	they	did	not	have	to	take	the	onus	of	raising	from	their	electors.	A	basically	unhealthy	situation	of	this	sort	could	have	many	undesirable	consequences.	For	example,	it	would	obviously	enhance	the	ability	of	regional	groups	to	block	legitimate	national	policies	if	they	so	desired.153							Once	again,	no	one	dared	to	raise	the	prospect	of	non-conditional	transfers	to	the	poorer	provinces	to	meet	their	fiscal	requirements.	And	no	one	had	suggested	that	such	transfers	should	be	linked	to	revenue-raising	capacity	as	opposed	to	spending	needs.	Genuine	equalization	payments	were	still	not	on	the	federal	agenda.	But	the	chorus	of	demands	from	social	reformers	was	growing.	The	Montreal	local	of	the	National	Council	of	Women,	for	one,	implored	civic	governments	to	ask	Ottawa	for	a	“greatly	expanded”	housing	program.154	Such	groups	had	not	yet	created	implicit	coalitions	across	classes	to	exert	power	resources.155					But	Mackenzie	King	did	not	need	a	sign	from	the	heavens	to	discern	the	threat	to	his	political	stability.	In	August	1943,	the	social	democratic	Co-Operative	Commonwealth	Federation	(CCF)	became	the	official	opposition	in	Ontario	when	the	Conservatives	won	the	provincial	election.	That	same	month,	the	CCF	snared	two	of	four	seats	in	federal	by-elections.	In	September	1943,	a	Gallup	Poll	showed	that	the	CCF	held	a	one-percentage-point	lead	over	both	the	Liberals	and	the																																																									153	“Post-War	Provincial	Finance,”,	pps.	16-17.	154	Montreal	Local	Council,	Resolutions	of	the	National	Council	of	Women,	LAC,	MG28,	Series	125,	vol.	85.	P.	3.	155	Danish	sociologist	Gøsta	Esping-Andersen	views	power-resources	as	the	key	to	political	influence:	that	is,	combinations	are	“more	decisive”	than	the	power	resources	of	any	single	class.	Gøsta	Esping-Andersen,	“The	Three	Political	Economies	of	the	Welfare	State”	in	Power	Resources	Theory	and	the	Welfare	State:	A	
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Conservatives.156	In	June	1944,	former	Parliamentarian	T.	C.	Douglas	and	the	Co-Operative	Commonwealth	Federation	(CCF)	became	the	first	social	democratic	government	in	Canada	when	the	party	won	the	Saskatchewan	election.						Partly	in	response	to	such	apparent	impatience	among	the	electorate,	the	Prime	Minister	opted	to	deliver	direct	transfers	to	individual	Canadians	through	a	program	of	Family	Allowances.	Cash	payments	would	go	to	families	with	children,	especially	large	families,	providing	income	maintenance.	That	would	relieve	pressure	from	labour	groups	to	drive	up	wages,	fueling	inflation.	As	well,	tucking	cash	in	the	pockets	of	low-income	consumers	would	increase	employment	while	allowing,	and	often	forcing,	women	to	leave	their	wartime	jobs.	King	was	already	fretting	about	the	transition	from	war	to	peace.	“Economic	policies	now	dominated	social	welfare	issues,”	observes	historian	Doug	Owram.157								In	his	diary,	King	emphasized	the	connection,	describing	a	cabinet	meeting	with	Deputy	Finance	Minister	W.	C.	Clark	in	January	1944:	“He	made	a	very	fine	presentation,	stressing	among	other	things	how	serious	might	be	the	solution	of	some	other	questions,	e.	g.	relief,	housing	and	the	like,	unless	family	allowances	measure	were	introduced.	He	also	touched	upon	the	necessity	of	this	measure	if	wage	stabilization	and	price	ceiling	were	to	be	maintained.”158																																																									156	Jeff	Keshen,	“Getting	It	Right	the	Second	Time	Around”	in	The	Veterans	Charter	
and	Post-World	War	II	Canada,	eds.	Peter	Neary	and	J.	L.	Granatstein	(Montreal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	1998)	p.	66.	157	Doug	Owram,	The	Government	Generation:	Canadian	Intellectuals	and	the	State,	
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					But	the	ever-cautious	King	was	wary	of	firm	commitments	to	health	insurance.	Even	after	Tommy	Douglas	and	his	CCF	won	the	Saskatchewan	election	on	June	15,	1944,	the	Prime	Minister	remained	“uneasy	about	the	financial	ramifications	of	health	insurance.”159	In	the	fall	of	1944,	he	declined	to	call	a	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	that	would	consider	the	two	draft	bills	on	health	care	from	the	Advisory	Committee	on	Health	Insurance,	arguing	that	he	should	wait	until	after	the	next	federal	election.	In	January	1945,	in	an	unusual	Speech	from	the	Throne	that	closed	the	session	in	anticipation	of	an	election,	Ottawa	again	repeated	its	intention	to	adopt	health	insurance	as	soon	as	“suitable	arrangements”	could	be	made	with	the	provinces	at	a	post-election	Dominion-Provincial	Conference.160	King’s	“strategic	delay”	would	buy	time	–	and	ensure	that	those	ambitious	plans	started	to	lose	momentum.161									But	King	could	not	wholly	relax.	The	Prime	Minister	scraped	through	the	June	1945	federal	election.	The	CCF	won	28	seats,	however,	with	15.6	per	cent	of	the	popular	vote.	That	was	less	than	many	party	stalwarts	had	expected	after	Douglas’	win	in	Saskatchewan	–	but	King	understood	that	the	threat	had	not	gone	away.								Keynesian	Policies	Gain	Credence																																																									159	David	Naylor,	Private	Practice,	Public	Payment:	Canadian	Medicine	and	the	Politics	
of	Health	Insurance	1911-1966	(Kingston	and	Montreal:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	1986.	p.	131.	160	Health	Minister	Brooke	Claxton,	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	August	6,	1945.	Dominion-Provincial	Submissions	and	Plenary	Conference	Discussions	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	to	the	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1946)	p.	88	161	David	Naylor,	Private	Practice,	Public	Payment:	Canadian	Medicine	and	the	Politics	
of	Health	Insurance	1911-1966	(Kingston	and	Montreal:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	198.	p.	132.	
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				There	was	another	factor	at	play	as	Ottawa	considered	its	post-war	world:	The	Keynesians	were	edging	into	control	within	the	Government	Generation.	Keynes	himself	visited	Canada	three	times	in	1944-1945.	His	former	students	at	Cambridge	University	–	future	deputy	finance	minister	Robert	Bryce	and	future	assistant	deputy	finance	minister	A.	F.	W.	Plumptre	–	were	attracting	respectful	attention	when	they	spoke	about	his	views	in	Ottawa.							Even	those	who	had	not	formally	embraced	the	doctrine	now	realized,	as	Owram	notes,	that	under-employment	was	not	self-correcting	in	capitalist	economies.162	Not	only	could	direct	federal	transfers	to	individuals	foster	social	cohesion,	they	could	also	promote	economic	vitality		and	consumer	demand	during	the	expected	post-war	downturn.	Federal	spending	could	moderate	the	effects	of	the	expected	downturn.	(It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	there	would	be	“but	limited	use	of	the	Keynesian	instruments	in	the	period	prior	to	the	Korean	War.	Aggregate	demand	conditions	were	healthy	after	the	war.”)163							But	what	about	the	glaring	fiscal	inequalities	among	governments	that	could	plague	social	stability	as	the	war	inched	toward	an	end	–	and	the	tax	rental	agreements	concluded?	What	would	happen	if	Ottawa	lost	control	of	that	huge	pot	of	tax	revenues	that	could	be	useful	in	a	downturn?	In	May	1944,	Ottawa	tapped	its	best	resource	on	Dominion-Provincial	financial	relations	to	handle	such	problems:	it	
																																																								162	Doug	Owram,	The	Government	Generation:	Canadian	Intellectuals	and	the	State,	
1900-1945.	p.	295.	Owram	quotes	J.	F.	Parkinson,	“Some	Problems	of	War	Finance,”	in	The	Canadian	Journal	of	Economics	and	Political	Science,	6:3.	August	1940,	415.	163	Robert	M.	Campbell,	Grand	Illusions:	The	Politics	of	the	Keynesian	Experience	in	
Canada,	1945-1975	(Peterborough,	On.:	broadview	press,	1987)	p.	70.	
	 	 	 	 	332	
appointed	Alex	Skelton	as	the	Secretary	of	a	committee	to	prepare	for	a	post-war	Dominion-Provincial	Conference.									Skelton	worked	fast.	Within	a	month,	he	had	produced	an	eleven-page	memorandum,	which	summarized	the	changing	world	for	people	and	governments.	“The	war	has	greatly	expanded	our	administrative	capacity	and	general	‘know-how’	of	taking	effective	preventive	measures	against	some	forms	of	economic	distress	which	were	formerly	considered	to	be	acts	of	God,”	he	wrote.164	Government	should	“for	economic	reasons,	[be]	thinking	of	the	distressed	citizen	as	a	consumer	and	potential	producer	as	well	as	for	social	reasons	(thinking	of	him	as	a	human	being).”165								In	turn,	the	provinces	“must	be	in	a	position	to	provide	roughly	comparable	services	to	their	residents	with	no	great	disproportion	in	their	respective	burdens	of	taxation.”166	Skelton	called	for	“special	assistance	for	financially	weaker	provinces”	–	
as	long	as	Ottawa	retained	control	of	those	three	tax	fields	to	ensure	that	the	Keynesian	goals	of	“full	employment,	high	national	income,	and	social	security	programmes	are	to	be	developed	on	an	effective	scale.”167									The	bottom	line	was	clear:	Ottawa	should	keep	the	revenue	–	and	provide	equalizing	compensatory	grants.	It	should	assume	more	responsibility	for	social	programs	such	as	training,	unemployment	and	health	services,	bearing	in	mind	the																																																									164.	Queen’s	University	Archives,	W.	A.	Mackintosh	Fonds,	Box	3,	file	76.	p.10.	165	D.	A.	Skelton,	“Dominion	Preparations	for	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,”	June	15,	1944,	p.	8.	166	D.	A.	Skelton,	“Dominion	Preparations	for	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,”	June	15,	1944.	Queen’s	University	Archives,	W.	A.	Mackintosh	Fonds,	Box	3,	file	76.	p.	1.	167	D.	A.	Skelton,	“Dominion	Preparations	for	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,”	June	15,	1944,	p.	3.		
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“economic	value	of	adequate	social	security	measures	in	maintaining	consumption.”168	But	the	federal	government	also	had	to	sweeten	the	pot	considerably	when	it	sought	to	renew	the	tax-rental	deals:	“Provincial	governments	will	require	considerably	more	financial	margin”	to	fulfill	their	expanding	post-war	social	and	economic	roles;	they	had	to	be	put	in	a	“comfortable	financial	position.”169	Skelton	could	not	give	up	on	the	centralist	approach	to	inequality	in	the	Rowell-Sirois	Royal	Commission	report	and	the	tax-rental	deals.		But	he	did	understand	that	fiscal	inequality	among	provincial	governments	was	the	greatest	barrier	to	the	expansion	of	social	security.						While	Allied	troops	fought	their	way	through	Europe	and	across	the	Pacific	Islands	during	the	winter	of	1944-1945,	Finance	Ministry	bureaucrats	wrestled	with	those	crucial	issues.	The	wartime	Economic	Advisory	Committee	had	already	turned	its	attention	to	peacetime.	By	early	May	1945,	the	war	in	Europe	was	over.	Two	months	later,	Robert	Bryce,	who	was	then	secretary	to	the	EAC’s	subcommittee	on	reconstruction	problems,	outlined	federal	fiscal	policy	for	the	upcoming	Dominion-Provincial	Conference.							Bryce,	who	would	later	become	the	prestigious	Clerk	of	the	Privy	Council,	had	a	bedrock	assumption:	“Some	level	of	government	must	take	final	responsibility	for	maintaining	a	high	level	of	employment.”170	The	bureaucrat,	who	had	fallen	under	
																																																								168	D.	A.	Skelton,	“Dominion	Preparations	for	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,”	June	15,	1944,	p.	5.	169	D.	A.	Skelton,	“Dominion	Preparations	for	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,”	June	15,	1944,	p.	11.	170	“Points	For	Inclusion	In	A	Statement	On	Dominion	Fiscal	Policy	And	The	Importance	To	It	Of	The	Dominion-Provincial	Arrangements	Proposed,”	signed	RBB	
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the	influence	of	John	Maynard	Keynes	at	Cambridge	University	in	the	1930s,	added	that,	in	times	of	economic	downturn,	Ottawa		“could	speed	up	programs	of	national	development	and	useful	public	investment	to	take	up	the	slack….	the	Dominion	must	expect,	and	be	able	to	manage,	substantial	deficits	at	such	periods.”171						There	were	other	pressures.	Bryce	maintained	that	Ottawa	had	three	“generally	agreed”	social	objectives,	including	old-age	pensions,	family	allowances	and	“large	grants	to	the	provinces	to	provide	health	insurance	benefits.”172	But	taxes	could	not	be	sky-high:	The	Dominion	had	to	balance	“equity	or	fairness”	with	“the	effects	of	taxes	on	incentives	–	production	and	employment.”173	If	this	were	done	properly,	Ottawa	would	“maintain	prosperity	within	a	modern,	progressive	and	democratic	society.”	As	Bryce	noted	significantly:	“[Ottawa]	cannot	hope	to	succeed	if	it	must	contend	and	compete	with	other	governments	imposing	taxes	of	the	same	kind	on	the	same	incomes	or	businesses.”174	There	it	was:	Ottawa	wanted	to	keep	corporate	and	personal	income	tax	revenues	and	succession	duties	after	the	war	–	in	return	for	continued	transfers.	Non-conditional	equalization	payments	that	supplemented	tax	revenues	for	the	poorer	provinces	would	remain	a	long	way	off.						Almost	from	the	start,	that	plan	to	keep	control	of	those	three	pivotal	sources	of	tax	revenue	would	disrupt	social	cohesion	among	the	provinces.	And,	as	I	will	show,																																																																																																																																																																						(This	was	Robert	Broughton	Bryce),	July	9,	1945.	Queen’s	University	Archives,	W.	A.	Mackintosh	Fonds,	Box	3,	file	70.	p.1.	171	“Points	For	Inclusion	In	A	Statement	On	Dominion	Fiscal	Policy	And	The	Importance	To	It	Of	The	Dominion-Provincial	Arrangements	Proposed,”,	p.	2.	172	“Points	For	Inclusion	In	A	Statement	On	Dominion	Fiscal	Policy	And	The	Importance	To	It	Of	The	Dominion-Provincial	Arrangements	Proposed,”,	p.	1.	173	“Points	For	Inclusion	In	A	Statement	On	Dominion	Fiscal	Policy	And	The	Importance	To	It	Of	The	Dominion-Provincial	Arrangements	Proposed,”,	p.	3.		174	Ibid,	p.	3.	
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it	would	threaten	the	identity	of	more	powerful	provinces	–	particularly	Quebec	and	Ontario	–	for	radically	different	reasons.									The	War	Ends	in	Australia	and	Canada						The	Australians	were	also	working	on	post-war	planning	–	and	the	Canadians	were	following	their	efforts.	The	Bank	of	Canada	Archives	contain	a	summary	of	an	address	on	post-war	planning	that	Australian	Post-War	Reconstruction	Secretary	H.	C.	Coombs	delivered	to	the	Australian	Institute	of	Political	Science	during	the	summer	of	1944.	Coombs	–	who	was	an	economist	and	the	most	important	civil	servant	of	his	generation	–	had	a	prescient	warning	for	his	listeners.	“There	is	a	great	danger	that	when	the	war	itself	is	over	we	will	be	tired	by	the	mental	and	spiritual	strain	of	years	of	war	and	will	be	unwilling	to	strive	further,”	he	declared.	“There	is	a	danger	that…when	we	realize	that	we	have	gained	only	the	opportunity	to	work	for	these	objectives,	there	will	be	disillusion,	and	cynicism.”175							The	situation	was	challenging.	The	wartime	willingness	to	make	radical	changes	could	“melt	in	the	face	of	criticism	of	interests	adversely	affected…we	will	not	be	‘allowed’	to	have	the	changes	which	alone	can	make	fruitful	the	victory	won.”	But	social	cohesion	was	at	stake.	Australian	society	was	“war	weary	and	to	some	extent	psychologically	unstable,	but	nevertheless	anxious	for	change	and	willing	to	be	inspired	into	social	unity	for	a	common	purpose.”176	The	first	objective	should	be	“a	
																																																								175	“The	Economic	Aftermath	Of	War”:	Summary	of	Address	by	H.	C.	Coombs,	The	Summer	School	of	the	Australian	Institute	of	Political	Science,	1944.	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	International	Department	Fonds,	File	4E-110,	volume	1,	p.	4.	176	“The	Economic	Aftermath	Of	War”:,	p.	5.	
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high	and	stable	level	of	employment.”177	As	Coombs	noted:	“The	history	of	the	depression	years	completely	destroyed	the	belief	that	insecurity	is	an	effective	stimulus	to	endeavor.”178	Government	had	an	important	role	to	play	–	if	only	to	preserve	social	and	economic	stability.							By	early	August,	as	the	war	in	the	Pacific	dragged	on,	The	Globe	and	Mail	warned	that	Dominion-provincial	relations	were	about	to	resume	their	often-prickly	course:	“Expect	Ottawa	To	Ask	Extended	Tax	Control.”179	That	oblique	headline	was	shorthand	for	Ottawa’s	decision	to	ask	for	a	renewal	of	the	tax-rental	agreements	with	the	provinces	as	its	long-planned	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	opened.	The	delegates	believed	that	Ottawa	was	“adamant”	on	the	“assumption	of	sole	taxing	powers…in	effect,	it	[that	assumption]	would	amount	to	a	continuation	of	the	wartime	tax	agreements.”180						The	Globe	and	Mail	‘s	Ottawa	correspondent	reported	that	the	Premiers	were	guardedly	prepared	to	co-operate.	“[But]	There	is	no	suggestion	any	one	Province	is	prepared	to	fall	within	the	Dominion	lap	and	take	any	old	thing	that	is	offered	in	return.	Every	Province	is	jealous	of	its	autonomy.	There	is	definite	opinion	that	without	some	fiscal	independence,	there	can	be	little	or	no	provincial	autonomy.”181	It	is	tempting	to	speculate	that	Ottawa	could	have	saved	itself	more	than	a	decade	of	difficulties	if	it	had	heeded	that	warning	–	and	resisted	the	continued	temptation	to	centralize	revenues	after	the	war	ended.																																																									177	“The	Economic	Aftermath	Of	War”:,	p.	5.	178	Ibid,	p.	6.	179	Kenneth	C.	Cragg,		“Expect	Ottawa	To	Ask	Extended	Tax	Control,”	in	The	Globe	
and	Mail,	on	Monday	August	6,	1945.	p.	1.	180	Kenneth	C.	Cragg,		“Expect	Ottawa	To	Ask	Extended	Tax	Control,”,	p.	1.	181	Kenneth	C.	Cragg,		“Expect	Ottawa	To	Ask	Extended	Tax	Control,”,	p.	1.	
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The	Marathon	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	1945-1946						Like	most	dominion-provincial	conferences,	the	one	in	1945-1946	is	now	virtually	forgotten	by	most	Canadians.	On	the	opening	day	of	the	Conference,	Prime	Minister	King	told	the	First	Ministers	that	their	gathering	“may	well	be	the	most	important	Canadian	Conference	since	Confederation.”182	It	was	certainly	the	longest.	The	Premiers	met	for	five	days	in	plenary	sessions	from	August	6	to	August	10.	They	created	a	coordinating	committee	that	met	on	November	26,	December	5,	December	29,	January	8-9	of	1946,	January	24,	January	26,	January	28,	and	April	25.	Then	they	met	again	in	plenary	session	for	five	days	from	April	29	to	May	3,	1946.	The	record	of	their	federal-provincial	statements	–	which	does	not	include	all	policy	documents	–	spans	624	large	pages.						They	accomplished	nothing.	Their	talks	were	inconclusive.	They	made	virtually	no	progress	on	the	big	issues	of	provincial	inequality,	social	security	and	social	cohesion	that	were	facing	the	nation.	There	was	little	doubt	about	where	the	individual	Premiers	stood.	The	gaps	between	the	Have	Provinces	of	Ontario	and	British	Columbia	and	the	Have	Not	Provinces	such	as	Nova	Scotia	were	enormous	–	and	they	did	not	narrow	over	the	course	of	the	nine-month	ordeal.	Ontario	was	the	only	province	to	present	a	detailed	proposal	with	a	funding	formula	to	counter	the	federal	proposal	–	although	other	provinces	would	outline	their	aspirations	and	their	bottom	lines,	often	at	length.																																																										182	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King,	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	August	6,	1945.	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1946)	p.	7.		
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						In	a	sign	of	the	battles	to	come,	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis	firmly	defended	his	province’s	constitutional	right	to	collect	and	control	its	own	revenues.	Quebec	had	cooperated	in	wartime.	But	it	would	not	cede	that	right	in	peacetime,	especially	not	for	the	limited	per-capita	amounts	in	compensation	that	King	offered.	Quebec	needed	to	spend	money	on	roads,	health,	education,	agriculture	and	settlement,	and	the	provinces	“are	fit	to	deal	with	their	own	affairs.”183	He	had	no	objection	to	federal	help	for	the	Maritimes,	and	he	would	work	with	them	to	secure	that	help:	“The	Maritime	provinces	contributed	a	lot	to	the	weal	of	this	country,	in	every	walk	of	life	and	in	every	human	endeavor.”184								But	he	would	not	allow	the	continued	centralization	of	revenues	–	because	that	would	weaken	his	province’s	constitutional	rights:	“Temporary	payments,	or	so-called	generous	subsidies,	cannot	compensate	for	permanent	rights,	and	once	those	rights	are	impaired	or	abandoned	the	results	may	be	disastrous…The	province	of	Quebec	is	always	in	favour	of	cooperation,	always	against	complicity.”185	That	stand,	which	would	endure	for	the	next	decade,	ensured	that	Quebec	played	a	pivotal	role	in	the	design	of	the	formula	for	equalization.186								The	624-page	transcript	traces	an	arc	from	initial	cordiality	to	outright	incivility	during	the	final	days.	On	May	2,	1946,	New	Brunswick	Premier	J.	B.	McNair	even																																																									183	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis,	Plenary	Session,	May	2,	1946.	p.	531.	184	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis,	Plenary	Session,	May	2,	1946.	p.	529.	185	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis,	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	May	1,	1946.	Dominion	and	Provincial	Submissions	and	Plenary	
Conference	Discussions	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1946)	p.	528.	186	David	Milne,	“Equalization	And	The	Politics	Of	Restraint”	in	Equalization:	Its	
Contribution	to	Canada’s	Economic	and	Fiscal	Progress,	eds.	Robin	W.	Boadway	and	Paul	A.	R.	Hobson.	p.	190.	
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mused	that	the	Fathers	of	Confederation	“never	envisaged	the	possibility	that	eighty	years	after	the	Union	was	created,	at	a	meeting	such	as	this,	the	citizens	in	the	different	provinces	would	be	talked	about	as	though	they	were	so	many	different	peoples.”187	The	First	Ministers	had	started	with	so	much	optimism,	mulling	expansive	federal	proposals	for	old-age	pensions,	unemployment	assistance	and	health	insurance	in	Ottawa’s	Green	Paper.	In	the	end,	federal	Health	Minister	Brooke	Claxton	lamented	that	Ottawa	had	presented	“a	plan	which	was	comprehensive	and	which	aimed	to	deal	with	the	main	needs	and	desires	of	the	Canadian	people.	Unfortunately	in	the	discussion,	too	much	emphasis	has	been	allowed	to	be	placed	on	the	tax	provisions.”188									Indeed,	that	was	exactly	what	happened	–	but	it	was	understandable.	The	Premiers	could	not	agree	on	the	provision	of	social	programs	until	they	established	their	budgetary	bottom	lines.	How	much	revenue	would	they	surrender	in	response	to	Ottawa’s	offer	to	rent	their	corporate	and	personal	income	taxes	and	their	succession	duties?	How	much	would	they	receive	in	return?	And,	most	crucially,	would	Ottawa	recognize	the	fiscal	needs	of	the	poorer	provinces?								The	ghost	of	the	Rowell-Sirois	report	and	the	Australian	Commonwealth	haunted	the	proceedings.	It	remains	astonishing	how	many	First	Ministers	cited	the	Commonwealth	Government’s	annual	grants	to	all	states	for	wartime	tax	rentals																																																									187	New	Brunswick	Premier	J.	B.	McNair,	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	May	2,	1946.	Dominion	and	Provincial	Submissions	and	Plenary	
Conference	Discussions	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1946)	p.	561.	188	Health	Minister	Brooke	Claxton,	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	May	3,	1946.	Dominion	and	Provincial	Submissions	and	Plenary	
Conference	Discussions	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1946)	p.	621.	
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along	with	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission’s	allocations	based	on	fiscal	need	to	the	poorer	ones.	They	would	often	brandish	varying	figures,	contradicting	each	other	on	exchange	rates	and	Australian	taxes,	to	buttress	their	arguments.							During	the	final	week,	for	one,	Ontario	Premier	George	Drew	maintained	that	the	Commonwealth	had	just	renewed	its	agreement	to	rent	all	state	income	taxes	in	return	for	18.5	per	cent	of	the	revenues,	which	worked	out	to	£40	million	for	the	states	or	$200-million	Canadian	dollars	for	a	population	of	seven-and-a-half	million	people.	That	was	“a	very	much	larger	percentage	of	[Commonwealth]	income	tax.”189							Federal	Health	Minister	Brooke	Claxton	countered	that	Australia’s	system	was	far	different	from	the	Canadian	system:	“The	practice	has	been	in	Australia	for	the	states	to	raise	a	very	large	percentage	of	their	revenue	from	income	tax…the	proposals	made	by	the	federal	government	here	are	reasonable,	fair	and	comprehensive,	having	regard	to	the	relative	circumstances	in	Australia	and	Canada.”190	Drew	should	acknowledge	the	necessity	of	comparing	“the	whole	situation”:	the	Australian	states	raised	far	more	of	their	revenues	from	income	taxes	than	the	Canadian	provinces	so	the	compensatory	grants	had	to	be	larger;	the	Commonwealth	raised	funds	from	other	sources	such	as	taxes	on	real	estate;	and	
																																																								189	Ontario	Premier	George	Drew,	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1946)	p.	530.	190	Health	Minister	Brooke	Claxton,	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	May	2,	1946.	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1946)	p.	531.	
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the	current	rate	of	exchange	put	the	size	of	those	grants	at	$144	million	Canadian,	not	$200	million	Canadian.191								A	day	later,	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley	argued	that	the	Commonwealth	had	increased	its	grants	to	the	states	by	only	seventeen	per	cent	under	the	new	rental	deals	whereas	the	Dominion	proposals	increased	grants	by	fifty-nine	per	cent.	Nova	Scotia	Premier	Angus	L.	Macdonald	pointedly	interjected	that	the	Commonwealth	Government	was	“still	making	[additional]	grants	under	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission.”	And	then	he	gave	the	exact	1944-1945	figures	for	South	Australia,	Western	Australia	and	Tasmania.192	Drew	then	maintained	that	land	taxes	constituted	only	one	per	cent	of	Australian	Commonwealth	revenues.193	Claxton	returned	to	the	topic	in	what	was	virtually	the	last	hour.	Unlike	Canada,	the	Commonwealth	Government	had	established	“a	very	wide,	almost	comprehensive	system	of	social	security	for	which	it	pays.”194	Claxton	was	aware	that	the	federation	was	falling	behind	in	the	provision	of	social	care	for	its	citizens.						And	that	was	just	one	testy	episode	in	an	ongoing	Conference	theme.																																																									191	Health	Minister	Brooke	Claxton	to	Ontario	Premier	George	Drew,	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	May	2,	1946.	Dominion	and	Provincial	
Submissions	and	Plenary	Conference	Discussions	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1946)	pps.	580-581.	192	Nova	Scotia	Premier	Angus	L.	Macdonald	to	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley,	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	May	3,	1946.	Dominion	and	
Provincial	Submissions	and	Plenary	Conference	Discussions	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1946)	p.	585.	193	Ontario	Premier	George	Drew,	May	3,	1946.	Dominion	and	Provincial	Submissions	
and	Plenary	Conference	Discussions	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1946)	p.	592.		194	Health	Minister	Brooke	Claxton,	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	May	3,	1946.	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1946)	p.	619,	
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The	Conference	Slips	Into	Deadlock							Perhaps	the	talks	were	doomed	from	the	outset	–	because	of	the	federal	desire	to	retain	fiscal	control.	But	the	yearning	for	the	good	life	after	the	bitter	war	was	also	palpable.	Prime	Minister	King	launched	the	proceedings	on	August	6	with	an	ambitious	call	for	a	“progressive	and	secure	standard	of	living	based	on	remunerative	employment	for	all	who	are	able	and	willing	to	work”	coupled	with	“a	comprehensive	system	of	social	insurance,	partially	federal	and	partially	provincial.”195	His	government’s	Green	Paper	on	social	policy	included	per	capita	grants	for	health	insurance	to	cover	family	doctors’	bills,	visiting	nursing	services	and	hospital	care;	health	grants	for	public	health	and	preventative	medicine;	universal	old-age	pensions	for	those	who	were	seventy	and	over;	and	unemployment	assistance	to	those	who	had	exhausted	their	UI	benefits.							It	was	an	ambitious	package	–	that	might	take	time	to	implement.	A	secret	federal	brief	for	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	which	is	inscribed	“As	Submitted	to	Cabinet,”	noted	flatly:	“It	is	significant	that	the	nations	which	have	not	adopted	health	insurance	include	Australia,	the	United	States	and	Canada.	All	three	of	these	
nations	are	federations,	where	the	power	to	deal	with	health	is	a	matter	of	local	
																																																								195	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King,	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	August	6,	1945.	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1946)	pps.	5	and	6.	
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concern,	of	the	states	and	provinces.”196	King	was	probably	among	the	few	who	suspected	that	it	would	take	decades	to	implement	fully.						But	his	attention	was	elsewhere.	At	noon	on	August	6,	he	received	a	note	from	Munitions	Minister	C.	D.	Howe,	which	stated	that	a	bomb	had	dropped.	The	Prime	Minister	confirmed	the	import	of	the	word	“bomb”	with	Howe	–	but	he	remained	silent	until	a	wire-service	report	confirmed	U.	S.	President	Harry	Truman’s	statement.	At	1	p.m.,	he	adjourned	the	proceedings	for	lunch,	explaining	that	he	had	a	“world	shaking	announcement.”197	And	then	he	told	them	about	the	atomic	bomb	on	Hiroshima.	There	was	“dead	silence.”198	It	was	a	civic	holiday	in	Ontario.	There	were	no	newspapers.	So,	when	the	session	resumed	that	afternoon,	King	read	statements	from	politicians	around	the	world,	including	one	from	former	British	Prime	Minister	Winston	Churchill.	The	news	“created	mixed	feelings	in	my	mind	and	heart.	We	were	now	within	sight	of	the	end	of	the	war	with	Japan.”199							The	next	day,	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley	spelled	out	Ottawa’s	fiscal	plans.	Federal	post-war	obligations	were	onerous:	Ottawa	had	to	finance	substantial	deficits	“when	necessary”;	it	had	to	adjust	the	tax	system	to	foster	investment	and	employment;	it	had	to	offer	“a	dependable	financial	basis	to	all	provinces”;	and,	most	important,	it	
had	to	bring	balance:	“Post-war	financial	arrangements	…should	make	possible	at	least	an	adequate	minimum	standard	of	services	in	all	provinces	while	not	denying																																																									196	“Social	Security”	in	The	Dominion	Proposals	for	High	Employment	and	National	Welfare,	Secret,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	on	Reconstruction.	August	1945,	LAC,	RG2,	Series	18,	Vol.	37,	File:	D-40	1945	(July-Aug)	Pt.	2.	p.	12.	My	italics.	197	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Monday,	August	6,	1945.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=28648	198	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Monday,	August	6,	1945.	199	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Monday,	August	6,	1945.	
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to	any	provinces	the	advantages	which	its	resources	give	to	it	nor	the	freedom	to	establish	its	own	standards.”200	It	was	an	implicitly	equalizing	goal.							His	approach	was	also	unreservedly	Keynesian:	“In	carrying	out	its	[Dominion]	employment	policy	it	will	at	times	be	necessary	for	large	deficits	to	be	incurred	while	at	the	same	time	expenditures	are	being	increased	or	taxation	reduced	in	order	to	aid	employment.	If	it	is	to	carry	deficits	at	times	when	they	are	necessary	for	the	maintenance	of	employment	and	income,	the	Dominion	should	be	in	a	position	to	recapture	in	periods	of	high	employment	and	vigorous	business	activity	revenue	from	rising	incomes	and	profits.”201						The	Finance	Minister	offered	to	implement	this	approach	in	return	for	continued	control	over	personal	and	corporate	income	tax	revenues	and	succession	duties.	In	compensation,	Ottawa	dangled	per-capita	grants	of	$12	to	every	province,	based	on	the	1941	census,	which	would	be	increased	or	decreased	with	the	value	of	the	Gross	National	Product.202							Harmony	proved	elusive.	At	the	heart	of	the	discussions,	running	through	every	session,	was	the	debate	around	how	to	handle	fiscal	need.	In	his	lengthy	opening	statement,	Manitoba	Premier	Stuart	Garson	stipulated	that	the	federal	government	had	to	increase	its	per	capita	grants	–	and	provide	national	adjustment	grants	to	
																																																								200	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley,	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	August	7,	1945.	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1946)	pps.	111-112.	201	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley,	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	August	7,	1945,	p.	113.	202	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley,	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	August	7,	1945.	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1946)	p.	115.		
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poorer	provinces	“on	the	basis	of	fiscal	need.”203	Saskatchewan	Premier	Tommy	Douglas	maintained	that	social	security	measures	“should	be	raised	to	a	minimum	standard	across	Canada	in	order	that	no	Canadian	shall	be	penalized	or	discriminated	against	because	of	the	geographical	area	in	which	he	resides.	That	to	us	is	fundamental.”204							And	so	it	continued.	Some	provinces	simply	wanted	a	higher	per-capita	grant	for	every	government.	In	late	November,	Alberta	Premier	Ernest	Manning	told	the	Conference	Coordinating	Committee	that	the	proposed	per	capita	grant	to	the	provinces	“is	inadequate.	The	per	capita	grant	is	insufficient	to	meet	post-war	requirements.”205	Other	provinces	wanted	a	version	of	the	National	Adjustment	Grants	that	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission	had	proposed	for	poorer	provinces.	The	New	Brunswick	government	asked	for	“a	special	allowance	or	fiscal	need	subsidy”	that	would	allow	local	and	provincial	services	“to	be	raised	to	the	average	standard	prevailing	throughout	Canada	without	raising	internal	taxation	beyond	the	general	level	in	all	provinces.”206	The	Nova	Scotia	government	demanded	that	Ottawa	recognize	the	principle	of	fiscal	need	in	the	allocation	of	grants	–	and	then	set	up	a	
																																																								203	Manitoba	Premier	Stuart	Garson,	August	7,	1945.	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	May	2,	1946.	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1946)	p.	161.	204	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas,	August	7,	1945,	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	May	2,	1946.	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	To	The	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1946)	p.	179.		205	Brief	submitted	by	the	Government	of	Alberta,	presented	by	Premier	Ernest	C.	Manning,	to	the	Coordinating	Committee,	November	26,	1945.	p.	209.		206	Submission	of	the	Government	of	New	Brunswick	on	Certain	Proposals	of	the	Dominion,	January	24,	1946.	p.	313.		
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permanent	finance	committee	similar	to	the	Australian	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	to	calculate	those	grants.207					The	Premiers	were	deadlocked.	In	early	January,	Ontario	Premier	Drew	tabled	a	counter-proposal:	the	wartime	tax	agreements	should	lapse	without	renewal;	the	provinces	should	retain	their	tax	revenues	to	foster	social	security	and	economic	development;	and	ten	per	cent	of	provincial	tax	revenues	from	“full-scale	post-war	production”	should	go	into	a	National	Adjustment	Fund,	which	a	Dominion-Provincial	Economic	Board	would	oversee.208	Drew	reasoned	that,	whenever	federations	move	toward	domination	from	the	centre,	“despotism	has	followed	sooner	or	later.”209	Under	his	plan,	the	poorer	provinces	“which	have	not	that	wide	latitude	and	flexibility	of	taxing	powers	possessed	by	certain	other	provinces	will	not	be	without	some	freedom	to	meet	unusual	conditions	which	because	of	the	limited	aspect	of	their	economy	–	I	mean	limited	in	the	particular	nature	of	the	economy	–	do	present	special	problems.”210							But	the	Premier	had	put	the	cat	among	the	provincial	pigeons.	Saskatchewan	Premier	Douglas	complained	that	Ontario’s	proposals	“do	not	represent	fiscal	need	at	all,	but	are	rather	a	source	of	federated	poor-box,	into	which	contributions	will	be	made	by	the	provinces,	and	the	poor	relations	will	line	up	at	Christmas	time	to	get	a	handout	from	the	fund.”211	Manitoba	Premier	Garson	was	even	more	emphatic.	“His	[Drew’s]	is	the	viewpoint	of	a	rich,	powerful	and	populous	central	province.	Banking																																																									207	Submission	by	the	Government	of	Nova	Scotia,	January	26,	1946.	pps.	316-317.	208	Submissions	by	the	Government	of	the	Province	of	Ontario,	January	8,	1946.	209	Submissions	[sic]	by	the	Government	of	the	Province	of	Ontario,	January	1946,	LAC,	RG47,	Vol.	80,	p.7.	210	Ontario	Premier	George	Drew,	April	29,	1946.	p.	408.		211	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas,	April	30,	1946.	p.	479.		
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companies,	banks,	insurance	companies,	loan	companies,	trust	companies,	flour	mills,	steel	companies	and	the	newspapers,	which	function	and	do	business	in	the	province	which	I	represent	are	all	owned	and	controlled,	and	they	have	their	head	office	in	his	province.”212	Ontario	was	a	fat	cat.									Drew	was	outraged.	“The	overwhelming	majority	of	every	dollar	produced	in	Ontario	is	made	by	the	work,	the	brain	and	the	vigour	of	the	people	of	Ontario,”	he	declared,	arguing	that	more	than	85.5	per	cent	of	the	federal	tax	revenues	collected	in	Canada	came	from	Ontario,	Quebec	and	British	Columbia.213	“Our	responsibility	in	the	[tax	rental]	settlement	reached	on	behalf	of	the	people	of	Ontario	must	have	due	regard	for	the	heavy	share	which	will	come	from	the	people	of	Ontario.”214								When	Ontario	finally	attached	very	complicated	figures	to	its	proposal	–	the	province	wanted	Ottawa	to	withdraw	from	other	tax	fields	as	well	–	Finance	Minister	Ilsley	was	aghast.	He	complained	that	the	plan	would	add	$100-million	per	year	to	Ottawa’s	tab	“as	a	minimum	applied	to	all	the	provinces.”215	Ottawa	simply	could	not	afford	to	pay	for	Drew’s	proposal.							Ilsley	also	ruled	out	subsidies	based	on	fiscal	need	as	“the	worst	kind	of	subsidy”	because	the	provinces	would	have	to	make	the	case	for	need	based	on	a	detailed	examination	of	their	spending	policies	and	severity	of	taxation.	“Surely	fiscal	need	subsidies	are	subsidies;	and	they	are	subsidies	much	more	undesirable	from	the	
																																																								212	Manitoba	Premier	Stuart	Garson,	April	29,	1946.	p.	427.		213	Ontario	Premier	George	Drew,	May	1,	1946.	P.	520-521.	214	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley,	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	August	7,	1945.		215	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley,	May	1,	1946.	p.	574.	
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standpoint	of	provincial	independence	than	are	fixed	subsidies.”216	Ilsley	raised	his	offer	to	$15	per	capita	–	but	that	was	where	the	federal	offer	would	stay.								The	First	Ministers	were	at	an	impasse.	They	could	not	heal	the	breach	between	the	richer	and	poorer	provinces.	Indeed,	more	than	seven	decades	later,	the	Conference	remains	noteworthy	because	it	re-emphasized,	and	probably	deepened,	the	divisions	among	the	Have	and	Have-Not	provinces.	Two	of	the	nine	provinces	–	Quebec	and	Ontario	–	retained	their	fierce	objections	to	Ottawa’s	proposals	to	extend	the	wartime	tax	rental	agreements	into	peacetime.	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis	actually	left	before	the	start	of	the	afternoon	session	on	the	last	day	in	May	1946.	As	Le	Devoir	reported,	his	supporters	planned	an	“enthusiastic	reception”	at	the	train	station;	one	admirer	praised	“his	defence	of	our	provincial	rights…without	bending”	at	the	Conference.217						Ontario	Premier	Drew	was	drawn	into	strongly	worded	debates	with	Saskatchewan	Premier	Douglas	and	Manitoba	Premier	Garson,	Finance	Minister	Ilsley	and	Prime	Minister	King.	The	situation	disintegrated	to	such	an	extent	during	the	final	days	that	Drew	cited	German	Chancellor	Adolf	Hitler’s	Mein	Kampf	to	illustrate	the	dangers	of	centralizing	revenues,	and	Duplessis	declared	that	the	federal	proposals	would	give	birth	to	“little	Hitlers.”218						In	the	end,	provinces	disagreed	with	each	other	–	and	all	provinces	objected	to	the	size	of	Ottawa’s	proposed	grants	in	any	renewed	tax	rental	agreements	–	even																																																									216	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley,	May	1,	1946.	p.	574.	,	p.	510.	217	“Réception	enthousiaste	préparée	pour	M.	Duplessis,”	D.	N.	C.	Québec,	Le	Devoir,	Friday,	May	3,	1946.	218	Ontario	Premier	George	Drew	and	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis,	May	1,	1946.	pps.	515,	530.	
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after	Ottawa	sweetened	the	per-capita	pot.	That	included	those	provinces	that	were	
already	receiving	extra	grants	for	extra	needs.	The	idealistic	Claxton	was	dashed:		It	is	important	to	realize…..	that	far	from	being	‘Ottawa,’	we	who	represent	the	Federal	government	here	represent	the	people	who	elected	us,	represent	them	in	just	the	same	way	and	in	exactly	the	same	degree	as	do	the	representatives	of	the	provinces.	They	represent	the	people	of	their	provinces	and	we	represent	the	people	of	all	of	Canada,	of	every	province,	of	every	part,	and	of	every	race.	In	these	discussions	sometimes	it	is	very	easy	to	refer	to	others	as	‘they’.219							Despite	its	extraordinary	length,	the	Conference	had	failed.	It	adjourned	on	May	3,	1946	with	little	agreement	on	anything	–	and	no	firm	date	for	a	further	meeting.	The	Premiers	returned	to	their	provincial	capitals,	nurturing	grievances.	Many	delegates	were	anxious	to	pin	the	blame	on	others.	Historian	James	Struthers	blames	Drew	and	latterly	Duplessis	for	the	impasse	because	both	provinces	wanted	to	regain	their	fiscal	autonomy.	As	well,	Ontario	wanted	to	off-load	“as	many	of	its	costs	as	possible	onto	the	federal	treasury	and	[to	prevent]…	raids	by	weaker	provinces	on	its	wealth.”	He	also	cites	historian	Marc	Gotlieb’s	view	that	Ontario’s	opposition	was	rooted	in	its	tradition	of	responsibility	for	its	own	development	and	in	its	fiscal	conservatism,	“which	remained	deeply	hostile	towards	and	suspicious	of	the	new	Keynesian	thinking	within	Ottawa.”220		
																																																								219	Health	Minister	Brooke	Claxton,	Plenary	Session	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	May	3,	1946.	Dominion-Provincial	Submissions	and	Plenary	Conference	Discussions	(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Printer	to	the	King’s	Most	Excellent	Majesty,	1946)	622.	220	James	Struthers,	The	Limits	of	Affluence:	Welfare	in	Ontario,	1920-1970	(Toronto:	Ontario	Historical	Studies	Series,	1994)	p.	126.			
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				In	his	Diary,	King	had	two	scapegoats.	He	blamed	the	Bank	of	Canada	for	its	continued	push	to	centralize	revenues.	The	provinces	would	eventually	wane	in	relative	power,	he	concluded,	but	“that	is	still	a	long	way	off.”221	Meanwhile,	Ottawa	should	let	the	provinces	resume	control	“over	certain	fields	of	taxation,”	interfering	only	to	maintain	“certain	standards.”222							Claxton,	King	added	sourly,	but	probably	sagely,	“has	pushed	the	social	legislation	to	make	too	many	commitments	in	the	matter	of	social	reform,	particularly	any	commitments	for	legislation	involving	more	in	the	way	of	taxation	by	a	levy	on	all	classes.”223	Now,	King	noted,	social	legislation	“is	now	in	a	way	being	cast	to	the	winds.”	He	felt	“neither	elation	nor	depression…	The	failure	to	reach	agreement	is	only	part	of	the	spirit	of	the	times….	The	world	is	full	of	hate	and	unrest	and	strife.”224	King	vowed	to	warn	Finance	Minister	Ilsley	against	the	imposition	of	further	taxes:	attention	should	be	focused	on	veterans	and	immediate	needs	such	as	housing	while	deferring	further	social	programs.	In	effect,	Claxton	had	tried	to	go	too	fast	in	a	difficult	federation	with	conflicting	provincial	and	social	identities.						In	the	end,	perhaps	the	principal	reason	for	the	failure	was	that	the	timing	simply	was	not	right.	As	historian	P.	E.	Bryden	notes,	early	post-war	efforts	“to	provide	a	coherent	system	of	equalization	were	destined	to	failure	until	two	preconditions	were	met:	the	federal	government	began	into	tap	into	Ontario’s	rich	fiscal	capacity,																																																									221	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Friday,	May	3,	1946.		http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=29527&		222	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Friday,	May	3,	1946.	223	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Friday,	May	3,	1946.	224	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Friday,	May	3,	1946,	p.	3.	
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and	Ontario	agreed	on	a	political	level	to	this	form	of	redistribution.”225	In	effect,	the	Ontario	economy	had	to	generate	more	revenue	for	Ottawa	–	and	for	the	provincial	government	–	before	sharing	became	acceptable.	That	was	certainly	one	key	reason	for	the	débacle.			
The	Australians	Do	Better								The	Australians	had	also	faced	problems	when	they	considered	post-war	reconstruction.	At	a	Commonwealth-State	Conference	during	the	autumn	of	1942,	Canberra	asked	for	constitutional	amendments	to	“enable	a	return	to	a	stable	peacetime	footing.”226	The	states	agreed	to	transfer	fourteen	legislative	powers	for	such	matters	as	commodity	marketing	and	corporate	regulation	–	for	a	trial	period	of	not	less	than	five	years	–	but	they	would	not	consent	to	permanent	constitutional	amendments.	Even	that	limited	measure	did	not	pass	unanimously	in	the	state	legislatures.	A	follow-up	referendum	in	August	1944	secured	acceptance	only	in	South	and	Western	Australia.	And	that	was	the	end	of	that	initiative.	A	Bank	of	Canada	memorandum	on	Australia	concluded	that	there	was	an	“underlying	desire	that	the	States	shall	remain	sovereign	states	and	that	the	federal	government	[in	Australia]	should	remain	weak.227							But	that	unsigned	post-war	memorandum	–	which,	based	on	internal	indications,	dates	to	the	summer	of	1946	–	also	examined	the	remarkable	extent	of	Australia’s																																																									225	P.	E.	Bryden,	“The	Obligations	of	Federalism”	in	Framing	Canadian	Federalism,	eds.	Dimitry	Anastakis	and	P.	E.	Bryden	(Toronto,	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2009)	p.	76.	226	“Post-War	Planning	in	Australia”,	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	International	Department	Fonds,	File	4E-110,	volume	1.	p.	1	227	“Post-War	Planning	in	Australia”,	p.	4.		
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social	security	benefits.	Prior	to	1945-1946,	the	Commonwealth	had	transferred	money	into	the	National	Welfare	Fund	for	unemployment	and	sickness	benefits,	which	began	in	July	1945,	old-age	pensions	and	child	benefits.	(Canberra	had	introduced	the	Child	Endowment	Act	in	1941	to	provide	a	small	weekly	payment	to	each	citizen	“who	supported	more	than	one	child	under	16	years	of	age,	the	sum	being	increased	according	to	the	number	of	children	supported.	There	was	no	means	test.”)228						The	road	to	expand	those	social	services	was	a	little	rockier.	In	1938,	Canberra	had	proposed	a	national	health	insurance	scheme	–	but	“the	medical	profession	rejected	the	range	of	services	to	be	covered	and	the	proposed	remuneration	arrangements.”229	The	legislation	was	not	implemented.	In	1944,	the	Commonwealth	Government	had	passed	another	law	to	cover	the	cost	of	prescription	drugs	–	but	pharmacists	had	challenged	that	law	and	it	was	found	to	be	unconstitutional.	The	Hospital	Benefits	Act	of	1945	survived	a	legal	challenge:	it	subsidized	public	hospitals	on	the	condition	that	they	provided	certain	free	services.						But	the	Commonwealth	Labour	Government	was	rattled	by	the	High	Court	rejection	of	phamacare	–	and	it	was	well	aware	that	the	public	had	new	expectations	of	the	state	in	the	wake	of	the	war.	In	1946,	it	passed	a	constitutional	amendment	to	transfer	power	over	“pensions	and	social	services	of	all	kinds	including	medical,	
																																																								228	Russel	Ward,	The	History	of	Australia:	The	Twentieth	Century	p.	255.	228	Russel	Ward,	The	History	of	Australia:	The	Twentieth	Century	(New	York:	Harper	&	Row	Publishers,	1977.	p.	255.		229	https://federation.dpmc.gov.au/evolution-government-involvement-health-care		
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dental	and	hospital	benefits”	to	the	Commonwealth	Government.230	The	amendment	faced	ratification	under	the	tough	amendment	process,	which	required	approval	“by	an	absolute	majority	of	people	and	by	a	majority	of	the	electors	in	a	majority	of	the	six	States.”231	More	than	54	per	cent	of	the	electors	and	all	six	states	approved	the	measure.232	Starting	in	1945-1946,	the	Commonwealth	Government	now	collected	contributions	for	social	security	along	with	payroll	taxes	to	fund	all	health	and	social	services,	which	included	hospital	care	in	public	hospitals	and	the	cost	of	medical	prescriptions.									Australia	was	well	ahead	of	Canada,	which	underlines	the	complications	and	sensitivities	of	provincial	rights	within	the	Canadian	federation.	The	contrast	with	Canada	–	despite	the	failure	to	even	temporarily	transfer	state	powers	to	Canberra	–	was	vivid.	Australia	had	somehow	managed	the	impossible	for	a	federation:	It	had	found	a	way	to	introduce	health	care	insurance	and	pharmacare	despite	the	strains	of	post-war	adjustment.							But	the	major	immediate	post-war	worry	for	the	transition	from	hostilities	to	peace	in	Australia	was	now	economic.	The	Bank	of	Canada	rather	smugly	noted	the	Australian	situation:	“For	some	time	at	least	the	level	of	demand	will	be	in	excess	of	the	resources	available	to	produce	goods	and	services	and	conflict	will	arise	between	investment	goods	or	consumption	goods,	public	investment	or	private.	The	belief	is	that	a	relatively	high	level	of	investment	goods	will	in	the	long	run	contribute	more	to	the	maintenance	of	the	standard	of	living	than	would	the																																																									230	Russel	Ward,	The	History	of	Australia:	The	Twentieth	Century,	p.	276.	231	Russel	Ward,	The	History	of	Australia:	The	Twentieth	Century,,	p.	72.	232	https://federation.dpmc.gov.au/evolution-government-involvement-health-care		
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satisfaction	of	the	full	demand	for	consumption	goods	after	the	war.”233	Australia	opted	to	continue	rationing	and	price	controls	until	“a	new	balance”	was	achieved.234						In	turn,	the	Australians	examined	Canada’s	situation.	In	late	May	1945,	they	noted	that	Ottawa	was	about	to	remove	eighty	per	cent	of	the	wartime	controls	on	business	and	industry.	But	Munitions	Minister	C.	D.	Howe	had	warned	that	price	controls	would	remain	“for	months,	and	maybe	years…after	the	battles	of	Europe	and	Asia,	we	will	still	have	the	battle	of	inflation.235	In	early	September	1945,	High	Commission	diplomats	noted	that	Canada	was	reintroducing	meat	rationing	–	in	order	to	share	supplies	with	southern	Europe,	including	Greece,	Albania	and		Yugoslavia,	“where	very	many	deaths	are	still	taking	place	due	to	starvation.”236	Victory	did	not	always	bring	social	peace.		
Conclusion						In	peacetime,	Canada	was	no	closer	to	equalization	than	it	had	been	in	1941.	And	equalization	was	the	remedy	for	provincial	fiscal	inequality	–	and	for	the	huge	holes	in	the	social	security	network	within	the	Canadian	federation.	Mackenzie	King	might	have	felt	relief	when	he	fended	off	the	recommendations	of	the	Rowell-Sirois	report																																																									233	“Post-War	Planning	in	Australia”,	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	International	Department	Fonds,	File	4E-110,	volume	1.	p.	36.	234	“Post-War	Planning	in	Australia.	235	“Price	Control	In	Canada:	“May	Stay	for	Years’”	in	The	Sydney	Morning	Herald,	Tuesday,	May	22,	1945.	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Series	A1066,	Control	symbol	A45/1/3/1,	Barcode	186955,	n.p.	236	“Meat	For	Europe,	The	[Canadian]	Wartime	Prices	and	Trade	Board	press	release,	Monday,	September	10,	1945.	National	Archives	of	Australia,	Series	A1066,	Control	symbol	A45/1/3/1,	Barcode	186955,	p.	2.	
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and	the	demands	at	the	1945-1946	Conference.	He	did	so	partly	for	financial	reasons	and	partly	to	preserve	political	stability.	He	did	not	want	to	intrude	permanently	onto	provincial	turf	without	provincial	consent,	nor	did	he	want	to	tamper	with	Quebec’s	distinct	identity.							There	was	little	expansion	of	the	social	safety	net	throughout	the	1940s.	That	was	partly	because	the	powerful	federal	government	could	not	contemplate	the	creation	of	genuine	equalization:	that	is,	non-conditional	federal	grants	to	the	poorer	provinces	that	were	based	upon	an	apparently	neutral	formula	pegged	to	their	revenue-raising	capacity.	Ottawa	still	wanted	to	centralize	revenues,	albeit	apparently	temporarily,	to	maintain	control	of	the	purse	strings,	to	even	out	economic	cycles	–	and	to	influence	how	the	bulk	of	the	money	was	spent.							In	the	post-war	era,	the	Prime	Minister	emphasized	spending	on	national	reconstruction	such	as	highways	and	the	need	for	a	strong	defence	against	Communism	–	as	opposed	to	spending	on	social	programs	–	as	a	reason	to	centralize	revenues.							But	King	remained	caught	between	the	defenders	of	provincial	identity	and	the	lobbyists	for	universal	social	programs,	which	included	the	still-weak	power	resources	of	national	organizations,	such	as	labour	and	women’s	groups,	along	with	provincial	premiers,	such	as	Saskatchewan’s	T.	C.	Douglas.	This	time,	however,	the	voices	of	the	latter	groups	would	be	louder.	The	Rowell-Sirois	report	along	with	the	1945-1946	Conference	had	fueled	the	aspirations	of	many	Canadians	who	espoused	expanded	social	programs	in	all	provinces.						The	nation-building	vision	would	not	abate.			
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But,	first,	Ottawa	would	have	to	learn	to	let	go.																									
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CHAPTER	FIVE:	The	Compromise	1946-1957						After	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	fell	apart	in	May	1946,	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King	abandoned	his	Green	Paper	proposals	to	expand	social	security.	He	was	relieved.	He	dutifully	signed	tax	rental	deals	with	seven	of	the	nine	provinces	–	only	Quebec	and	Ontario	refused	to	sign.	And	he	ignored	complaints	from	poorer	provinces	such	Saskatchewan	about	his	abandonment	of	health	insurance.	In	early	1948,	after	Health	Minister	Paul	Martin	warned	King	that	the	public	was	impatient	with	the	slow	pace	of	social	progress,	the	Prime	Minister	offered	grants	to	the	provinces	for	health	surveys,	hospital	construction	and	public	health.							But	King	had	reached	his	limits.	He	was	unwilling	to	tread	too	heavily	onto	the	provinces’	constitutional	turf,	and	he	remained	cautious	about	assuming	more	expensive	and	expansive	responsibilities.	He	simply	refused	to	commit	the	federal	government	to	his	Green	Paper	proposal	to	cover	three-fifths	of	the	cost	of	health	insurance	at	an	estimated	$150	million,	arguing	that	the	Premiers	had	to	agree	on	the	entire	federal	package.	The	promise	of	the	post-war	Good	Life	was	at	a	standstill.							King’s	successor,	corporate	lawyer	Louis	St.	Laurent,	approached	the	provinces	with	leisurely	aplomb.	Eventually,	in	1950,	he	called	federal-provincial	conferences	to	tackle	the	problem	that	had	long	plagued	Canada’s	fractious	federation:	the	nation’s	constitution	remained	an	act	of	the	British	Parliament.	Predictably,	he	got	nowhere	in	his	quest	for	patriation	and	an	amending	formula.	Finally,	St.	Laurent	shifted	his	focus.	After	unanimous	provincial	consent	for	a	constitutional	amendment,	Ottawa	instituted	an	expanded	Old	Age	Pension,	which	it	wholly	funded,	starting	in	January	1952.		
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								But	the	Canada	of	the	1950s	was	different	from	the	prewar	federation.	The	gulf	between	the	richer	provinces	such	as	Ontario	and	British	Columbia	and	the	poorer	provinces	such	as	New	Brunswick	and	that	distinctive	newcomer	Newfoundland,	which	joined	the	federation	in	1949,	was	enormous.	The	richer	ones	were	flexing	their	fiscal	muscles,	proclaiming	their	desire	to	use	the	bulk	of	their	taxpayers’	funds	for	their	purposes,	resentful	of	more	sharing	with	other	poorer	governments	or	individual	Canadians	in	other	provinces.	Meanwhile,	social	activists	and	Saskatchewan’s	socially	activist	Tommy	Douglas	wanted	Ottawa	to	do	more	for	their	citizenry.								The	tugs-of-war	became	ominous.	Both	Ontario	and	Quebec	were	wary	of	Ottawa’s	intrusions	onto	provincial	constitutional	turf:	they	wanted	to	retain	their	tax	revenues	for	their	own	use.	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis	also	resisted	St.	Laurent’s	program	to	transfer	per-capita	grants	directly	to	universities.	And	Duplessis	flatly	refused	to	sign	the	next	tax	rental	deal	–	when	even	Ontario	signed	it	–	despite	the	fact	that	his	government’s	uncompromising	stance	meant	the	loss	of	significant	compensatory	federal	grants.	Amid	a	dangerously	escalating	showdown	with	Quebec	over	tax	collection	in	1953,	St.	Laurent	backed	down.							Then,	in	1954,	he	acted.	As	the	former	Francophone	Counsel	for	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission,	the	Prime	Minister	understood	that	he	had	to	institute	a	non-conditional	version	of	the	National	Adjustment	Grants	for	the	poorer	provinces	–	including	those	that	had	not	signed	tax	rental	accords.	And	he	understood	that	those	grants	could	not	be	based	upon	an	intrusive	federal	examination	of	provincial	spending.	Otherwise,	the	resentments	within	the	federation	would	escalate	
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dramatically:	Quebec	would	keep	losing	money	–	and	the	poorer	provinces	such	as	Newfoundland	would	never	be	able	to	pay	for	expanded	social	programs.						Instead,	Ottawa	focused	on	provincial	revenues	as	the	basis	for	the	formula.	Those	figures	were	far	more	accessible	–	and	Quebec	could	not	protest.	As	political	scientist	David	Milne	underlines:	“Analysts	must	acknowledge	the	truly	pivotal	role	played	by	Quebec	in	the	final	achievement	of	equalization	as	a	principle	of	the	federation,	unfettered	by	any	concession	over	the	fiscal	autonomy	of	the	provinces.”1								Non-conditional	equalization	grants	–	first	based	upon	the	average	per-capita	amount	of	key	tax	revenues	that	were	collected	in	the	two	richest	provinces	–	allowed	the	poorer	provinces	to	pay	for	social	programs	that	were	roughly	equivalent	to	those	in	the	richer	provinces	at	roughly	equal	levels	of	taxation.	It	was	a	necessity:	otherwise,	Canadians	in	provinces	without	adequate	health	care	or	social	assistance	or	post-secondary	education	would	move	to	provinces	where	better	services	were	provided.	Unemployment	Insurance	allowed	workers	to	stay	in	place,	to	look	for	suitable	work	in	their	home	province.	In	contrast,	the	lack	of	universal	social	programs	could	force	workers	to	abandon	their	hunt	for	work,	and	flock	to	richer	provinces	in	search	of	care.							Inequality	in	social	programs	within	a	federation	carries	a	high	price	tag.	As	political	scientist	Douglas	M.	Brown	notes:	“Equalization	enhances	national	economic	efficiency	by	helping	to	ensure	that	labour	migration	occurs	for	reasons																																																									1	David	Milne,	“Equalization	And	The	Politics	Of	Restraint”	in	Equalization:	Its	
Contribution	to	Canada’s	Economic	and	Fiscal	Progress,	eds.	Robin	W.	Boadway	and	Paul	A.	R.	Hobson	(Kingston:	John	Deutsch	Institute	For	The	Study	Of	Economic	Policy,	Queen’s	University1997)	p.	190.	
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which	contribute	to	economic	growth	and	development,	i.	e.	for	improved	wages	or	return	on	capital,	not	for	access	to	better	public	services.”2							I	will	show	how	the	advocates	of	provincial	rights	jostled	against	the	proponents	of	expanded	social	security	during	the	post-war	decade.	As	I	have	said	previously,	this	will	be	a	state-centred	approach	–	of	necessity	–	but	I	will	also	examine	the	pressure	that	other	groups	brought	to	bear	in	these	debates.	As	political	scientist	Richard	Simeon	has	observed,	states	are	“actors”	in	the	great	debates	over	policy.	“It	is	their	political	leaders	and	civil	servants	who	formulate,	express,	and	fight	for	their	government’s	interests…[but]	the	governments	do	not	fight	in	a	vacuum.	They	must	bear	in	mind	other	groups	–	audiences	–	which	form	their	environment	and	on	which	they	depend	for	support.”3	That	is,	governments	respond	to	pressures	from	groups	and	individuals	–	but	they	also	lead	when	they	anticipate	a	pressing	social	or	economic	need.						With	equalization,	governments	had	to	lead.	True,	many	advocacy	groups	wanted	expanded	social	security	–	but	few	understood	the	dangers	and	challenges	that	fiscal	inequality	among	the	provinces	posed.	As	a	rule,	their	views	of	the	situation	resembled	that	of	sociologist	Harry	Cassidy:	they	did	not	have	a	specific	remedy	for	inequality.	Instead,	they	wanted	Ottawa	to	find	the	money	for	social	security	for	the	provinces,	or	to	launch	the	programs	on	its	own	dime.	It	was	up	to	governments	themselves	to	devise	the	missing	link	in	the	expansion	of	social	citizenship:	an	
																																																								2	Douglas	M.	Brown,	Equalization	On	The	Basis	Of	Need	In	Canada”	(Kingston:	Institute	of	Intergovernmental	Relations:	Queen’s	University,	1996)	p.	5.	3	Richard	Simeon,	Federal-Provincial	Diplomacy:	The	Making	of	recent	policy	in	
Canada.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1972)	p.	13.	
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equalization	program	with	non-conditional	grants	and	an	apparently	neutral	formula.	But	the	onus	for	change	was	on	Ottawa.						In	retrospect,	equalization	seems	like	a	simple,	almost	obvious,	plan	to	remedy	fiscal	inequality	and	to	ensure	social	cohesion.	But	it	was	difficult	to	devise	–	and	even	more	difficult	to	convince	the	richer	provinces	to	accept	it,	albeit	begrudgingly.	In	turn,	Ottawa	had	to	accept	its	loss	of	control	over	how	the	poorer	provinces	spent	their	equalization	grants.	(The	Rowell-Sirois	Commission	had	advocated	adjustment	grants	based	on	specific	areas	of	provincial	spending.)	But	non-conditional	equalization	was	the	only	way	to	bridge	the	tensions	between	the	advocates	of	provincial	rights	and	the	proponents	of	expanded	social	security	to	ensure	the	survival	of	the	nation-state.			
King’s	Post-War	Years	in	Power					Throughout	his	last	years	in	power,	the	Prime	Minister	paid	little	attention	to	fiscal	inequality	or	social	programs.	The	second	round	of	tax-rental	agreements,	which	ran	from	1947	to	1952,	did	contain	some	adjustment	for	fiscal	need	because	the	compensatory	grants	offered	more	money	per	capita	for	each	percentage	point	of	tax	than	the	poorer	provinces	could	collect	on	their	own.	As	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley	explained	in	1947,	the	per-capita	payments	ensured	that	the	“weaker	provinces	would	share	equally	in	the	productivity	of	the	three	fields	of	direct	taxation.”4	(Those	were	personal	and	corporate	income	taxes	and	succession																																																									4	Douglas	M.	Brown,	Equalization	On	The	Basis	Of	Need	In	Canada.	Brown	is	quoting	R.	M.	Burns,	The	Acceptable	Mean:	The	Tax	Rental	Agreements,	1941-1962.	Toronto:	The	Canadian	Tax	Foundation,	1980.	
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duties.)	Quebec	did	not	sign	the	rental	deals	on	constitutional	principle;	Ontario	did	not	sign	because	it	objected	to	the	amount	of	compensation	and	the	loss	of	autonomy.								Meanwhile,	Saskatchewan	Premier	Tommy	Douglas	became	an	influential	voice	amid	the	growing	post-war	chorus	calling	for	expanded	social	programs,	especially	for	health	care.	The	Premier,	who	is	now	honoured	as	the	founder	of	Medicare,	agreed	with	federal	proposals	at	the	1945-1946	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	to	expand	social	security,	especially	hospital	care.	He	also	agreed	with	Ottawa’s	Keynesian	attempt	to	maintain	full	employment	and	healthy	economic	growth	through	the	continued	centralization	of	key	revenues.	As	he	later	explained,	“There	are	a	great	many	corporations	that	make	their	money	in	our	[have-not]	provinces	but	don’t	pay	corporation	taxes,	income	taxes,	or	inheritance	taxes	in	our	province.”5	If	those	revenues	could	remain	centralized	in	return	for	federal	grants,	he	reasoned,	there	would	be	greater	fiscal	equality	and	social	cohesion	among	governments	and	citizens.	There	would	be	enough	money	to	expand	social	security.										When	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	dissolved	in	May	1946,	Douglas	kicked	off	his	advocacy.	On	June	29,	he	told	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley	that	his	province	would	sign	a	tax-rental	deal,	and	called	for	“steps	[to]	be	taken	immediately	to	work	out	arrangements	to	establish	social	security	on	a	national	basis.”6		When	Ilsley’s	answer	was	vague,	Douglas	wrote	to	King,	arguing	that	the																																																																																																																																																																							5	T.	C.	Douglas,	The	Making	of	a	Socialist:	The	Recollections	of	T.	C.	Douglas,	ed.	Lewis	H.	Thomas,	p.	217.	6	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas	to	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley,	July	29,	1946.	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	Correspondence	Since	the	Budget	of	1946	on	
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proposed	social	security	programs	had	been	left	at	“loose	ends.”7	On	July	15,	King	responded	that	he	was	waiting	for	“sufficient	acceptance”	of	the	tax	rental	deals.8	That	was	a	ploy	–	and	Douglas	recognized	it.							Other	provinces	joined	the	cause.	On	July	5,	New	Brunswick	Premier	John	McNair	told	Ilsley	of	his	“regret”	at	the	postponement	of	the	Social	Security	proposals,	suggesting	that	the	expansion	of	old-age	pensions	could	be	implemented	separately.9	Nova	Scotia	Premier	Angus	L.	Macdonald,	who	had	returned	to	the	Premier’s	job	after	a	difficult	stint	in	Ottawa	as	Defence	Minister	for	the	Navy,	telegrammed	Ilsley,	asking	for	the	details	of	Ottawa’s	proposed	health	care	grants	and	assistance	for	the	unemployed	employables.	On	July	5,	Ilsley	told	Macdonald	that	health	care	grants	were	“not	included	in	the	present	[tax	rental]	offer,”	and	that	unemployment	assistance	was	“necessarily	dependent	upon	agreement	of	all	the	provinces”	with	that	offer.10	In	mid-October,	Macdonald	told	King	that	it	seemed	“illogical”	to	settle	the	tax-rental	deals	with	individual	provinces	“and	then	to	confer	
																																																																																																																																																																					Matters	of	Substance	Regarding	Tax	Agreements	with	the	Provinces.	Library	and	Archives	Canada,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference.	RG	19,	Vol.	538.	File	(1)	135-0-167	1946.	p.	52.	7	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas	to	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley,	July	29,	1946,	p.	53.	8	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas	to	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley,	July	29,	1946,	p.	54.	9	New	Brunswick	Premier	John	B.	McNair	to	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley,	July	5,	1946.	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	Correspondence	Since	the	Budget	of	1946,	on	Matters	of	Substance	Regarding	Tax	Agreements	with	the	Provinces.	LAC,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference.	RG	19,	Vol.	538.	File	(1)	135-0-167	1946.	p.	41.	10	Finance	Minister	J.	L.	Ilsley	to	Nova	Scotia	Premier	Angus	L.	Macdonald,	July	5,	1946.	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	Correspondence	Since	the	Budget	of	1946	on	Matters	of	Substance	Regarding	Tax	Agreements	with	the	Provinces.	LAC,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference.	RG	19,	Vol.	538.	File	(1)	135-0-167	1946.	p.	27.	
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on	dependent	matters	the	dignity	of	consideration	by	a	general	conference.”11	King	replied	that	a	Conference	would	serve	“no	useful	purpose”	unless	“the	attitude	of	certain	provincial	governments	has	altered.”12							The	Prime	Minister	had	found	his	“out”:	He	could	not	recall	the	First	Ministers	until	all	tax	deals	were	signed.	And	he	used	that	excuse.	Repeatedly.	In	early	October,	Alberta	Premier	Ernest	Manning	made	a	“personal	appeal”	to	King	to	recall	the	Conference	because	the	issue	“so	vitally	concerns	the	welfare	of	the	people	of	Canada	as	a	whole.”13	Once	again,	King	argued	that	there	could	be	no	Conference	until	there	were	tax	rental	deals	with	every	province.							Douglas	tried	again,	He	asked	King	to	recall	the	Conference	to	discuss	“social	security,	unemployment,	health	insurance	and	old-age	pensions…these	matters	cannot	be	delayed	indefinitely….	It	should	be	possible	to	find	certain	minimum	services	at	least	on	which	all	the	provinces	and	the	Federal	Government	could	agree	to	proceed.”14	King	ducked	again	–	with	politely	expressed	regret.		
																																																								11	Nova	Scotia	Premier	Angus	L.	Macdonald	to	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King,	October	16,	1946.	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	Correspondence	Since	the	Budget	of	1946	on	Matters	of	Substance	Regarding	Tax	Agreements	with	the	Provinces.	LAC,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference.	RG	19,	Vol.	538.	File	(1)	135-0-167	1946,	p.	28.		12	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King	to	Nova	Scotia	Premier	Angus	L.	Macdonald,	October	22,	1946.	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	Correspondence	Since	the	Budget	of	1946	on	Matters	of	Substance	Regarding	Tax	Agreements	with	the	Provinces.	LAC,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference.	RG	19,	Vol.	538.	File	(1)	135-0-167	1946,	p.	29.	13	Alberta	Premier	Ernest	C.	Manning	to	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King,	October	8,	1946.	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	Correspondence	Since	the	Budget	of	1946	on	Matters	of	Substance	Regarding	Tax	Agreements	with	the	Provinces.	LAC,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference.	RG	19,	Vol.	538.	File	(1)	135-0-167	1946.	p.	59.	14	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas	to	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King,	November	13,	1946.	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	Correspondence	Since	the	Budget	of	
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					But	there	were	other	reasons	for	Ottawa’s	hesitancy	in	expanding	social	spending:	the	federal	government	wanted	to	conserve	its	available	cash	to	protect	Canada	against	the	horrors	of	another	Depression.	Finance	Minister	Douglas	Abbott	perfectly	captured	Ottawa’s	conversion	to	Keynesian	economics	in	a	press	release	on	January	25,	1947.	Abbott	outlined	the	progress	in	negotiating	tax-rental	deals	with	the	provinces	–	and	then	he	asserted	Ottawa’s	aims:	“It	was	the	Dominion	Government’s	hope…that	all	governments	would	be	in	a	position	to	act	effectively	to	prevent	a	repetition	of	the	calamitous	days	of	the	thirties…Tax	agreements	are	desirable	in	order	to	put	both	federal	and	provincial	governments	in	a	position	to	meet	the	challenge	of	possible	post-war	deflation	and	depression.”15						Douglas	let	go	of	the	issue	of	expanded	social	security	for	ten	months.	Then,	in	mid-August	1947,	he	once	again	tackled	King	on	the	expansion	of	social	security.	He	reminded	the	Prime	Minister	of	his	exact	words	in	his	telegram	on	July	15,	1946:	“As	soon	as	there	is	a	sufficient	acceptance	of	the	proposed	tax	agreements	we	shall	be	ready	to	explore	in	a	general	conference	or	otherwise	the	possibility	of	working	out	mutually	satisfactory	arrangements	in	regard	to	the	whole	or	any	part	of	our	earlier	public	investment	and	social	security	proposals.”16	Since	seven	provinces	had	now	signed	tax-rental	deals	with	Ottawa,	surely	the	time	was	right.	Douglas	asked	“that																																																																																																																																																																						1946	on	Matters	of	Substance	Regarding	Tax	Agreements	with	the	Provinces.	LAC,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference.	RG	19,	Vol.	538.	File	(1)	135-0-167	1946.	p.	55.	15	“Press	Statement	–	For	release	–	afternoon	papers,	Saturday	January	25,	1947,	Honourable	Douglas	C.	Abbott,”	File:	Correspondence	–	Reply	To	Telegrams	1946,	LAC,	RG	47,	Volume	68,	p.	1.		16	Telegram	from	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas	to	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King,	August	13,	1947,	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	76,	File	D40	1947-49	Dominion-Provincial	Relations.	Douglas	put	“quote”	and	“end	quote”	around	King’s	previous	message.	p.	1.	
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[a]	conference	be	called	immediately	to	work	out	details	for	implementing	proposals	regarding	old	age	pensions	health	insurance	unemployment	and	public	investment.”[Sic]17	In	the	cryptic	language	of	telegrams,	the	Premier	went	straight	to	the	point.									King	replied	the	next	day	by	telegram,	referring	Douglas	to	Finance	Minister	Douglas	Abbott’s	budget	speech	on	April	29,	1947.	Then,	Abbott	had	said	the	government	still	hoped	to	secure	provincial	approval	for	its	proposals	to	the	1945-1946	Conference,	including	the	“development	of	an	efficient	and	flexible	tax	system	designed	to	promote	the	expansion	of	employment	and	incomes,	as	well	as	a	comprehensive	program	for	the	co-operation	of	the	Dominion	and	provincial	governments	in	the	field	of	public	investment	and	social	security.”18	Now,	King	told	Douglas	in	telegraph	shorthand,	“I	am	doubtful	if	government	would	be	prepared	to	go	beyond	position	stated	by	Mr.	Abbott	in	Parliament	in	presenting	the	budget	and	in	moving	second	reading	of	Bill	to	authorize	Dominion	Provincial	tax	agreements.”19	It	was	a	wordy	way	of	saying	No.						Douglas	always	spoke	for	many	of	the	poorer,	more	left	wing	provinces	after	his	Depression-era	experience	as	a	Baptist	minister	and	an	ardent	proponent	of	the	social	gospel.	He	wanted	more	federal	money	in	his	coffers	to	expand	social	security,																																																									17	Douglas	to	King,	August	13,	1947,	LAC,	p.	2.	18	“Minister	Says	Ottawa	Still	Wants	Agreement”	in	The	Globe	and	Mail,	Wednesday,	April	30.	P.	12.	19	Telegram	from	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King	to	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas,	August	14,	1947,	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	76,	File	D40	1947-49	Dominion-Provincial	Relations.	p.	1.	http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/hnpglobeandmail/docview/1323611036/F55D35176C034F35PQ/49?accountid=15182		
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and	he	was	impatient	with	Quebec’s	insistence	on	provincial	autonomy	over	its	revenues.	He	never	comprehended	Quebec’s	resistance	to	Ottawa’s	push	for	revenue	centralization,	nor	would	he	grasp	the	depth	of	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis’s	conservatism.									It	was	an	unexpected	and	somewhat	unsettling	side	to	an	estimable	politician.	As	he	later	observed:	Canadians	“had	wasted	a	lot	of	time	arguing	about	federal	grants	for	education,	highways,	and	the	development	of	natural	resources.”20	Ottawa	should	have	found	a	way	to	keep	the	revenues	from	income	taxes	and	succession	duties	in	the	post-war	era,	and	offered	non-conditional	grants	for	health,	welfare	and	education	to	the	provinces	“without	any	strings	attached…	The	sources	of	revenue	have	not	kept	pace	with	the	increasing	responsibilities	laid	on	our	[provincial]	doorstep.”21											Those	discussions	about	social	security	took	place	while	other	Premiers	argued	with	King	about	the	resumption	of	the	Conference	or	their	tax	rental	deals.	Ontario	Premier	George	Drew	became	embroiled	in	a	nasty	four-month	correspondence	with	King:	the	Premier	wanted	the	Prime	Minister	to	recall	the	Conference;	the	Prime	Minister	insisted	that	the	Premiers	had	to	agree	to	the	tax-rental	deals	before	he	would	recall	the	Conference	to	discuss	“mutually	satisfactory	arrangements	relating	to	public	investment	and	social	welfare.”22	It	was	hardball.		
																																																								20	T.	C.	Douglas,	The	Making	of	a	Socialist:	The	Recollections	of	T.	C.	Douglas,	ed.	Lewis	H.	Thomas,	p.	218.	21	T.	C.	Douglas,	The	Making	of	a	Socialist:	The	Recollections	of	T.	C.	Douglas,	ed.	Lewis	H.	Thomas,	pps.	218-219.	My	italics.	22	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King	to	Ontario	Premier	George	Drew,	January	27,	1947,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	Correspondence	Since	the	Budget	of	1946	
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					The	animosity	crackled	in	their	exchanges.	Ontario	insisted	that	the	federal	compensatory	grant	for	the	surrender	of	its	tax	revenues	was	not	high	enough	to	meet	its	responsibilities.	It	also	objected	to	Ottawa’s	modest	generosity	to	the	poorer	provinces	to	ease	fiscal	inequality	–	and	to	secure	their	consent	to	the	tax-rental	deals.	For	a	decade,	Ontario	Premiers	simply	walked	away	from	Ottawa’s	tax-rental	deals	(the	1947-1952	tax	rentals)	–	or	they	drove	hard	bargains	in	terms	of	compensation	(the	1952-1957	rentals).	In	early	1946,	Premier	Drew	even	proposed	that	the	poorer	provinces	should	have	“to	levy	taxes	equal	to	the	highest	in	any	other	province”	to	qualify	for	fiscal-need	payments	as	part	of	the	tax-rental	pacts.23	Ottawa’s	generosity	to	the	poorer	provinces,	he	insisted,	simply	went	too	far.									Quebec	objected	to	the	tax	rental	deal	on	constitutional	grounds		–	although	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis	was	more	polished	than	Drew	in	his	response.	In	peacetime,	Duplessis	initially	seemed	willing	to	allow	Ottawa	to	collect	income	taxes	–	but	he	set	impossible	conditions	upon	any	potential	deal.	He	concluded	that	if	he	actually	surrendered	access	to	revenue	that	he	had	the	constitutional	right	to	collect,	he	could	no	longer	protect	Quebec’s	provincial	rights,	including	its	unique	approach	to	social	policy.								The	issue	was	particularly	important	for	Quebec.	The	province	had	introduced	corporate	income	taxes	in	1884.24	It	would	introduce	personal	income	taxes	in																																																																																																																																																																						on	Matters	of	Substance	Regarding	Tax	Agreements	with	the	Provinces.	LAC,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference.	RG	19,	Vol.	538.	File	(1)	135-0-167	1946.	p.	25.	23	Minutes	of	the	Coordinating	committee	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	(Confidential),	February	1,	1946,	January	28,	1946,	p.	2.	24	J.	Thomas	McCallum,	“A	Trip	Down	Memory	Lane:	Reflections	on	the	evolution	of	taxation	and	tax	rates,”	in	CGA	Magazine,	January-February	2008,	The	Chartered	Professional	Accountants	of	Canada.		
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1954,	partly	as	a	gesture	of	defiance	against	Ottawa.	But	Duplessis	flatly	refused	to	surrender	his	province’s	right	to	collect	succession	duties.	As	he	argued	in	early	January	1946,	such	taxes	were	“intimately	associated	with	family	life	and	the	civil	code	in	Quebec	and	these	were	more	important	aspects	than	purely	financial	and	economic	ones.”25	In	effect,	Quebec	was	unwilling	to	surrender	one	of	its	hegemonic	roles	in	the	cultural	life	of	its	citizens:	it	wanted	to	remain	the	primary	presence	during	the	legal	rites	of	generational	change.	A	month	later,	the	Premier	formally	ruled	out	a	tax	rental	deal	at	a	press	conference:	“To	participate	in	the	violation	of	the	federative	pact	in	the	sabotage	of	provincial	rights,	particularly	those	of	the	Province	of	Quebec,	would	be	complicity,	not	collaboration.”26	The	province	would	not	sign	another	tax-rental	accord.						Other	provinces	squabbled	over	which	province	had	secured	the	better	tax	rental	pact	with	Ottawa.	But	they	agreed	with	the	principle	of	the	rental	deals,	primarily	for	the	sake	of	their	economic	and	fiscal	safety.	In	January	1946,	Manitoba	Premier	Stuart	Garson	argued	that	the	tax-rental	deals	would	ensure	that	Ottawa	had	enough	money	to	smooth	out	economic	downturns	through	Keynesian	spending:	“One	of	the	surest	ways	to	destroy	our	federal	system	would	be	to	leave	its	tax	structure	and	its																																																																																																																																																																						http://www.cga-canada.org/en-ca/AboutCGACanada/CGAMagazine/2008/Jan-Feb/pages/ca_2008_01-02_prof_taxstrategy.aspx		25	Minutes	of	the	Coordinating	committee	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	(Confidential),	February	1,	1946,	LAC,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	Co-Ordinating	Committee	Meeting,	January	28th-Febraury	1st,	RG	2,	Volume	76,	File:	D-40	1946	Filed	Separately.	p.	26.	26	“Avoid	Friction	Over	Tax	Deals,	Duplessis	Warns,”	in	The	Globe	and	Mail,	Monday,	February	3,	1947.	p.	15.	http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/hnpglobeandmail/docview/1325686887/3BB5077FE28A4C3APQ/2?accountid=15182	
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monetary	and	fiscal	policy	in	such	a	condition	that	no	government	has	the	authority	and	the	ability	to	take	effective	steps	to	prevent	the	return	of	the	industrial	unemployment	and	the	low	farm	incomes	which	were	so	typical	of	the	pre-war	conditions.”27	Garson	remembered	the	Depression	on	the	Prairies	only	too	well	–	and	he	wanted	Ottawa	to	have	funds	to	stimulate	the	economy	during	downturns.					Then	there	were	provinces	which	asserted	that	the	tax-rental	deals	did	not	take	account	of	their	special	revenue	needs.	This	remained	an	ongoing,	and	usually	tense,	debate.	Almost	ten	years	after	Duplessis	effectively	rejected	King’s	offer	to	renew	Quebec’s	rental	deal,	British	Columbia	Premier	W.	A.	C.	Bennett	told	his	fellow	Premiers	that	he	would	only	renew	his	tax-rental	deal	if	Ottawa	recognized	that	“under	the	present	formula	we	are	not	receiving	a	fair	or	adequate	share.”28	His	province	had	“the	right	to	substantially	increased	federal	assistance	for	the	public	services	which	the	province	has	undertaken…	The	nation	should	see	to	it	that	the	citizens	of	no	area	fall	below	the	national	average	in	the	matter	of	social	and	educational	services.”	In	fact,	his	province	was	wealthy	–	but	Bennett	wanted	more.							Federal	politicians	and	bureaucrats	surely	dreaded	the	renewal	of	the	five-year	deals	with	their	one-on-one	squabbles	and	their	impossible	dreams.	The	issue	of	revenue	centralization	split	the	participants	between	the	“Haves”	and	“Have	Nots”	–	
and	between	the	defenders	of	provincial	rights	and	the	proponents	of	expanded																																																									27	“Statement	of	Premier	Stuart	Garson	On	Behalf	of	The	Province	Of	Manitoba:	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	on	Reconstruction,	Ottawa,	January	1946,”	File:	Statement	of	Premier	Stuart	Garson	On	Behalf	of	The	Province	Of	Manitoba,	LAC,	RG	47,	Volume	68.	p.	1.		28	Proceedings	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955.	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	October	3	1955	Summary	Record	Of	Proceedings,	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(55/2)-3.	Pps.	76-77.	
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social	security.	These	were	not	tidy	splits:	individual	provinces	adopted	nuanced	approaches	to	Ottawa	and	to	each	other.	Despite	changes	in	their	political	leadership,	however,	provincial	governments	kept	generally	consistent	positions	over	the	post-war	decade.	During	King’s	last	years	in	power,	and	St.	Laurent’s	early	ones,	the	federation	was	at	an	impasse.					Federations	Require	Some	Form	of	Equalization	to	Survive							Few	had	any	doubts	at	the	time	about	what	was	to	blame	for	this	stalemate:	the	very	nature	of	federalism	itself	–	especially	Canadian	federalism	with	its	strong	provincial	identities.	As	Premier	Douglas	and	the	Saskatchewan	Government	shrewdly	maintained	at	the	start	of	the	post-war	odyssey:		The	federal	system	of	government	cannot	be	commended	as	giving	a	maximum	of	convenience…[But]	it	may	reasonably	be	supposed	that	the	factors	making	compromise	necessary	in	1867	are	just	as	strong	to-day…It	seems,	therefore,	that	we	must	regard	the	inconveniences	of	the	federal	system	as	merely	a	circumstance	to	be	reckoned	with	in	the	future...A	federal	union	is	certainly	to	be	preferred	to	no	union	at	all.	At	the	same	time	it	seems	reasonable	to	urge	that	the	federal	system	should	be	made	as	workable	as	possible.29							More	than	two	years	later,	social	reformer	Harry	Cassidy	summarized	that	lesson	in	an	influential	report	on	Canadian	social	security,	which	he	wrote	at	the	behest	of	Health	Minister	Paul	Martin.	The	University	of	Toronto	sociologist	outlined	the	gaps	in	coverage	in	December	1947.	And	he	stressed	how	far	Canada	lagged	behind	other	developed	nations:	the	United	States	with	its	Social	Security	Act	of	1935;	New																																																									29	Saskatchewan	Replies…To	the	Dominion	Government	Proposals	delivered	to	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	on	Reconstruction,	August	6,	1945,	with	covering	letter	from	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas.	“Saskatchewan	replies”,	LAC,	RG	19,	Volume	536,	file	135-0-167	(1)	1944-45.	p.	84.	
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Zealand	with	its	Social	Security	Act	of	1938;	Great	Britain’s	postwar	program	based	on	the	report	of	social	reformer	Sir	William	Beveridge	in	1942;	and	Australia’s	postwar	reforms	in	health	care.	Canada	was	far	behind	–	because	of	its	extremely	difficult	federal	system:		A	major	reason	for	Canada’s	delay	in	building	social	services	up	to	good	modern	standards	has	been	the	acute	conflict	between	the	Dominion	and	the	provinces	regarding	finances	and	legislative	jurisdiction.	The	provinces	were	reluctant	to	go	ahead	with	ambitious	and	costly	schemes	of	social	welfare	in	the	1930s	pending	the	settlement	of	their	claim	that	the	Dominion	should	assume	an	increasing	share	of	the	burden,	particularly	in	connection	with	economic	security….	But	there	is	still,	in	most	provincial	capitals,	marked	reluctance	to	move	forward	vigorously	on	social	security	measures	until	agreement	is	reached	regarding	the	respective	roles	of	the	Dominion	and	of	the	provinces.	On	the	other	hand,	Dominion	action	is	clearly	difficult	as	long	as	there	is	opposition	by	some	of	the	Provinces	to	infringement	upon	their	traditional	jurisdiction	over	health	and	welfare	and	as	long	as	they	are	unwilling	to	agree	to	redistribution	of	the	tax	fields.30											That	quotation	is	pivotal	to	my	thesis.	It	was	an	astute	recognition	of	the	nation’s	longstanding	quandary:	Ottawa	could	not	unilaterally	barge	onto	the	provincial	turf	of	social	programs,	at	least	not	in	all	provinces;	but	many	poorer	provinces	still	lacked	sufficient	funds	to	implement	programs	that	would	be	roughly	comparable	to	those	in	the	richer	provinces	without	impossibly	high	tax	rates.	Cassidy	had	a	solution:	Ottawa	“should	be	actively	interested	in	all	aspects	of	social	security.	It	should	assist	and	encourage	those	parts	of	the	program	which	are	
																																																								30	Harry	M.	Cassidy,	A	Canadian	Program	Of	Social	Security:	A	Report	to	the	Honourable	Paul	Martin,	Minister	of	Health	and	Welfare,	December	16,	1947.	LAC,	RG	19,	Volume	440,	File	108-8-1.	pps.	4-5.	
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administered	by	the	provincial	and	local	governments	by	means	of	financial	grants	and	technical	services.”31								Cassidy	did	not	explicitly	address	the	notion	of	equalizing	grants:	instead,	he	maintained,	“minimum	standards	of	service	should	be	general	throughout	the	country.”32	But	his	advocacy	eventually	prompted	Martin	to	push	King	to	take	small	steps	toward	health	coverage.				Australia	and	Inequality	in	the	Post-War	World	Throughout	Canada’s	journey	through	the	complications	of	federalism,	the	Australians	monitored	the	process	–	and	the	Canadians	watched	them	enviously	in	return.	When	Bank	of	Canada	researcher	W.	Elwynne	Scott	visited	Australia	for	six	weeks	during	the	autumn	of	1946,	he	produced	a	fourteen-page	chronicle	of	many	aspects	of	Australian	life,	including	its	weather,	its	housing	and	trade	policies,	its	industrial	strategies,	its	living	standards,	and	the	decrepitude	of	its	automobiles.						He	concluded	that	Australia	was	“an	ideal	country	for	the	little	man.	He	can	get	enough	to	eat,	decent	housing	and	clothes	and	have	reasonable	leisure	time.	He	is	not	‘pushed	around’	or	made	to	feel	particularly	inferior	in	his	occupation	and	he	is	not	made	unhappy	by	the	sight	of	great	wealth	in	the	hands	of	the	few.”33	By	then,	of	course,	Australia	had	developed	a	network	of	social	programs.	Canada’s	sister																																																									31	Harry	M.	Cassidy,	A	Canadian	Program	Of	Social	Security:	A	Report	to	the	Honourable	Paul	Martin,	Minister	of	Health	and	Welfare,	December	16,	1947.	p.	30.	32	Harry	M.	Cassidy,	A	Canadian	Program	Of	Social	Security:	A	Report	to	the	Honourable	Paul	Martin,	Minister	of	Health	and	Welfare,	December	16,	1947.,	p.	202.	33	“Australia:	A	General	Memorandum	Based	on	October-November	Visit	1946,”	dated	February	25,	1947,	signed	with	initials	WES,	Bank	of	Canada	Archives,	International	Development	Fonds,	File	4E-110	v.	2,	p.	14.	
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Dominion	had	long	since	dealt	with	fiscal	inequality	among	state	governments	–	and	Canberra	had	sufficient	constitutional	power	to	create	social	programs.		
The	Voices	of	the	Social	Activists	Grow	Louder						In	the	early	post-war	years,	King	was	determined	to	preserve	cash	for	infrastructure	spending	during	downturns	and	for	defence	spending	during	the	Cold	War.	In	turn,	advocacy	groups	and	their	political	supporters	such	as	Saskatchewan’s	Douglas	and	Nova	Scotia’s	Angus	L.	Macdonald	tailored	their	pleas	for	expanded	social	programs	to	counter	Ottawa’s	resistance.	They	maintained	that	programs	such	as	expanded	old-age	pensions	would	actually	smooth	out	the	fiscal	cycle,	funneling	cash	to	poorer	Canadians	to	spend	during	downturns.	Social	programs	would	also	ensure	resistance	to	Communism	and	loyalty	to	the	Canadian	way	of	life.	Douglas	added	that	equalized	compensatory	grants	would	flatten	out	regional	downturns,	ensure	economic	stability	and	strengthen	national	ties.							Initially,	those	advocates	made	little	progress	with	appeals	in	the	name	of	economic	stability	and	social	cohesion.	But,	as	federal	politicians	pushed	for	the	renewals	of	the	five-year	tax-rental	agreements	with	the	provinces,	they	were	uneasily	aware	that	they	were	running	out	of	string.	The	Green	Paper	had	aroused	hopes	that	social	advocates	could	not	abandon:	it	had	dangled	the	prospect	of	The	Good	Life.	Advocacy	groups,	some	provincial	premiers	and	other	politicians	and	academics	became	an	increasingly	persistent	force	in	many	provinces.	Budgetary	trade-offs	became	progressively	more	difficult.	But	Ottawa	could	not	find	a	compromise	between	the	defenders	of	provincial	rights	and	the	activists	for	social	
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security	–	because	it	would	not	even	consider	the	possibility	of	non-conditional	equalizing	grants	to	the	poorer	provinces.								The	relentless	pressure	for	expanded	social	security	actually	deepened	before	the	1945-1946	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	officially	failed.	To	encourage	Ottawa,	in	March	1946,	the	Canadian	Welfare	Council	lauded	Ottawa’s	post-war	proposals,	particularly	its	Green	Paper	on	social	security.	“The	Dominion	government	recognizes	social	security	as	an	important	part	of	the	total	programme	of	achieving	high	employment	and	adequate	standards	of	living.”34	It	urged	Ottawa	to	proceed	with	a	comprehensive	Social	Security	program	through	its	own	initiatives	to	boost	aid	to	the	unemployed,	provide	for	unemployed	employables,	and	institute	old-age	pensions	without	“the	ignominy	of	the	means	test.”35							The	welfare	council	argued	that	Unemployment	Insurance	benefits	were	inadequate:	Ottawa	should	make	a	determined	effort	to	boost	wage	rates	in	depressed	areas	and	industries,	which	would	automatically	raise	UI	payments.	“Insurance	benefits	must	obviously	be	somewhat	less	than	wage	rates,	some	of	which	are	now	very	low	indeed.”36	Clearly,	the	fear	of	dependency	remained	vivid.	The	welfare	council	also	urged	Ottawa	to	inaugurate	grants	to	the	provinces	for	a	national	health	program,	welfare	payments	and	employment	retraining.		
																																																								34	“Dominion-Provincial	Relations	and	Social	Security,”	Canadian	Welfare	Council	brief	presented	to	the	Government	of	Canada,	March	1946,	Social	Security	Canada	1946,	LAC,	MG28,	Series	I	103,	Vol.	358,	p.	2.	35	“Dominion-Provincial	Relations	and	Social	Security,”	Canadian	Welfare	Council	brief	presented	to	the	Government	of	Canada,	March	1946,	p.	5.	36	“Dominion-Provincial	Relations	and	Social	Security,”	Canadian	Welfare	Council	brief	presented	to	the	Government	of	Canada,	March	1946,	p.	8.	
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				Then	it	added	a	crucial,	and	prescient,	caveat:	“The	total	financial	settlement,	embracing	basic	grants	plus	specific	grants	plus	tax	transfers	plus	any	other	items,	
must	guarantee	that	the	poorer	provinces	have	sufficient	revenues	to	carry	on	their	
essential	services	of	education,	health,	welfare,	conservation,	highways,	etc.,	at	a	
reasonable	level.	This	principle	was	enunciated	by	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission	in	1940,	and	it	should	be	followed	now.”37	The	National	Adjustment	Grants	that	the	Royal	Commission	had	so	bravely	espoused	in	1940	were	now	seen	as	pivotal	for	the	cause	of	social	reform.									No	one	yet	realized	or	accepted	that	Ottawa	first	had	to	de-couple	such	grants	from	specific	provincial	spending	programs	or	from	the	tax-rental	deals	to	make	the	breakthrough	of	non-conditional	equalization.	But	the	Welfare	Council,	while	applauding	the	simplicity	of	Ottawa’s	call	for	tax	rental	deals	with	compensatory	per-capita	grants,	did	add	a	critical	acknowledgment.	Such	grants	“would	give	the	poorer	provinces	larger	Dominion	grants,	on	a	per	capita	basis,	than	the	richer	provinces	–	which	should	freely	accept	such	treatment	in	the	interests	of	national	unity	and	welfare.”38							In	effect,	the	council	explicitly	recognized	Ottawa’s	implicit	equalization	in	the	tax-rental	agreements.	It	was	also	an	early	convert	to	the	language	of	social	rights,	as	opposed	to	social	needs.	In	a	key	passage	in	that	March	1946	paper,	it	put	a	high	priority	on	the	redesign	of	the	Old-Age	Pension,	including	the	lowering	of	the	age	of	qualification	from	seventy	to	sixty-five	years	of	age	and	the	elimination	of	the																																																									37	“Dominion-Provincial	Relations	and	Social	Security,”	Canadian	Welfare	Council	brief.	p.	3-4.	My	italics.	38	“Dominion-Provincial	Relations	and	Social	Security,”	Canadian	Welfare	Council	brief,	p.	4.		
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despised	means	test.	There	were	“great	numbers	of	independent,	hard-working,	self-respecting	people	in	Canada	who	can	and	do	avoid	‘relief’	and	other	means-test	schemes	during	their	working	lives,	but	cannot	avoid	the	ignominy	of	the	means-test	after	they	retire	from	active	work	unless	there	are	provided	for	them	pensions	as	a	matter	of	right.”39	That	was	one	voice	among	a	growing	chorus	that	was	starting	to	talk	about	the	right	to	social	security	when	describing	the	requirements	for	the	post-war	world.								Other	groups	added	their	voices	to	that	lobbying	effort.	There	was	the	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour	with	its	brilliant	research	director	and	future	Senator	Eugene	Forsey;	the	Canadian	Council	of	Churches;	the	National	Council	of	Women;	and	the	Canadian	Teachers’	Federation,	which	also	tartly	noted	the	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	provinces.	The	list	expanded	as	the	1940s	edged	into	the	1950s,	when	the	First	Ministers	gathered	again	and	again,	usually	deadlocked.							That	line-up	was	formidable.	At	the	annual	National	Council	of	Women	gathering	in	June	1946,	local	affiliates	presented	resolutions	that	addressed	social	needs.	The	delegates	from	Windsor,	On.,	called	for	the	resumption	of	the	First	Ministers’	Conference	to	agree	on	constitutional	amendments	to	meet	“present	day	ideas	of	social	services	and	..	modern	economic	conditions.”40	The	resolution	did	not	specify	what	that	might	entail	–	or	how	the	First	Ministers	could	address	the	huge	stumbling	block	of	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	provinces.																																																										39	“Dominion-Provincial	Relations	and	Social	Security,”	Canadian	Welfare	Council	brief.	p.	5.	40	Resolutions:	Annual	Meeting	Niagara	Falls,	June	3rd	to	7th,	1946,	National	Council	of	Women.	LSC,	MG	28,	Series	I	25,	Volume	89,	File:	Resolutions	1945-1946,	File	2.	p.	4.	
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							The	Vancouver	affiliate	of	the	National	Council	of	Women	called	for	subsidized	rental	housing	for	low-income	Canadians,	citing	the	proposals	of	the	housing	subcommittee	of	the	Advisory	Committee	on	Reconstruction	as	the	model.	That	controversial	wartime	subcommittee	had	called	on	Ottawa	to	pick	up	the	full	tab	to	subsidize	low-income	renters	–	and	to	loan	money	to	municipalities	for	the	construction	of	new	public	housing	units.	It	also	urged	Ottawa	to	provide	annual	subsidies	to	local	authorities	to	ensure	that	rents	stayed	low.41						The	council	from	Peterborough,	On.	wanted	Ottawa	to	“enact	some	measure	of	National	Health	Insurance	to	be	enforced	along	the	same	lines	as	Unemployment	Insurance	to	replace	the	haphazard	non-continuous	form	of	Compulsory	Insurance	now	in	effect	with	the	different	employers.”42	The	council	did	not	address	fiscal	inequality	among	the	provinces.	Instead,	the	resolution	implied	that	Canadians	would	pay	for	their	health	insurance	through	payroll	deductions	–	but	there	was	no	mention	of	the	provinces,	which	were	responsible	for	hospitals	and	health	care.					Other	groups	were	singing	from	the	same	ill-informed	songbook.	In	October	1947,	the	seventh	annual	convention	of	the	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour	(CCL)	requested	“a	comprehensive	social	security	plan	for	Canada,”	the	abolition	of	the	means	test	for	the	old-age	pension,	and	a	national	program	for	low-rental	housing.43	There	was	no	mention	of	what	level	of	government	would	pay	for	those	programs	–	or	what																																																									41	John	C.	Bacher,	Keeping	To	The	Marketplace:	The	Evolution	Of	Canadian	Housing	
Policy	(Montreal-Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	1993)	pps.	169-170.	42	National	Council	of	Women	Resolutions:	Annual	Meeting,	Niagara	Falls,	June	3-7.	1946.	Resolutions	1945-1946	File	2,	LAC,	MG	28,	Series	I	25,	Volume	89.	pps.	4,	3,	and	7.		43	News	Bulletin	No.	16:	“CCL	Holds	Canada’s	Greatest	Labour	Convention,”	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour,	News	Bulletin	1947	173-7,	LAC,	MG	28,	Series	103,	Volume	173.	p.	2.	
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level	of	government	would	administer	them.	The	key	issue	of	fiscal	inequalities	among	provinces	was	simply	ignored.							In	March	1948,	the	CCL	reflected	its	members’	dreams	with	another	nudge:	It	regretted	that	Ottawa	had	not	proceeded	“with	the	social	security	programme	which	it	presented	to	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	in	1945,	covering	such	matters	as	health	insurance,	increased	old	age	pensions,	unemployment	assistance	and	similar	benefits.”44	The	CCL	welcomed	Health	Minister	Martin’s	reassurance	that	the	proposal	had	not	been	abandoned,	“but	it	is	obvious	that	a	programme	of	the	nature	proposed	is	urgently	needed.”45	Once	again,	there	was	no	mention	of	provincial	fiscal	inequalities	or	the	source	of	funds	for	those	programs.								Inequalities	remained	glaring.	In	mid-1948,	the	Canadian	Council	of	Churches,	on	behalf	of	ten	churches	and	three	affiliated	groups,	asked	King	to	work	with	the	provinces	to	enact	“a	comprehensive	scheme	of	social	insurance	which,	by	satisfactorily	combining	provincial	and	federal	services,	would	constitute	a	charter	of	social	security	for	the	whole	of	Canada.”46	The	Council	added	that	the	social	security	program	should	be	financed	on	a	contributory	basis	“for	all	appropriate	
																																																								44	“Memorandum	Submitted	to	the	Dominion	Government	by	the	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour,	March	5,	1948.	Annual	Memorandum	to	Federal	Government	(Canadian	Congress	of	Labour)	1943-1955.	LAC.	MG	28,	Series	l	103.	Volume	282.	p.	4.	45	“Memorandum	Submitted	to	the	Dominion	Government	by	the	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour,	March	5,	1948,	p.	4.	46	Memorandum	For	Right	Honourable	W.	L.	Mackenzie	King	from	the	Canadian	Council	of	Churches,	File:	164	SS	1949,	LAC,	RG	19,	Series	E–	2–C,	Volume	226,	n.	d.,	n.	p.	–	but	page	two	of	two-page	memorandum.	This	was	tucked	in	a	1949	file	–	but	it	dates	from	mid-1948.	
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items,	[and]	participated	in	by	the	Dominion	and	all	Provincial	Governments.”47	There	was	no	mention	of	how	the	poorer	provinces	would	pay	for	such	programs.						Those	major	groups	targeted	the	Prime	Minister	along	with	the	Dominion	Government	in	general.	But	federalism	seemingly	confused	them.	At	best,	they	urged	Ottawa	to	work	with	the	provinces.	Or	they	urged	Ottawa	to	act	on	its	own.	Or	they	called	upon	taxpayers	to	pay	through	their	contributions	to	public	insurance	plans.	But	it	is	striking	today	that	the	advocacy	groups	did	not	tackle	that	huge	conundrum	of	federalism:	fiscal	inequality	among	the	provinces.	It	was	seemingly	up	to	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	to	figure	out	how	social	programs	would	apply	across	the	nation	when	poorer	provinces	could	not	afford	them.							Governments	were	seemingly	unable	to	solve	their	societal	problems.		In	March	1949,	the	CCL	broadened	its	request	for	expanded	social	security:	Ottawa	should	develop	a	national	social	security	program	including	health,	invalidity	and	old	age	pensions	“in	accordance	with	the	principles	of	the	British	system	of	social	security.”48	Pensions	were	“particularly	urgent.”	Few	workers	are	covered	“by	pension	plans	of	any	kind,	and	most	of	these	plans	are	altogether	inadequate	for	health	and	decency.	Millions	of	Canadian	citizens	have	nothing	to	look	forward	to	at	the	end	of	their	working	lives	but	destitution	or	penury.”49		
																																																								47	Memorandum	For	Right	Honourable	W.	L.	Mackenzie	King	from	the	Canadian	Council	of	Churches.	48	“Memorandum	Submitted	to	the	Government	by	the	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour	on	Friday,	March	25,	1949.	Annual	Memorandum	to	Federal	Government	(Canadian	Congress	of	Labour)	1943-1955.	LAC.	MG	28,	Series	l	103.	p.	2.	49	“Memorandum	Submitted	to	the	Government	by	the	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour	on	Friday,	March	25,	1949.	
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						The	author	of	this	memo	to	the	federal	cabinet,	presumably	Forsey,	called	for	constitutional	amendments	so	that	Ottawa	could	institute	a	nationwide	social	security	program.	The	memorandum	reasoned	that	social	programs	“are	of	common	interest	to	the	Canadian	people,	and	…can	be	dealt	with	in	an	adequate	manner	only	if	such	an	amendment	is	obtained.”50	Thus,	the	CCL	ignored	the	problem	of	provincial	fiscal	inequality	with	the	simple	expedient	of	putting	the	onus	on	Ottawa.	It	also	ignored	the	danger	of	creating	federal	social	programs	for	all	provinces	–	when	some	provinces,	particularly	Quebec,	wanted	to	design	and	run	their	own.						The	voices	of	these	disparate	groups	were	becoming	stronger:	the	federal	Liberals	could	not	completely	ignore	the	public	expectations	that	they	had	aroused	–	especially	because	so	many	Canadians	now	knew	what	other	nations	had	done	for	their	citizenry.	In	a	report	on	a	roundtable	at	the	University	of	Toronto	in	May	1948,	social	work	professor	John	S.	Morgan	concluded:	“There	is	an	unmistakable	drift	of	public	opinion	in	Canada	towards	overt	expression	of	the	need	in	a	complex	industrial	society	for	programs	of	social	security	which	will	place	the	protection	against	the	main	hazards	of	modern	times	on	a	predictable	insurance	basis.”51	Morgan	detected	a	trend	over	the	previous	twenty	years	of	“increasing	responsibility	for	social	welfare	by	the	Dominion	Government.”	52		
																																																								50	“Memorandum	Submitted	to	the	Government	by	the	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour	on	Friday,	March	25,	1949.	51	John	S.	Morgan,	A	Meeting	of	Minds:	A	Report	on	the	Round	Table	on	Social	Security,	
held	at	the	University	of	Toronto,	May	8-11,	1948,	reprinted	from	Canadian	Welfare,	July	1948,	File:	Social	Security	Canada	Morgan	John	S	A	Meeting	Of	Minds,	LAC,	MG28,	Series	I	103,	Vol.	358,	p.	6.	52	John	S.	Morgan,	A	Meeting	of	Minds:	A	Report	on	the	Round	Table	on	Social	Security,	
held	at	the	University	of	Toronto,	May	8-11,	1948,	p.	5.	
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							But	he	understood	the	complications	that	Dominion	control	would	entail.	There	was	a	“battle	of	wits	and	words”	at	the	roundtable	over	the	difficulty	of	establishing	adequate	social	security	in	a	federal	state:	“The	constitutional	issues	were	recognized.”53	Most	delegates	concluded	that	contributory	insurance	should	be	a	federal	operation.	Perhaps	Ottawa	could	use	grants-in-aid	to	fund	other	nation-wide	but	provincially	administered	programs	–	although	Morgan	made	no	mention	of	equalized	grants-in-aid.	So	far,	all	levels	of	government	–	federal,	provincial	and	municipal	–	had	“shirked	the	problem	and	preferred	to	keep	the	real	costs	of	having	no	integrated	plan	for	social	security	hidden	in	a	complex	tangle	of	federal,	provincial	and	municipal	responsibilities	for	patching	and	repairing	the	neglect	of	[Canada’s]	human	resources.”54	But	“the	Canadian	people	are	beginning	to	awaken	to	the	need	for	something	more	constructive	and	more	positive	in	their	approach	to	social	welfare.”55						At	a	similar	gathering	in	May	1949,	Morgan’s	summary	of	the	experts’	discussions	became	even	more	emphatic	–	and	the	language	of	rights	was	emerging	here,	too.	“Social	security	was	seen	to	be	not	a	cure-all	for	the	maintenance	of	a	dynamic	economy,	but	an	essential	protection	of	individual	rights	in	human	society	now	more	complex	in	its	organization	than	ever	before.”56	The	experts	recognized	that																																																									53	John	S.	Morgan,	A	Meeting	of	Minds:	A	Report	on	the	Round	Table	on	Social	Security,	
held	at	the	University	of	Toronto,	May	8-11,	1948,	p.	10.	54	John	S.	Morgan,	A	Meeting	of	Minds:	A	Report	on	the	Round	Table	on	Social	Security,	
held	at	the	University	of	Toronto,	May	8-11,	1948,	p.	11.	55	John	S.	Morgan,	A	Meeting	of	Minds:	A	Report	on	the	Round	Table	on	Social	Security,	
held	at	the	University	of	Toronto,	May	8-11,	1948,	p.	11.		56	John	S.	Morgan,	Foundations	of	Economic	Security:	A	Report	on	the	Second	Round	
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Ottawa	had	a	responsibility	to	devise	public	works	to	increase	the	number	of	jobs	when	business	activity	slackened	dramatically.57	The	next	challenge	was	to	devise	Unemployment	Assistance	for	employables	who	had	exhausted	their	benefits:	“But	there	are	fiscal	problems	and	constitutional	difficulties	in	relating	political	and	administrative	responsibilities	to	financial	capacities,”	Morgan	reported.	The	experts	had	finally	grasped	the	central	problem	of	fiscal	inequality	in	federalism	–	but	they	could	not	solve	it.					The	delegates	did	emphasize	the	importance	of	employment	for	human	dignity.	The	effect	of	American	work-relief	programs	in	the	1930s	should	be	viewed	in	terms	of		“social	accounting….All	America	is	richer	in	human	values	retained	and	enhanced	in	those	who	worked	rather	than	rotted	on	relief.”58	The	advocates	had	adeptly	linked	a	healthy	economy	with	a	healthy	society.			
King	Finally	Takes	Action					In	May	1948,	Health	Minister	Paul	Martin	warned	the	Prime	Minister	that	the	public	was	becoming	more	critical	of	his	government’s	failure	to	provide	health-care	funding.	After	reading	Martin’s	letters,	King	confided	to	his	Diary	that	he	had	already	been	considering	the	proclamation	of	a	nation-wide	social	security	minimum	that	
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Table	organized	by	the	School	of	Social	Work	and	the	Department	of	Extension	in	the	
University	of	Toronto,	held	in	Toronto	May	28,	29	and	30,	1949,	pps.	10-11.		
	 	 	 	 	384	
could	be	“identified	with	my	life’s	effort.”59	That	might	have	been	true.	Then	again,	the	Prime	Minister	was	capable	of	self-deception	in	his	diary	–	and	he	had	not	acted.					But	Martin’s	warning	about	the	possibility	of	electoral	shifts	stung	him.	In	January	1948,	he	had	indicated	that	he	would	resign	later	that	year.	Now,	he	worried	that	his	inaction	on	social	policy	might	have	put	the	Liberal	hegemony	at	risk.	A	day	after	those	musings,	he	told	key	ministers	that	health	care	would	provide	“a	human	side”	for	the	Liberals	in	the	upcoming	election	campaign.60	Then	he	told	the	entire	cabinet	that	he	was	aiming	“in	the	direction	of	national	minimum…[That]	would	perhaps	obviate	having	to	take	up	other	bits	of	social	reform	at	present.	I	did	not	want	the	
party	to	do	more	than	it	really	should.”61							That	was	typical	King:	cautious	to	the	end.	But	when	he	read	a	statement	of	his	health-care	policy	to	the	House	of	Commons	on	Friday,	May	14,	he	met	with	almost	universal	applause.	He	would	start	with	federal	health-care	grants	to	all	provincial	governments	–	even	if	he	did	not	have	tax-rental	accords	with	Ontario	and	Quebec.	Ottawa	earmarked	money	for	health	surveys,	hospital	construction	and	general	public	health.	He	“obtained	Quebec’s	approval	[for	the	grants]	through	personal	diplomacy	with	its	premier,	Maurice	Duplessis.”62	Ontario	would	also	accept	the																																																									59	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Tuesday,	May	11,	1948.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=32089&		60	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Wednesday,	May	12,	1948.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber		61	Diary	of	William	Lyon	Mackenzie	King,	Wednesday,	May	12,	1948.	My	italics.	62	Implementing	the	National	Health	Grants	in	Making	Medicare:	The	History	of	Health	Care	in	Canada,	1914-2007,	History	Museum,	Government	of	Canada	site	
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federal	funding.	Federal	efforts	were	minimal,	far	short	of	the	Green	Paper	that	Ottawa	had	championed	with	such	aplomb	in	1945.	But	it	was	a	start.							More	importantly,	those	grants	did	not	require	matching	grants	from	the	provinces.	So	King	did	not	have	to	tackle	the	issue	of	provincial	fiscal	inequality	–	and	the	need	for	equalizing	grants.						Louis	St.	Laurent	Becomes	Prime	Minister	
					Despite	King’s	action,	advocacy	groups	would	not	go	away.	What	about	the	rest	of	the	Green	Paper?	When	would	Ottawa	work	with	the	provinces	to	implement	such	plans	as	unemployment	assistance?	Many	groups	did	not	care	if	what	they	wanted	was	in	Ottawa’s	field	of	constitutional	jurisdiction	or	in	the	provinces’	field.	Some	groups	understood	intuitively	that	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	had	to	work	together	if	social	programs	were	to	function	effectively.	Others	wanted	Ottawa	to	pick	up	the	cost.	Very	few	recognized	the	huge	impediment	of	fiscal	inequalities	to	expanded	social	security	across	the	provinces.	The	discussion	of	equalization	was	always	a	government	insiders’	game.									Those	groups	were	hopeful	when	Louis	St.	Laurent	succeeded	Mackenzie	King	as	Prime	Minister	on	November	15,	1948.	Four-and-a-half	months	later,	at	midnight	on	March	31,	1949,	the	impoverished	colony	of	Newfoundland	joined	Canada	as	the	tenth	province	–	after	two	divisive	referendums.	Canada	had	a	prominent	presence	in	the	post-war	world.	But	St.	Laurent	did	not	initially	tackle	the	challenge	of	expanding	social	programs.	Alarmed,	the	lobbyists	for	social	security	redoubled																																																																																																																																																																						http://www.civilization.ca/cmc/exhibitions/hist/medicare/medic-3h17e.shtml		
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their	efforts,	anxious	to	tilt	the	balance	against	the	protectors	of	provincial	autonomy,	who	were	partly	responsible	for	St.	Laurent’s	caution.								But	the	international	situation	was	also	fraught.	From	the	early	years	of	the	post-war	era,	fears	about	Communism	had	preoccupied	the	West,	especially	after	the	Soviet	Union	secured	the	atomic	bomb.	Those	sentiments	deepened	with	the	Korean	War,	which	ran	from	June	1950	to	July	1953.	Canada	participated	in	that	conflict	at	the	behest	of	the	United	Nations	Security	Council.	It	also	beefed	up	its	defence	budget	in	response	to	the	perceived	Communist	threat,	setting	up	yet-another	tug-of-war	between	spending	on	social	security	and	spending	on	defence.							Undaunted,	many	advocacy	groups	and	politicians	portrayed	this	tension	as	artificial.	In	February	1949,	the	Canadian	Teachers’	Federation	urged	St.	Laurent	to	earmark	federal	funding	for	education	–	because	of	the	fiscal	inequalities	across	provinces	and	municipalities.	“Surely,	the	educational	opportunity	of	the	Canadian	child	should	not	depend	entirely	upon	the	wealth	of	the	province	of	his	birth,	the	real	property	of	his	municipality	and	the	generosity	of	the	individual	property	owner	to	translate	his	recognition	of	the	need	for	increased	educational	expenditure	into	a	specific	increase	in	mills	upon	his	specific	piece	of	property.”63							The	teachers’	federation	specified	that	control	over	education	should	remain	with	the	provinces	–	but	that	Ottawa	should	provide	“a	straight	per	pupil	capita	grant”	to	the	provinces	as	long	as	they	“did	not	lower	their	own	educational	spending.64	It	added	pointedly:	“We	are	faced	with	a	national	problem.	To	the	degree	that	the																																																									63	Canadian	Teachers’	Federation	to	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	February	3,	1949,	LAC,	MG28,	Vol.	10,	File	Briefs	to	Government	CTF,	1938-1961.	p.3.		64	Canadian	Teachers’	Federation	to	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	February	3,	1949,	p.	7.	
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education	of	Canadian	boys	and	girls	is	deficient	or	insufficient,	we	reduce	the	prosperity	of	our	nation	and	increase	the	vulnerability	of	our	national	security.”65							In	March	1949,	University	of	Toronto	sociologist	Cassidy	suggested	to	Justice	Minister	Stuart	Garson	that	Ottawa	should	hold	a	series	of	Dominion-Provincial	Conferences	on	specific	issues,	especially	social	security.	Ottawa	should	consider	a	constitutional	amendment	that	would	allow	the	federal	government	to	administer	contributory	social	insurance	measures.	It	should	also	introduce	a	program	to	assist	those	whose	Unemployment	Insurance	payments	had	expired.	“As	economic	conditions	become	more	difficult	the	old	“relief”	problems	of	the	1930s	will	reappear,”	Cassidy	warned.	“As	soon	as	demands	for	relief	on	the	local	public	authorities	amount	to	very	much	the	provinces	will	probably	be	making	representations	to	Ottawa	for	assistance.”66	Cassidy	was	one	of	the	few	experts	who	understood	the	constitutional	problems	of	social	security:	His	solution	for	fiscal	inequality	was	to	put	the	onus	on	Ottawa,	which	would	administer	contributory	social	security	schemes.	He	ignored	potential	objections	from	the	provinces.						The	pressure	on	the	federal	Liberals	mounted.	A	few	days	later,	the	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour	made	its	ninth	annual	presentation	to	the	federal	government	with	the	pointed	observation	that	“our	recommendations	in	the	past	have	not	been	as	effective	as	we	had	wished.”67	It	was	a	clear	challenge	to	St.	Laurent:	among	the																																																									65	Canadian	Teachers’	Federation	to	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	February	3,	1949,	LAC,	MG28,	Vol.	10,	File	Briefs	to	Government	CTF,	1938-1961.	p.3.	My	italics.		66	Harry	M.	Cassidy,	director	of	the	University	of	Toronto	School	of	Social	Work,	to	Justice	Minister	Stuart	Garson,	March	17,	1949,	File	D-40	(Volume	1)	1949	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	LAC,	RG2,	Volume	126,	p.3.		67	“Memorandum:	Submitted	to	the	Government	of	Canada	by	the	Canadian	Congress	
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CCL	requests	was	its	repeated	call	for	“free	medical,	hospital	and	dental	services,	as	well	as	sickness	and	accident	insurance.”68	Although	Ottawa	had	started	to	cooperate	with	the	provinces	and	municipalities	–	this	was	a	reference	to	King’s	health	grants	–	there	had	been	“undue	delay”	in	adopting	a	national	health	insurance	scheme.69	Once	again,	the	CCL	called	for	constitutional	amendments	to	handle	social	security	issues	that	“are	of	common	interest	to	the	Canadian	people.”70						St.	Laurent	hastened	to	assure	the	delegates	that	they	should	take	credit	for	recent	modifications	to	labour	and	social	legislation.	They	remained	impatient.	A	few	days	later,	when	Ottawa	refused	to	provide	funding	for	low-rental	housing,	CCL	President	A.	R.	Mosher	was	bleak:	“Unless	the	Government	can	offer	something	better	than	this,	the	Canadian	people	are	bound	to	show	their	resentment.”71						The	Prime	Minister	also	received	letters	that	belied	the	promise	of	the	post-war	boom.	Madame	P.	Emile	Ouellet	wrote	from	Matane	County,	Quebec,	on	April	9,	1949,	begging	St.	Laurent	to	“tax	the	rich	instead	of	the	poor,	so	that	we	might	be	able	to	live	a	little	better.	When	a	man	with	a	family	and	who	has	worked	hard	all	his	life	reaches	the	age	of	50	without	having	been	able	to	accumulate	any	savings	or	to	
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own	a	house,	there	is	no	social	security…We	lack	clothing,	food	and	housing….all	the	stores	are	loaded	down	with	fruit	and	meat.	All	that	is	lacking	is	money.”72		
Australia	Keeps	Track					The	Australians	watched	avidly.	Across	the	postwar	decades,	they	deluged	Canberra	with	catalogs	of	current	legislation,	updates	on	provincial	and	federal	politics,	lists	of	prominent	civil	servants	and	politicians	–	the	Bank	of	Canada’s	new	Deputy	Governor	James	Coyne	was	a	“refreshing	anomaly”	in	February	1950	–	and	the	texts	of	budgets	and	Speeches	From	The	Throne.73	The	topic	of	federalism,	particularly	social	security,	retained	its	endless	fascination.							The	Australians	were	far	ahead	of	Canada	in	the	implementation	of	Social	Security	–	but	they	also	understood	the	careful	balance	of	costs	and	benefits	that	such	programs	entailed.	Tucked	into	the	High	Commission’s	files	was	a	pivotal	address	that	Finance	Minister	Douglas	Abbott	gave	on	January	5,	1949	to	the	annual	lunch	of	the	Canadian	Women’s	Club	of	New	York.	The	minister	used	the	occasion	to	provide	an	overview	of	Canada’s	progress	in	1948:	“It	is	safe	to	say	that	the	average	Canadian	now	enjoys	a	standard	of	living	at	least	half	as	high	again	as	he	did	before	the	war,	and	a	good	deal	higher	than	at	any	time	in	the	past.”74	
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					The	fourteen-page	speech	was	remarkable	because	Abbott	boasted	about	the	Liberal	Government’s	advances	in	social	security	as	a	boost	for	economic	efficiency.	Social	security	“strengthens	the	economy,	increases	production	by	assuring	a	more	intelligent	and	more	healthy	population,	lessens	the	haunting	worry	of	unemployment	and	family	illness	that	might	otherwise	impair	morale	and	productivity,	makes	systematic	provision	in	advance	against	the	inevitable	contingencies	and	to	that	extent	makes	it	unnecessary	when	adversity	comes	for	the	state	to	step	in	with	improvised	and	expensive	construction	or	other	remedial	programs.”75								The	division	of	responsibilities	for	social	programs	within	the	federation	could	be	difficult.	Still,	“even	though	progress	has	not	been	as	rapid	as	some	might	have	wished,”	Abbott	maintained,	“it	has	been	substantial.”76		With	Unemployment	Insurance,	Family	Allowances	and	Old-Age	Pensions,	he	added,	federal	spending	on	social	security	had	multiplied	tenfold	over	the	previous	ten	years.	Ottawa	had	finally	drawn	the	link	between	social	equity	and	economic	efficiency.	The	Australians	likely	gloated	about	their	more	adaptable	federation	and	their	superior	programs.		
St.	Laurent	Wins	The	Election	And	The	Lobbying	Begins	Again	
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				After	seven	months	in	power,	St.	Laurent	and	his	Liberals	handily	won	the	election	in	late	June	1949	with	just	under	fifty	per	cent	of	the	vote.	All	federal	parties	in	that	election	–	the	Progressive	Conservatives,	the	CCF	and	the	Social	Credit	Party	–	supported	a	national	health	insurance	program.	Immediately	after	that	vote,	80	per	cent	of	respondents	told	pollsters	that	they	backed	a	government-funded	health	plan	to	which	they	would	make	monthly	contributions.77							Saskatchewan	Premier	Douglas	did	not	waste	a	minute.	By	mid-July,	he	was	again	pushing	St.	Laurent	to	reconvene	the	1945-1946	Conference	to	deal	with	the	social	security	measures	outlined	in	the	Green	Paper.	“The	problems	which	the	Federal	Government	recognized	as	crying	for	attention	then	are	even	more	pressing	now,”	he	wrote	in	a	three-page	letter	on	July	15,	1949.78	Saskatchewan	had	implemented	hospital	insurance	in	1947,	which	was	“placing	a	very	heavy	financial	burden	upon	the	individual	taxpayer	and	upon	the	provincial	treasury.”79	Douglas	wanted	to	discuss	a	similar	plan	for	all	Canadians,	so	that	“some	system	of	prepaid	health	services	[could	be]	established	in	some	of	the	provinces	at	least.”80							He	also	wanted	to	talk	about	health	insurance,	universal	old-age	security,	federal	contributions	of	fifty	per	cent	to	pensions	for	those	between	the	ages	of	sixty-five	and	seventy	–	and	the	maintenance	of	full	employment.	Douglas	pointedly	did	not																																																									77	Making	Medicare:	The	History	of	Health	Care	in	Canada,	1948-1958.	http://www.historymuseum.ca/cmc/exhibitions/hist/medicare/medic-4h01e.shtml	78	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas	to	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	July	15,	1949,	File:	Correspondence	Between	Dominion	and	Provinces	Re:	Conference,	LAC,	RG	19,	Series	E21	Volume	3442.	p.	1.	79	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas	to	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	July	15,	1949,	p.	2.	80	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas	to	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	July	15,	1949,	p.	2.	
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ask	for	specific	federal	help	with	his	program	of	hospital	insurance	–	but	the	hint	was	there.	St.	Laurent	replied	almost	five	weeks	later	on	August	18	–	“after	a	much	appreciated	holiday”	–	with	the	cautionary	observation	that	he	first	had	to	get	the	tax-rental	deals	for	1952-1957	renewed.	Anyway,	“more	progress	can	be	made	…[through]	frank	discussions	with	individual	provincial	administrations	about	separate	concrete	questions.”81	It	was	a	polite	brush-off.									Other	Premiers	wistfully	remembered	the	Green	Paper.	In	early	August	1949,	Manitoba	Premier	Douglas	Campbell	asked	St.	Laurent	to	tackle	the	list	of	public	programs	that	the	previous	conference	had	considered.	But	he	had	a	fascinating	caveat:	“Our	first	concern	in	Manitoba	would	be	in	regard	to	the	development	of	plans	to	insure	the	financial	stability	of	the	provinces	and	to	develop	sound	productive	policies	on	public	investment,	on	development	and	conservation	of	natural	resources,	on	social	security	measures	of	various	sorts,	and	on	measures	designed	to	encourage	industrial	and	agricultural	development	generally.”82	The	Liberal-Progressive	Premier	was	obliquely	asking	for	some	form	of	equalization	to	ensure	that	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	could	work	together	“to	improve	the	general	welfare	of	Canada.”83	The	poorer	provinces	clearly	had	a	realistic	idea	of	what	their	voters	wanted,	what	their	governments	could	afford	to	provide	–	and	what	they	
needed	from	Ottawa	to	make	up	the	difference.	He,	too,	got	nowhere	initially.																																																									81	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent	to	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas,	August	18,	1945.	,	File:	Correspondence	Between	Dominion	and	Provinces	Re:	Conference,	LAC,	RG	19,	Series	E21	Volume	3442.	p.	2.	82	Manitoba	Premier	Douglas	Campbell	to	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	August	6,	1949.	File:	Correspondence	Between	Dominion	and	Provinces	Re:	Conference,	LAC,	RG	19,	Series	E21	Volume	3442.	p.	1.	83	Manitoba	Premier	Douglas	Campbell	to	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	August	6,	1949.		
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								But,	eventually,	St.	Laurent	moved	unhurriedly	to	work.	He	was	a	corporate	lawyer	but,	more	important,	he	had	been	the	Francophone	Counsel	to	the	Rowell-Sirois	Royal	Commission.	He	understood	perfectly	that	the	constitution	was	an	impediment	to	any	reshuffling	of	federal	and	provincial	revenues	and	responsibilities.	Perhaps	worse,	as	St.	Laurent	grasped,	Canada	had	no	amending	formula:	Convention	seemingly	dictated	that	all	governments	had	to	assent	to	major	changes	–	and	then	the	approval	of	the	British	Parliament	was	required.						So	the	Prime	Minister	embarked	on	a	series	of	federal-provincial	conferences,	starting	with	the	amending	formula.	It	was	a	calculated	move	to	address	that	basic	federal	problem,	which	bred	political	instability.	But	only	oblivious	constitutional	insiders	could	love	it.	The	initial	gathering	in	Ottawa	in	January	1950	tackled	the	patriation	of	the	constitution	with	an	amending	formula.	(This	would	be	the	first	conference	devoted	exclusively	to	this	topic.	It	would	also	be	the	first	that	Newfoundland	attended	since	it	had	joined	Canada	in	1949.)	The	Conference	failed.					Meanwhile,	the	appeals	for	social	security	grew	more	insistent.	In	July	1950,	the	Canadian	Federation	of	Business	and	Professional	Women’s	Clubs	petitioned	Ottawa	for	“a	retirement	pension	plan	without	a	means	test.”84	That	would	remove	an	expense	from	the	provinces	–	which	had	covered	twenty-five	per	cent	of	the	cost	of	pensions	for	low-income	seniors	over	seventy	since	1931	–	and	put	the	onus	on	
																																																								84	With	Enthusiasm	and	Faith:	History	of	The	Canadian	Federation	of	Business	and	
Professional	Women’s	Clubs	–	La	Fédération	Canadienne	des	Clubs	de	Femmes	de	
Carriéres	Libérales	et	Commerciales	–	1930-1972,	compiled	by	Elizabeth	(Bess)	Forbes	(Published	by	The	Canadian	Federation	of	Business	and	Professional	Women’s	Clubs,	December	1974),	p.	60.	
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Ottawa.	There	was	no	immediate	response.	The	elegant	St.	Laurent	understood	the	issue	in	theory	–	but	he	floated	above	those	women’s	real	world.								The	First	Ministers	met	again	in	late	September	in	the	Quebec	Legislative	Assembly.	Once	again,	they	discussed	constitutional	patriation	and	their	deadlocked	hunt	for	an	amending	formula.	The	September	1950	Conference	also	failed.						Although	St.	Laurent	took	his	time,	however,	he	eventually	pulled	out	a	plum	for	the	social	activists.	In	late	1949,	the	Prime	Minister	had	proposed	a	third	conference	for	December	1950	–	and	he	had	asked	the	Premiers	for	suggestions	for	the	agenda.	Six	provinces	had	deluged	his	office	with	suggestions,	including	the	expansion	of	health	services	through	medical	and	hospital	insurance,	unemployment	assistance	for	employable	and	unemployable	persons,	and	the	adoption	of	a	minimum	standard	for	educational	opportunity.							Newfoundland	deferred	to	the	suggestions	of	its	peers.	Quebec	did	not	respond	but	federal	officials	cited	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis’s	frequent	references	to	“the	problems	relating	to	the	exclusive	rights	of	the	provinces	in	the	matter	of	insurance,	unemployment,	and	radio	broadcasting,	etc.,	etc.”85	(The	First	Ministers	should	have	paid	more	attention	to	that	warning.)						But	it	was	also	clear	that	the	provinces	were	well	aware	of	the	problem	of	fiscal	inequalities	among	their	governments.	New	Brunswick,	Prince	Edward	Island	and	Saskatchewan	directly	asked	for	National	Adjustment	Grants;	Ontario	proposed																																																									85	“Items	for	the	agenda	as	proposed	by	provincial	governments,”	Interdepartmental	Committee	On	The	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	Confidential,	F-P	(G)	Document	No.	14,	September	9,	1950.	File:	Cabinet	Committee	on	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	LAC,	RG	19,	Series	E21,	Volume	3442.	p.	1.		
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subsidies	based	on	fiscal	need	to	“assure	a	minimum	standard	of	public	services.”86	Prince	Edward	Island	wanted	an	overhaul	of	federal	subsidies	coupled	with	the	“transfer	of	certain	existing	services	to	federal	jurisdiction.”87	Saskatchewan	proposed	federal	assistance	to	the	provinces	for	capital	financing,	while	Manitoba	wanted	a	review	of	federal	grants	“in	the	light	of	increasing	municipal	costs.”88	It	was	an	expansive	and	expensive	list.							But	St.	Laurent’s	senior	civil	servants	had	almost	certainly	seen	a	Bank	of	Canada	review	of	the	proposed	Social	Security	payments	to	individuals	in	late	June	1950,	which	parsed	the	varying	program	suggestions	–	and	then	raised	the	tricky	issue	of	dependency.	Social	Security	payments	had	an	effect	on	those	who	received	them	and	on	those	who	funded	them	through	insurance	contributions	and	taxes.	If	the	rates	of	benefits	were	too	high	in	relation	to	earnings	among	potential	beneficiaries,	“some	individuals	might	work	less,	and	make	less	provision	for	their	own	future	security,	than	they	should	or	otherwise	would.”89	As	well,	the	higher	taxes	that	would	be	required	to	pay	for	social	security	might	impair	the	incentive	to	work	or	invest.	
																																																								86	“Items	for	the	agenda	as	proposed	by	provincial	governments,”	Interdepartmental	Committee	On	The	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	Confidential,	F-P	(G)	Document	No.	14,	September	9,	1950.	File:	Cabinet	Committee	on	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	LAC,	RG	19,	Series	E21,	Volume	3442.	pps.	1-3.	Quotation	from	page	1.	My	italics.	87	“Items	for	the	agenda	as	proposed	by	provincial	governments,”	p.	1.	88	“Items	for	the	agenda	as	proposed	by	provincial	governments,”	p.	2.	89	Federal	Social	Security	Payments,	Bank	of	Canada,	June	28,1950,	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	126,	File	D-40	(Vol.	1)	1949-1950	(July)	Dominion-Provincial	General	Relation	1950	General	Conference.	p.	5.	Only	thirty	copies	of	this	document	were	made	at	the	time.		
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There	was,	however,	no	way	to	determine	what	would	happen	with	the	proposed	new	programs:	“These	effects	will	only	become	apparent	over	a	period	of	time.”90								The	memo	added	that	federal	social	security	payments	including	Family	Allowances	had	already	raised	the	purchasing	power	of	the	recipients	by	nearly	five	times	the	amount	that	such	payments	had	provided	in	1938.	Viewed	in	terms	of	the	total	personal	expenditure	on	consumer	goods	and	services,	those	social	security	payments	were	nearly	three	times	as	large	as	those	before	the	war.91	The	Bank	of	Canada	clearly	viewed	further	expansion	of	social	security	as	a	gamble.								Four	months	later,	the	Privy	Council	Office	produced	a	17-page	report	on	federal-provincial	relations	since	Confederation,	detailing	the	constitutional	provisions,	the	First	Ministers’	meetings,	the	departmental	meetings,	the	administrative	collaboration,	the	royal	commissions,	the	delegations	of	administrative	power	and	the	proposals	for	cooperative	machinery.92	It	was	exhaustive	–	and	no	doubt	exhausting	for	its	readers.	But	its	first	appendix	was	notable	for	its	examination	of	cooperative	machinery	in	the	United	States	and	Australia,	including	the	Premiers’	frequent	conferences,	the	Loan	Council	and	the	Grants	Commission.93	
																																																								90	Federal	Social	Security	Payments,	Bank	of	Canada	memorandum,	June	28,1950,	File:	D-40	(Vol.	1)	1949-1950	)July)	Dominion-Provincial	Relation	1950	General	Conference,	LAC,	RG	2,	Volume	126.	p.5.	There	is	no	name	on	the	memorandum.	91	Federal	Social	Security	Payments,	Bank	of	Canada	memorandum,	June	28,1950,	p.	3.	92	A	Report	On	Federal-Provincial	Co-operation,	Federal-Provincial	General	Conference	1950,	Privy	Council	Office,	October	1950.	LAC,	File	D-40-D	(Vol.	2)	1950	Filed	Separately	(FPG)	Documents,	RG2,	Series	18,	Volume	151.	Pps.	1-17.	Notation	says	Document	No.	19.		93	A	Report	On	Federal-Provincial	Co-operation,	Federal-Provincial	General	Conference	1950,	Privy	Council	Office,	October	1950,	p.	16.	
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					Perhaps	overwhelmed	by	such	warnings	and	prospects,	St.	Laurent	placed	limitations	upon	the	upcoming	Conference	agenda	in	October	1950	because	of	“the	uncertainty	that	exists	as	to	the	character	of	the	international	conditions	with	which	the	economy	will	be	faced”	–	and	the	previous	failure	to	deal	with	constitutional	limitations	on	Ottawa’s	role	in	social	security.94	Under	the	circumstances,	this	third	First	Ministers’	meeting	of	1950	would	be	restricted	to	discussions	about	the	tax-rental	deals	and	Old	Age	Pensions	–	with	the	possibility	of	establishing	sub-committees	on	other	issues.									Discouraged,	Tommy	Douglas	wrote	again:	He	realized	that	St.	Laurent	was	hesitant	to	expand	social	security	because	of	the	cost	of	responding	to	international	threats.	“[But]	the	home	front	is	equally	as	important	as	the	international	front.	We	have	always	taken	the	position	that	the	best	way	to	defend	democracy	is	to	remove	those	social	and	economic	forces	that	tend	to	undermine	it.”95	That	argument	–	which	maintained	that	social	security,	housing	and	unemployment	assistance	was	an	antidote	to	Communism	–	went	nowhere.	St.	Laurent	replied	that	the	majority	of	Premiers	were	willing	to	restrict	their	discussions	to	those	issues.	Douglas	agreed	to	abide	by	those	terms	–	but	he	reserved	the	right	to	push	for	the	expansion	of	the	agenda	after	those	items	had	been	handled.	If	that	did	not	appeal	to	the	First	
																																																								94	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent	to	Ontario	Premier	Leslie	M.	90,	October	11,	1950.	File:	Correspondence	Between	Dominion	and	Provinces	Re:	Conference,	LAC,	RG	19,	Series	E21	Volume	3442.	p.2.	95	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas	to	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	October	26,	1950,	File:	Correspondence	Between	Dominion	and	Provinces	Re:	Conference,	LAC,	RG	19,	Series	E21	Volume	3442.	p.1.		
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Ministers,	“the	very	least	that	ought	to	be	done”	would	be	to	create	sub-committees	to	produce	reports	for	another	conference	in	1951.96							Other	groups	were	adamant	about	the	need	for	expanded	social	programs.	In	November	1950,	superintendent	Reverend	J.	Lavell	Smith	of	the	Queen	Street	and	Church	of	All	Nations,	which	was	affiliated	with	the	United	Church	of	Canada,	asked	the	federal	secretary	for	the	Inter-Departmental	Committee	for	the	upcoming	Conference	to	remember	“that	we	still	have	the	unemployed	with	us,	in	considerable	numbers.”	His	church	was	a	block	away	from	the	Unemployment	Insurance	Office	in	downtown	Toronto.	“And	on	these	wintry	days,	we	are	having,	numbers	of	men	come	to	us,	looking	for	a	meal,	a	pair	of	shoes	and	overcoat,	or	a	night’s	lodging.”	He	asked	that	the	Conference	consider	“this	ever	present	problem.”97									Two	weeks	later,	in	December	1950,	Elizabeth	DeWitt,	secretary	to	the	board	of	directors	of	the	Visiting	Homemakers	Association	of	Toronto,	asked	the	same	federal	secretary	for	the	upcoming	Conference	to	ensure	that	the	First	Ministers	considered	assistance	for	the	unemployed	employables	who	had	exhausted	their	Unemployment	Insurance.	“Last	winter	a	number	of	families	which	were	known	to	our	agency	suffered	hardships	due	to	the	present	policy	of	not	giving	assistance	to	unemployed	employable	persons	when	it	was	impossible	for	them	to	secure	work	in																																																									96	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas	to	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	November	20,	1950,	File:	Correspondence	Between	Dominion	and	Provinces	Re:	Conference,	LAC,	RG	19,	Series	E21	Volume	3442.	p.	1.		97	Reverend	J.	Lavell	Smith,	superintendent	of	the	Queen	Street	and	Church	of	All	Nations,	the	United	Church	of	Canada,	to	R.G.	Robertson,	secretary	of	the	inter-departmental	committee	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	November	25,	1950.	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	149,	File	D-40	(volume	1a)	Dominion-Provincial	Relations	-	General.	p.	1.	
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this	area.”98	DeWitt	added	that	the	association	had	already	forwarded	a	similar	plea	to	the	Ontario	government.							Neither	the	Reverend	Smith	nor	De	Witt	suggested	which	level	of	government	should	pay	for	such	social	assistance	–	or	administer	it.	Nor	did	they	deal	with	the	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	provinces.	That	was	perhaps	because	they	lived	in	relatively	wealthy	Ontario	–	but	it	is	more	likely	that	they	did	not	even	consider	this	challenge.	The	problem	of	the	unemployed	employables	who	did	not	qualify	for	UI	would	become	more	severe	as	the	economy	worsened	in	the	mid-1950s.						The	notion	of	stability	was	central	to	all	of	these	competing	pre-Conference	discourses.	St.	Laurent	saw	the	centralization	of	revenues	in	terms	of	economic	stability	and	social	cohesion.	He	also	viewed	his	careful	economic	stewardship	as	the	key	to	his	continued	political	hegemony.	Premiers	such	as	Quebec’s	Maurice	Duplessis	viewed	centralization	of	revenues	and	federally	administered	social	programs	as	a	threat	to	his	province’s	social	cohesion	and	constitutional	rights	–	and	to	his	hegemony.						Wealthier	provinces	fretted	that	Ottawa	would	succumb	to	the	temptation	to	buy	political	popularity	with	lavish	social	programs	that	would	endanger	the	nation’s	economic	security.	Premiers	such	as	Tommy	Douglas	and	many	advocacy	groups	saw	St.	Laurent’s	innate	caution	as	a	threat	to	social	cohesion	within	the	Rest	of	Canada	and	to	the	expansion	of	social	security.	Over	the	next	five	years,	the	impatience	of	those	poorer	Premiers	and	national	advocacy	groups	would	start	to																																																									98	Elizabeth	DeWitt,	secretary	to	the	board	of	directors	of	the	Visiting	Homemakers	Association	of	Toronto	to	R.G.	Robertson,	secretary	of	the	inter-departmental	committee	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	December	7,	1950.	LAC,	RG	2,	Vol.	149,	File	D-40	(volume	1a).,	1950-51,	Dominion-Provincial	Relations	–	General.	p.	1.	
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erode	the	federal	Liberals’	political	hegemony	–	although	St.	Laurent	would	win	another	majority	with	a	reduced	number	of	seats	in	August	1953.		
The	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	of	December	1950					So	many	groups	wanted	the	Prime	Minister	and	the	Premiers	to	consider	more	components	of	the	Social	Security	package.	But,	throughout	November,	the	federal	cabinet	committee	on	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	quietly	rejected	any	move	to	expand	health	insurance	because	of	the	cost.99	In	January	1950,	it	had	already	quietly	shelved	any	attempt	to	provide	more	aid	to	the	unemployed	because	they	were	a	provincial	responsibility	–	and	because	Ottawa	was	theoretically	committed	to	full	employment.100	Senior	bureaucrats	had	confirmed	that	dismissal	on	November	27	at	the	interdepartmental	committee	on	social	security,	reasoning	that	unemployment	levels	were	not	above	normal	–	and	Ottawa	had	widened	the	coverage	of	Unemployment	Insurance.101						The	only	program	that	the	ministers	could	not	dismiss	off-hand	was	an	expansion	of	the	Old-Age	Pension,	which	led	to	a	lengthy	cabinet	meeting	on	November	7,	1950.	Finance	Minister	Douglas	Abbott	argued	that	a	contributory	plan,	which	would	cost	more	than	$200	million,	would	fuel	inflation.																																																										99	Minutes	of	The	Cabinet	Committee	on	Federal	Provincial	Relations,	November	28,	1950,	Secret.	File:	Cabinet	Committee	On	The	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	1950,	LAC,	RG	19,	Series	E21,	Volume	3442,	p.	3.	100	Minutes	of	The	Cabinet	Committee	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	January	3,	1950,	Secret.	File:	Cabinet	Committee	On	The	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	1950,	LAC,	RG	19,	Series	E21,	Volume	3442,	p.	3.	101	Minutes	and	so	on	re:	Interdepartmental	Committee	on	Social	Security,	General	File,	Dominion-Provincial	Conference:	1950.	File	135-0-167	General	File,	RG	19,	Series	E-2-C,	Volume	92.	p.	2.		
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				His	colleague,	Health	Minister	Paul	Martin,	pointed	out	that	the	Liberals	had	campaigned	on	this	proposal,	which	they	had	first	advocated	in	1945.	They	had	appointed	a	joint	Parliamentary	Committee,	which	had	reported	on	the	proposal	favorably	in	June	1950	to	all-party	acclaim.	If	the	Liberals	did	not	expand	the	program,	he	maintained,	there	would	be	huge	pressure	to	raise	the	actual	amount	of	the	pension	–	which	would	also	prove	costly.	Anyway,	relatives	were	already	spending	heavily	on	the	upkeep	of	the	elderly:	federal	payments	would	simply	be	a	substitute	for	that	spending,	not	inflation-fueling	new	spending.102	Martin	got	everyone’s	attention	–	and	Ottawa	focused	on	models.											When	the	First	Ministers	met	in	early	December	1950,	their	agenda	was	largely	limited	to	Old	Age	Pensions,	which	Ottawa	would	administer	as	a	universal	right	and	which	would	not	be	based	on	need,	and	to	the	renewal	of	the	tax	agreements.	But	they	created	a	sub-committee	on	Old-Age	Security	that	split	such	pensions	into	two	tranches:	Ottawa	would	administer	the	contributory	system	for	those	aged	seventy	and	over;	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	would	share	the	costs	of	pensions	for	those	between	the	ages	of	sixty-five	and	sixty-nine,	based	on	a	means	test,	but	the	provinces	would	administer	them.	As	Health	Minister	Martin	told	them,	public	support	ensured	that	this	should	be	the	next	major	social	program:	The	Federal	Government	recognized	that	the	programme,	as	proposed,	was	a	very	expensive	one.	Combined	expenditures	of	the	Federal	and	Provincial	Governments	with	respect	to	old	age	security	might	well	be	trebled	if	the	plan	were	approved	and	established.	However,	it	was	felt	that	the	general	public	were																																																									102	Cabinet	Committee	on	Federal-Provincial	Relations,	November	7,	1950,	Secret.	File:	Cabinet	Committee	On	The	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	1950,	LAC,	RG	19,	Series	E21,	Volume	3442,	p.ps.	1-4.	
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prepared	to	pay	directly	for	this	important	improvement	in	its	domestic	security.103										But	a	constitutional	amendment	would	be	required	to	shift	responsibility	for	old-age	pensions	to	Ottawa.	The	pace	was	glacial	–	because	of	the	mechanics	of	federalism	and	St.	Laurent’s	inclinations.	But	the	ministers	would	eventually	hammer	out	four	approaches	to	this	expansion,	including	one	for	an	Old	Age	Security	Tax	that	was	eventually	adopted.104							The	Premiers	were	generally	amenable	to	Martin’s	proposal:	even	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis	agreed	to	refer	the	required	amendment	to	the	Legislative	Assembly–	although	he	did	not	promise	to	support	it.	In	the	end,	no	province	could	resist	Ottawa’s	highly	popular	offer	of	expanded	social	security	–	especially	when	Ottawa	would	fund	the	pension	by	itself	and	there	would	be	no	need	
for	new	federal	transfers	to	the	provinces.	Ottawa	was	already	paying	seventy-five	per	cent	of	the	means-tested	Old-Age	Pension	for	those	seventy	and	over.	Old	Age	Security	was	enacted	through	a	constitutional	amendment	in	1951	that	took	effect	on	January	1,	1952.	But	Quebec	Premier	Duplessis	had	insisted	on	the	insertion	of	a	clause	in	that	constitutional	amendment	that	asserted	Quebec’s	hegemony:	the	measure	would	not	affect	‘the	operation	of	any	law	present	or	future	of	a	provincial	
																																																								103	Committee	on	Old	Age	Security,	Federal-Provincial	Conference	December	1950,	Confidential.	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	149,	D-40	(Volume	1)	p.	2.	104	The	earmarked	tax,	which	took	effect	in	1952,	was	actually	a	composite	of	three	taxes:	one	on	manufacturers’	selling	price	or	the	duty-paid	value	of	items	covered	by	the	federal	sales	tax,	a	tax	on	personal	income	and	a	tax	on	corporate	income.		http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/MR/mr58-e.htm		
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legislature’	in	relation	to	old	age	pensions.105	The	defenders	of	provincial	rights	had	brushed	up	against	the	claimants	for	expanded	social	security	–	and	they	had	guardedly	yielded,	partly	because	the	federal	payments,	which	went	directly	to	elderly	individuals,	relieved	obligations	on	the	provincial	treasury,	which	had	been	paying	one-quarter	of	the	cost.			
The	Quest	For	Social	Citizenship	Continues	–	With	Mixed	Results						By	now,	every	Premier	in	the	Rest	of	Canada	could	hear	the	demands	for	social	citizenship.	In	April	1951,	the	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour	reminded	St.	Laurent	that	it	was	stoutly	backing	federal	efforts	to	combat	Communism	abroad.	Its	press	release	about	that	meeting	then	added:	“There	was	also	need	for	a	social	and	economic	program	in	Canada	itself	to	give	Canadians	a	full	realization	of	their	opportunities	and	the	necessity	to	fight	to	preserve	those	conditions.”106	The	CCL	also	called	for	a	program	to	provide	“properly	constructed	houses”	for	lower-income	Canadians:	Ottawa	should	run	the	program	on	a	non-profit	basis	so	that	it	could	”not	[be]	used	as	a	means	for	private	exploitation.”107						A	year	later,	St.	Laurent	reversed	that	argument	against	the	CCL	executives.	“He	[St.	Laurent]	said	that	Canada	is	doing	what	it	can	to	prevent	a	third	World	War,	but	that	our	share	of	the	joint	effort	amounted	to	nearly	two	billion	dollars,	which	was	
																																																								105	Paul-André	Linteau,	René	Durocher,	Jean-Claude	Robert,	François	Ricard,	Quebec	
Since	1930	(Toronto:	James	Lorimer	&	Company	Publishers,	1986)	p.	281.	Also,	section	94A,	Constitution	Act	1982.	106	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour	press	release,	April	11,	1951,	LAC,	MG28,	Series	I	103,	Vol.	174,	File	News	Releases	1951,	174-2.	p.	2.	My	italics.	107	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour	press	release,	April	11,	1951.		
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almost	fifty	per	cent	of	the	entire	[federal]	budget	of	the	nation.”108	The	defence	tab	was	so	high	that	Ottawa	could	not	afford	to	meet	the	full	CCL	social	demands	–	even	though	they	were	looking	to	Ottawa	to	take	the	lead.						But	the	mood	of	the	post-war	era	on	health	care	was	becoming	evident.	As	public	policy	expert	Malcolm	G.	Taylor	has	noted:		Voluntary	prepayment	plans	and	commercial	insurance	were	rapidly	expanding	their	coverage,	clearly	demonstrating	that	the	public	wanted	insurance	protection	against	medical	and	hospital	bills,	and	were	willing	to	pay	for	it.	But	even	more	significant	was	that	by	1950	government	hospital	insurance	programs	had	been	introduced	in	four	provinces	–	Saskatchewan,	British	Columbia,	Alberta,	and	Newfoundland	–	and	all	without	federal	subsidy.	Their	leaders	and	members	of	parliament	constantly	reminded	the	federal	government	that	the	time	had	come	for	the	1945	offer	[the	Green	Paper]	to	be	fulfilled.109									There	was	one	powerful	group	that	consistently	backed	St.	Laurent	in	his	efforts	to	control	the	pace	of	social	spending:	the	Canadian	Chamber	of	Commerce.	Across	the	1950s,	the	voluntary	organization,	representing	almost	700	boards	of	trade	and	local	chambers	in	ten	provinces,	always	argued	for	restraint	in	social	spending.	In	February	1951,	the	Chamber	explained	that	it	was	“in	sympathy	with	desires	for	expanding	social	security	measures	but	points	out	that	such	goals	can	be	achieved	only	if	Canadian	national	wealth	continues	to	increase…[New	demands]	must	be	viewed	carefully	in	the	light	of	new	and	additional	financial	burdens	for	National	
																																																								108	Canadian	Labour	Congress	Circular	Letter	No.	279,	March	28,	1952,	LAC,	MG28,	Series	I	103,	Vol.	172,	File	Circular	Letters	1952	172-87,	p.	2.	109	Malcolm	G.	Taylor,	“Health	Insurance:	the	Roller-Coaster	in	Federal-Provincial	Relations”	in	federalism	and	political	community:	Essays	in	Honour	of	Donald	Smiley,	eds.	David	P.	Shugarman	and	Reg	Whitaker	(Peterborough,	On.:	Broadview	Press	Ltd.,	1990.	
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Defence.”110	Any	extra	spending	should	be	only	for	defence.	“Expenditures	for	non-Defence	items	must	be	eliminated	or	indefinitely	postponed	until	the	threatening	clouds	which	are	on	the	horizon	have	been	dissipated.”111						It	repeated	that	mantra	throughout	the	ensuing	years.	In	October	1954,	the	Chamber	urged	restraint	to	preserve	Ottawa’s	economic	health	–	and	to	curb	the	role	of	the	state	in	meeting	individual	needs:	“In	the	field	of	social	welfare	the	Chamber	believes	that	careful	distinction	must	be	drawn	between	what	is	socially	desirable	as	an	ultimate	aim	and	that	which	can	be	achieved	without	damaging	the	system	which	makes	our	social	welfare	advances	possible.	Individuals	should	be	encouraged	to	make	every	effort	to	provide	for	their	own	future.”112	Such	appeals	to	self-sufficiency	were	out	of	step	with	many	social	advocates,	at	least	those	in	the	Rest	of	Canada.		
The	Quarrel	With	Quebec	Commences	
							But	there	were	multiple	and	often	conflicting	pressures	on	St.	Laurent’s	shoulders.	On	June	1,	1951,	the	Royal	Commission	on	National	Development	in	the	Arts,	Letters	and	Sciences	–	otherwise	known	as	the	Massey	Commission	–	reported	after	more	than	two	years	of	complicated	work.	Almost	three	weeks	later,	in																																																									110	“Submission	To	The	Minister	Of	Finance	And	The	Minister	of	National	Revenue	regarding	Canada’s	Fiscal	Policy,	The	Income	Tax	Act,	and	the	Dominion	Succession	Duty	Act,	February	23,	1951,	The	Canadian	Chamber	of	Commerce,	LAC,	Department	of	Finance,	Department	files	–	briefs	from	organizations	and	associations,	RG	19	E2C,	Volume	116,	File	164-B-1951	A.	p.	4.		111	“Submission	To	The	Minister	Of	Finance	And	The	Minister	of	National	Revenue	regarding	Canada’s	Fiscal	Policy,	The	Income	Tax	Act,	and	the	Dominion	Succession	Duty	Act,	February	23,	1951.		112	“Policy	Declarations	And	Resolutions,	1954-1955,”	The	Canadian	Chamber	of	Commerce,	LAC,	RG	19,	Volume	624,	File	(1955)	164	B.	pps.	27-28.	
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accordance	with	its	recommendations,	Prime	Minister	St.	Laurent	offered	to	provide	$7.1-million	in	per-capita	federal	grants	to	Canada’s	universities	–	or	roughly	fifty	cents	per	student.	St.	Laurent	stressed	that	Ottawa’s	money	was	“a	necessary	supplement”	to	existing	provincial	funding	–	and	university	authorities	should	use	it	“to	maintain	quality	rather	than	to	increase	facilities.”113							The	Quebec	Government	viewed	the	federal	plan	with	distrust:	in	the	long	run,	the	ensuing	controversy	would	become	one	of	the	key	factors	behind	the	creation	of	equalization.	As	historian	Michael	Behiels	notes,	Quebec’s	francophone	universities	put	pressure	on	Ottawa	to	negotiate	a	deal	with	the	Duplessis	government	so	that	they	could	accept	money	under	“this	audacious	and	unprecedented	scheme	of	statutory	nonconditional	grants	to	Canadian	universities.”114	For	the	first	year,	a	Quebec-Ottawa	committee	administered	the	fund	for	Quebec	–	and	the	provincial	representative	on	that	committee	countersigned	the	cheques.	But,	as	Behiels	relates,	this	approach	could	not	last.	“Sensitive	to	the	loud	outcry	from	nationalist	circles	and	hoping	perhaps	to	keep	Quebec	universities	under	his	government’s	political	control,	Duplessis	refused	to	renew	the	arrangement	after	1952.”115								In	effect,	Quebec	was	leading	the	post-war	provincial	resistance	to	Ottawa’s	use	of	its	spending	power	–	effectively	an	anti-Rowell-Sirois	movement.	The	assertion	of	provincial	rights	was	as	old	as	Confederation	itself.	But	this	powerful	Quebec	nationalist	movement	was	developing	throughout	the	1950s	because	of	the	clash	of																																																									113	“Universities	to	Receive	$7,000,000	Ottawa	Aid;	CBC	Also	to	Get	Help,”	in	The	
Globe	and	Mail,	Wednesday,	June	20,	p.	3.		114	Michael	D.	Behiels,	Prelude	to	Quebec’s	Quiet	Revolution:	Liberalism	Versus	Neo-
Nationalism,	1945-1960	(Kingston	and	Montreal:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	1985)	206.		115	Behiels,	206.	
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two	post-war	forces.	On	one	side,	there	was	Ottawa’s	push	to	centralize	revenues	and	then	use	its	spending	power	to	stimulate	the	economy	and	to	fund	social	security	measures	for	all	citizens.	On	the	other,	there	was	Quebec’s	growing	alarm	as	Ottawa	started	to	spend	in	fields	of	provincial	responsibility,	nudging	into	its	place	in	the	cultural	heart	of	French	Canada.	As	Simeon	and	Robinson	have	described,	this	was	a	encroachment	on	Quebec’s	territorial	federalism	with	its	emphasis	on	the	protection	of	language	and	culture.116					As	such,	Quebec	was	the	only	province	that	did	not	sign	the	second	post-war	tax	rental	agreements	that	ran	from	1952	to	1957.	Ontario	did	sign	–	much	to	Quebec’s	chagrin	–	so	“Quebec	found	itself	alone	in	the	fight	for	the	autonomy	of	the	provinces.”117	Other	provinces	drove	hard	bargains	with	Ottawa	over	the	size	of	their	fiscal	need	grants	and	abatements.	But	Quebec	was	the	provincial-rights	force	on	one	side	of	the	tightening	pressures	on	St.	Laurent.	Ottawa	did	offer	a	seven-per-cent	abatement	on	corporate	taxes	and	a	five-per-cent	abatement	on	personal	income	taxes	to	Quebec	taxpayers.	(It	had	initially	offered	an	abatement	of	five	percentage	points	to	Ontario	and	Quebec	for	the	second	tax-rental	deal.)	But	Duplessis	refused	to	create	a	provincially	administered	personal	income	tax	–	“no	matter	how	small.”118	The	province	had	lost	more	than	$76-million	in	federal	
																																																								116	Richard	Simeon	and	Ian	Robinson,	State,	Society,	and	the	Development	of	
Canadian	Federalism.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1990)	pps.	125,	129,	139-145.	117	http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/c.belanger/quebechistory/federal/taxrent.htm		118	Behiels,	196.	
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compensatory	grants	between	1947	and	1952	because	of	Duplessis’	line-in-the-sand.119									The	Premier	fought	back.	In	1953,	he	established	the	pivotal	provincial	Royal	Commission	on	Constitutional	Problems,	which	Judge	Thomas	Tremblay	chaired.	In	late	1953,	well	before	their	final	report,	the	commissioners	urged	Duplessis	to	resist	Ottawa’s	fiscal	domination.	The	province	was	also	experiencing	“an	increasingly	difficult	time	finding	enough	revenue	to	finance	all	of	the	highways,	bridges,	school,	and	hospitals	that	were	required.”120	In	1954,	Duplessis	finally	introduced	a	provincial	income	tax	equal	to	fifteen	per	cent	of	the	federal	rate.	It	was	a	direct	challenge:	Quebec	taxpayers	were	now	paying	double	taxes.	Duplessis	also	contended	that	Quebec	had	priority	in	the	field	of	direct	taxation.	“A	lively	struggle	ensued	between	the	two	governments.”121						This	was	a	pivotal	event	in	the	creation	of	equalization.	Ottawa’s	push	to	centralize	revenues	was	creating	political	instability.	Quebec’s	strong	assertion	of	provincially	based	rights	–	along	with	increasing	resistance	from	other	provinces	such	as	Ontario	for	fiscal	reasons	–	delayed	the	expansion	of	social	security	because	there	was	no	remedy	for	inequality	in	provinces	that	did	not	rent	their	taxes.	It	was	a	small	indication	of	the	growing	provincial	resistance	to	Ottawa	that	would	reappear	so	strongly	during	the	Quiet	Revolution.							Duplessis	had	strong	supporters	among	Quebec	groups,	which	followed	the	dispute	over	the	tax-rental	accords	with	far	more	interest	than	many	groups	in	the																																																									119	Behiels,	199.	120	Behiels,	199.	121	Paul-André	Linteau,	René	Durocher,	Jean-Claude	Robert,	François	Ricard,	Quebec	
Since	1930	(Toronto:	James	Lorimer	&	Company,	Publishers,	1991)	282.	
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Rest	of	Canada.	In	January	1954,	the	Quebec	Division	of	the	Canadian	Manufacturers’	Association	told	the	Tremblay	Commission	that	there	were	many	good	reasons	to	resist	the	tax-rental	deals.	“For	example,	such	a	centralized	system	would	provide	a	government	of	socialistic	tendencies	with	a	ready-made	instrument	of	attack	not	only	on	provincial	prerogatives	but	on	free	enterprise	as	well,	a	state	of	affairs	which	all	would	have	just	cause	to	deplore.”122								Duplessis	had	also	cultivated	the	prelates	and	priests	of	the	Roman	Catholic	Church.	He	“prolonged	the	significance	of	the	Church	in	matters	that	have	subsequently	become	secular:	education,	hospitalization,	public	assistance.”123	In	turn,	“the	higher	clergy	approved	of	Duplessis”	for	reasons	that	“were	generally	rooted	in	ideology,	or	at	least	policy,	especially	provincial	autonomy	and	Duplessis’s	incessant	representation	of	himself	as	the	more	Catholic	candidate.”124							As	historian	Behiels	notes,	Ottawa’s	activist	fiscal	federalism	was	partly	responsible	for	the	rise	of	neo-nationalism	in	Quebec:	It	became	increasingly	clear	…that	Ottawa’s	decision	to	forge	ahead	with	Keynesian-inspired	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	and	the	creation	of	a	highly	centralized	social	welfare	state	had	altered	in	crucial	ways	the	prevalent	conception	of	federal-provincial	relations..	Neo-nationalists	felt	strongly	that	the	new	federalism	was	a	serious	threat	to	provincial	autonomy	and	therefore	to	the	French–Canadian	nation.125																																																																122	Memorandum	of	Submissions	to	the	Royal	Commission	of	Inquiry	on	constitutional	problems,	January	27,	1954	by	The	Canadian	Manufacturers’	Association	(Quebec	Division).	LAC.	RG	19,	Volume	624,	File	164#201	to	282.	p.	12.	123	Conrad	Black,	Render	Unto	Caesar:	The	Life	and	Legacy	of	Maurice	Duplessis.	(Toronto:	Key	Porter	Books,	1998)	p.	401.		124	Conrad	Black,	Render	Unto	Caesar:	The	Life	and	Legacy	of	Maurice	Duplessis,	p.	399.	125	Behiels,	185-186.	
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					After	months	of	fierce	skirmishes,	St.	Laurent	delivered	a	particularly	tough	challenge	to	Duplessis	at	the	Quebec	Reform	Club	on	September	18,	1954.	But	the	Prime	Minister	knew	that	the	situation	was	untenable:	the	impasse	was	now	a	threat	to	national	unity.	St.	Laurent	had	to	find	a	gracious	exit.	The	two	men	met	
privately	at	Montreal’s	Windsor	Hotel	in	early	October	to	draft	the	outlines	of	a	compromise.	At	a	cabinet	meeting	in	January	1955,	the	Prime	Minister	argued	that	the	only	solution	to	the	standoff	was	to	make	an	offer	that	would	be	available	to	all	provinces.	As	the	Top	Secret	cabinet	records	reveal,	the	Prime	Minister	concluded:	“No	matter	how	far	the	Federal	government	went,	the	government	of	Quebec	would	not	be	satisfied…[but]	any	serious	Federal	proposal,	even	though	it	might	not	satisfy	Mr.	Duplessis,	would	at	least	show	the	people	of	Quebec	that	the	Federal	authorities	had	honestly	tried	hard	to	meet	their	point	of	view	and	had	sought	to	relieve,	at	least	in	part,	those	who	suffered	from	double	taxation.”126							Accordingly,	Ottawa	offered	to	reduce	its	income	tax	by	ten	per	cent	for	all	provinces	where	a	provincial	income	tax	was	levied	–	and	to	apply	that	move	retroactively	to	Quebec	for	1954.	On	January	19,	1955,	Duplessis	accepted	this	truce.	In	a	subsequent	telephone	call	with	St.	Laurent,	he	also	agreed	to	delete	the	assertion	of	provincial	priority	in	direct	taxation	from	the	provincial	income	tax	act.127	That	scuffle	“had	wider	significance.	For	the	first	time	since	the	war,	Ottawa	
																																																								126	Records	of	Cabinet	meeting,	January	11,	1955,	Top	Secret,	RG2,	Vol.	2657,	file	4	January	to	1	March,	1955.	p.	4.	127	Records	of	Cabinet	meeting,	January	25,	1955,	Top	Secret,	p.	5.	
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had	to	draw	back	and	temper	its	new	national	policy	[of	tax-rental	accords	and	abatements]	to	take	the	demands	of	a	province	into	account.”128								The	Australians	Laud	The	Centralist	Approach					St.	Laurent’s	initially	belligerent	response	to	the	tense	situation	with	Quebec	deeply	impressed	the	Australians,	particularly	High	Commissioner	Sir	Douglas	Copland,	who	was	an	academic	and	an	economic	analyst.	In	a	“confidential”	five-page	memorandum	to	Australia’s	External	Affairs	Minister	R.	G.	Casey,	Copland	outlined	the	standoff	over	jurisdictions.	Dubbing	this	personal	memorandum	as	“The	Measure	Of	The	Man,”	Copland	first	reviewed	St.	Laurent’s	career	as	well	as	the	political	situation	in	Quebec:	“In	all	federations	there	are	usually	one	or	more	units	who	find	it	difficult	to	fit	into	the	federal	structure.	This	is	probably	more	so	in	Canada	than	in	any	other	modern	federation,	because	the	Province	of	Quebec	is	jealous	of	its	French	origin,	its	language,	its	culture	and,	above	all,	its	religion…The	law	in	Australia	on	[taxation]	is	much	more	uncompromising	than	it	is	in	Canada.”129						Then	Copland	recounted	the	reputations	of	St.	Laurent	–	who	was	“the	most	distinguished	living	French	Canadian”	–	and	Duplessis	–	who	wanted	to	position	himself	as	“the	defender	of	the	faith,	the	upholder	of	French	culture	in	Canada,	the	
																																																								128	Linteau,	Durocher,	Robert,	Ricard,	Quebec	Since	1930.	p.	282.	129	“The	Measure	Of	The	Man:	Confidential”	with	covering	letter	dated	December	6,	1954,	Australian	High	Commissioner	Sir	Douglas	Copland	to	Australian	External	Affairs	Minister	R.	G.	Casey,	National	Archives	of	Australia:	Canada	–	Internal	–	General.	Series	number:	A1838,	Control	symbol:	229/1/1	PART	1,	Barcode:	1603769,	p.	2.	
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guardian	of	autonomy.”130	The	two	men	had	clashed	on	several	occasions	throughout	the	autumn,	Copland	reported,	but	it	was	St.	Laurent’s	defiant	speech	at	the	Quebec	Reform	Club	on	September	18	that	impressed	the	High	Commissioner.	“He	[St.	Laurent]	was	able	to	show…that,	above	all,	the	path	to	glory	was	to	drop	any	policies	that	would	divide	the	nation	into	a	minority	of	little	Canadians	and	a	majority	of	those	who	believed	in	the	expansion	of	Canada	as	one	nation.”131	The	Australian	did	not	grasp	the	importance	or	the	force	of	provincial	identity	in	Canada.								But	economist	Copland	was	also	a	source	for	Canada’s	files	on	Australia.	The	Bank	of	Canada	Archives	include	a	thirty-page	paper	on	post-1945	Australian	Economic	Policy	and	Economic	Development	that	the	High	Commissioner	delivered	to	the	American	Philosophical	Society	in	Philadelphia	in	1953.	He	surveyed	everything	from	national	income	to	wage	movements	to	Australia’s	administrative	structure.	His	prose	was	dense;	he	included	multiple	lists	of	statistics;	he	did	not	address	the	workings	of	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission.						But	when	he	outlined	the	development	of	social	policy	in	Australia,	he	added	a	fierce	observation:	such	programs	had	not	evolved	as	part	of	an	economic	strategy	–	nor	was	their	impact	on	the	economy	as	a	whole	taken	into	account.	“It	is	not	easy	to	do	this	in	a	unitary	state,”	he	added.	“[It	is]	still	more	difficult	in	a	federal	structure	where	governments	may	be	jealous	of	their	prerogatives	and	unduly	concerned	with																																																									130	“The	Measure	Of	The	Man:	Confidential”	with	covering	letter	dated	December	6,	1954,	Australian	High	Commissioner	Sir	Douglas	Copland	to	Australian	External	Affairs	Minister	R.	G.	Casey,	National	Archives	of	Australia:	Canada	–	Internal	–	General.	Series	number:	A1838,	Control	symbol:	229/1/1	PART	1,	Barcode:	1603769,	p.	2.	131	“Submission	To	The	Minister	Of	Finance	And	The	Minister	of	National	Revenue	regarding	Canada’s	Fiscal	Policy,	The	Income	Tax	Act,	and	the	Dominion	Succession	Duty	Act,	February	23,	1951,	p.	5.		
	 	 	 	 	413	
their	own	immediate	interests.”132	The	belated	wisdom	of	grasping	the	connection	between	economic	policies	and	social	programs	would	have	resonated	in	Canada.		
The	Tremblay	Report,	Quebec	and	Equalization					The	five-volume	Tremblay	Royal	Commission	report	on	federalism	brought	sociological	depth	to	Quebec’s	resistance.	More	importantly,	although	almost	overlooked	at	the	time,	it	singled	out	fiscal	inequality	as	a	huge	impediment	to	the	expansion	of	social	services	within	the	federation.	Tabled	in	1956,	it	espoused	a	complicated	plan:	All	provinces	should	take	over	the	taxation	of	revenues	earned	within	their	boundaries;	they	should	also	agree	to	redistribute	taxes	on	revenues	earned	from	inter-provincial	trade	to	the	poorer	provinces	such	as	Manitoba;	finally,	Ottawa	should	send	money	from	its	remaining	revenues	to	the	Maritime	Provinces	for	“social	equalization…to	assure	them	the	same	services	as	the	rest	of	the	country”	–	as	long	as	all	provinces	endorsed	the	transfer.133		The	report	did	not	grapple	with	the	difficult	problem	of	distinguishing	revenues	earned	from	trade	within	the	province	from	revenues	earned	from	trade	with	other	provinces.	But	it	did	grasp	the	idea	that	it	was	necessary	“to	assure	the	really	handicapped	provinces	of	social	services	in	conformity	with	the	minimum	standards	of	the	country	as	a	whole.”134						Significantly,	the	report	maintained	that	the	Constitution	“makes	no	provision	for	equalization	in	any	form…the	federal	government	claims	to	provide	therefor,	but																																																									132	Sir	Douglas	Copland,	“Economic	Policy	And	Economic	Development	In	Australia	From	1945:	A	Study	in	Economic	Administration,”	p.	8.	133	The	Tremblay	Report,	ed.	David	Kwavnick	(Toronto:	The	Carleton	Library,	McClelland	and	Stewart	Limited,	1973)	218.	134	The	Tremblay	Report,	ed.	David	Kwavnick,	p.	218.		
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this	is	through	an	interpretation	of	its	powers	which,	in	our	opinion,	is	inadmissible,	(the	‘unlimited’	taxing	power	and	the	‘absolute’	spending	power).	It	is	essential	that	this	situation	be	regularized.”135						In	effect,	the	Tremblay	report	called	for	a	system	of	equalization	payments	that	the	provinces	would	organize	–	and	Ottawa	could	administer.	Duplessis	was	able	to	set	aside	those	recommendations	with	the	excuse	that	Ottawa	had	responded	to	his	demands.	In	reality,	“its	conclusions	went	farther	than	he	had	wished,	especially	with	respect	to	the	province’s	assumption	of	social	programs	and	to	educational	reform.”136	But	the	report’s	statement	of	principles	would	become	an	operational	mantra.	As	it	proclaimed:	“By	reason	of	its	history,	as	well	as	of	the	cultural	character	of	its	population,	Quebec	is	not	a	province	like	the	others,	whatever	may	be	said	to	the	contrary.	It	speaks	in	the	name	of	one	of	the	two	ethnic	groups	which	founded	Confederation…It	is	the	only	one	able	to	represent	one	of	these	two	partners,	just	as	it	alone	may	determine	its	reasons	for	refusing	federal	largesse.”137								By	the	mid-1950s,	of	course,	Ottawa	was	moving	toward	unconditional	equalization	–	if	only	to	secure	the	federation’s	continued	existence	and	Quebec’s	continued	presence.	Such	payments	could	ensure	relative	fiscal	equality	among	the	provinces	without	federal	interference	in	provincial	affairs	–	or	the	need	to	sign	tax	rental	agreements.	Quebec’s	assertion	of	its	provincial	rights	as	a	founding	partner	
																																																								135	The	Tremblay	Report,	218.	136	Michael	Sarra-Bournet,	The	Dictionary	of	Canadian	Biography	http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/duplessis_maurice_le_noblet_18E.html		137	The	Tremblay	Report,	ed.	David	Kwavnick	(Toronto:	The	Carleton	Library,	McClelland	and	Stewart	Limited,	1973)	166.		
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of	the	original	compact	to	form	Canada	had	finally	grabbed	the	attention	of	the	Dominion	Government.			
The	Pressure	on	St.	Laurent	Mounts						But	Quebec’s	line	in	the	sand	was	not	the	only	prod	toward	relative	fiscal	equality	among	the	provinces.	Labour	unions	and	other	advocacy	groups	were	becoming	increasingly	impatient	with	Ottawa’s	slow-motion	response	to	their	needs.	On	March	27,	1952,	the	360,000-member	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour	asked	the	federal	cabinet	to	restore	price	controls,	impose	an	excess-profits	tax,	deal	with	unemployment	and	take	action	on	housing,	especially	where	there	was	the	“greatest	need”	for	low-rental	housing.138	Then	the	CCL	turned	to	the	lack	of	health	insurance:	“The	absence	of	health	insurance	is	the	biggest	gap	in	our	social	security	system.	It	is	high	time	it	was	filled.	Health	insurance	has	been	for	nearly	a	third	of	a	century	part	of	the	policy	of	the	party	now	in	power.”139	It	called	for	a	Parliamentary	inquiry	“leading	to	immediate	and	effective	action.”140	It	did	not	address	the	issue	of	fiscal	inequality:	how	would	the	poorer	provinces	pay	for	the	services?							A	year	later,	in	the	wake	of	the	1953-1954	budget,	the	CCL	remained	discontented:	the	Liberal	budget	had	cut	taxes	–	but	the	Liberals	had	refused	to	adopt	national	health	insurance	with	the	“excuse”	that	Canada	could	not	afford	it.141																																																									138	News	Release,	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour,	March	27,	1952.	LAC,	MG28,	Series	I-103,	Vol.	174,	File:	News	Releases	1952	174-3,	p.	2.	139	News	Release,	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour,	March	27,	1952.	LAC,	MG28,	Series	I-103,	Vol.	174,	File:	News	Releases	1952	174-3.	p.	3.	140	News	Release,	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour,	March	27,	1952.	141	News	Release,	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour,	February	20,	1953.	LAC,	MG	28,	Series	I-103,	Vol.	172,	File:	Circular	Letters	1953	172-90.	p.	1.	
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Once,	again,	the	CCL	put	the	onus	on	Ottawa	–	with	no	reference	to	provincial	fiscal	inequality.	But	the	message	was	clear.								Under	pressure	from	such	groups,	the	mood	in	Ottawa	was	becoming	edgier.	There	had	to	be	a	way	to	expand	social	programs	without	further	jeopardizing	the	federation	through	clumsy	bids	for	centralized	fiscal	control.	Canada	was	now	more	than	a	decade	behind	its	fellow	Dominion,	Australia,	in	terms	of	expanding	social	programs.	It	was	nowhere	near	the	1945	Green	Paper	goal	of	a	relatively	inclusive	social	safety	net.	Something	had	to	give.	There	had	to	be	a	mechanism	that	could	induce	the	richer	and	poorer	provinces	to	work	together	for	the	greater	good	of	all	Canadians.	Politicians	could	aspire.	Ordinary	Canadians	and	advocacy	groups	could	demand	expanded	social	programs..	But	it	was	difficult	to	adjust	the	mechanics	of	federalism	to	meet	the	expectations	of	the	mid-1950s.						Federal	politicians	found	themselves	under	increasing	pressure	from	middle-income	voters	who	dreamed	of	a	better	world.	The	decade	was	“hardly	a	stable	time	economically”	but	there	was	also	“considerable	economic	vibrancy.”142	By	the	mid-1950s,	despite	slowdowns	during	the	winter	of	1950	and	from	June	1953	to	September	1954,	most	Canadians	found	that	their	standard	of	living	was	gradually	improving:	suburban	housing	tracts	would	soon	make	“modern	technology	available	to	the	average	Canadian.”143	That,	in	turn,	would	lead	to	“the	broadening	of	a	
																																																								142	Robert	M.	Campbell,	Grand	Illusions:	The	Politics	of	the	Keynesian	Experience	in	
Canada,	1945-1975	(Peterborough,	On.:	broadview	press,	1987)	pps.	94,	93.	143	Robert	M.	Campbell,	Grand	Illusions:	The	Politics	of	the	Keynesian	Experience	in	
Canada,	1945-1975,	p.	93	and		Doug	Owram,	Born	At	The	Right	Time:	A	History	Of	The	
Baby	Boom	Generation	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1996)	p.	74.	
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standardized	North	American	middle-class	lifestyle.”144	But,	with	the	exception	of	the	extension	of	Old-Age	Security	and	the	per-capita	grants	to	post-secondary	institutions	for	program	improvements	in	the	early	1950s,	little	had	changed	for	so	many	Canadians	who	faced	serious	illness	or	dismal	poverty.							Labour	unions	could	rarely	control	their	members’	votes.	But	they	could	capture	the	zeitgeist.	In	early	November	1954,	the	CCL	called	for	the	creation	of	“an	industrial	pension	plan	which	would	provide	universal	pension	coverage	for	all	workers	through	a	fund	of	employer-employee	contributions	administered	by	the	government	with	pension	credits	accruing	regardless	of	the	changes	in	employment.”145								It	was	an	early	vision	of	the	Canada	Pension	Plan,	which	the	First	Ministers	would	eventually	establish	in	1966,	although	Quebec	would	create	a	parallel	Quebec	Pension	Plan.	A	few	days	later,	eleven	months	after	its	last	meeting	with	cabinet,	the	
CCL	reflected	the	mood	of	many	Canadians:	“The	case	[for	health	insurance]	is	stronger	still	after	yet	another	eleven	months’	further	delay…The	workers	of	Canada	are	becoming	weary	of	procrastination	and	excuses	on	this	subject,	the	more	so	since	the	drop	in	defence	expenditure	is	removing	one	of	the	chief	excuses	of	recent	years.”146		
																																																								144	Doug	Owram,	Born	At	The	Right	Time:	A	History	Of	The	Baby	Boom	Generation.					145	News	Release,	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour,	November	12,	1954.	LAC,	MG28,	Series	I-103,	Vol.	174,	File:	News	Releases	1953-1955	174-4.	p.	5.	146	The	Congress	Memorandum,	Submitted	to	the	Government	by	The	Canadian	Congress	of	Labour	on	November	12,	1954,	LAC,	MG28,	Series	l103,	Volume	282,	File:	Annual	Memorandum	to	Federal	Government	(Canadian	Congress	of	Labour)	1943-1955,	p.	8.	
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					Thirteen	months	later,	in	December	1955,	in	a	presentation	to	St.	Laurent	and	his	cabinet,	the	Trades	and	Labor	Congress	of	Canada	“urgently	requested	immediate	action	to	implement	a	nation-wide	health	insurance	scheme.”147	Interestingly,	the	TLC,	which	represented	600,000	affiliated	members,	also	urged	Ottawa	to	work	with	the	provinces	“to	produce	to	the	maximum	extent	possible	uniformity	of	economic	policy	throughout	Canada	and	uniformity	of	labor	and	social	legislation	with	a	view	to	reducing	regional	inequalities	of	wage	and	salary	rates,	hours	of	work,	social	security	benefits,	and	the	burden	of	taxation	on	the	lower	and	middle	income	groups.”148							The	TLC	added	that	the	delegates	at	its	annual	convention	had	called	for	health	insurance	“in	the	full	knowledge	of	the	constitutional	difficulties…a	nation-wide	health	insurance	scheme	should	be	government-subsidized,	contributory	and	cover	every	Canadian	citizen;	and	include	medical,	surgical,	dental	and	optical	care,	hospitalization,	provision	of	artificial	limbs	where	necessary,	psychiatric	treatment,	and	competently	supervised	mental	homes.”149	It	did	not	address	the	issue	of	fiscal	inequality	among	provincial	governments:	that	was	a	state-centred	insiders’	issue.						The	federation	was	seemingly	deadlocked.	While	Quebec	and	Ontario	epitomized	the	strength	of	provincial	rights,	advocacy	groups	and	other	provinces	were	pulling	in	the	other	direction	toward	expanded	social	security.																																																										147	Press	Release,	The	Trades	and	Labor	Congress	of	Canada,	December	14,	1955.	LAC,	MG28,	Series	I	103,	Volume	282,	File:	Annual	Memorandum	to	Cabinet,	1955	282-17.	p.1.	148	Press	Release,	The	Trades	and	Labor	Congress	of	Canada,	December	14,	1955.	LAC,	MG28,	Series	I	103,	Volume	282,	File:	Annual	Memorandum	to	Cabinet,	1955	282-17.	p.2.	My	italics.	149	Press	Release,	The	Trades	and	Labor	Congress	of	Canada,	December	14,	1955,	pps.	3-4.	
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St.	Laurent	Looks	For	Another	Way						By	1955,	federal	politicians	and	bureaucrats	knew	that	they	had	to	rethink	their	approach	to	the	renewal	of	the	tax	rental	agreements,	if	only	to	halt	Quebec’s	isolation.	In	his	later	book	on	those	agreements,	federal	bureaucrat	R.	M.	Burns	dated	the	official	birth	of	equalization	to	the	aftermath	of	St.	Laurent’s	tax	settlement	with	Quebec	in	January	1955.	In	a	pivotal	letter	to	the	other	premiers	after	that	pact,	on	January	14,	1955,	St.	Laurent	explained	that	Ottawa	was	not	wedded	to	the	principle	of	the	tax	rental	deals	“to	the	exclusion	of	any	better	alternative	arrangement	if	one	could	be	found.”150	But	Ottawa		had	no	intention	of	abandoning	the	objective	of	the	tax	rental	agreements	which	is	to	make	it	financially	possible	for	all	provinces,	whatever	their	tax	base,	to	perform	their	constitutional	functions	themselves	and	to	provide	a	reasonable	Canadian	level	of	
provincial	services	without	an	abnormal	burden	of	taxation.	That	is	the	foundation	of	the	policy	of	the	federal	government.151													After	quoting	St.	Laurent,	Burns	emphasized:	“This	was	the	first	official	acknowledgement	by	the	federal	government	of	its	adoption	of	equalization	as	a	basic	and	explicit	principle	of	its	fiscal	program,	as	distinct	from	the	rental	of	the	income	tax	fields,	since	its	acceptance	of	the	Rowell-Sirois	recommendations	in	1941.”152																																																										150	Letter	from	Louis	St.	Laurent	to	all	provincial	premiers	with	the	exception	of	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis,	January	14,	1955	as	quoted	in	R.	M.	Burns,	The	
Acceptable	Mean:	The	Tax	Rental	Agreements,	1941-1962.	(Toronto:	The	Canadian	Tax	Foundation,	1980).	pps.	111-112.	151	Letter	from	Louis	St.	Laurent	to	all	provincial	premiers	with	the	exception	of	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis,	as	quoted	in	R.	M.	Burns,	p.	111-112.	My	italics.		152	R.	M.	Burns,	The	Acceptable	Mean:	The	Tax	Rental	Agreements,	1941-1962.112.	
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				That	is	true.	There	had	been	adjustments	to	the	Maritime	Provinces’	subsidies	for	fiscal	need	in	the	1920s	and	1930s	in	the	name	of	generosity.	But	St.	Laurent’s	letter,	which	recognized	the	concept	of	fiscal	inequality	–	and	how	to	measure	it	in	terms	of	services	and	taxation	levels	–	was	also	an	explicit	recognition	of	ideas	that	the	federal	bureaucracy	had	quietly	mulled	since	1941,	whenever	the	tax	rental	agreements	came	up	for	renewal.						St.	Laurent	had	laid	out	the	principle	for	every	Premier	to	see.	Now	his	government	had	to	find	a	formula	that	would	meet	those	needs	–	and	win	the	acceptance	of	the	poorer	and	the	richer	provinces.	He	also	had	to	reassure	Premier	Duplessis	that	non-conditional	grants,	which	were	calculated	through	a	transparent	formula	and	which	had	no	application	forms,	would	protect	Quebec’s	provincial	rights.												A	subsequent	history	of	fiscal	events	during	1955	by	former	Privy	Council	Clerk	Robert	B.	Bryce	downgraded	the	influence	of	the	Rowell-Sirois	report	on	the	creation	of	equalization.	Bryce	conceded	that	the	report	“did	have	an	important	but	indirect	effect	in	leading	to	the	tax	rental	agreements.”	153	But	he	argued	that	the	report	and	its	proposals	for	National	Adjustment	Grants	did	not	“have	any	significant	influence	on	the	introduction	of	equalization	grants	in	1957.”154	Instead,	Bryce	asserted	that	in	1956,	St.	Laurent	simply	wanted	to	separate	the	“fiscal	need”	element	from	the	tax-rental	agreements:	this	was	“Prime	Minister	St.	Laurent’s	own																																																									153	Robert	B.	Bryce,	Maturing	in	Hard	Times:	Canada’s	Department	of	Finance	
through	the	Great	Depression.	(Kingston	and	Montreal:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	1986)	p.	218.	154	Robert	B.	Bryce,	Maturing	in	Hard	Times:	Canada’s	Department	of	Finance	
through	the	Great	Depression.	p.	218.	
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decision,	reached	after	lengthy	discussions	with	Finance,	and	it	reflected	his	view	that	the	inclusion	of	such	a	subsidy	in	the	tax	rental	agreements	was	seriously	unfair	to	Quebec…I	was	the	secretary	to	the	Cabinet	at	the	time	and	very	much	involved	in	the	discussions	on	the	subject.”155								I	dispute	his	assertion	that	the	proposal	for	National	Adjustment	Grants	did	not	have	“any	significant	influence”	on	the	introduction	of	equalization.	It	is	clear	that	the	Prime	Minister	wanted	to	be	closely	involved	in	every	step	in	the	introduction	of	equalization.	And	it	is	equally	clear	that	the	consideration	of	those	grant	proposals	were	an	important	part	of	the	introductory	process.	Top	Secret	cabinet	documents	indicate	that,	in	mid-March,	St.	Laurent	set	up	the	nucleus	of	a	cabinet	committee	to	work	with	an	interdepartmental	committee	of	bureaucrats	to	prepare	for	the	upcoming	federal-provincial	discussions.	Finance	Minister	Walter	Harris,	Justice	Minister	Stuart	Garson	and	St.	Laurent	himself	would	oversee	preparations	for	a	preliminary	meeting	in	early	April	with	provincial	representatives.156	And	cabinet	documents	throughout	the	ensuing	three-quarters	of	the	calendar	year	show	that	different	formulas	for	equalization	went	to	cabinet	regularly,	outlining	the	arithmetical	and	political	calculations	for	each	one.157	As	well,	in	the	lead-up	to	the	full	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	in	October	1955,	Finance	Ministry	bureaucrats	prepared	full	reports	on	equalization	in	Australia,	the	Rowell-Sirois	report’s																																																									155	Bryce,	Maturing	in	Hard	Times:	Canada’s	Department	of	Finance	through	the	Great	
Depression	p.	269.	156	Federal-provincial	Conference;	preparation,	records	of	Cabinet	meeting,	March	15,	1955,	Top	Secret,	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	2657,	File	8	March	to	May	1955	Copy	1.	p.	10.		157	Minutes	of	cabinet	meetings,	September	29	to	December	21	1955,	Top	Secret,	LAC,	RG2,	volume	2659,	File:	September	29	to	December	21	1955	Copy	1;	conclusions	of	cabinet	meetings,	January	3	to	March	1,	1956,	Top	Secret,	RG2;	Volume	5775’	File:	January	3	to	March	1,	1956.	
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proposed	National	Adjustment	Grants,	the	Ontario	proposal	for	sharing	to	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	of	1945-1946,	and	the	American	system	of	variable	grants.								I	maintain	that	Bryce	ignored	federal	history:	Louis	St.	Laurent	did	not	suddenly	decide	to	separate	the	special	grants	for	fiscal	need	from	the	tax-rental	agreements.	He	had	been	the	Francophone	Counsel	to	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations.	He	had	befriended	Joseph	Sirois,	and	convinced	him	to	join	the	commission.	He	had	endured	its	arduous	hearings.	He	had	asked	questions	of	the	witnesses.	And,	in	the	end,	he	had	convinced	Sirois	to	accept	all	of	the	commission’s	recommendations,	including	the	call	for	National	Adjustment	Grants.	Sirois	later	defended	the	report	with	the	argument	that	adequate	revenues	were	necessary	for	true	provincial	autonomy.	More	remarkably,	as	historian	Penny	Bryden	points	out,	the	federal	finance	official	who	espoused	equalization	in	1955	was	J.	J.	Deutsch,	who	had	been	the	assistant	research	director	and	then	the	research	director	for	the	Rowell-Sirois	Commission.158	(She	does	not	make	the	connection	with	Rowell-Sirois.)						As	well,	in	his	memoirs,	St.	Laurent’s	former	Clerk	of	the	Privy	Council	J.	W.	Pickersgill,	who	was	then	in	cabinet	but	still	involved	as	an	advisor	on	equalization,	maintained	that	the	Prime	Minister	worked	closely	with	Deutsch	on	the	introduction	and	development	of	equalization.	He	did	not	mention	Robert	Bryce	in	this	regard.	(Bryce	did,	however,	summarize	cabinet	discussions	of	the	varying	formulas.)																																																									158	P.	E.	Bryden,	“The	Obligations	of	Federalism:	Ontario	and	the	Origins	of	Equalization”	in	Framing	Canadian	Federalism:	Historical	Essays	in	Honour	of	John	T.	
Saywell,	Dimitry	Anastakis	and	P.	E.	Bryden,	eds.	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2009)	p.	81.	
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Equalization	is	a	thread	that	connects	Deutsch	and	St.	Laurent.	“It	was	Deutsch	who	convinced	me	that	the	new	approach	would	almost	certainly	end	the	dangerous	isolation	of	Quebec,	since	no	agreements	would	have	to	be	signed	and	no	tax	fields	would	have	to	be	rented	to	Ottawa,”	Pickersgill	wrote.159	He	added	that	St.	Laurent	liked	the	plan	“because	it	could	be	implemented	without	formal	agreements	with	any	provincial	government,	and	would,	therefore,	leave	the	federal	government	free	to	determine,	on	its	own,	how	great	the	equalization	payments	would	be.”	160						Significantly,	Pickersgill	added:	“The	opponents	of	the	new	plan	in	the	bureaucracy	objected	to	it	on	the	ground	that	all	the	provincial	governments	would	be	free	to	impose	any	taxes	they	liked	and	the	simplicity	and	the	convenience	of	having	a	single	personal	income	tax	all	over	Canada	might	disappear.”161	Those	“highly	competent	and	respected	senior	advisers”	provided	Finance	Minister	Walter	Harris	with	“conflicting	advice”	about	the	wisdom	of	equalization	–	until	St.	Laurent	“became	impatient	with	Harris.”162						As	a	final	recollection,	Pickersgill	added:	“It	was	characteristic	of	St.	Laurent’s	leadership	that	he	left	the	management	of	the	debate	on	equalization	entirely	to	Harris	and	did	not	himself	say	a	word	during	the	enactment	of	a	measure	for	which	
he	was	uniquely	responsible.”163	In	effect,	St.	Laurent	drove	this	process	–	and	Harris	came	around	to	supporting	it.																																																										159	J.	W.	Pickersgill,	My	Years	with	Louis	St.	Laurent:	A	Political	Memoir	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1975)	p.	309.	160	J.	W.	Pickersgill,	My	Years	with	Louis	St.	Laurent:	A	Political	Memoir.	p.	309.		161	J.	W.	Pickersgill,	My	Years	with	Louis	St.	Laurent:	A	Political	Memoir.	p.	309.	162	J.	W.	Pickersgill,	My	Years	with	Louis	St.	Laurent:	A	Political	Memoir.	pps.	309-310.	163	J.	W.	Pickersgill,	My	Years	with	Louis	St.	Laurent:	A	Political	Memoir.	p.	312.	My	italics.		
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				Perhaps	this	is	another	addition	to	the	historical	record.	The	cabinet	documents	back	my	assertion	of	the	Prime	Minister’s	involvement	–	and	his	deep	familiarity	with	the	approach	of	adjustment	grants.	St.	Laurent	had	accepted	the	principle	of	equalization	long	before	the	finance	ministry	went	to	work	on	the	mechanics	of	equalization	during	1955.	To	repeat:	As	the	Prime	Minister	told	the	Premiers	on	January	14,	1955,	Ottawa	would	enable	them	“to	provide	a	reasonable	Canadian	level	of	provincial	services	without	an	abnormal	burden	of	taxation.”164	And	then	he	chaired	the	pivotal	three-person	cabinet	committee	to	prepare	for	those	discussions.	The	model	of	Australia	along	with	the	Rowell-Sirois	discussions	figured	
heavily	in	the	Finance	Department’s	papers	for	the	politicians.	The	idea	was	there.	Indeed,	for	Louis	St.	Laurent,	it	had	been	there	for	more	than	fifteen	years.							But	Ottawa’s	tense	relationship	with	Quebec	ensured	that	it	could	not	use	the	approach	of	Australia’s	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	or	the	Rowell-Sirois	report:	it	could	not	use	expenditure	needs	as	a	basis	for	any	calculation.	As	Douglas	H.	Clark,	who	became	the	federal	expert	on	equalization	in	the	1970s	into	the	1990s,	later	explained,	that	approach	could	not	work	in	Canada:	Ottawa	had	“relatively	good	data”	on	revenue-raising	capacity	but	“much	weaker”	data	on	provincial	spending;	to	obtain	that	spending	data,	Ottawa	would	have	been	too	intrusive	–	and	the	consultative	process	might	have	broken	down;	unit	costs	across	the	provinces	differed	for	everything	from	public	service	salaries	to	capital	expenditures;	officials	could	not	decide	if	there	should	be	a	difference	between	so-called	controllable	costs																																																									164	Letter	from	Louis	St.	Laurent	to	all	provincial	premiers	with	the	exception	of	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis,	as	quoted	in	R.	M.	Burns,	p.	111-112.	164	R.	M.	Burns,	The	Acceptable	Mean:	The	Tax	Rental	Agreements,	1941-1962.112	
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and	uncontrollable	costs;	it	would	be	difficult	to	disentangle	other	federal	transfers	from	revenues	subject	to	equalization;	and	the	total	provincial	population	might	not	produce	“a	reasonable	result”	for	individual	expenditure	items.165										Over	the	next	ten	months,	the	cabinet	committee	and	federal	officials	would	refine	the	formula.	Equalization	would	end	Quebec’s	isolation	through	a	unilateral	transfer	that	would	require	no	provincial	agreement.	It	would	also	lessen	the	endless	hassles	with	the	other	nine	provinces	that	were	always	bargaining	for	higher	compensatory	grants	or	a	larger	share	of	the	personal	and	corporate	income	tax	collections	along	with	the	succession	duties.							Ottawa	was	wearing	down	from	the	constant	wheedling	discourses	about	poverty	and	pride		–	and	the	ever-present	danger	to	national	unity.	Once	St.	Laurent	enunciated	the	principle	in	mid-January	1955,	the	bureaucrats	got	to	work.	But	the	Prime	Minister	oversaw	the	discussions	through	his	cabinet	committee.	There	is	no	reference	to	Australia	within	the	terse	cabinet	records.	But	federal-provincial	fiscal	arrangements	with	their	possible	formulae	and	political	implications	went	to	cabinet	regularly.	St.	Laurent	had	understood	the	issues	since	the	late	1930s.						
The	Quest	for	Solutions	
			The	dilemma	was	pressing.	The	five-year	tax-rental	agreements	were	going	to	expire	in	1957.	How	could	Ottawa	possibly	compensate	poorer	provinces	that	refused	to	sign	the	deals?	How	could	it	ensure	that	Quebec	was	not	abandoned	in	an																																																									165	Douglas	H.	Clark,	“Canada’s	Equalization	Program:	In	Principle	and	in	Practice”	in	Equalization:	Its	Contribution	to	Canada’s	Economic	and	Fiscal	Progress	(Kingston,	On.:	John	Deutsch	Institute	For	The	Study	Of	Economic	Policy,	Queen’s	University,	1998)	pps.	104-105.	
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unequal	position	to	the	rest	of	the	provinces?	Although	the	officials	did	not	frame	the	question	in	this	fashion,	there	was	no	doubt	about	the	stakes:	how	could	they	keep	the	federation	together	when	the	price	of	fiscal	equality	among	the	provinces	apparently	remained	federal	control	of	cash	earmarked	for	the	provinces?							Throughout	the	summer	and	fall	of	1955,	the	federal	Finance	Ministry	churned	out	hundreds	of	pages	of	reports	on	how	to	cope	with	the	provinces’	unequal	fiscal	requirements	–	and	what	such	offers	to	the	poorer	provinces	could	mean	in	discussions	with	the	richer	provinces.	The	Ministry	effectively	created	a	mini-industry	devoted	to	federal-provincial	fiscal	relations.	In	a	Confidential	discussion	paper	in	late	June	1955	for	the	interdepartmental	committee	on	the	upcoming	October	Conference,	those	officials	noted	that	wealthy	Ontario	did	not	regard	the	tax-rental	deals	“as	a	sound	approach	[to	the	federation’s	fiscal	problems]…but	only	as	a	temporary	expedient.”166	Ottawa	would	have	to	raise	its	concessions	to	secure	the	province’s	consent	to	the	tax-rental	deals.							Other	provinces	would	then	demand	similar	concessions	or	abatements.	And	that	would	further	isolate	and	penalize	Quebec.	“Some	formula	designed	to	reduce	[Quebec’s]	penalty	might	have	to	be	found.”167	As	well,	the	tax-rental	approach	“tends	to	invite	some	provinces	to	become	fiscally	irresponsible:	when	they	need	more	revenues,	rather	than	trying	to	raise	them	through	taxation,	they	ask	the	
																																																								166	Federal-Provincial	Fiscal	Relations:	Some	Possible	Lines	of	Approach,	June	17,	1955,	Confidential,	LAC,	RG19,	Volume	3880,	File	5515-04	(55/2)-2.	p.	2.	167	Federal-Provincial	Fiscal	Relations:	Some	Possible	Lines	of	Approach,	June	17,	1955.		
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Federal	Government	to	increase	its	grants.”168	That	doubt	about	the	tax	rental	deals	–	including	the	worry	about	dependency	–	would	persist	into	the	autumn.								On	August	30,	R.	M.	Burns,	who	was	then	the	director	of	the	ministry’s	federal-provincial	relations	division,	summarized	Ottawa’s	dilemma	in	a	five-page	memorandum	entitled,	“Some	Problems	In	Application	Of	An	Equalization	Formula.”	As	he	saw	it,	“the	stone	over	which	the	agreements	have	stumbled	has	been	the	heavy	penalty	falling	on	Quebec	for	non-compliance	and	this	equalization	plan	has	the	very	considerable	merit	of	providing	a	possible	solution.”169	Burns	added	that	the	“outstanding	attraction”	of	equalization	grants	was	that	Premier	Duplessis	would	likely	accept	them	because	“they	would	be	unconditional	and	would	involve	no	form	of	agreement.”170								By	September	1955,	those	bureaucrats	were	playing	with	specific	models	for	grants	based	on	fiscal	inequality	that	would	be	separate	from	the	tax-rental	accords.	In	early	September,	Economic	Policy	Division	official	E.	A.	Oestreicher	assembled	a	32-page	package	on	Fiscal	Need	Grants	for	Deputy	Finance	Minister	K.	W.	Taylor.	That	included	nine	pages	on	the	Australian	experience,	reviewing	the	history	and	the	evolution	of	that	formula	–	“the	most	important	criticism	is	the	complexity	of	its	
																																																								168	Federal-Provincial	Fiscal	Relations:	Some	Possible	Lines	of	Approach,	June	17,	1955,	Confidential,	LAC,	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File	5515-04	(55/2)-2.	p.	3.	169	“Some	Problems	in	Application	Of	An	Equalization	Formula”	initialed	RMB,	August	30,	1955.	LAC:	Plenary	Conferences:	Conference	of	October	3,	1955	Agenda	–	Briefing	material,	RG	19,	Volume	3880,	File	5515-04	(55/2)	-2.	p.	1.	The	memo	runs	for	five	pages.	170	“Some	Problems	in	Application	Of	An	Equalization	Formula”	initialed	RMB,	August	30,	1955,	p.	2.	
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method.”171	Still,	Oestreicher	concluded,	the	Australian	public’s	acceptance	of	those	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	transfers	remained	strong.							Oestreicher	then	looked	at	other	models.	He	devoted	seven	pages	to	the	Rowell-Sirois	report,	concentrating	on	its	proposed	National	Adjustment	Grants,	which	would	link	the	size	of	the	grants	to	specific	spending.	He	concluded	that	this	approach	could	lead	to	a	difficult	spiral:	the	growth	in	national	income	would	spark	demands	for	expanded	government	services;	if	Ottawa	then	guaranteed	grants	linked	to	the	size	of	those	provincial	expenditures,	“there	could	come	about	a	growing	dependence	on	transfers	from	the	federal	government.”172	In	other	words,	provinces	would	spend	more	to	get	more	from	Ottawa.						He	also	looked	at	the	United	States	experience:	the	Americans	offered	conditional	federal	grants	“to	encourage	certain	types	of	expenditure	but	these	amounted	to	a	negligible	proportion	of	the	revenues	raised	by	the	states	themselves.”173	Still,	this	five-page	section	concluded	that	the	U.	S.	approach	“sometimes	results	in	a	distortion	of	[state]	services	in	favour	of	those	subsidized	by	the	federal	government.”174							Ottawa	knew	that	it	needed	to	achieve	relative	fiscal	equality	among	the	members	of	the	federation.	But,	as	the	opening	of	the	October	Dominion-Provincial	Conference	neared,	it	could	not	decide	whether	the	tax-rental	deals	were	even																																																									171	E.	A.	Oestreicher,	“Fiscal	Need	Grants,”	Department	of	Finance,	September	2,	1955.	LAC:	Plenary	Conferences:	Conference	of	October	3,	1955	Agenda	–	Briefing	material,	RG	19,	Volume	3880,	File	5515-04	(55/2)	-2.	p.	11.	The	Australian	portion	of	the	brief	runs	from	pps.	6-14.		172	E.	A.	Oestreicher,	“Canadian	Proposals	for	Fiscal	Need	Grants,”	p.	21.	The	section	on	Rowell-Sirois	is	seven-pages.	173	E.	A.	Oestreicher,	“Variable	Grants	in	the	United	States,”	p.	25.		174	E.	A.	Oestreicher,	“Variable	Grants	in	the	United	States,”	p.	27.	
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necessary	–	given	the	decision	to	provide	some	form	of	equalization	to	provinces	that	did	not	sign	the	deals.	As	Burns	related	in	a	remarkable	summary,	there	were	divisions	within	the	government	about	the	wisdom	of	pursuing	tax	rental	deals	for	another	five	years:			No	longer	was	there	over-riding	concern	with	central	fiscal	and	economic	controls	which	had	been	considered	so	vital	from	1941	on.	Whether	this	was	a	conscious	conversion	to	a	new	spirit	of	federalism,	a	response	to	Quebec	demands,	a	realistic	assessment	of	changing	provincial	and	public	attitudes,	a	reaction	to	the	political	hazards	of	Keynesian	management,	or	merely	an	unwillingness	to	continue	to	be	pushed	by	the	provinces	to	provide	more	revenue	at	federal	political	expense	is	not	determinable.	Undoubtedly	all	these	factors	influenced	different	people	at	different	times.	The	important	point	is	that	willingness	to	relinquish	
a	measure	of	control	existed,	even	though	it	was	not	unanimous….	The	basic	ground	rules	were	changing	and	the	ideas	that	were	sacrosanct	in	the	1941-52	period	were	no	longer	inviolable	in	1955-56.175							I	did	not	find	an	opinion	on	the	legality	of	equalization	in	any	Privy	Council	documents.	Actually,	I	did	not	expect	to	find	any:	this	was	a	unilateral	use	of	the	federal	spending	power,	which	has	never	itself	been	properly	tested	in	court.	In	1956,	when	St.	Laurent’s	government	passed	the	Federal-Provincial	Tax	Sharing	Arrangements	Act,	which	received	royal	assent	on	July	31,	he	and	his	officials	would	have	assumed	that	the	federal	law	provided	the	necessary	legal	consent	to	distribute	non-conditional	grants	to	the	provinces	based	upon	tax	revenues.	And	no	government	has	challenged	that	assumption	in	subsequent	decades.																																																												175	R.	M.	Burns,	The	Acceptable	Mean:	The	Tax	Rental	Agreements,	1941-1962.	p.122.	My	italics.	
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Social	Citizenship	Also	On	The	Table					Meanwhile,	federal	politicians	also	had	to	address	other	social	needs,	especially	health	insurance	and	assistance	for	those	unemployed	employables	who	were	not	eligible	for	Unemployment	Insurance	or	whose	benefits	had	expired.	The	Liberal	Government	had	first	made	those	promises	in	1945.	The	pressure	on	the	budgets	of	the	poorer	provinces	had	only	become	more	intense	since	then	as	the	demands	for	social	services	increased.	The	postwar	boom	could	not	raise	all	provincial	boats	–	and	inequality	could	be	treacherous	for	political	and	social	stability.						In	late	April	1955,	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	met	in	a	preliminary	gathering	to	consider	a	national	plan	for	health	insurance	–	now	that	the	four	provinces	of	Newfoundland,	Saskatchewan,	Alberta	and	British	Columbia	already	had	some	form	of	insurance.176	They	also	discussed	federal	contributions	toward	relief	for	Unemployed	Employables.	The	First	Ministers	concluded	that	it	would	be	“impractical	and	invidious”	to	separate	the	hard-core	unemployed,	one	by	one,	from	everyone	on	relief.	So	they	decided	to	consider	a	statistical	approach	to	remove	the	hard-core	unemployed	of	“say	1	or	1.5	or	2	percent	of	the	total	population”	from	the	list	of	those	eligible	for	federal	help.177					In	mid-June,	as	the	federal	equalization	discussions	proceeded,	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	agreed	on	the	outlines	of	a	deal	on	Unemployment	Assistance:	the	federal																																																									176	Canadian	Museum	of	History:	Making	Medicare:	The	History	of	Health	Care	in	Canada:		http://www.historymuseum.ca/cmc/exhibitions/hist/medicare/medic-4h10e.shtml	177	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	1955,	Preliminary	Meeting,	April	27,	1955	–	Afternoon	Session,	Confidential.	LAC.	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	October	3,	1955	Agenda	–	Briefing	Material,	RG	19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(55/2)-2.	p.		
	 	 	 	 	431	
government	would	pay	fifty	per	cent	of	the	costs	of	provincial	relief	whenever	the	number	of	people	on	relief	exceeded	0.45	per	cent	of	a	province’s	population.	This	excess	group	was	deemed	to	represent	the	unemployed	employables.178	It	is	noteworthy	that	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis	sent	Social	Welfare	Minister	Paul	Sauvé	to	this	Conference	–	and	St.	Laurent	was	delighted	with	his	“conscientious	thoughtfulness	for	the	public	welfare.”179						The	Unemployment	Assistance	Act	passed	on	July	11,	1956,	but	it	was	retroactive	to	July	1955	since	six	provinces	had	already	signed	agreements	with	Ottawa.180	Ontario	Premier	Leslie	Frost	refused	to	sign	the	deal,	contending	furiously	that	Ottawa	should	pay	fifty	per	cent	of	the	entire	relief	tab.181	The	new	Progressive	Conservative	government	would	remove	the	ceiling	in	December	1957	–	and	Ontario	would	join	the	agreement	on	January	1,	1958.182							In	mid-1959,	Quebec	signed	the	deal	–	and	its	participation	was	made	retroactive	to	1958.	“To	participate	in	this	plan,	Quebec	for	the	first	time	introduced	an																																																									178	John	E.	Osborne,	Special	Advisor	on	Policy,	Department	of	National	Health	and	Welfare,	The	Evolution	of	the	Canada	Assistance	Plan,	Appendix	to	the	Nielsen	Task	
Force	Report	on	the	Canada	Assistance	Plan,	1985,	ed.	federal	bureaucrat	Gilles	Seguin,	on	Canada	Social	Research	Links:	http://www.canadiansocialresearch.net/capjack.htm	179	Conrad	Black,	Render	Unto	Caesar:	The	Life	and	Legacy	of	Maurice	Duplessis.	(Toronto:	Key	Porter	Books,	1998)	p.	348.	180	Unpublished	thesis	of	Douglas	Weatherbee	Fowler,	The	Unemployment	Assistance	Act	(1956):	Its	Implications	for	Social	Security	and	Public	Welfare	Administration	in	Canada,	School	of	Social	Work,	University	of	British	Columbia.	Pps.	30,	33.	181	Unpublished	thesis	of	Douglas	Weatherbee	Fowler,	The	Unemployment	Assistance	Act	(1956):	Its	Implications	for	Social	Security	and	Public	Welfare	Administration	in	Canada,	School	of	Social	Work,	University	of	British	Columbia.	Pps.	36-37	and	James	Struthers,	The	Limits	of	Affluence:	Welfare	in	Ontario,	1920-
1970	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	Ontario	Historical	Studies	Series	for	the	Government	of	Ontario,	1994)	p.	175.		182	James	Struthers,	The	Limits	of	Affluence:	Welfare	in	Ontario,	1920-1970.	p.	178.	
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assistance	program	for	needy	persons	who	were	not	in	hospital,”	federal	bureaucrat	John	E.	Osborne	wrote.	“All	provinces	had	signed	agreements	by	1959.”183	This	federal	contribution	would	eventually	become	the	Canada	Assistance	Plan	of	1966,	which	would	contribute	to	the	cost	of	all	provincial	welfare	payments.							
The	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	October	1955						The	players	at	the	First	Ministers’	meeting	in	early	October	1955	understood	that	they	had	put	off	the	solution	to	provincial	inequality	–	and	therefore	restricted	social	security	–	for	far	too	long.	Using	the	state-centred	approach,	they	were	the	central	players	in	the	equalization	discourse.	Indeed,	there	were	virtually	no	other	lobbyists	for	such	arcane	transfers.	But,	despite	the	impatience	of	their	citizenry	and	the	threats	to	their	political	hegemony,	the	First	Ministers	had	to	settle	the	issue	of	equalization	before	they	could	expand	the	social	safety	net.									They	were	wrestling	with	questions	that	no	federation	could	settle	easily.	Equalization	was	a	necessary	nation-building	tool	for	a	modern	federation,	especially	for	one	with	such	divided	notions	of	identity.	But	what	was	the	satisfactory	level	for	equalization	payments	that	would	not	compromise	the	initiative	or	the	autonomy	of	the	provinces?	If	Ottawa	offered	too	little	money,	the	poorer	provinces	would	still	be	unable	to	expand	their	social	services.	They	might	even	proclaim	that	their	citizens	had	the	same	moral	right	to	expanded	social																																																									183	John	E.	Osborne,	Special	Advisor	on	Policy,	Department	of	National	Health	and	Welfare,	The	Evolution	of	the	Canada	Assistance	Plan,	Appendix	to	the	Nielsen	Task	
Force	Report	on	the	Canada	Assistance	Plan,	1985.	http://www.canadiansocialresearch.net/capjack.htm		
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services	as	the	residents	of	the	richer	provinces	–	and	the	federal	government	was	letting	them	down.	If	Ottawa	offered	too	much	money,	federal	politicians	and	officials	feared	that	the	cash	would	create	provincial	dependency	with	disastrous	results	for	the	province’s	economy	and	its	citizenry.	The	richer	provinces	might	rebel.	It	was	a	balancing	act.												The	proceedings	opened	on	a	sunny	Monday,	October	3,	and	ran	through	to	a	drizzly	Thursday,	October	6,	in	the	House	of	Commons	Chamber	in	Ottawa.	The	events	on	the	first	day	were	open;	the	next	three	days	were	closed.	But,	wherever	the	politicians	appeared,	they	demonstrated	the	ongoing	divide	between	provincial	loyalists,	who	wanted	to	preserve	their	fiscal	and	cultural	bailiwicks,	and	the	advocates	of	social	security,	who	wanted	Ottawa	to	continue	fiscal	centralization	to	redistribute	more	funds.	Those	were	very	clear-cut	differences.	As	politicians	who	operated	within	the	limits	of	a	federalist	democracy	with	a	capitalist	economy,	their	attitudes	toward	sharing	their	citizens’	tax	dollars	with	strangers	remained	strikingly	at	variance.							St.	Laurent	greeted	the	First	Ministers	with	conciliation	–	and	the	recognition	that	the	public	was	impatient	with	their	slow	progress	toward	expanded	social	security.	“Second	only	to	national	security	are	the	demands	of	social	security,	which	the	public	
expects	of	both	Canada	and	the	provinces	in	great	measure,”	he	declared.184																																																									184	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	Proceedings	Of	The	Federal-Provincial	Conference	1955,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955.	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	October	3	1955	Summary	Record	Of	Proceedings.	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(55/2)-3.	p.	8.	My	italics.		
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The	Prime	Minister	quoted	from	his	January	letter	to	the	Premiers,	which	explained	that	the	tax	rental	agreements	were	not	carved	in	stone.	What	he	had	enunciated	was	“the	principle	of	paying	an	element	of	fiscal	need	subsidies	to	provinces	with	lesser	tax	potential	than	others.”185						Ottawa	had	no	pre-determined	formula	to	address	fiscal	inequality	–	but	it	was	inclined	to	favour	payments	“determined	by	the	amounts	which	need	to	be	added	to	the	yield	of	a	set	of	standard	taxes	in	that	province	to	bring	the	revenue	per	capita	up	to	some	specified	level	defined	in	terms	of	what	all	provinces	or	certain	provinces	might	obtain	from	those	sources…We	think	that	some	plan	of	equalization	payments	…can	be	fitted	into	a	variety	of	different	possible	decisions.”186	He	went	on	to	point	out	that	one	province	(Quebec)	objected	to	the	tax	rental	deals	on	constitutional	grounds.	Others	thought	that	there	“should	be	a	more	explicit	recognition	of	fiscal	need.”187							The	bottom	line	was	clear:	Ottawa	wanted	“to	ensure	that	there	will	not	be	any	
first-class	or	any	second-class	kind	of	Canadian	citizen.”	188	That,	of	course,	remains	the	reasoning	behind	the	principle	of	equalization	today.						As	the	Premiers	spoke,	however,	the	fiscal	divide	among	the	provinces	–	and	their	differing	concepts	of	citizenship	and	identity	–	quickly	became	apparent.	Ontario																																																									185	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	Proceedings	of	the	Federal-Provincial	
Conference,	October	3,	1955.(Ottawa:	Edmond	Cloutier,	Queen’s	Printer	and	Controller	of	the	Stationery,	1955)	p.	15.	186	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	Proceedings	Of	The	Federal-Provincial	Conference	1955,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955,	pps.	16-17.	187	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	Proceedings	Of	The	Federal-Provincial	Conference	1955,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955,	p.	16.		188	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	Proceedings	Of	The	Federal-Provincial	Conference	1955,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955,	p.	20.	My	italics.		
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Premier	Leslie	Frost	summed	up	his	attitude	toward	the	expansion	of	social	security	in	the	poorer	provinces	with	lethal	tact:			We	do	not	question	the	desirability	of	the	Federal	government	paying	subsidies	to	provinces	which	need	them….but	the	amount	of	these	subsidies	should	be	determined	in	the	light	of	sound	principles.	While	giving	assistance	to	the	receiving	provinces	they	should	not	be	such	as	to	destroy	enterprise	and	productivity	in	the	province	from	which	the	revenue	is	taken.189									It	was	a	warning	that	the	principle	of	equalization	might	be	settled	–	but	the	
mechanics	would	always	remain	tricky.	Conservative	Frost	frequently	complained	that	Ontario	had	to	spend	more	money	on	infrastructure	than	most	provinces	to	make	money	from	economic	development.	Frost	did	expand	Ontario’s	public	services	such	as	its	highways,	schools	and	hospitals	throughout	the	1950s.	He	even	proposed	expanded	health	care	services,	including	hospital	insurance,	at	this	conference.	But	he	wanted	Ottawa,	the	province	and	the	patients	to	share	the	costs	of	the	provincially	administered	system:	there	should	be	hospital	user	fees	to	discourage	“unwarranted	demands,”	prevent	overcrowding,	and	encourage	patients	to	explore	lower-cost	options.190		
																																																								189	Ontario	Premier	Leslie	Frost,	Proceedings	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955.	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	October	3	1955	Summary	Record	Of	Proceedings.	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(55/2)-3.	p.	21	190	Appendix	D,	The	Ontario	Government’s	Submission,	attached	to	the	Proceedings	of	the	Dominion-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955,	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	October	3	1955	Summary	Record	Of	Proceedings.	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(55/2)-3.	pps.	104–117..		
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				Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis	did	not	share	his	colleagues’	desire	to	collaborate	with	Ottawa.	He	was	adamantly	opposed	to	the	tax-rental	deals:191	And	he	took	a	cynical	view	of	Ottawa’s	need	to	centralize	revenues.	At	an	in-camera	session	of	the	Conference	on	October	4,	1955,	he	pointed	out	that	the	temporary	tax-rental	agreements	appeared	to	have	become	permanent,	with	Ottawa’s	rationale	for	them	changing	from	wartime	needs	to	post-war	reconstruction	to	defence.	As	the	federal	summary	noted,	he	observed	with	asperity:	“It	was	clear	that	if	the	provinces	were	to	survive	they	must	have	breathing	space.”192					The	federation	seemed	endlessly	divergent.	New	Brunswick	Premier	Hugh	John	Flemming,	who	came	from	the	other	side	of	the	provincial	income	divide,	arrived	with	a	recipe	for	sharing.	He	submitted	a	“Proposed	Formula	For	Calculating	An	Adjustment	Grant	For	Provinces	That	Lack	Adequate	Taxable	Capacity	To	Finance	A	Reasonably	Adequate	Level	Of	Services.”193	Ottawa	would	bring	the	poorer	provinces,	including	New	Brunswick,	up	to	eighty-five	per	cent	of	the	per-capita	personal	income	of	Canada	for	the	preceding	three	years.	The	difference	between	New	Brunswick	and	Ontario,	let	alone	Quebec,	was	stark.		
																																																								191	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis,	Proceedings	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955.	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	October	3	1955	Summary	Record	Of	Proceedings,	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(55/2)-3.	p.	37.	192	Federal-Provincial	Conference	1955,	morning	in-camera	session	of	October	4,	1955,	Summary	of	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis,	In-Camera	Proceedings,	Confidential,	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	October	3	1955	Summary	Record	Of	Proceedings	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File	5515-04	(55/2)-3.	p.	2.	193	Appendix	E,	Province	of	New	Brunswick,	attached	to	the	Proceedings	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955,	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	October	3	1955	Summary	Record	Of	Proceedings	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(55/2)-3.	pps.117-128.	
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						Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas	seconded	New	Brunswick’s	plea	for	equality.	First	Ministers	had	an	obligation	to	decide	“what	adjustment	grants	or	equalization	payments	should	be	paid	to	the	less	favoured	provinces	to	permit	an	equitable	minimum	standard	of	government	services	across	Canada.”194	He	added:	“I	am	convinced	that	[the	majority	of	Canadians]	want	adequate	levels	of	education,	health	and	welfare	services	and	economic	development	in	all	parts	of	Canada.”195							Douglas	dismissed	St.	Laurent’s	plea	that	Ottawa	needed	to	earmark	large	amounts	of	money	for	defence:		The	so-called	‘cold	war’	is	more	than	a	contest	of	armaments;	it	is	also	a	conflict	of	ideas	and	a	struggle	for	the	mastery	of	men’s	minds.	In	that	kind	of	a	war	the	greatest	defence	which	this	country	or	any	other	country	can	have	is	a	happy	and	contented	people	who	enjoy	an	increasing	measure	of	protection	against	sickness,	unemployment	and	want.	To	postpone	the	achievement	of	the	objectives	is	to	deprive	this	country	of	its	greatest	defence,	namely,	a	people	who	have	a	stake	in	the	democratic	way	of	life.196								As	a	Keynesian,	Douglas	also	wanted	Ottawa	to	continue	the	tax-rental	deals	so	that	the	federal	government	would	have	money	to	intervene	in	the	economy	during	downturns:	“I	believe	that	the	majority	of	Canadians	subscribe	to	the	view	that	the	Federal	government	has	a	responsibility	for	maintaining	high	levels	of	employment																																																									194	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas,	Proceedings	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955.	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	October	3	1955	Summary	Record	Of	Proceedings,	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(55/2)-3.	p.	81.	195	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas,	Proceedings	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955.	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	October	3	1955	Summary	Record	Of	Proceedings,	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(55/2)-3.	p.	81.	196	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas,	Proceedings	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference	1955,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955.	LAC,	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File	5515-04	(55/2)-3.	p.	91.	
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and	income.”197	Douglas’s	did	not	understand	that	the	federation	could	no	longer	survive	such	fiscal	centralization.	Ottawa	would	renew	the	tax-rental	deals	for	one	more	term	with	those	provinces	that	wanted	to	participate		–	but	the	end	of	such	control	was	nigh.					There	was	one	last	grace	note.		After	more	than	six	years	in	Confederation,	Premier	Joseph	Smallwood	disavowed	any	declaration	of	dependence.	Newfoundlanders	would	“infinitely	prefer”	to	finance	their	essential	public	services	from	natural	resource	taxes	“rather	than	by	dependence	on	a	hand-out	from	the	benevolent	Federal	government	in	Ottawa.”198							After	four	days	of	difficult	but	polite	wrangling,	the	participants	emerged	with	a	vague	message.	Ottawa	had	proposed	“a	system	of	equalization	payments	to	be	made	unconditionally	by	the	Federal	government	to	those	provincial	governments	whose	tax	potential	in	the	fields	of	personal	income	taxes,	corporation	taxes	and	succession	duties	was	below	some	defined	level.”199	From	the	start,	unlike	the	Australian	system,	the	Canadian	payments	would	be	calculated	by	examining	the	provinces’	capacity	to	raise	revenues.	As	Queen’s	University	economist	Thomas																																																									197	Saskatchewan	Premier	T.	C.	Douglas,	Proceedings	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955.	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	October	3	1955	Summary	Record	Of	Proceedings,	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(55/2)-3.	p.	82.	198	Premier	Joseph	R.	Smallwood,	Proceedings	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955.	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	October	3	1955	Summary	Record	Of	Proceedings,	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(55/2)-3.	p.	98.	199	Press	Co3.mmuniqué,	October	6,	1955,	Appendix	F,	Proceedings	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955.	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	October	3	1955	Summary	Record	Of	Proceedings	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(55/2)-3.	p.	127-128.	
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Courchene	points	out,	“The	[Australian]	CGC	model	equalizes	for	both	‘revenue	means’	and	‘expenditure	needs,’	whereas	the	Canadian	model	is	limited	to	ensuring	that	all	provinces	have	access	to	some	‘standard	level’	of	per	capita	revenues.”200							There	were	several	reasons	for	this	approach.	In	1968,	Ottawa	equalization	expert	Douglas	Clark,	who	was	the	best	of	his	bureaucratic	generation	on	this	topic,	wrote	a	37-page	memorandum	on	the	difference	between	fiscal	need	and	revenue	equalization	for	his	political	masters.		There	is	no	question	whatever	that	the	concept	of	fiscal	need	is	superior	to	the	concept	of	revenue	equalization	grants.	However,	while	a	great	deal	of	progress	has	been	made	in	our	ability	to	compare	the	revenue-raising	capacities	of	co-ordinate	governments,	very	little	progress	has	been	made	in	our	ability	to	make	intergovernmental	comparisons	concerning	the	costs	and	needs	for	public	expenditures.201											Forty	years	later,	University	of	Alberta	economist	Bev	Dahlby	also	maintained	that	Canada	avoided	Australia’s	system	because	it	was	difficult	to	define	need.	As	well,	Ottawa	wanted	“to	limit	federal	interference	in	areas	of	provincial	jurisdiction.”202	Perhaps	most	importantly,	Dahlby	asserted	that	Ottawa	was	concerned	about	“the	potential	distortions	in	provincial	policies	that	might	arise	if	the	needs	components	
																																																								200	Thomas	J.	Courchene,	“Subnational	Budgetary	and	Stabilization	Policies	in	Canada	and	Australia”	in	Fiscal	Institutions	and	Fiscal	Performance.	(Cambridge,	Massachusetts:	National	Bureau	of	Economic	Research,	Inc.,	1999)	pps.	312-313.			201	Douglas	H.	Clark,	“The	Concept	And	Calculation	Of	Fiscal	Need	And	Revenue	Equalization	Grants	With	Specific	Reference	To	Canada,	Ottawa,	February	1968,”	LAC,	Federal-Provincial	Relations	Division:	equalization	fiscal	needs,	RG	19,	Volume	5512,	File	5628-	04	PT	1,	p.	3.	202	Douglas	H.	Clark,	“The	Concept	And	Calculation	Of	Fiscal	Need	And	Revenue	Equalization	Grants	With	Specific	Reference	To	Canada,	Ottawa,	February	1968.”	
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could	be	affected	by	provincial	policies.”203	In	effect,	the	federal	government	feared	that	Canadian	provinces	could	game	the	system,	exaggerating	their	needs	to	pocket	more	funds.									Ottawa	made	a	self-interested	choice	when	it	decided	to	base	equalization	on	the	revenues	that	the	provinces	could	theoretically	collect	–	as	opposed	to	the	money	
that	they	were	spending.	It	certainly	appeared	to	be	simpler.	That	was	then.	Saskatchewan	Premier	Douglas	would	soon	ask	that	Ottawa	include	petroleum	and	natural	gas	revenues	in	the	formula	calculation.204	The	provincial	lobbying	over	the	make-up	of	the	formula	would	start	again.	(It	continues	to	the	present	day!)				The	Formula						Four	weeks	after	the	Conference	adjourned,	a	senior	federal	official	–	who	seems	to	have	been	R.	M.	Burns	–	drafted	tough	summaries	of	the	provinces’	positions.	He	viewed	Ontario	with	some	derision	as	a	poor-little-rich-regime:	“The	basic	theme	emphasized	by	Ontario	throughout	the	meeting	was	the	costs	of	development	and	of	increasing	population…While	not	opposing	equalization	as	a	principle	or	method,	Ontario	seemed	to	feel	that	the	Federal	adoption	of	the	idea	had	gone	too	far.”205	That	was	a	protest	that	would	resound	across	the	decades	–	until	Ontario	needed	equalization,	too.																																																									203	Bev	Dahlby,	“Fiscal	Equalization:	Country	Experiences:	The	Canadian	Federal-Provincial	Fiscal	Equalization	System,”	CESifo	DICE,	Report	1,	2008,	p.	4.	204	R.	M.	Burns,	The	Acceptable	Mean:	The	Tax	Rental	Agreements,	1941-1962.,	p.	155.	205	Summary	of	Provincial	Viewpoints	on	Fiscal	Matters	as	Expressed	at	‘In	Camera”	Session,	Proceedings	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955.	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	October	3	1955	Summary	Record	Of	Proceedings,	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(55/2)-3.	p.	1.	The	initials	“RMB”	and	the	date	“3	11	55”	are	at	the	bottom	of	this	document.	
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						When	Burns	turned	to	Quebec,	he	was	smug.	To	Ottawa’s	satisfaction,	Duplessis	was	restrained	on	the	topic	of	the	provincial	right	to	tax,	and	“the	impression	was	left	that	there	would	be	no	basic	objection	in	principle	to	the	equalization	formula.”	But,	Burns	added,	Duplessis	“did	not	seem	prepared	to	recognize	or	accept	the	fact	that	on	a	basis	of	personal	income	per	capita	or	tax	collection	per	capita,	Quebec	was	below	the	national	average	of	provinces.”206	Quebec	would	receive	equalization.								Manitoba	wanted	to	retain	the	tax-rental	deals,	but	it	wanted	its	per-capita	payments	to	be	higher.	The	province	emphasized	“the	heavy	demands	for	provincial	and	municipal	expenditure	in	the	fields	of	health,	welfare,	education	and	highways….	[along	with]	a	belief	that	the	long-term	interests	of	the	economy	were	best	served	by	some	form	of	central	control	of	tax	policy.”207		But	Manitoba	also	proposed	“supplementary	fiscal	need	payments	where	these	were	necessary.”208	That	is,	Manitoba	wanted	the	assurance	of	access	to	equalization	when	needed	on	top	of	the	tax-rental	compensatory	grants.					Saskatchewan	Premier	Douglas	agreed	with	Manitoba:	he	wanted	to	retain	the	tax-rental	deals,	basing	the	rental	arrangements	“on	equalization	to	the	highest	
																																																								206	Summary	Of	Provincial	Viewpoints	On	Fiscal	Matters	As	Expressed	at	‘In	Camera”	Session,	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	October	1955.	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	October	3	1955	Summary	Record	Of	Proceedings,	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(55/2)-3.	p.	2.		207	Summary	of	Provincial	Viewpoints	on	Fiscal	Matters	as	Expressed	at	‘In	Camera”	Session,	Proceedings	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955.	LAC,	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(55/2)-3.	p.4.	My	italics.		208	Summary	of	Provincial	Viewpoints	on	Fiscal	Matters	as	Expressed	at	‘In	Camera”	Session,	Proceedings	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955,	p.	3.	
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provinces	with	growth	provisions.”209	He	agreed	with	equalization	payments,	and	with	tax-abatements	for	the	provinces	that	would	not	sign	the	rental	deals.	But	he	
would	penalize	any	dissident	provinces	by	withholding	any	supplementary	or	
equalization	payments.						Douglas	still	did	not	“get”	the	depth	of	Quebec	objections	to	the	tax-deals	–	nor	did	he	understand	the	danger	to	national	unity	that	Quebec’s	continued	isolation	could	create.	Instead,	rather	remarkably,	he	wanted	Ottawa	to	create	“an	incentive”	for	those	who	signed	the	deals	as	a	“tangible	reward	in	compensation.”210	As	Burns	wrote,	Douglas	rattled	federal	officials	with	his	inference	that	only	provinces	that	signed	the	tax-rental	deals	should	get	aid	for	fiscal	need,	“a	bias	the	Government	of	Canada	had	been	trying	to	avoid	in	the	new	approach.”211							In	the	end,	Burns	was	upbeat.	“Aside	from	Quebec	which	maintained	its	position	on	provincial	fiscal	autonomy,	there	was	surprisingly	little	emphasis	on	the	desirability	of	provinces	being	responsible	for	raising	their	own	revenues….	Equalization	as	an	idea	on	principle	seemed	to	get	fairly	general	acceptance	whether	as	a	basis	for	payment	under	[tax-rental]	agreements	or	otherwise.”212	There	were	caveats.	Ontario	and	British	Columbia	felt	the	idea	“could	be	carried	too	far”;	New																																																									209	Summary	of	Provincial	Viewpoints	on	Fiscal	Matters	as	Expressed	at	‘In	Camera”	Session,	Proceedings	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955,	p.	5.	210	Summary	of	Provincial	Viewpoints	on	Fiscal	Matters	as	Expressed	at	‘In	Camera”	Session,	Proceedings	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955,	p.	5.	211	R.	M.	Burns,	The	Acceptable	Mean:	The	Tax	Rental	Agreements,	1941-1962.	(Toronto:	The	Canadian	Tax	Foundation,	1980)	p.	148.	212	Summary	of	Provincial	Viewpoints	on	Fiscal	Matters	as	Expressed	at	‘In	Camera”	Session,	Proceedings	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955.	LAC,	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(55/2)-3.	p.	6.	
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Brunswick	and	Manitoba	wanted	to	extend	the	compensation	to	cover	other	tax	fields.213	A	cynic	might	say	that	it	was	business	as	usual	within	the	fractious	federation.	A	deal	seemed	possible.					But	the	details	of	any	tax-rental	agreements	or	an	equalization	formula	were	far	from	settled.	Burns	raised	twelve	major	theoretical	issues	–	and	suggested	that	Ottawa	start	bilateral	behind-the-scenes	talks	with	individual	provinces	to	thrash	out	the	host	of	problems.							The	federal	cabinet	mulled	its	options.	Federal	ministers	thought	that	Quebec	“might	accept	a	tax	equalization	payment.”214	That	is,	it	might	accept	an	unconditional	transfer.	But,	they	concluded,	any	attempt	to	combine	equalization	with	a	special	grant	based	on	fiscal	need	for	Quebec,	which	the	tax-rental	deals	provided	to	other	provinces,	would	simply	“aggravate”	the	tensions	–	if	only	because	“it	would	be	said	that	by	offering	this	added	grant,	the	federal	authorities	recognized	they	had	taxed	more	than	they	should	in	the	three	main	fields.”215								A	week	later,	the	cabinet	wrestled	with	the	mechanics	of	an	equalization	formula:	How	could	they	explain	the	needs	of	strangers	–	let	alone	their	moral	rights	–	to	their	fellow	Canadians?	What	would	happen	if	they	based	their	calculations	on	the	per-capita	average	collections	in	the	five	wealthier	provinces	“to	keep	the	
																																																								213	Summary	of	Provincial	Viewpoints	on	Fiscal	Matters	as	Expressed	at	‘In	Camera”	Session,	Proceedings	of	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	Ottawa,	October	3,	1955.,	p.	6.	214	Summary	of	Cabinet	Proceedings,	December	7,	1955,	Top	Secret,	LAC,	December	RG2,	Vol.	2659,	File:	29	September	to	21	December	1955,	p.	24.	215	Summary	of	Cabinet	Proceedings,	December	7,	1955,	Top	Secret,	LAC,	December	RG2,	Vol.	2659,	File:	29	September	to	21	December	1955,	p.	25.	
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equalization	grants	as	low	as	possible?”216	The	use	of	the	two	wealthier	provinces	of	Ontario	and	British	Columbia	as	a	base	would	mean	higher	equalization	payments:	how	would	the	richer	provinces	and	the	West	accept	a	formula	that	delivered	$40-million	to	Quebec	“if	that	was	justified?”217	The	cabinet	decided	to	take	a	chance	on	the	simpler	formula,	using	only	two	provinces	as	the	basis	for	their	calculations,	concluding	that	no	provincial	government	would	offer	much	objection	to	the	higher	level	of	generosity:	Public	opinion	had	to	be	considered	and	the	first	impression	was	the	one	that	mattered	most.	On	balance	it	would	be	preferable	to	make	an	offer	now	which	would	be	close	to	the	final	terms	of	any	agreement	which	might	be	reached…	The	advantages	of	trying	to	keep	this	[equalization]	grant	[of	$40-million	to	Quebec]	a	little	below	that	figure	by	averaging	to	the	top	half	[of	the	provinces]	were	far	outweighed	by	the	disadvantages	of	adopting	a	formula	
which	would	be	inexplicable.218										Ottawa	stuck	to	that	decision.	In	early	January	1956,	St.	Laurent	consulted	with	his	colleagues	about	a	draft	letter	to	the	Premiers,	outlining	an	equalization	formula	that	would	be	based	upon	the	average	per-capita	take	from	those	three	taxes	in	the	two	wealthiest	provinces.	His	“Confidential”	letter	outlined	the	formal	proposal	for	equalization	that	he	had	presented	at	the	October	1955	Conference:	Ottawa	would	make	“unconditional	tax	equalization	payments”	to	bring	the	per-capita	yield	of	key	
																																																								216	Summary	of	Cabinet	Proceedings,	December	14,	1955,	Top	Secret,	LAC,	December	RG2,	Vol.	2659,	File:	29	September	to	21	December	1955,	p.	14.	217	Summary	of	Cabinet	Proceedings,	December	14,	1955.		218	Summary	of	Cabinet	Proceedings,	December	14,	1955,	Top	Secret,	LAC,	December	RG2,	Vol.	2659,	File:	29	September	to	21	December	1955,	p.	14,	15.	My	italics.	
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taxes	“up	to	the	level	of	the	average	per	capita	yield	of	these	taxes”	in	the	two	wealthiest	provinces,	which	were	then	Ontario	and	British	Columbia.219							If	a	province	opted	to	continue	with	the	tax-rental	scheme,	it	would	receive	increased	grants,	which	would	“guarantee	a	measure	of	stability	in	this	sector.”220	The	Cabinet	would	later	spell	out	that	“a	tax	rental	agreement	was	not	a	required	feature”	of	equalization	payments.221	That	is,	provinces	that	did	not	sign	the	final	round	of	tax-rental	deals	would	also	receive	equalization.	On	February	15,	after	a	lengthy	cabinet	discussion,	St.	Laurent	and	his	colleagues	agreed	to	send	a	revised	version	of	that	letter	to	the	Premiers,	making	it	clear	that	Ottawa	“was	not	in	a	position	to	make	any	further	commitments	or	to	accept	another	concept	of	fiscal	need.”222						Almost	forgotten	now,	this	undertaking	was	then	regarded	as	pivotal	to	St.	Laurent’s	career.	As	Pickersgill	noted	in	his	memoirs:	“St.	Laurent	regarded	the	settlement	of	the	tax-sharing	problem	between	the	federal	and	provincial	authorities	as	more	essential	to	the	continued	unity	and	growth	of	Canada	than	the	construction	of	the	[Trans	Canada]	pipeline…[Equalization	was]	a	measure	for	which	he	[St.	Laurent]	was	uniquely	responsible.”223	The	federal	government	had	finally	found	a	non-intrusive	way	to	solve	the	fiscal	inequality	among	the	provinces																																																									219	“Letter	To	Provincial	Premiers”	from	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	January	6,	1956.	Confidential.	LAC,	MG	28,	Series	I103,	Volume	171,	File:	D-60	1956-1957	Drafts	-	(Privy	Council	Office)	–	Official	Correspondence.	p.	2.	220	“Letter	To	Provincial	Premiers”	from	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	January	6,	1956,	p.	4.	221	Summary	of	Cabinet	Proceedings,	May	30,	1956,”	LAC,	RG	2,	Volume	5775,	File:	14	May	1956	to	7	August	1956,	p.	3.	222	Summary	of	Cabinet	Proceedings,	February	15,	1956,	Top	Secret,	LAC,	RG	2,	Vol.	5775,	File	Cabinet	Conclusions	January.	03	–	March	1,	1956,	p.	3.	223	J.	W.	Pickersgill,	My	Years	with	Louis	St.	Laurent:	A	Political	Memoir.	pps.	310,	312.	
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–	and	thus	provide	the	ability	to	expand	social	security	–	that	had	impeded	the	expansion	of	social	programs	for	years.	Politicians	could	now	rely	on	a	supposedly	neutral	formula	to	determine	their	needs.							A	follow-up	First	Ministers’	Conference	on	March	9,	1956	sealed	the	deal	–	despite	the	objections	of	key	provinces.	Finance	Minister	Harris	pointedly	observed	that	there	“seems	to	have	been	a	general	acceptance	of	the	principle	of	equalization.”224	But,	he	added	dourly,	the	poorer	provinces	wanted	higher	equalization	or	fiscal	need	grants	while	the	richer	provinces	wanted	more	room	to	raise	their	own	taxes	to	fulfill	their	responsibilities.	“The	federal	government	is	squeezed	between	these	conflicting	views,”	he	lamented.225		In	response,	Ottawa	had	devised	a	compromise	that	would	meet	“the	needs	of	those	provinces	which	have	been	having	difficulty	in	providing	standards	of	service	which	modern	societies	consider	to	be	essential”	–	while	preserving	“the	national	interests	of	our	peoples.”226	There	would	be	no	extra	federal	cash.						The	Premiers	had	not	changed	their	stances.	Perhaps	the	most	outspoken	against	the	equalization	formula	was	Ontario	Premier	Frost,	who	remained	indignant	about	the	size	of	the	transfers	to	the	poorer	provinces:			[I]t	costs	money	to	earn	money…We	simply	cannot	afford	many	of	the	services	the	other	provinces	now	have.	Because	of	our	great	credit	requirements,	for	we	are	borrowing	hundreds	of	millions	of																																																									224	Formal	statement	of	Finance	Minister	Walter	Harris	to	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	March	9,	1956.	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	March	9,	1956.	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(56/1)-4,	p.	8.	225	Formal	statement	of	Finance	Minister	Walter	Harris	to	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	March	9,	1956.	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	March	9,	1956.	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(56/1)-4,	p.	8.	226	Formal	statement	of	Finance	Minister	Walter	Harris	to	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	March	9,	1956,	p.	10.	
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dollars	for	public	investment,	a	balanced	budget	on	ordinary	account	is	a	necessity.	We	are	only	achieving	such	a	balanced	budget	now	at	the	expense	of	very	essential	services.227							After	the	in-camera	sessions,	he	delivered	a	terrible	public	verdict:	“They	were	wrong	in	1945,	they	were	wrong	in	1952,	and	they	are	wrong	today.	And	they	will	find	out	how	wrong	they	are	in	about	five	years	when	they	come	face	to	face	with	the	realization	that	today’s	lack	of	foresight	will	bring	this	country	to	the	brink	of	economic	disaster.”228	(Frost	was	citing	the	dates	that	tax-rental	agreements	were	signed.)	St.	Laurent	could	never	convince	Frost	to	change	his	mind	about	the	limits	of	generosity	–	because	the	Premier	wanted	his	taxpayers’	funds	for	his	government.	But	then	St.	Laurent	did	not	need	Frost’s	consent	to	send	cheques	from	the	federal	government	to	the	poorer	provinces.	Still,	the	Prime	Minister	would	rue	his	failure	to	pacify	Frost	when	fiscal	issues	figured	in	the	1957	election.									Indeed,	Frost	would	turn	his	quest	for	a	higher	percentage	of	the	personal	income	taxes	into	an	issue	in	Ontario	during	the	June	1957	federal	election.	As	historian	P.	E.	Bryden	points	out,	Frost	shrewdly	coupled	his	demands	for	Ontario	with	the	stipulation	that	the	“chronically	poor”	Atlantic	provinces	should	also	get	an	extra	adjustment	grant,	“which	softened	the	overt	tax-grab	component”	of	his	plan.229	“So	effective	was	Frost	at	driving	home	his	twin	messages	–	more	tax	room																																																									227	Formal	Statement	of	Ontario	Premier	Leslie	Frost	to	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	March	9,	1956.	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	March	9,	1956,	RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(56/1)-4,	pps.	3	and	7.	228	“Ottawa	Ends	Tax	Talks,	$640,000,000	Limit,	Harris	Tells	Provinces”	in	The	Globe	and	Mail,	Saturday,	March	10,	1956.	p.	1.	229	P.	E.	Bryden,	“The	Obligations	of	Federalism”	in	Framing	Canadian	Federalism,	eds.	Dimitry	Anastakis	and	P.	E.	Bryden,	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2009)	pps.	86,	87.			
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for	the	wealthier	provinces,	equalization	grants	for	the	poorer	provinces	–	that	fiscal	concerns	became	identified	as	a	key	battlefield	in	the	federal	election,”	notes	Bryden.230	When	Frost	introduced	Conservative	leader	John	Diefenbaker	at	a	Toronto	rally,	the	Premier	declared:	“It	is	not	a	matter	of	the	Federal	Government	giving	Ontario	or	the	Provinces	anything.	That	is	the	patronizing	attitude	in	Ottawa.	All	that	we	ask	is	a	reasonable	part	of	our	own.”231	It	would	be	electoral	dynamite	–	and	St.	Laurent	would	lose	the	election	partly	for	that	reason.						At	the	Conference,	however,	New	Brunswick	Premier	Hugh	John	Flemming	countered	Frost’s	assertions	with	a	firm	endorsement	of	the	principle	of	equalization:		
Our	people	are	citizens	of	Canada	and	they	expect	and	deserve	to	be	considered	and	treated	as	such.	They	expect	Canadian	standards	of	health	services;	they	expect	Canadian	standards	of	educational	services;	they	expect	roads	built	to	Canadian	standards;	and	they	expect	a	way	of	life	which	is	not	too	dissimilar	from	the	way	of	life	enjoyed	by	Canadians	in	other	provinces.232								That	was	an	avowal	of	equitable	social	citizenship	within	the	nation-state.	Saskatchewan	Premier	Douglas	did	not	provide	a	formal	public	statement,	perhaps	understanding	that	equalization	would	go	to	the	“Have	Not”	provinces	such	as	Quebec	that	did	not	sign	the	tax	rental	deals	–	no	matter	what	he	urged.							The	Conference	concluded	after	five	hours	and	fifteen	minutes	–	without	an	agreement.	It	was	business	as	usual	within	the	federation.	But	the	federal	Liberals	decided	to	push	through	the	enabling	legislation	anyway:	they	did	not	need																																																									230	P.	E.	Bryden,	“The	Obligations	of	Federalism”.	p.	87.	231	P.	E.	Bryden,	“The	Obligations	of	Federalism”.	p.	87.	232	Formal	statement	of	New	Brunswick	Premier	Hugh	John	Flemming	to	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference,	March	9,	1956.	LAC,	Plenary	Conferences	Conference	of	March	9,	1956RG19,	Vol.	3880,	File:	5515-04	(56/1)-4,	p.	17.		
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provincial	agreement	to	send	non-conditional	grants.	Provinces	could	opt	for	tax-rental	deals	through	one-on-one	deals.	Non-conditional	equalization	required	no	consensus.	And	there	was	none.			
The	Enabling	Legislation											Although	St.	Laurent	had	been	intimately	involved	in	the	design	of	equalization,	he	left	its	Parliamentary	passage	to	Finance	Minister	Harris	–	even	though	he	had	been	impatient	with	his	minister’s	failure	to	immediately	grasp	the	value	of	the	proposal.233	The	bill	authorizing	the	new	tax-rental	and	equalization	arrangements	was	tabled	in	Parliament	in	July	1956.	Harris	estimated	that	equalization	would	cost	$155-million	in	the	1957-1958	fiscal	year	–	and	the	entire	deal	would	cost	$653-million.	That	was	more	than	twenty	per	cent	higher	than	the	amount	that	would	have	been	sent	to	all	provinces	if	the	tax	rental	deals	had	simply	been	renewed.	The	legislation	passed	without	amendment,	“and	became	the	Federal-Provincial	Tax	Sharing	Arrangements	Act,	receiving	royal	assent	on	July	31,	1956.”234								Equalization	would	start	on	April	1,	1957.	As	tax	expert	J.	Harvey	Perry	later	remarked:	“Equalization	was	to	be	an	answer	to	the	argument	of	the	non-agreeing	provinces,	principally	Quebec,	that	the	alternative	between	autonomous	taxation	and	a	deal	with	the	federal	government	was	biased	financially	in	favour	of	the	
																																																								233	J.	W.	Pickersgill,	My	Years	with	Louis	St.	Laurent:	A	Political	Memoir,	p.	310.	234	R.	M.	Burns,	The	Acceptable	Mean:	The	Tax	Rental	Agreements,	1941-1962.p.	154.	
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latter.”235	Provinces	that	did	not	play	ball	with	Ottawa	were	no	longer	penalized	for	the	assertion	of	their	autonomy.						The	social	activists	paid	virtually	no	attention	to	this	breakthrough	in	resolving	provincial	inequality.	Few	realized	what	equalization	had	accomplished.	Or,	if	they	did,	they	wanted	more	federal	money	for	the	provinces	anyway	–	and	they	would	link	that	demand	with	specific	social	spending.						It	was	almost	as	if	the	advocates	were	unaware	of	the	miracle	of	equalization	–	and	the	festering	problems	that	it	had	addressed.	That	was	an	irony	that	two	generations	of	beleaguered	politicians	and	bureaucrats	would	have	appreciated.			
Conclusion				Equalization	did	not	magically	unite	the	partners	in	the	Canadian	federation.	There	would	be	many	more	battles	ahead	among	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	over	provincial	autonomy,	fiscal	sharing	and	the	expansion	of	social	citizenship.	But	those	first	1957-1958	equalization	cheques,	which	totaled	$139-million,	including	a	$46.4-million	peace	offering	to	Quebec,	would	be	a	godsend	for	the	poorer	provinces.								The	new	transfer	program	commenced	as	the	tax-rental	agreements	for	1957-1962	reached	their	last	renewal.	All	provinces	signed	those	deals,	except	for	Ontario	and	Quebec;	Ontario	rented	only	its	personal	income	tax	but	it	was	unsatisfied	with	its	grant;	Quebec	stayed	out	of	this	last	post-war	pact	–	finally	without	penalty.	There	would	be	no	more	rental	deals.		
																																																								235	J.	Harvey	Perry,	A	Fiscal	History	of	Canada	–	The	Postwar	Years	(Toronto:	The	Canadian	Tax	Foundation,	1989)	p.	435.		
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					The	days	of	fiscal	centralization	were	creaking	to	an	end.	Now	nine	provinces,	including	British	Columbia,	were	cashing	non-conditional	cheques	based	upon	a	neutral	formula.	(Obviously,	since	British	Columbia	was	the	poorer	of	the	two	wealthiest	provinces,	it	received	a	relative	pittance	of	$5.5-million,	too.)	Poorer	provinces	could	count	on	regular	transfers	that	raised	their	revenues	to	the	per-capita	average	that	Ontario	and	British	Columbia	collected	from	personal	and	corporate	income	taxes	and	succession	duties.	It	worked.							The	vociferous	lobby	for	changes	in	provincial	fiscal	shares	has	continued	across	the	decades,	up	to	the	present	day.	But,	as	this	thesis	has	argued,	the	greatest	boost	for	Canadian	citizenship	and	national	unity	remains	the	equalization	program.	It	is	a	neutral	fiscal	mechanism,	which	must	be	carefully	adjusted	to	avoid	the	pitfalls	of	dependency	and	the	resentments	about	excess	generosity.	In	itself,	it	is	neither	good	nor	bad.	Its	formula	is	variable.	Its	operations	remain	obscure.	But,	without	it,	the	federation	could	not	have	endured.						Perhaps	the	best	summary	of	the	miracle	of	equalization	came	from	Prime	Minister	Lester	Pearson	who	recognized	that	sharing	had	brought	freedom	to	the	federation,	allowing	provincial	governments	to	devise	their	own	versions	of	specific	social	programs.	On	March	31,	1964,	he	told	the	First	Ministers	that	equalization	was	the	key	to	a	better	world.	He	spoke	in	government	jargon	–	but	he	captured	the	possibilities	on	the	eve	of	the	nation’s	centenary:		We	believe	that	in	the	past	shared-cost	programs	have	been	essential	to	remove	the	obstacles	created	by	the	uneven	fiscal	capacity	of	the	provinces	and	the	competing	demands	on	provincial	treasuries.	These	programs	have	made	an	essential	contribution,	I	believe,	to	the	economic	and	social	progress	of	Canada,	and	to	the	reduction	of	regional	unevenness	in	that	
	 	 	 	 	452	
progress.	However,	changing	conditions	–	including,	above	all,	the	
development	of	our	system	of	equalization	of	revenues	in	the	shared	
tax	fields	–	now	offer	us	more	alternatives	than	we	had	in	the	past.	It	is	appropriate,	therefore,	to	consider	whether	some	of	the	shared	programs	should	now	be	changed,	with	federal	withdrawal	and	a	full	assumption	of	provincial	responsibility.236							The	federation	had	not	solved	inequality.	It	would	always	walk	a	fine	line	between	doing	too	little	to	tackle	the	fundamental	social	and	economic	problems	in	the	poorer	provinces	–	and	fostering	dependency	among	governments	that	did	not	want	to	raise	taxes	in	case	they	lowered	their	equalization	benefits.	But	it	had	found	a	remedy	that	had	–	however	briefly	–	satisfied	(almost)	every	government.	And,	almost	unnoticed	at	the	time,	Pearson	had	attributed	the	evolution	of	social	security	to	this	unlovely	program	that	only	an	accountant	could	love.					The	federation	partners	now	had	their	fiscal	peace	treaty.													
																																																								236	Opening	Statement	of	Prime	Minister	Lester	B.	Pearson	at	the	Federal-Provincial	Conference	in	Quebec	City,	March	31-April	2,	1964.	Appendix	B,	Conditional	Grants	and	Shares	Cost	Programs,	in	Notes	on	Federal-Provincial	Plenary	Conference	at	Quebec	City,	March	31-	April	2,	1964,	LAC,	RG19,	Vol.	3884,	File	5515-04	(64/1)	-3.	p.	53.	My	italics.		
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Conclusion					Fiscal	inequality	can	destroy	federations.	The	richer	provinces	have	the	money	to	provide	better	services	while	imposing	lower	taxes.	The	poorer	provinces	struggle	to	fund	such	basic	services	as	education	and	health,	and	to	build	infrastructure.	They	keep	raising	taxes	–	but	they	can	seemingly	never	catch	up.	The	worm	of	jealousy	eats	into	their	politicians	and	their	voters.	They	blame	their	fellow	citizens	in	the	richer	states,	convinced	that	the	system	is	rigged	against	them.	They	claim	that	the	central	government	has	designed	everything	from	tariffs	to	taxes	to	thwart	their	economic	development	and	social	wellbeing.	They	see	a	wealthier	province	–	just	across	an	invisible	border	–	doing	so	much	better	that	the	contrast	can	be	visible,	even	in	road	quality,	whenever	they	travel	across	boundary	lines.	They	might	need	to	move	to	a	richer	province	to	improve	their	social	care.	It	is	a	recipe	for	a	national	break-up.							Equalization	is	sharing	with	a	wry	twist.	If	federations	do	not	share,	if	they	cannot	ease	the	fiscal	gaps	among	their	provinces	–	that	is,	the	difference	in	the	average	per-capita	amount	that	each	province	can	raise	from	key	taxes	–	they	may	not	survive.	In	theory,	federal	sharing	is	a	moral	act	of	generosity,	where	money	is	given	freely	to	a	fellow	human	being	or	to	a	provincial	government	as	a	right	of	social	citizenship.	Those	ideals	are	still	cited	as	a	legitimate	defence	for	Canada’s	huge	federal	transfer	program	of	equalization,	which	ensures	that	all	provinces	can	provide	relatively	equal	levels	of	services	for	relatively	equal	levels	of	taxation.	And	they	remain	the	foundational	ideal.		
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					But	the	reality	is	that	equalization	is	also	a	hardheaded	state-centred	bargain	that	ties	together	Ottawa	and	the	richer	and	the	poorer	provinces	in	a	skein	of	calculated	trade-offs.	The	formula	is	complex,	but	theoretically	beyond	any	federal	interference	for	political	reasons	that	would	tamper	with	payments	to	poorer	provincial	governments.	Provincial	treasurers	can	figure	out	their	annual	entitlements	–	and	they	can	usually	budget	for	several	years	ahead	because	the	amounts	remain	relatively	stable	and	stabilized.	The	federal	government	–	with	the	sometimes-grudging	consent	of	the	richer	provinces	–	hands	out	the	cash	to	the	poorer	provinces	that	it	collects	from	taxpayers	in	all	provinces.	But	it	cannot	tell	those	provinces	how	to	spend	the	money.	There	are	no	application	forms.	It	is	a	practical	system	that	is	designed	to	keep	the	peace.	And,	despite	mutual	resentments	among	the	poorer	and	the	richer	provinces,	it	has	largely	worked.					Indeed,	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent	and	his	government	pounced	on	equalization	in	1956	as	a	way	to	calm	the	tensions	within	the	federation,	especially	with	Quebec.	Ottawa	could	–	and	eventually	would	–	tinker	with	the	equalization	formula,	usually	to	cover	the	revenues	from	more	taxes.	But	it	was	sharing	without	the	messy	process	of	ad	hoc	handouts	that	had	prevailed	in	the	past.	There	were	few	complaints,	partly	because	few	Canadians	understood	the	system	–	or	grasped	its	pivotal	importance	in	the	funding	of	social	services	in	poorer	provinces.	There	were	few	compliments,	because	the	intricacies	of	equalization	were	even	a	mystery	to	many	ministers	in	federal	and	provincial	governments.	And	that	was	just	the	way	that	the	insiders	liked	it.		
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						But	equalization	has	saved	the	federation.	It	is	not	a	beloved	social	program	like	Medicare	or	an	obvious	economic	lifesaver	such	as	federal	transfers	for	post-secondary	education.	Instead,	it	pumps	funds	into	the	behind-the-scenes	operations	of	the	provincial	and	territorial	governments,	preserving	social	peace	and	national	unity,	bringing	equity	and	efficiency.	Its	arrival	was	a	pivotal	moment	in	nation-building	that	allowed	the	poorer	provinces	to	participate	in	the	expansion	of	social	programs	along	with	the	richer	provinces	–	because	they	finally	had	the	funds.	The	practical	benefit	was	that	each	province	pocketed	non-conditional	transfers,	which	came	without	application	forms,	boosting	their	bottom	lines.	The	principle,	which	was	embedded	in	the	Constitution	in	1982,	has	become	a	pivotal	fiscal	tie	that	binds	every	province	to	Ottawa	and	to	each	other.								This	thesis	has	traced	the	social	and	political	history	of	equalization,	chronicling	how	the	partner	governments	in	the	Canadian	federation	haggled,	fretted	and	feuded	over	inequality	for	ninety	years	before	they	endorsed	or	at	least	tolerated	the	federal	fiscal	mechanism	of	equalization.	Equalization	was	the	product	of	a	state-centred	approach	to	inequality	–	of	necessity	–	because	only	the	central	government	could	remedy	the	fiscal	inequalities	among	provincial	governments	within	the	Canadian	federation.	Indeed,	initially,	many	provincial	politicians	and	most	social	advocates	did	not	grasp	the	need	to	address	fiscal	inequality	among	provincial	governments	before	social	programs	could	expand.								As	a	consequence,	I	have	used	the	state-centred	approach	of	Canadian	political	scientist	Donald	Smiley	and	American	historian	Theda	Skocpol,	concentrating	on	
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key	politicians	and	administrators	“as	the	primary	focus	of	action.”	Those	politicians	and	bureaucrats	were	“actors	in	their	own	right,	enabled	and	constrained	by	the	political	organizations”	within	which	they	operated.1	As	I	have	shown,	Ottawa	bureaucrats	and	politicians	–	along	with	provincial	premiers	–	were	key	centres	of	power	–	and	they	were	pivotal	in	the	development	of	equalization.										But,	as	scholars	Richard	Simeon	and	Robin	Boadway	have	argued,	states	do	not	operate	in	a	vacuum.	During	the	post-war	years,	politicians	and	bureaucrats	became	increasingly	sensitive	to	the	lobbying	efforts	of	activist	groups,	especially	those	within	the	Rest	of	Canada,	for	better	social	security.	As	I	have	shown,	women’s	organizations	and	labour	unions	usually	concentrated	on	Ottawa	when	they	pleaded	for	the	expansion	of	social	care.	But	few	suggested	remedies	for	the	inability	of	the	poorer	provinces	to	fund	those	programs.	There	was	an	eerie	absence	of	concern	about	provincial	fiscal	inequalities:	civil	society	groups	wanted	progress	but	they	did	not	see	the	elephant	in	the	federal-provincial	room.								Their	pressure	eventually	prodded	Ottawa	into	easing	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	federation	members.	That,	in	turn,	allowed	all	provinces	to	expand	social	security.	But	most	activists	did	not	understand	the	connection.								Sharing	among	the	federal	and	provincial	governments	was	not	a	novelty.	From	Confederation,	Ottawa	had	provided	subsidies	to	all	provinces,	which	were	theoretically	equal	but	which	could	be	manipulated	to	put	extra	cash	in	the	pockets																																																									1	Theda	Skocpol,	Protecting	Soldiers	and	Mothers:	The	Political	Origins	of	Social	Policy	
in	the	United	States.	(Cambridge,	Massachusetts:	The	Belknap	Press	of	Harvard	University	Press,	1992)	41.	
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of	the	poorer	ones.	It	was	an	unsatisfactory,	often	slapdash	and	inherently	unfair	solution	for	inequality	–	if	only	because	the	extra	payments	were	minimal	and	the	decisions	were	ad	hoc.	Federal	politicians	could	manipulate	those	subsidies	at	will	–	as	they	did	when	they	offered	more	money	to	the	poorer	Maritime	Provinces	as	an	inducement	to	join	Confederation.							Meanwhile,	Ottawa	effectively	implemented	a	“systematic	consolidation	and	centralization	of	[fiscal]	power.”2	In	response,	the	poorer	provinces	blamed	the	very	act	of	federation	for	their	plight	–	and	demanded	special	subsidies	to	remedy	what	they	saw	as	their	inherently	unequal	fiscal	status	and	their	fiscal	needs.	Subsidies,	in	effect,	became	economic	and	political	acts	that	tacitly	addressed	fiscal	needs	to	a	limited	extent.								But	there	were	limits	to	Ottawa’s	fiscal	power.	The	richer	provinces	resented	Ottawa’s	largesse	with	their	taxpayers’	funds.	They	invoked	the	fiction	that	all	provinces	were	purportedly	equal	–	and	Ottawa	should	treat	them	equally	–	whenever	federal	subsidies	to	their	poorer	brethren	appeared	to	go	too	far.	Their	ire	was	a	formidable	weapon	that	curbed	lavish	transfers	–	and	restrained	overt	federal	bids	to	buy	popularity	with	flashy	announcements	in	the	poorer	provinces.							Ottawa	could	usually	maintain	a	temporary	peace.	But	the	Confederation	bargain	had	not	foreseen	the	diminution	in	the	value	of	the	fixed	subsidies	across	time,	the	loss	of	traditional	social	supports	from	churches	and	extended	family	for	people	in	difficult	circumstances,	and	the	growth	of	provincial	responsibilities.	By	the	late	1920s	and	into	the	1930s,	as	the	role	of	governments	in	Canadian	society	escalated																																																									2	E.	A.	Heamon,	Tax,	Order,	and	Good	Government:	A	New	Political	History	of	Canada,	
1867-1917	(Montreal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2017)	p.	460.	
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in	response	to	social	and	economic	needs,	Ottawa	resorted	to	special	federal	subsidies,	targeted	loans	and	specific	grants	to	placate	the	poorer	provinces,	preserving	their	fiscal	bottom	line,	allowing	them	to	provide	minimal	services	such	as	relief	for	their	struggling	citizenry.										Amid	the	iron	grip	of	the	Depression,	however,	it	was	difficult	to	maintain	this	federal	solution	for	the	federation’s	poorer	members.	Fiscal	inequality	among	the	provinces	was	a	state-centred	problem,	largely	aloof	from	the	concerns	of	many	Canadian	voters.	But,	as	basic	social	care	crumbled,	especially	in	the	poorer	Prairie	Provinces	and	the	Maritimes,	politicians	and	bureaucrats	realized	that	the	division	of	revenues	and	responsibilities	within	the	federation	was	not	working.	The	costs	of	relief	were	so	huge,	especially	within	the	poorer	provinces,	that	Ottawa	could	barely	hold	together	the	federation.						There	was	little	thought	of	adopting	a	neutral	program	with	a	transparent	formula	to	transfer	cash	to	the	poorer	provinces	–	and	there	was	not	enough	federal	money	to	do	much	more	anyway.		But	Ottawa	was	aware	in	the	mid-1930s	that	an	Australian	model	for	this	approach	existed.	Indeed,	as	I	have	shown,	Ottawa	kept	tabs	on	its	sister	federation	–	and	vice	versa	–	as	each	central	government	examined	how	the	other	handled	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	member	states.	Instead,	Ottawa	appointed	a	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	which	reported	in	wartime	in	1940.	It	urged	Ottawa	to	centralize	key	revenues	–	and	to	introduce	National	Adjustment	Grants	that	would	compensate	provinces	for	spending	in	key	social	and	economic	areas.		
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					When	three	provinces	rejected	that	proposal	in	January	1941,	Ottawa	unilaterally	centralized	the	key	revenues	of	income	taxes	and	succession	duties	–	and	sent	compensatory	grants	to	the	provinces,	which	were	minimally	equalized.	In	peacetime,	the	federal	government	fought	to	keep	control	of	those	revenues:	it	had	finally	embraced	the	Keynesian	notion	that	it	should	spend	during	economic	downturns	to	moderate	the	effects	and	to	stimulate	consumer	demand.	But	when	the	initial	tax-collection	agreement	expired	in	the	post-war	era,	Quebec	and	Ontario	refused	to	continue	this	centralization	of	revenues	–	and	Quebec	fiercely	defended	its	decision	on	constitutional	grounds.								Ottawa	could	not	retain	its	hold.	By	the	mid-1950s,	Quebec	was	furiously	resisting	Ottawa’s	fiscal	centralization	–	and	its	resulting	loss	of	federal	grants.	Meanwhile,	social	activists	were	putting	pressure	on	provincial	governments	and	Ottawa	to	expand	social	programs.	Ottawa	could	no	longer	ignore	the	danger	to	national	unity	that	the	five-year	tax	rental	deals	posed.	Nor	could	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	ignore	the	call	for	expanded	social	care.	But	the	fiscal	inequalities	among	the	provinces	were	huge:	the	poorer	ones	could	not	provide	better	social	security.							Equalization	was	the	belated	solution	to	this	dilemma.	In	1956,	Ottawa	adopted	its	program	of	unconditional	federal	transfers	to	the	poorer	provinces,	based	upon	their	ability	to	raise	key	revenues.	Thereafter,	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	were	able	to	introduce	programs	for	social	assistance,	hospital	care,	Medicare	and	post-secondary	education	funding.								I	have	argued	that	equalization	took	so	long	because	the	federal	government	and	the	provinces	were	embroiled	in	a	struggle	over	the	division	of	revenues	and	
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responsibilities	within	the	federation.	Ottawa	wanted	a	strong	central	government	with	control	over	the	lion’s	share	of	the	tax	revenues.	It	did	not	accept	or	even	understand	the	strength	of	provincial	rights,	particularly	in	Quebec,	which	wanted	to	protect	its	cultural	and	linguistic	responsibilities	through	control	of	its	own	tax	revenues.	Nor	did	Ottawa	understand	that	wealthier	provinces	such	as	Ontario	wanted	to	preserve	their	taxpayers’	revenues	for	their	purposes	–	and	they	objected	to	the	size	of	Ottawa’s	subsidies	to	their	poorer	kin.	Ottawa	did	not	even	fully	grasp	the	desire	of	most	provinces	to	design	and	administer	their	own	social	programs.								That	battle	reached	its	nadir	in	the	mid-1950s.	The	federal	government	had	a	choice:	It	could	continue	on	its	stubborn	path	to	centralize	revenues	and	possibly	destroy	the	federation	–	or	it	could	create	unconditional	grants	that	would	allow	the	provinces	to	fund	and	run	their	own	social	programs.	Commonsense	prevailed.	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent	pulled	back	from	the	brink	–	and	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis	accepted	the	eventual	compromise	of	unconditional	equalization.							In	turn,	richer	provinces	such	as	Ontario	and	poorer	provinces	such	as	New	Brunswick	grudgingly	accepted	the	bargain	–	although	the	federal	Liberals	would	pay	a	price	for	that	consent.	During	the	June	1957	election	campaign,	Ontario	Premier	Leslie	Frost	demanded	better	tax	abatements	for	his	province	and	extra	adjustment	grants	for	the	Maritimes.	Astonished	by	Frost’s	calculated	advocacy,	the	poorer	Maritime	Provinces	echoed	the	Ontario	Premier’s	call	for	extra	grants.	As	a	result,	“fiscal	concerns	became	a	key	battlefield	in	the	federal	election	called	for	June	
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1957.”3	The	unlikely	issue	of	provincial	fiscal	inequality	had	its	[brief]	moment	of	public	fame	–	and	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent	lost	the	election	to	Progressive	Conservative	John	Diefenbaker.					Today,	although	Ottawa	and	the	provinces	still	compete	for	control	over	revenues	and	responsibilities,	although	the	two	levels	of	government	still	squabble,	often	dangerously,	they	now	have	a	fiscal	tie	that	binds.										Federal	bureaucrats	and	politicians	–	and	some	remarkable	provincial	politicians	such	as	Manitoba	Premier	John	Bracken	and	Nova	Scotia	Premier	Angus	L.	Macdonald	–	had	been	well	aware	of	possible	state-centred	solutions	for	inequality	for	decades.	By	the	last	half	of	the	1920s,	Ottawa	understood	that	federations	in	the	20th	century	had	to	find	a	formal	remedy	for	fiscal	inequality	among	their	members	or	face	irreparable	strains.	In	particular,	Canadian	politicians	and	bureaucrats	established	close	ties	with	the	Australian	federation:	the	two	federations	chronicled	each	other’s	support	for	member	states	that	were	facing	bankruptcy	or	threatening	secession.	This	thesis	has	traced	that	deepening	bond	throughout	the	mid-to-late	1920s	and	into	the	1930s,	as	both	Canada	and	Australia	set	up	royal	commissions	to	probe	the	inequalities	that	had	driven	provincial	and	state	governments	to	profound	dissatisfaction	and	near-ruin	in	a	changing	economic	and	social	world.		
																																																								3	P.	E.	Bryden,	“The	Obligations	of	Federalism”	in	Framing	Canadian	Federalism,	eds.	Dimitry	Anastakis	and	P.	E.	Bryden,	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2009)	p.	87.			
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					The	ties	were	remarkable	–	and	no	one	in	Canada	or	Australia	has	explicitly	outlined	them.	I	have	chronicled	how	each	royal	commission	in	each	nation	began	to	cite	reports	from	its	sister	Dominion	in	its	scrutiny	of	inequality.	Those	Royal	Commission	hearings	were	informative	and	mutually	beneficial	exercises.	All	of	them	tackled	basic	questions.	Were	the	poorer	states	put	in	an	inferior	position	from	
the	start	through	the	very	structure	and	provisions	of	the	federation?	Should	central	governments	treat	their	members	as	fiscal	equals	in	the	distribution	of	subsidies,	or	should	they	work	to	ease	fiscal	inequality?	Did	central	governments	have	a	moral	and/or	practical	obligation	to	handle	ruinous	inequalities?	If	so,	what	should	they	do?						The	parallels	with	Australia	were	remarkable.	In	late	1924,	the	Commonwealth	Government	established	a	Royal	Commission	on	the	fiscal	predicament	of	Western	Australia.	The	ensuing	report	examined	the	operations	of	other	federations	such	as	Brazil	and	South	Africa,	cited	the	Canadian	approach	to	targeted	grants	and	Parliamentary	operations,	and	clumsily	dodged	demands	that	it	proclaim	the	very	act	of	federation	as	inherently	unfair.	It	did,	however,	call	for	special	grants	to	remedy	fiscal	inequalities	anyway.	In	1926,	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King	established	the	Duncan	Royal	Commission	on	the	Maritimes	in	response	to	bitter	complaints	about	high	freight	rates	and	threats	of	secession.	That	report,	which	was	tabled	in	December	1926,	also	refused	to	blame	the	mere	act	of	federation	for	the	region’s	plight	–	but	it	called	for	a	generous	lump-sum	increase	in	subsidies.							In	turn,	in	mid-1928,	the	Commonwealth	Government	requested	copies	of	the	Duncan	Royal	Commission	report,	and	promptly	established	its	own	Royal	
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Commission	into	the	plight	of	South	Australia.	That	report,	which	appeared	during	the	autumn	of	1929,	cited	Canadian	and	American	precedents:	In	particular,	it	quoted	the	Duncan	report,	which	had	refused	to	blame	the	inherent	disabilities	of	federation	for	the	Maritimes’	plight	but	which	called	for	compensation	for	inequality	
anyway	–	because	the	region	merited	sympathetic	treatment.						Four	months	later,	the	Australian	Parliamentary	Joint	Committee	of	Public	Accounts	probed	the	difficult	situation	in	the	impoverished	state	of	Tasmania.	That	committee	concluded	that	there	would	always	be	financial	inequalities	within	federations,	citing	the	examples	of	the	United	States,	South	Africa,	Germany	and	Canada.	It,	too,	quoted	from	the	Duncan	Commission,	urging	the	central	government	to	be	generous	and	fair	to	its	poorer	member	states.	And	it	called	for	the	creation	of	a	permanent	body	to	ensure	that	the	current	ad	hoc	payments	to	the	states	could	be	put	on	a	uniform	basis.							The	Depression-era	difficulties	in	both	countries	were	now	shaping	the	debate	about	inequalities	among	the	member-states.	In	April	1933,	the	residents	in	Western	Australia	voted	by	a	majority	of	two-to-one	to	secede.	In	response,	the	Commonwealth	Government	of	Australia	created	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	to	transfer	funds	to	the	poorer	states	–	that	is,	Tasmania,	South	Australia	and	Western	Australia.								Those	grants	were	based	upon	their	so-called	fiscal	need	–	which	the	Commission	calculated	through	investigations	into	their	spending	and,	in	a	minor	way,	their	revenues.	A	remarkable	Tasmanian-born	mathematician,	L.	F.	Giblin,	who	was	one	of	the	first	three	commissioners,	devised	a	somewhat	quirky	formula	to	
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determine	the	grants.		All	states	accepted	the	commission’s	decisions	because	it	operated	at	arm’s	length	from	the	central	government.	As	well,	the	formula	appeared	to	be	politically	neutral	–	and	Giblin	was	idolized.						Canadians	were	well	aware	of	Australia’s	activities.	Politicians	and	bureaucrats	kept	track	of	the	Australia	Commonwealth	Government’s	policies	across	many	ministries	such	as	immigration	and	the	approach	to	unemployment	–	and	the	interest	was	mutual.	The	Canadians	knew	that,	under	the	so-called	Premiers’	Plan	of	1931,	Australia	had	reduced	real	wages,	slashed	government	expenditures,	cut	interest	charges,	expanded	central	bank	credit	to	finance	deficits	and	loans	for	necessary	works,	and	depreciated	its	currency.						The	Bank	of	Canada,	which	was	established	in	1935,	carefully	studied	the	operations	of	the	Commonwealth	Bank	of	Australia,	which	had	held	central	bank	powers	since	the	mid-1920s.	They	also	examined	the	workings	of	the	Australian	Loan	Council:	under	an	agreement	in	1929,	the	Commonwealth	Government	had	taken	over	all	state	debts,	and	then	put	responsibility	for	all	future	federal	or	state	borrowings	under	the	Council.	Bank	of	Canada	officials	also	studied	the	annual	reports	of	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	–	thoroughly.						In	turn,	the	Australians	followed	multiple	federal	and	provincial	debates	and	activities	–	but	they	were	particularly	interested	in	the	increasingly	desperate	efforts	of	the	Western	provinces	during	the	1930s	to	obtain	federal	financing	to	back	their	bond	redemptions.	It	was	clear	that	the	Canadian	federal	system	was	not	working	and	ongoing	debt	service	well:	the	poorer	provinces	in	the	West	and	the	Maritimes	remained	dissatisfied	with	the	federal	assistance	that	they	deemed	to	be	
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their	moral	right;	the	richer	provinces	were	convinced	that	their	poorer	kin	were	becoming	dependent	on	federal	hand-outs	of	their	taxpayers’	dollars	at	a	time	when	every	provincial	government	was	hurting.											When	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King	finally	created	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations	in	February	1937,	commission	officials	asked	for	lengthy	reports	on	how	Australia,	along	with	other	federations	such	as	Argentina,	the	United	States,	tackled	fiscal	inequalities	among	their	member-states.	They	interviewed	multiple	witnesses	on	remedies	for	inequality,	including	the	redoubtable	Giblin,	who	explained	how	his	system	worked	–	and	how	it	might	or	might	not	work	in	Canada.	Other	witnesses,	including	Nova	Scotia	Premier	Angus	L.	Macdonald	and	Manitoba	Premier	John	Bracken	along	with	private	groups	such	as	the	Chamber	of	Commerce,	cited	the	Australian	Grants	Commission	as	an	example	that	Canada	should	emulate.						Indeed,	the	Royal	Commission’s	concentration	was	always	on	Australia,	if	only	because	the	two	federations	were	relatively	similar	in	terms	of	culture,	heritage,	economics	and	the	division	of	powers	–	although	the	central	government	had	more	revenues.	The	resulting	report	called	for	centralized	revenues	and	National	Adjustment	Grants	for	the	provinces	similar	to	the	Australian	approach	for	the	support	of	education	and	welfare	at	an	average	national	standard.	Such	revisions	in	revenues	and	responsibilities	would	have	entailed	radical	change	–	and	Prime	Minister	Mackenzie	King	shunned	the	approach.		
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					But	the	recommendation	did	provide	a	theoretical	foundation	for	Canadian	equalization	–	although	its	formula	would	be	radically	overhauled	in	the	different	world	of	federal-provincial	relations	that	would	prevail	only	seventeen	years	later.	In	effect,	the	report	made	a	breakthrough	with	its	embrace	of	the	idea	that	the	poorer	provinces	should	be	able	to	provide	social	services	that	were	roughly	comparable	to	those	in	richer	provinces	at	roughly	comparable	levels	of	taxation.								This	thesis	has	shown	how	the	federal	inclination	toward	revenue	centralization	became	increasingly	untenable	during	the	post-war	years	into	the	mid-1950s.	The	richer	provinces	–	Ontario	eventually	signed	a	second	tax-rental	deal	in	1952	–	demanded	increased	compensation	in	return	for	their	concessions.	Quebec	simply	refused	to	cooperate,	arguing	that	Ottawa	was	setting	precedents	that	could	affect	its	right	to	collect	key	revenues.							Ottawa,	in	turn,	played	its	relations	with	the	provinces	with	a	tin	ear.	Its	series	of	five-year	tax-rental	deals	centralized	income	tax	revenues	and	succession	duties	in	return	for	grants	that	included	a	small	but	tacit	degree	of	equalization	and	recognition	of	fiscal	need.	Quebec	would	not	sign	any	rental	agreements	–	and	forfeited	the	grant	money.	Ontario	was	off-and-on.	Other	provinces	played	hardball	over	the	size	of	their	compensatory	grants	and	tax	abatements.	By	now,	the	identities	of	the	richer	and	poorer	provinces	had	changed:	in	the	early	1870s,	British	Columbia	and	the	North-West	Territories	were	poor	relatives	–	actually	fiscal	burdens	–	on	the	wealthy	provinces	of	Ontario	and	Quebec.	By	the	mid-1950s,	British	Columbia	and	Ontario	were	wealthy,	Alberta	was	close	to	the	time	when	it	
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would	no	longer	qualify	for	equalization	(1965),	and	Quebec	was	a	recipient.	Atlantic	Canada	remained	in	fiscal	need.							Meanwhile,	the	pressures	for	expanded	social	citizenship	would	not	go	away.	National	advocacy	groups	and	key	provincial	premiers	such	as	Saskatchewan’s	Tommy	Douglas	kept	pushing	Ottawa	to	expand	the	social	envelope.	The	First	Ministers	discussed	national	programs	for	hospital	care	and	social	assistance	while	the	poorer	provinces	outlined	the	limits	of	their	financial	resources.	They	did	not	have	the	revenues	to	meet	their	existing	social	responsibilities,	let	alone	their	citizens’	often-eloquent	social	demands.								The	dilemma	became	intense.	But,	as	Canadians	redoubled	their	demands	for	expanded	social	security	during	the	two	decades	following	World	War	Two,	government	elites	as	“sites	of	autonomous	action”	had	to	“intersect	in	varied	ways	with	economic	and	social	transformations.”4	Those	elites	picked	their	way	between	the	treacherous	shoals	of	provincial	rights	such	as	language	and	culture,	particularly	in	Quebec,	and	the	forces	for	expanded	social	citizenship.							By	the	mid-1950s,	this	undertaking	became	ever	more	hazardous.	Some	poorer	provinces	wanted	Ottawa	to	introduce	key	social	and	economic	programs	unilaterally	–	out	of	its	own	tax	revenues;	many	provinces	wanted	Ottawa	to	transfer	cash	to	their	governments	so	that	they	could	extend	their	own	social	safety	net.	Advocacy	groups	–	for	women,	labour,	the	needy,	the	churches	and	educational	institutions	–	adopted	varying	suggestions	as	to	where	the	money	for	social	programs	should	come	from.	Business	groups	such	as	the	Canadian	Chamber	of																																																									4	Skocpol,	pps.	42,	39.	
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Commerce	could	slow	the	expansion	of	social	security	with	calls	for	budgetary	restraint	–	but	they	could	not	stop	it.						I	maintain	that	at	least	two	initial	conditions	for	reform	were	necessary.	One,	there	had	to	be	a	changing	of	the	guard	in	Ottawa:	Mackenzie	King	was	too	cautious	about	increased	federal	spending	–	and	exceedingly	wary	about	undertaking	projects	such	as	nationwide	hospital	care	that	might	set	Ottawa	on	a	collision	course	with	Quebec.								Two,	his	successor,	Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent,	had	to	change	his	approach.	St.	Laurent	had	spent	much	of	his	career	within	the	Ottawa	establishment,	absorbing	its	approach	to	federalism,	and	he	initially	adhered	to	the	mindset	of	continued	federal	fiscal	control.	Indeed,	Ottawa	politicians	and	bureaucrats	viewed	such	control	as	essential	to	preserve	the	federation	from	the	centrifugal	tug	of	provincial	governments,	especially	Quebec	with	its	fierce	defence	of	provincial	rights.	In	his	first	years	in	power,	St.	Laurent	transferred	funds	for	improvements	to	universities	directly		–	over	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis’s	vehement	objections.								By	the	mid-1950s,	such	approaches	could	not	continue.	The	dilemma	was	fraught.	Ottawa	could	not	barge	into	areas	of	provincial	jurisdiction	such	as	hospital	care	–	and	run	national	programs.	But	the	poorer	provinces	could	not	create	programs	that	were	roughly	similar	to	those	in	the	wealthier	provinces	without	extra	funding	or	impossible	levels	of	taxation.							St.	Laurent	was	uneasily	aware	of	the	need	to	maintain	good	relations	with	his	home	province.	He	was	also	uneasily	aware	that	the	tax	rental	agreements	–	which	Quebec	would	not	sign	–	were	penalizing	the	provincial	government	financially.	
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Eventually,	the	province	and	Ottawa	were	imposing	double	taxes	on	the	wealthiest	of	Quebec’s	citizenry.	St.	Laurent	had	to	broaden	his	outlook	to	see	the	federation	as	a	dynamic	and	evolving	entity.	When	the	war	of	words	between	the	Prime	Minister	and	the	Premier	escalated	dramatically,	St.	Laurent	backed	down.	He	decided	to	separate	the	grants	that	compensated	the	provinces	for	fiscal	need	from	the	tax	rental	deals.	In	January	1955,	St.	Laurent	settled	the	tax	dispute	with	Quebec	through	retroactive	payments	and	astute	adjustments	in	Ottawa’s	tax	rates.						A	few	days	later,	the	Prime	Minister	told	the	Premiers,	with	the	exception	of	Duplessis,	that	Ottawa	“had	no	intention	of	abandoning	the	objective	of	the	tax	rental	agreements	which	is	to	make	it	financially	possible	for	all	provinces,	whatever	their	tax	base,	to	perform	their	constitutional	functions	themselves	and	to	provide	a	reasonable	Canadian	level	of	provincial	services	without	an	abnormal	burden	of	taxation.	That	is	the	foundation	of	the	policy	of	the	federal	government.”5	In	effect,	the	dispute	with	Quebec	had	forced	St.	Laurent	to	look	for	a	better	way	to	handle	inequalities	among	the	provinces	–	without	centralizing	their	revenues.	The	tax-rental	deals	were	nearing	their	end.							This	thesis	has	shown	that	the	Prime	Minister	was	involved	in	this	settlement.	He	had	been	the	Francophone	Counsel	for	the	Royal	Commission	on	Dominion-Provincial	Relations,	which	had	devised	the	National	Adjustment	Grants.	He	now	worked	with	the	cabinet	and	Finance	Ministry	official	J.	J.	Deutsch	who	had	been	the	assistant	research	director	–	and	then	the	research	director	–	of	that	Royal	Commission.	Both	St.	Laurent	and	Deutsch	knew	about	the	Australian	model	of																																																									5	Letter	from	Louis	St.	Laurent	to	all	provincial	premiers	with	the	exception	of	Quebec	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis,	as	quoted	in	R.	M.	Burns,	p.	111-112.	
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using	“fiscal	need”	in	spending	as	a	gauge	for	remedying	inequality.	They	also	understood	the	Royal	Commission’s	model	of	National	Adjustment	Grants,	with	its	funds	for	key	social	services	and	infrastructure.	St.	Laurent	oversaw	the	search	for	formulas	as	the	chair	of	a	three-person	cabinet	committee	to	oversee	preparations	for	federal-provincial	talks.					Most	importantly,	the	federal	cabinet	received	new	studies	from	the	Finance	Ministry	on	the	Rowell-Sirois	adjustment	grants,	the	Commonwealth	Grants	Commission	and	other	models	such	as	the	United	States	approach	to	grants.	Month	after	month,	under	cabinet	scrutiny,	the	bureaucrats	hammered	out	an	equalization	scheme	that	St.	Laurent	presented	to	the	Premiers	during	the	first	week	of	October	in	1955.	The	Premiers	were	divided	about	the	wisdom	of	the	approach	–	the	poorer	Maritimes	wanted	more	money	from	Ottawa,	Ontario	wanted	Ottawa	to	send	less	money	to	them	–	but	no	Premier	was	furiously	opposed	to	the	principle.							In	February	1956,	St.	Laurent	outlined	the	proposal	–	and	how	those	unconditional	payments	would	work.	Unlike	the	Australian	model,	his	government	did	not	link	equalization	payments	with	provincial	spending.	Nor	did	it	link	the	size	of	the	grant	to	specific	provincial	spending,	as	the	Royal	Commission	had	advocated.	Instead,	equalization	would	compensate	provinces	for	inequalities	in	their	per-capita	average	capacity	to	raise	key	revenues.	The	First	Ministers’	Conference	on	March	9,	1956	sealed	the	deal,	despite	dissent.	The	poorer	provinces	still	wanted	more	money.	The	richer	provinces,	particularly	Ontario,	predicted	dire	outcomes	from	such	forced	generosity.	But	Ottawa	proceeded	with	the	necessary	legislation.	It	was	using	money	from	federal	taxpayers	–	and	no	province	could	block	the	deals.	
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					Equalization	was	non-conditional.	Provinces	did	not	have	to	apply.	They	could	spend	the	money	in	any	way	that	they	pleased.	In	the	beginning,	the	formula	was	relatively	straightforward:	It	was	based	upon	the	average	per-capita	collections	from	three	major	taxes	in	the	two	wealthiest	provinces	of	British	Columbia	and	Ontario.	All	provinces	were	then	brought	up	to	that	level,	which	included	a	payment	for	British	Columbia.						While	provincial	governments	would	later	lobby	endlessly	for	changes	in	the	formula	to	suit	their	needs,	they	were	free	from	Ottawa’s	heavy	hand	in	the	tax-rental	deals.	In	November	1957,	the	succeeding	Conservative	Government	re-opened	the	1957-1962	tax	rental	deals,	providing	adjustment	grants	to	the	hard-pressed	Atlantic	Provinces.	Ottawa	later	mollified	Ontario	by	providing	a	larger	share	of	1958-1959	personal	income	tax	revenues,	moving	the	rebate	from	10	to	13	per	cent.6						Historian	Penny	Bryden	notes	that	“a	coherent	system	of	equalization”	was	only	possible	when	“two	preconditions	were	met:	the	federal	government	began	to	tap	into	Ontario’s	rich	fiscal	capacity,	and	Ontario	agreed	on	a	political	level	to	this	form	of	redistribution.	When	those	two	prerequisites	had	been	fulfilled,	in	the	late	1950s,	Canada	was	able	to	embark	on	a	course	of	development	that	would	leave	commentators	at	century’s	end	heralding	equalizing.”7	In	effect,	the	Ontario	
																																																								6	Robert	Bothwell,	Ian	M.	Drummond,	John	English,	Canada	Since	1945:	Power,	
Politics,	and	Provincialism	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1981)	p.	237.		7	P.	E.	Bryden,	“The	Obligations	of	Federalism”	in	Framing	Canadian	Federalism,	eds.	Dimitry	Anastakis	and	P.	E.	Bryden	(Toronto,	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2009)	p.	76.	Bryden	does	not	note	Ontario’s	increased	share	of	PIT.			
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economy	had	to	generate	more	wealth	for	Ottawa	–	and	for	the	provincial	government	–	before	such	formal	sharing	became	acceptable	to	all.							Bryden’s	argument	certainly	accounts	for	part	of	the	delay	in	the	implementation	of	equalization.	But	there	were	other	factors	behind	the	twelve-year	post-war	delay	in	equalization	than	the	improvement	in	the	Ontario	and	federal	fiscal	position.	The	Canadian	federation	is	unusually	complicated:	It	encompasses	a	tacit	pact	between	the	two	nations	of	Francophones	and	Anglophones.	(Although	most	French-speaking	Canadians	were	in	Quebec,	the	population	also	included	Acadians	sprinkled	through	the	Maritimes	and	the	Métis	in	Manitoba.)	When	Ottawa	emphasized	the	importance	of	maintaining	its	traditional	control	over	its	revenues,	Quebec	with	its	majority	francophone	population	resisted	wholeheartedly,	citing	its	constitutional	rights	to	its	revenues	and	its	implicit	position	as	the	special	defender	of	Francophones	within	the	federation.						It	was	a	dangerously	prolonged	impasse.	The	grants	to	the	poorer	provinces	were	small.	Ottawa	could	not	fight	Quebec	forever:	Quebec	was	losing	those	compensatory	grants.	The	perils	from	discriminating	against	a	key	federal	partner	were	too	strong.	By	the	mid-1950s,	as	the	third	post-war	deal	came	up	for	discussion,	Ottawa	had	to	change	course.	Caught	between	the	pressure	to	expand	nationwide	social	programs	and	the	refusal	of	Quebec	to	go	along	with	its	ongoing	schemes	to	centralize	revenues,	the	federal	government	had	to	yield.															Equalization	was	a	deft	state-centred	compromise.	Fiscal	disparities	among	states	can	create	regional	identities	that	become	bred	in	the	bone,	instilling	
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expectations	and	resentments	in	the	minds	of	succeeding	generations.	They	can	imperil	the	hegemony	of	politicians	and	their	most	senior	civil	servants.	They	can	disrupt	economic	efficiency	and	equity	–	if	only	because	populations	in	poorer	regions	can	receive	inferior	standards	of	services	that	ill-prepare	them	for	their	social	and	economic	world	or	they	can	move	to	another	province	for	better	care.						The	precise	reasons	for	inequality	may	only	capture	the	attention	of	the	initiates	–	those	politicians	and	civil	servants	within	the	inner	circles	of	government	finance.	But	the	discourse	of	inequality	can	seep	throughout	the	federation,	arousing	envy	within	the	poorer	provinces	and	acrimony	within	the	wealthier	provinces.	If	a	nation-state	is	the	geographic	area	over	which	citizens	are	prepared	to	share	–	to	paraphrase	sociologist	Raymond	Breton	–	then	the	vitality	of	the	equalization	program	is	an	important	indicator	of	social	cohesion	within	the	nation-state.						The	introduction	of	equalization	heralded	the	arrival	of	new	social	programs.	In	July	1956,	before	the	first	equalization	cheques	were	in	the	mail,	Ottawa	agreed	to	pick	up	the	tab	for	a	portion	of	provincial	social	assistance	for	those	who	had	exhausted	their	Unemployment	Insurance	benefits.	In	mid-April	1957,	Ottawa	agreed	to	fund	fifty	per	cent	of	the	costs	of	a	specific	set	of	provincial	hospital	and	diagnostic	services.	The	plan	would	take	effect	on	July	1,	1958	–	if	six	provinces	representing	a	majority	of	Canadians	agreed	to	participate.	A	few	days	later,	six	provinces	signed	up	–	and	hospital	care	coverage	commenced	on	July	1,	1958.						By	the	1960s,	Ottawa	was	applying	the	principle	of	equalization	with	more	imagination.	It	transferred	tax	points	to	the	provinces	–	that	is,	it	allowed	the	provinces	to	occupy	tax	room	that	it	had	vacated	–	and	then	it	ensured	that	
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provincial	revenue	from	those	tax	points	was	equalized.	In	1964,	after	four	years	of	fierce	Quebec	resistance,	Ottawa	established	a	so-called	interim	agreement	on	specific	shared-cost	programs:	this	pivotal	arrangement	allowed	the	provinces	to	opt	out	of	social	programs	and	finance	their	own	plans	in	exchange	for	a	tax	abatement,	an	equalization	payment	to	bring	the	province	up	to	what	it	would	have	
received,	and	an	operating	cost	adjustment.							There	were	more	innovations.	In	1966,	Ottawa	introduced	the	formal	Canada	Assistance	Plan,	which	picked	up	half	of	the	costs	of	social	assistance	benefits	and	services.	That	same	year,	Ottawa	passed	the	innovative	Medical	Care	Insurance	Act,	which	initially	paid	fifty	per	cent	of	the	national	average	costs	for	physicians’	services	on	an	equal	per-capita	basis.	By	1972,	all	provinces	had	embraced	Medicare.	In	1967,	Ottawa	introduced	a	cost-sharing	agreement	on	post-secondary	education:	provincial	governments	could	accept	fifty	per	cent	of	the	operating	costs	of	such	institutions	or	a	specific	per-capita	amount.							In	effect,	equalization	was	the	key	to	another	quiet	revolution.	Indeed,	it	was	an	almost	unnoticed	revolution.	But,	without	this	transfer	program,	the	social	security	network	could	not	have	expanded.	By	the	mids-1960s,	equalization	was	vital	to	national	unity	as	the	fiscal	tie	that	bound	the	provinces	to	the	nation-state.	The	wealthier	provinces	could	count	on	equalization	as	a	back-up	plan	if	their	fortunes	changed.	(Ontario	briefly	qualified	in	the	late	1970s	–	and	it	is	a	recipient	province	in	the	21st	century.)	The	poorer	provinces	could	provide	relatively	similar	levels	of	services	for	relatively	similar	levels	of	taxation.		
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					I	do	not	claim	that	the	equalization	mechanism	is	perfect.	It	is	an	adjustable	fiscal	creation,	neither	inherently	good	nor	bad.	But	it	is	immensely	useful.	It	remains	vital.	Poorer	provinces	may	flirt	with	dependency.	(Fiscal	analysts	have	wondered	aloud	if	New	Brunswick	has	rejected	fracking	because	it	is	politically	easier	to	pocket	equalization	than	to	earn	those	controversial	resource	revenues.)8	Richer	provincial	governments	have	slipped	into	bouts	of	resentment.	But	somehow	the	power	of	non-conditional	sharing	has	pulled	us	through.					Those	annual	transfers	may	have	become	part	of	the	federal-provincial	wallpaper.	But	Canada	would	not	last	without	them.																																																																									8	Ben	Eisen	and	Mark	Milke,	Nova	Scotia,	New	Brunswick,	and	the	Equalization	Policy	
Crutch	(Vancouver	and	Halifax:	Fraser	Institute	and	Atlantic	Institute	for	Market	Studies,	2014)	https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/nova-scotia-new-brunswick-and-the-equalization-policy-crutch-rev2.pdf		
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